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Recent Decisions:
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Permitting Injustice by Applying the One Satisfaction Rule to a
Subsequent Medical Malpractice Claim
In Underwood-Gary v. Mathews,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland
considered whether a plaintiff who reaches an agreement and marks a
judgment as satisfied against one tortfeasor is thereinafter prohibited
from bringing a second action against additional alleged tortfeasors
for the same harm. 2 The court affirmed the Court of Special Appeals'
decision, holding that satisfaction of the underlying case excluded the
petitioner, Rita Underwood-Gary, from pursuing subsequent claims
against her treating physicians, Dr. Mathews and Dr. Yousaf, in a sub-
sequent medical malpractice action.3 The Underwood-Gary court's de-
cision is inconsistent with prior Court of Appeals' decisions, which
have held that a treating physician, as a subsequent tortfeasor, is not
released from liability following a satisfaction or release in an underly-
ing case.4 While the outcome in Underwood-Gary may be fair from a
public policy standpoint, in that injured parties should only be com-
pensated once for the same harm, the court should have reviewed the
jury's allotment of damages in the underlying suit to ensure that all
harms were indeed compensated. The drastic difference in the
amount of damages awarded in the underlying automobile accident
case and the present medical malpractice action indicates the possibil-
ity that different injuries were compensated in the two cases. In fail-
ing to reassess the damages awarded in the underlying case, the court
perpetuated injustice to an injured party and prematurely released a
subsequent tortfeasor from liability.
1. 366 Md. 660, 785 A.2d 708 (2001).
2. Id. at 662, 785 A. 2d at 709.
3. Id. at 673-75, 785 A.2d at 716-17. A satisfaction of ajudgment is "an acceptance of
full compensation for the injury." Morgan v. Cohen, 309 Md. 304, 312, 523 A.2d 1003,
1007 (1987) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court declined to
consider the issue of judicial estoppel, simply stating that the idea that Underwood-Gary
intended to mislead the court in any way was not at issue in this case. Underwood-Gay, 366
Md. at 667 n.6, 785 A.2d at 712 n.6.
4. See infra notes 111-118, 126-129 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland cases
that have held that ajudgment or release does not bar a subsequent damages award from a
treating physician).
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1. The Case.--On July 10, 1991, Rita Underwood-Gary was in-
volved in an automobile accident with Marie Thompson in Charles
County, Maryland.5 In August 1991, after experiencing severe lower
back pain following the accident, Underwood-Gary sought treatment
from Dr. Shaheer Yousaf, an orthopedic surgeon.6 Over the next
seven months, Dr. Yousaf treated Underwood-Gary, but her back pain
did not subside.7 Dr. Yousaf concluded that Underwood-Gary suf-
fered an injury to the soft tissue and the facetjoint in her back and he
indicated that surgery might be necessary to relieve her pain.8 Dr.
Yousaf referred Underwood-Gary to a neurosurgeon, Dr. George J.
Mathews, for a second opinion.9 After meeting with Underwood-Gary
and evaluating her prior medical treatment, Dr. Mathews agreed with
Dr. Yousafs diagnosis of Underwood-Gary's injuries and also sug-
gested back surgery."0 With the assistance of Dr. Dadgar, a vascular
and thoracic surgeon, Drs. Yousaf and Mathews performed back sur-
gery on Underwood-Gary on May 20, 1992.11
a. The Underlying Lawsuit Against Marie Thompson.-Approxi-
mately one year after her accident, on July 22, 1992, Underwood-Gary
filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Charles County against
Marie Thompson. 12 In her complaint, Underwood-Gary alleged that
Thompson caused the collision by negligently operating her vehicle.13
Underwood-Gary further alleged that she had sustained "serious, pain-
ful and permanent" injury to her head, back, hip, and neck as well as
to other parts of her body.'4 She sought recovery for these injuries. 5
She also asked for additional damages for her back surgery, loss of
income, loss of earning power, and loss of enjoyment of life. 6 On
October 18, 1993, when Underwood-Gary took the de bene esse deposi-
tion 7 of defense witness Dr. Kevin Hanley, she became aware of
Thompson's unnecessary surgery defense;' 8 she was put on notice that
5. Underwood-Gary, 366 Md. at 663, 785 A.2d at 709-710.











17. A de bene esse deposition is a deposition taken from a witness who will likely be
unable to attend a scheduled trial or hearing. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
18. Underwood-Gary, 366 Md. at 664, 785 A.2d at 710.
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Thompson's defense incorporated the assertion that Underwood-
Gary's back surgery was unwarranted.
Underwood-Gary's case against Thompson advanced to jury trial
on October 27, 1993."9 While testifying, Underwood-Gary detailed
her complete course of therapy and treatment after the accident.
2 0
She also described the pain and physical limitations she suffered both
before and after the surgery.2 ' All of the medical bills relevant to the
treatment by Drs. Yousaf and Mathews, including the bills for the sur-
gery and the hospital stay, were admitted into evidence. 2 2 In addition,
Underwood-Gary presented evidence indicating that she was thirty
percent permanently disabled as a result of the accident and the sur-
gery.23 During her case-in-chief, Underwood-Gary called Drs. Yousaf
and Mathews, who testified that her back surgery was necessary based
on indications and that the surgery was related to the accident caused
by Thompson. 24  Overall, Underwood-Gary claimed $38,195.28 in
medical expenses, plus $250,000.00 for pain and suffering. 25 In her
defense, Thompson presented evidence that Underwood-Gary's sur-
gery was unnecessary because she suffered from a soft tissue injury,
not a facet joint injury.2 6
The jury decided in favor of Underwood-Gary, finding Thompson
negligent, and further determining that Underwood-Gary endured in-
juries as a result of the accident.2 The jury awarded Underwood-Gary
damages in the amount of $8337-$9087 for medical expenses and
$750 for lost wages .28 Thejury awarded no damages for pain and suf-
fering.29 On the verdict sheet, there were no questions requiring the
jury to indicate whether it was convinced that Underwood-Gary's back
surgery was necessary or whether Underwood-Gary's claimed injuries
to her vertebral facets as opposed to her soft tissue resulted from the
collision with Thompson's vehicle.30 Underwood-Gary appealed to
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 665, 785 A.2d at 710.
22. Id. at 664, 785 A.2d at 710.
23. Id. at 665, 785 A.2d at 710.
24. Id., 785 A.2d at 711. After seven months of unsuccessful treatment of Underwood-
Gary, Dr. Yousaf presumed that Underwood-Gary had injuries to the soft tissue and facet
joint of her lower back, and suggested that surgery might be necessary to alleviate Under-
wood-Gary's pain. Id. at 663, 785 A.2d at 710.
25. Id. at 664-65, 785 A.2d at 710.
26. Id. at 665, 785 A.2d at 711.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 665-66, 785 A.2d at 711.
29. Id. at 665, 785 A.2d at 711.
30. Id. at 666 n.4, 785 A.2d at 711 n.4.
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the Court of Special Appeals but settled the case for the policy limits
of $20,000 while the appeal was still pending.3 An order of satisfac-
tion was entered, and the appeal was dismissed by the circuit court on
May 15, 1993.32
b. The Subsequent Lawsuit Against Drs. Yousaf and Mathews. -
About one week following the order of satisfaction entered in the
Thompson case, Underwood-Gary filed a complaint in the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County against Drs. Yousaf and Mathews.
The complaint alleged negligence because Underwood-Gary had
none of the accepted indications for surgery and therefore it was not
necessary. 3 Before trial, both doctors filed motions for summary
judgment, contending that Underwood-Gary's action was barred by
the doctrines of collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, and satisfac-
tion.34 All of these motions were denied by the court and the case
proceeded to trial.35 At trial, Underwood-Gary provided evidence that
the doctors did not meet the standard of care regarding the decision
to operate and contended that the surgery was unnecessary. 6 The
trial court instructed the jury that "the only issue in the case is
whether the surgical treatment was negligent or not. ''3 After deliber-
ating, the jury returned a verdict for Underwood-Gary for
$437,073.69.38 The doctors' post-trial summary judgment motions ar-
guing that Underwood-Gary's actions were barred byjudicial estoppel,
collateral estoppel and satisfaction were denied, and they subse-
quently filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. 9 On
the grounds that the claim was barred by the doctrine of judicial es-
31. Id., 785 A.2d at 711.
32. Id.




36. Id. In order to establish a claim for negligence under Maryland law, a party must
prove four elements: 1) that the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury,
2) that the defendant breached that duty, 3) that actual injury or loss was suffered by the
plaintiff, and 4) that the loss or injury was a proximate result from the defendant's breach
of duty. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., 366 Md. 29, 85, 782 A.2d 807, 841
(2001). Thus, failing to meet the standard of care satisfies one element of negligence. Id.
In their defense, the doctors asserted that the surgery was necessary. Underwood-Gary, 366
Md. at 666, 785 A.2d at 711. Despite several months of treatment on her lower back follow-
ing the accident, Underwood-Gary's pain persisted. Therefore, Dr. Yousaf, with the con-
curring opinion of Dr. Mathews, explained to Underwood-Gary that surgery might be
necessary to relieve her pain. Id. at 663, 785 A.2d at 710.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 666, 785 A.2d at 712.
39. Id. at 666-67, 785 A.2d at 712.
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toppel and the one satisfaction rule, the Court of Special Appeals re-
versed the judgment." The court held that Underwood-Gary's
assertion that her surgery was unnecessary directly contradicted her
prior affirmation that the surgery was necessary.41 Because Under-
wood-Gary chose to argue that her surgery was necessary in the under-
lying case, she could not thereafter argue the opposite.42
Additionally, the court found that "no reasonable trier of fact could
find that [Underwood-Gary] did not seek compensation for her sur-
gery from the Charles County jury."4 Therefore, Underwood-Gary's
settlement of the underlying case included "satisfaction" for her
surgery.44
2. Legal Background.-For years, courts have attempted to distin-
guish between jointly liable concurrent or successive tortfeasors and
true joint tortfeasors at common law.45 At the same time, courts have
addressed the associated procedural rules.46 Additionally, courts have
tried to differentiate between the notions of release of a claim and
satisfaction of a claim.4" Unfortunately, these endeavors have often
led to confusion as to when the one satisfaction rule or the one com-
pensation rule is applied. 48 The one satisfaction rule stems from the
general principle ofjudicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel is designed to
prevent a party from taking a position in one court proceeding and
then taking a contrary position in a second case.49 The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland has reasoned that judicial estoppel preserves the
"integrity of the judicial process" by prohibiting parties from inten-
tionally shifting positions in the course of litigation.5 ° In the past four
decades, Maryland courts have decided several cases that have
stemmed from prior litigation. In addition to issues of judicial estop-
pel and one satisfaction, the courts have addressed the distinction be-
tween a satisfaction and a release and have explained the common law
40. Id. at 667, 785 A.2d at 712.
41. Mathews v. Gary, 133 Md. App. 570, 580, 758 A.2d 1019, 1024 (2000).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 581, 758 A.2d at 1025.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Morgan v. Cohen, 309 Md. 304, 311, 523 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1987).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 314-15, 523 A.2d at 1007-08.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Gordon v. Posner, 142 Md. App. 379, 424, 790 A.2d 675, 689-90 (2002);
Roane v. Washington County Hosp., 137 Md. App. 582, 592, 769 A.2d 263, cert. denied, 364
Md. 463, 773 A.2d 514 (2001); Winmark Ltd. P'ship v. Miles & Stockbridge, 345 Md. 614,
620-21, 693 A.2d 824, 827 (1997).
50. Gordon, 142 Md. App. at 425, 790 A.2d at 690 (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine,
532 U.S. 742 (2001)).
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understanding of a joint tortfeasor; however, confusion remains as to
the preclusive effect of an order of satisfaction.51
a. Judicial Estoppel.-Maryland courts, and courts of other
jurisdictions, have long recognized the principle of judicial estoppel
where there was an underlying lawsuit followed by a malpractice
claim.5 2 Like the one satisfaction rule, judicial estoppel is an equita-
ble doctrine applied by the court on a discretionary basis. 53 The doc-
trine of judicial estoppel provides that "a party is bound by his judicial
declarations and may not contradict them in a subsequent proceeding
involving [the] same issues and parties. 54
In the 1938 case, Kramer v. Globe Brewing Co.,55 the corporate de-
fendant first took the position that Kramer was not employed by their
company at the time he filed his workers' compensation suit, but later
asserted the opposite in an effort to have the case dismissed. 56 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that after a party has taken a par-
ticular position in the course of litigation, that party must maintain
consistency, unless mistake was encouraged by the opposing party.57
Through its reasoning, the court explained that a party cannot
change its position in a subsequent lawsuit unless it is somehow co-
erced into believing a mistake was made.58 It was clear in Kramer that
the corporate defendant changed its positions intentionally and for
the sole purpose of dismissing the underlying suit; thus, the corpora-
tion was estopped from doing so.51
51. Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. 111, 116-17 n.4, 166 A.2d 892, 895 n.4 (1961) (stat-
ing that "[a] satisfaction is an acceptance of full compensation for the injury; a release is a
surrender of the cause of action, which may be gratuitous, or given for inadequate consid-
eration"); Morgan, 309 Md. at 311, 523 A.2d at 1006 (explaining that, at common law, early
'joint tortfeasor' cases applied solely to defendants who acted together, allowing a judg-
ment against one tortfeasor to excuse the rest).
52. See Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 164 F. Supp. 503, 506 (D. Md.
1958) (noting that previous positions taken by plaintiffs did not estop them from bringing
the current lawsuit); see also Pittman v. Ad. Realty Co., 359 Md. 513, 529 n.9, 754 A.2d 1030,
1038-39 n.9 (2000) (stating that "[t]he application ofjudicial estoppel requires: (1) the
assertion of a factual position inconsistent with that taken in prior litigation; (2) that the
prior inconsistent position must have been accepted by the court; and (3) that the party
sought to be estopped must intentionally have misled the court to gain unfair advantage")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Brief for Appellant at 9, Underwood-Gary (No. 107).
54. BLACK's LAw DiCYIoNARy 848 (6th ed. 1990).
55. 175 Md. 461, 2 A.2d 634 (1938).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 469, 2 A.2d at 637.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 469-70, 2 A.2d at 637.
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In Konstantinidis v. Chen,6 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the issues of good faith mis-
takes and judicial estoppel.6 After bringing a workers' compensation
claim for damages that he alleged were solely the result of his work-
related accident, Konstantinidis brought suit for medical malpractice
against his treating doctor for basically the same damages.6 2 In the
underlying suit, Konstantinidis received a $20,000 settlement from his
employer and his employer's insurer before the circuit court acted
and, in return, executed a final compromise and release, which was
approved by the Workers' Compensation Commission.6 3 Subse-
quently, in a suit against the treating physician for medical malprac-
tice, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
doctor.6" Under the theory of judicial estoppel, the court found that
because Konstantinidis' past contentions were that his work-related ac-
cident was the sole cause of his arm, back, and neck pain,6 5 summary
judgment for the doctor was appropriate. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the grant of sum-
mary judgment, stating that even if judicial estoppel were recognized
by the District of Columbia, which it was not, judicial estoppel would
not apply to the facts of this malpractice action because, among other
reasons, Konstantinidis' prior position was a mistake made in good
faith.6
6
In a case decided six years later, Horger v. New York University Medi-
cal Center,6 7 the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action for un-
necessary surgery after he sued his employer for injuries due to
negligence. 6' The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York held that no precedent existed where judicial estop-
pel was used to keep a litigant from taking a different position than
one asserted previously against a party whose testimony they had re-
60. 626 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
61. Id. at 935.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 935-36.
64. Id. at 936.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 939. The court expanded its discussion by asserting that "U]urisdictions rec-
ognizing judicial estoppel also refuse to apply the doctrine when the prior position was
taken because of a good faith mistake rather than as part of a scheme to mislead the
court." Id. The court further noted that "the rule looks toward cold manipulation and not
unthinking or confused blunder, [and] it has never been applied where plaintiff's asser-
tions were based on fraud, inadvertence, or mistake." Id. (citation omitted).
67. 642 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
68. Id. at 976.
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lied on in good faith.6 9 Therefore, the court stated thatjudicial estop-
pel would not apply to a subsequent lawsuit against parties who acted
as experts in an underlying case.
Recently, in Pittman v. Atlantic Realty Co., 70 the Court of Appeals
of Maryland discussed the application of judicial estoppel, maintain-
ing that judicial estoppel requires: "(1) the assertion of a factual posi-
tion inconsistent with that taken in prior litigation; (2) that the prior
inconsistent position must have been accepted by the court; and (3)
that the party sought to be estopped must intentionally have misled
the court to gain unfair advantage. ' '7' The issue in Pittman centered
around the discretion of the trial court in striking affidavits presented
after the expiration of the discovery deadline, when the facts in those
affidavits differed from facts previously disclosed by the non-moving
party during discovery.7 2 According to the court, the rules governing
summary judgment authorize the filing of a factually inconsistent affi-
davit if it is in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, as was
the case here.73 While the Pittman court recognized the applicability
of judicial estoppel in the summary judgment context, it found that
judicial estoppel was inapplicable since the intent of the parties was
not to mislead the court.7 1 Pittman and the prior cases demonstrate
that Maryland and other courts use judicial estoppel when a plaintiff
misleads the court in an attempt to recover double damages, and that
the doctrine is designed "to protect the court, not the parties, from
false, frivolous, and misleading allegations in judicial proceedings. '7 5
b. The One Satisfaction Rule.--The one satisfaction rule dates
back to at least 1600, when English courts developed a standard that a
plaintiff could only receive one compensation for a loss suffered, and
that once the claim was satisfied, even by a third party, the claim was
prevented from being enforced further.76 This rule was intended to
69. Id. at 981.
70. 359 Md. 513, 754 A.2d 1030 (2000).
71. Id. at 529 n.9, 754 A.2d at 1038 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1998)).
72. Id. at 517, 754 A.2d at 1032.
73. Id. at 534, 754 A.2d at 1041.
74. Id. at 531 n.9, 754 A.2d at 1039 n.9.
75. Wilson v. Stanbury, 118 Md. App. 209, 214, 702 A.2d 436, 438 (1997) (emphasis
omitted).
76. Brown v. Ubotton, 79 Eng. Rep. 62 (1600); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 48 (5th ed. 1984). See also id. (rev. 5th ed. Supp. 1988)
(indicating cases where settlements occurred and those satisfactions discharged the liabil-
ity of another tortfeasor against whom a separate suit was pending, thereby fulfilling the
rule that an injured party is only entitled to full recovery once).
[VOL. 62:657
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be equitable in nature, purporting to prevent unjust enrichment. 77
The rule applies not only to joint tortfeasors, but "also to concurrent
tortfeasors not acting in concert, or even to payments made by parties
who have no connection with the tort at all."78 In Lanasa v. Beggs, 79
the Court of Appeals of Maryland discussed the idea of one satisfac-
tion in detail, stating that after accepting full satisfaction for injuries,
regardless of the source of the award, the plaintiff is unable to recover
again for the same damages.8 0 The Lanasa court explained that it
would be unlawful for there to be more than one satisfaction for the
same injury, regardless of whether that injury was inflicted by one or
more people.81
Nearly six decades later, in Hartlove v. BEDCO Mobility, Inc.,8" the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland elaborated further on the one
satisfaction rule by describing when the one satisfaction rule applies.83
The court explained that, to the best of its knowledge, the one satis-
faction rule pertains to cases in which a plaintiff "has ... recovered a
judgment against one of several tortfeasors who, allegedly, caused or
contributed to a single, particular harm, and ... has received satisfac-
tion of that judgment."84 In its discussion, the court reasoned that a
plaintiff is not necessarily "made whole" simply by settling with one of
several joint or concurrent tortfeasors; rather, a plaintiff may pursue
each tortfeasor individually to collect as much in damages as possible
until ajudgment is rendered.85 Thus, the one satisfaction rule applies
on a case-by-case basis to situations involving joint tortfeasors.86
c. Joint Versus Subsequent Tortfeasors in Medical Malpractice Ac-
tions.-In establishing whether the one satisfaction rule applies, two
issues generally must be addressed, the first of which is the determina-
77. KEETON ET AL., supra note 76.
78. Id.
79. 159 Md. 311, 151 A. 21 (1930) (explaining that "[when] the plaintiff has accepted
satisfaction in full for the injury done him, from whatever sources it may come, he is so far
affected in equity and good conscience, that the law will not permit him to recover again
for the same damages").
80. Id. at 320, 151 A. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id.
82. 72 Md. App. 208, 527 A.2d 1342 (1987).
83. Id. at 212, 527 A.2d at 1344.
84. Id. In the context of a single harm, a plaintiff is prohibited from pursuing subse-
quent suits against additional tortfeasors because the plaintiff has already been fully com-
pensated for his injury. Id.
85. Id. at 213, 527 A.2d at 1344.
86. See, e.g., Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 474 (D.
Md. 2000) (discussing how the one satisfaction rule is universally recognized and applies in
cases where a plaintiff settles with one of several joint tortfeasors).
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tion ofjoint versus subsequent tortfeasor status."' Courts have contin-
uously recognized the difficulty in assessing whether an individual
who first causes a harm and a physician who later aggravates the harm
should serve as joint or subsequent torffeasors88 While no Maryland
case law prior to the early 1960s directly addresses this issue, the deci-
sions of several other states were influential in determining subse-
quent Maryland cases. In one such case, Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros.,89 the
Court of Appeals of New York explained the relationship between an
initial tortfeasor and a physician who later aggravates the injury.9"
The Parchefsky court stated that a person who injures another negli-
gently should not be considered a joint tortfeasor with a physician
who subsequently worsens the original injury.9 In its reasoning, the
court explained that the physician's malpractice is combined with the
original injury, thereby making them concurrent causes of the end
result.92 Thus, although the actions of the tortfeasors are indepen-
dent of one another, the position of the two negligent actors essen-
tially becomes analogous to joint tortfeasors because the original tort
and the subsequent negligence are combined to form the end re-
sult.93 The court in Parchefsky concluded that bringing suit against the
negligent physicians does not bar the plaintiffs from later filing suit
against the first tortfeasor for damages suffered from the original
wrong.94
The California Supreme Court in Ash v. Mortensen95 also explored
the link between an original wrongdoer and a doctor who is later neg-
ligent and complicates the injuries.96 In Ash, the court addressed the
one satisfaction rule and its effect on the release of a negligent physi-
cian upon release of the original tortfeasor.97 The Ash court held that
87. See, e.g., Morgan v. Cohen, 309 Md. 304, 311-12, 523 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1987) (dis-
cussing how damages can be affected based on who are joint and who are successive
tortfeasors).
88. Id. at 310-11, 523 A.2d at 1006 (explaining how imprudent analysis and statutory
change have resulted in confusion ofjointly liable concurrent or successive tortfeasors with
true joint tortfeasors at common law).
89. 267 N.Y. 410, 196 N.E. 308 (1935).
90. Id. at 414, 196 N.E. at 310.
91. Id. at 413, 196 N.E. at 310.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 413-14, 196 N.E. at 310. Furthermore, the Parchefsky court stated that a per-
son may bring an action and obtain recovery against the original tortfeasor for all damages
resulting from his wrong or may seek to receive recovery from the physician for the dam-
ages which follow the initial harm. Id. at 414, 196 N.E. at 310.
94. Id.
95. 150 P.2d 876 (Cal. 1944).
96. Id. at 877.
97. Id. at 878.
666 [Voi-. 62:657
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releasing a cause of action against one wrongdoer does not release a
separate cause of action against another independent wrongdoer. 98
The court reasoned that only when full compensation for all injuries
has been satisfied can an attending doctor be released from liability."9
The Ash court concluded that the common law rule of "unity of dis-
charge" is based on the release of more than one wrongdoer when
such wrongdoers are recognized asjoint torffeasors, and not as succes-
sive tortfeasors.' 0o Therefore, independent tortfeasors would be given
an advantage that is inconsistent with the extent of their liability. 101
The reasoning in Ash lends itself to the idea that an evaluation of
prior damages awards is necessary to determine whether the one satis-
faction should apply. °2 In its discussion of compensation, the Ash
court stated that when a negligent physician creates an additional in-
jury or aggravates a previous one, it is not assumed that these injuries
have been fully compensated for by a prior settlement.' °3 Therefore,
when the injured person has a separate claim for an injury caused by
an independent tortfeasor, there should not be a presumption that
the separate injury was liquidated by an underlying settlement."0 4
In Trieschman v. Eaton,10 5 the Court of Appeals of Maryland recog-
nized that most states have found that the original tortfeasor and the
physician who aggravated the harm were not joint tortfeasors and that
damages can be recovered separately.'0 6 The Trieschman court dis-
cussed the difficulty in determining a joint tort, pointing out that the
term 'Joint tort" has different meanings among different courts.'0 7
The court then traced the evolution of the meaning of joint
tortfeasors in Maryland, noting that originally, independent wrongdo-
ers who were liable for identical damages were not absolved by the
release of one cause of action.'0 8 The court in Trieschman stated that,





102. Id. at 877.
103. Id. at 878-79.
104. Id. at 879.
105. 224 Md. 111, 166 A.2d 892 (1961).
106. Id. at 115, 166 A.2d at 894.
107. Id. at 115 n.3, 166 A.2d at 894 n.3 (citing William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several
Liability, 25 CAL. L. REv. 413 (1937)).
108. Id. at 117, 166 A.2d at 895. Gradually, as the Trieschman court pointed out, the rule
of release against joint tortfeasors was extended to independent tortfeasors, which has be-
come the law in most states. Id. That rule indicated that when a concurrent tortfeasor
paid an amount in full to the injured person who "caused to be made a docket entry in the
case of agreed and settled and all claims satisfied, there had been full satisfaction which
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a joint tortfeasor to absolve others from liability.1"' When there is a
presumption of satisfaction, any subsequent orjoint tortfeasors are re-
leased from further suits; however, if an unsatisfied judgment held by
an injured party exists against one tortfeasor, joint or successive
tortfeasors are not discharged from liability.110
The debate over whether physicians should be considered joint
or successive tortfeasors continued for thirty years until Morgan v. Co-
hen."' In Morgan, the Court of Appeals discussed the law concerning
negligent treatment by a physician." 2  Specifically, the court ex-
amined whether that negligence renders the physician a joint or sub-
sequent tortfeasor." The court recognized that, in general,
negligent treatment by a physician is characterized as a subsequent
tort for which the first tortfeasor is jointly liable." 4 The Morgan case
involved two torts: negligence in an automobile accident and negli-
gent treatment by a physician. 5 The underlying automobile acci-
dent suit was settled and an order of satisfaction was entered prior to
any trial." 6 Holding that only the original tortfeasor is liable for the
automobile accident, the court noted that the physician and the origi-
nal tortfeasor were jointly and severally liable for the second tort." 17
While the torts may be seen as concurrent wrongs because both con-
tributed to the additional harm, the court stated that the torts could
also be seen as successive because the wrongs took place at different
times and because each wrong elicited a separate cause of action." 8
In conclusion, the Morgan court held that neither a release nor a satis-
fied judgment prohibits an action against the medical doctor as a mat-
ter of law." 9
discharged the other tortfeasor and barred a subsequent suit against him." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 119, 523 A.2d at 896. Essentially, the court in Trieschman concluded that it is
irrelevant whether a physician is a joint or subsequent tortfeasor. Id. What is important,
according to the court, is whether the injured person received an order of satisfaction or
release from the original tortfeasor. Id.
111. 309 Md. 304, 523 A.2d 1003 (1987).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 311, 523 A.2d at 1006.
114. Id. at 311-12, 523 A.2d at 1006-07.
115. Id. at 316, 523 A.2d at 1008.
116. Id. at 308, 523 A.2d at 1005.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 320, 523 A.2d at 1011. The court recognized that it was presented with a
question of fact: "Did the satisfied judgment include damages for both torts, or just the
original tort?" Id. at 321, 523 A.2d at 1011. According to the court, whether the judgment
encompassed damages for both torts or just one tort determined whether a second claim
was barred. Id.
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d. The Effect of an Order of Satisfaction or a Prior Judgment on a
Subsequent Medical Malpractice Claim. -Ensuring that two claims exist is
the second issue that arises when determining the applicability of the
one satisfaction rule.12 ° Accordingly, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land has discussed the effect of a release on a doctor's liability in a
subsequent claim.1 2 '
In Knutsen v. Brown,122 a parent brought a derivative action on
behalf of their infant child, who had received full satisfaction of judg-
ment against the original tortfeasors. 2  The Knutsen court reasoned
that the issue of whether the infant received double damages was to
be resolved through examination of the record from the underlying
case, not from oral testimony.' 24 In reviewing the record, a trial court
can determine whether the recovery was independent of the addi-
tional harm due to malpractice, or whether the injuries suffered from
malpractice were part of the original damages award. 25
Grantham v. Prince George's County1 26 involved a negligence action
against a medical doctor and the hospital at which the plaintiff was
treated.1 27 After the claim against the doctor was settled and the judg-
ment was marked paid and satisfied, the hospital moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the satisfaction of a judgment obtained
against one tortfeasor bars further proceedings against another
tortfeasor.' 28 The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that the well-established common law rule
barring additional action when a judgment against one tortfeasor is
satisfied should not be amended. 129
Morgan v. Cohen also addressed the issue of liability when there is
a satisfaction against one of the two tortfeasors.1 30 Morgan's central
focus was whether a general release, executed on settlement of a dam-
age claim against a negligent motor vehicle operator whose negli-
gence caused harm, also releases a doctor who subsequently treated
the injury.' 3' In holding that it does not release the doctor who
treated the subsequent injury, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
120. Id. at 312-13, 523 A.2d at 1006-07.
121. Grantham v. Prince George's County, 251 Md. 28, 246 A.2d 548 (1968).
122. 232 A.2d 833, 833 (N.J. Super. 1967).
123. Id. at 833.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 836.
126. 251 Md. 28, 246 A.2d 548 (1968).
127. Id. at 30, 246 A.2d at 549.
128. Id. at 33, 246 A.2d at 551.
129. Id. at 40, 246 A.2d at 555.
130. 309 Md. 304, 523 A.2d 1003 (1987).
131. Id.
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adopted the view that the filing of a line of satisfaction, or a release of
the original tortfeasor, does not bar an action against a physician for
medical negligence. 3 2 The court's focus on the intent of the parties
at the time of the release or satisfaction served as precedent for the
court's decision in Welsh v. Gerber Products Inc.13 3
In 1989, the decision in Welsh overruled Grantham."3 4 In Welsh,
the Court of Appeals addressed the preclusive effect that a consent
judgment has on recovering additional damages, and it concluded
that the Grantham court did not scrutinize the consent judgment to
discern whether it represented a "determination of the complete
equivalent of the plaintiff's damages."" 5 In overruling Grantham for
its failure to consider the actual intent of the parties in their consent
judgment, the Welsh court accepted the modern view that a consent
judgment does not prohibit litigation of the damages issue, as long as
that issue was not previously considered or the parties did not intend
preclusion of the issue of damages.1 36 The court, therefore, found
that a consent judgment is not necessarily indicative of the parties'
intent regarding damages awards and that it is often appropriate for
the court to make a subsequent inquiry to determine the parties' in-
tentions. 137 In both Morgan and Welsh, the Court of Appeals held that
a plaintiff's subsequent claims against a negligent physician were not
barred by an underlying satisfaction, thereby ensuring that plaintiffs
receive full damages for all harms they suffered at the hands of sepa-
rate and distinct tortfeasors.' 38
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Underwood-Gary, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland held that Underwood-Gary's claim against Drs.
Yousaf and Mathews was satisfied by the settlement in the underlying
case against Thompson.' 9 Judge Raker, writing for the majority, 140
132. Id. at 320, 523 A.2d at 1011 (overruling any Maryland decision that holds that a
release of the original tortfeasor as a matter of law releases a negligently treating
physician).
133. 315 Md. 510, 555 A.2d 486 (1989).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 523, 555 A.2d at 492. The court went on to explain that an action for dam-
ages which advances to trial and has a judgment entered on the verdict embodies a final
determination as to the plaintiffs claim for those damages. Id.
136. Id. at 522, 555 A.2d at 492. In its holding, the court discarded as unrealistic the
idea that every consent judgment automatically represents actual litigation of the damages
issue. Id.
137. Id. at 515-16, 555 A.2d at 488.
138. Morgan, 309 Md. at 304, 523 A.2d at 1003; Welsh, at 315 Md. at 510, 555 A.2d at 486.
139. Underwood-Gary, 366 Md. at 677, 785 A.2d at 712. Because the court reached the
conclusion that the claim had been satisfied, the court did not decide the issue ofjudicial
estoppel. Id. at 667, 785 A.2d at 712.
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began with the general standard that "a plaintiff is entitled to but one
compensation for her loss and that satisfaction of her claim prevents
further action against another for the same damages." 4 ' The court
relied heavily on Morgan, yet distinguished it by pointing out that the
judgment in the underlying case in Underwood-Gary was the result of a
full trial on the merits.1 4 2 In Morgan, summary judgment was granted
at the trial court level, thereby eliminating the need for a full trial. 4 '
Although the court recognized that the original tortfeasor is lia-
ble for additional harm caused by a treating physician's improper di-
agnosis and unnecessary surgery, it also acknowledged the physician's
liability to a party harmed by the doctor's negligence.' 44 The Under-
wood-Gary court labeled the physician's negligent treatment as a "sub-
sequent tort for which both the doctor and the original tortfeasor are
jointly liable." 145 The court stated, however, that double recovery for
the same harm is not acceptable if one tortfeasor already paid the
judgment in full.146
The court recognized that application of the one satisfaction rule
has resulted in much confusion in the law. 47 The court noted that
the Morgan court attempted to clarify the confusion stemming from
courts' failure "to distinguish between jointly liable concurrent or suc-
cessive tortfeasors on the one hand and true joint tortfeasors as they
existed at common law." '148 The Morgan court concluded that the ef-
fect of a release on a subsequent action against a successive or concur-
rent tortfeasor is not a question of law, but a question of fact to be
determined by the language in the release itself.149
In distinguishing Morgan, the Court of Appeals in Underwood-Gary
held that the satisfied judgment in the Thompson litigation was subse-
quent to a full trial on the merits.15 ° Judge Raker stated that, as such,
140. Judge Raker was joined in the majority by every member of the court with the
exception of ChiefJudge Bell, who dissented from the decision of the court. Id. at 661, 786
A.2d at 708.
141. Id. at 667, 785 A.2d at 712.
142. Id. at 670 n.9, 785 A.2d at 714 n.9.
143. Morgan, 309 Md. at 304, 523 A.2d at 1003.
144. Underwood-Gary, 366 Md. at 668-69, 785 A.2d at 713.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 669, 785 A.2d at 713.
147. Id. The court addressed the difference between a satisfaction and a release, noting
that "a satisfaction is an acceptance of full compensation for the injury; a release is a sur-
render of the cause of action, which may be gratuitous, or given for inadequate considera-
tion." Id. at 670 n.8, 785 A.2d at 714 n.8.
148. Id. at 669, 785 A.2d at 713.
149. Morgan, 309 Md. at 321, 523 A.2d at 1011.
150. Underwood-Gary, 366 Md. at 670 n.9, 785 A.2d at 714 n.9. The court went on to state
that the jury verdict in the Thompson litigation, and the subsequent settlement in that
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Underwood-Gary presented issues of collateral estoppel not present in
Morgan.1 51 In its determination that a full trial followed by an order of
satisfaction has a preclusive effect, the court relied on the Commen-
tary to the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments.'5 2 To determine the scope
of a satisfied award of damages from a prior trial, the court noted that
it is necessary to examine which issues were put forward at the first
trial, as these issues are precluded from relitigation in the second
case. 1 5 1 In so doing, the court relied on Knutsen,154 which held that
the preclusive effect of a satisfied judgment in a prior case is a proper
question for the trial judge, not thejury. 5 5 The Underwood-Gary court
reasoned, as did the court in Knutsen, that resolving whether a plain-
tiff has received full satisfaction of a judgment after the judgment is
entered against the original tortfeasors, requires scrutinizing the re-
cord in the underlying litigation and determining whether the plain-
tiff was fully compensated for all damages, including those arising
from the alleged malpractice, from the judgment entered in the prior
case.
1 56
After reviewing the accessible portions of the trial record from
the Thompson litigation, the court determined that the satisfied judg-
ment in the Thompson case "embodies an evaluation as to all harms
that [p] etitioner later claimed in the malpractice action."' 57 In its de-
cision, the court did note that the record failed to conclusively indi-
cate whether the jury in the Thompson litigation either accepted or
rejected Thompson's defense that the surgery was unnecessary. 158
The court refused to speculate, however, as to how the damages were
awarded over each claim. 159 Finding that Underwood-Gary sought to
recover the same post-surgery medical expenses that she presented to
the jury in the Thompson suit, the court concluded that the judgment
in the first case precluded relitigation of the value of those same
claims and that all of the petitioner's claimed damages had been satis-
case, were not open for speculation as to how the Thompson jury allocated the various
claims and damages sought by Underwood-Gary. Id. at 674 n.10, 785 A.2d at 716 n.10.
151. Id. at 670 n.9, 785 A.2d at 714 n.9.
152. Id. The Restatement (Second) ofJudgments explains that "when ajudgment is based on
actual litigation of the measure of a loss, and the judgment is thereafter paid in full, the
injured party has no enforceable claim against any other obligor who is responsible for the
same loss." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 50 cmt. d (1982).
153. Underwood-Gary, 366 Md. at 670 n.9, 785 A.2d at 715 n.9.
154. 232 A.2d 833 (N.J. Super. 1967).
155. Knutsen, 232 A.2d at 836-37.
156. Id. at 836; Underwood-Gary, 366 Md. at 673-74, 785 A.2d at 715-16.
157. Underwood-Gary, 366 Md. at 673, 785 A.2d at 716.
158. Id. at 674 n.10, 785 A.2d at 716 n.10.
159. Id.
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fled. 161 In its judgment affirming the Court of Special Appeals' opin-
ion, the Court of Appeals held that Underwood-Gary failed to present
a "new and independent injury" that would warrant additional recov-
ery in the medical malpractice action.16 Although the Court of Ap-
peals agreed with the Court of Special Appeals, it did so without using
judicial estoppel as a grounds for its decision."6 2 Its only recognition
ofjudicial estoppel was to point out that Underwood-Gary argued that
she never attempted to mislead the court in any way at any time and,
that in fact, the issue has never been raised in the case.' 63
In his dissent, Chief Judge Bell began by expressing his general
agreement with the majority's statement of the law: "ordinarily a
question of fact, when the judgment that is satisfied results from full
adjudication, i.e., trial on the merits, its effect may be decided as a
matter of law in the context of summary judgment."'64 However,
Chief Judge Bell reasoned that, under the particular facts in this case,
the scope of the judgment should not have been determined as a mat-
ter of law.' 65 He opined that because of the size of the verdict in the
medical malpractice action, the jury in the Thompson litigation may
not have compensated Underwood-Gary for her back surgery.166 As
Chief Judge Bell noted, the trial court in the Thompson suit rejected
Underwood-Gary's request for a specific jury instruction that the de-
fendant was liable for the surgery, even if negligently executed, as
long as the surgery was related to the accident.' 67 Citing Knutsen,
Chief Judge Bell pointed out that the effect of a satisfied judgment
includes a determination of whether the amount paid in damages
fully compensated the loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the
negligence by both the original tortfeasors and the doctors. 68
160. Id. at 674, 785 A.2d at 716.
161. Id. at 675, 785 A.2d at 717.
162. Id. at 667, 785 A.2d at 712. The Court of Appeals of Maryland defined judicial
estoppel as a principle that "precludes a party from taking a position in a subsequent ac-
tion inconsistent with a position taken by him or her in a previous action." Id. at 667 n.6,
785 A.2d at 712 n.6 (quoting Winmark Ltd. P'ship v. Miles & Stockbridge, 345 Md. 614,
693 A.2d 824 (1997)).
163. Id. at 667 n.6, 785 A.2d at 712 n.6.
164. Id. at 680, 785 A.2d at 720 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Bell also noted his
concurrence with the principle that a plaintiff should only receive one compensation for a
loss and that satisfaction of a claim recovering for that loss prohibits further action. Id. at
680, 785 A.2d at 719-20. Additionally, he promoted the use of 'equitable principles' to
prevent double recovery and unjust enrichment. Id. at 680, 785 A.2d at 720.
165. Id. at 680, 785 A.2d at 720.
166. Id. at 681, 785 A.2d at 721.
167. Id. at 681 n.3, 785 A.2d at 721 n.3.
168. Id. at 687, 785 A.2d at 724 (quoting Knutsen v. Brown, 232 A.2d 833, 836 (1967)).
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According to ChiefJudge Bell, the majority failed to consider sev-
eral factors, including the significance of the award made by the jury
in the Thompson suit and the fact that the parties settled the suit
while the trial courtjudgment was pending on appeal.' 69 ChiefJudge
Bell stated that if these factors had been contemplated by the court,
they would have demonstrated the existence of a genuine dispute of
material fact, thereby defeating summary judgment.1711 In reaching
this conclusion, Chief Judge Bell argued that a distinct scheme of
health claims litigation exists because it is necessary for a patient to
rely on her treating physicians in an automobile case to decide what
actions, if any, to take. 171 Chief Judge Bell reasoned that requiring
the plaintiff to pursue both claims simultaneously in the same lawsuit
forces him or her to question a trusting and confidential relationship
perhaps prematurely. 172 According to Chief Judge Bell, joining both
parties in the same lawsuit is unfair and goes against the purpose of
the health care arbitration system.'17  Chief Judge Bell concluded,
therefore, that Underwood-Gary should be entitled to damages from
her doctors as subsequent tortfeasors.174
4. Analysis.-In Underwood-Gary, the Court of Appeals held that
the satisfaction of her underlying case excluded Underwood-Gary
from pursuing claims against her treating physicians, Dr. Mathews and
Dr. Yousaf, in a succeeding medical malpractice action. 171 In so hold-
ing, the court strayed from precedent and caused an injustice by refus-
ing to allow recovery of a second damage award. The court
contradicted its decisions in Morgan and Welsh, where it barred the
preclusive effect of an underlying satisfaction on collection of dam-
ages for a subsequent negligence claim. In ignoring precedent, the
court placed Underwood-Gary and future plaintiffs in a dilemma. 76
Litigants are not forced to eitherjoin all parties who potentially could
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 688 n.5, 785 A.2d at 724 n.5.
172. Id. at 689, 785 A.2d at 725.
173. Id. at 688 n.5, 785 A.2d at 724 n.5.
174. Id. at 675-76, 785 A.2d at 717.
175. Id. at 673-74, 785 A.2d at 716. Unlike the lower courts, the Court of Appeals did
not consider the issue ofjudicial estoppel. It at 667 n.6, 785 A.2d at 712 n.6
176. The Court of Appeals in Morgan and Welsh held that a release of the original
tortfeasor as a matter of law does not automatically release a negligent treating physician.
Morgan v. Cohen, 309 Md. 304, 306, 523 A.2d 1003, 1004 (1987); Welsh v. Gerber Prods.,
Inc., 315 Md. 510, 522-23, 555 A.2d 486, 492 (1989). The intent of the parties must be
clear to determine whether a true satisfaction of all damages was agreed upon. Underwood-
Gary, 366 Md. at 670, 785 A.2d at 714.
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have caused the harm, or risk receiving little or no compensation for
their injuries. In an attempt to distinguish these prior cases, the court
instead reinforced the similarities. Primarily, the court noted that it is
essential to investigate not only the intent of the parties at the time of
the order of satisfaction, but also the jury's consideration when allo-
cating the damages award in the underlying case. 1" In so doing,
courts ensure compliance with the one satisfaction rule while concom-
itantly guaranteeing justice for each plaintiff through full compensa-
tion of all damages.
a. Preclusion Based on a Satisfaction or Release after a Jury Trial
Should Not Be Automatic Because an Injured Party Could Be Left Without
Compensation.-Precluding a plaintiff from initiating a lawsuit follow-
ing a satisfaction or release in a prior case could result in a minimal or
nonexistent damages award for an injured party who is deserving of
compensation. In Underwood-Gary, the court abandoned precedent
when it held that an order of satisfaction in an underlying automobile
accident case precluded Underwood-Gary from receiving a second
damage award for medical malpractice.' 78 Distinguishing Underwood-
Gary from Morgan, the court noted that the satisfied judgment in the
Thompson litigation followed a full trial on the merits, whereas the
consentjudgment in Morgan occurred before trial.'7 9 While the court
was correct to bar the relitigation of issues after a full trial, it improp-
erly assumed that all of the damages claims made in this suit were
addressed in the Thompson litigation. As Chief Judge Bell argued in
dissent, the majority's decision was flawed because it did not consider
the possibility that the jury in the Thompson litigtation failed to award
Underwood-Gary compensation for her back surgery.18 ° Notably, the
trial court refused Underwood-Gary's request to explicitly instruct the
jury that Thompson was liable for the surgery, even if it was negli-
gently performed, as long as the surgery was related to the accident. 8"
However, the trial court did grant Underwood-Gary's motion in
limine to exclude evidence on the necessity of the back surgery, which
supports the argument that the issue was not, in fact, litigated in that
177. Underwood-Gary, 366 Md. at 674, 785 A.2d at 716.
178. Id. The court also stated that all of the harm claimed in the case at hand was
included in the harms alleged to have resulted from the underlying case. Id.
179. Id. at 670 n.9, 785 A.2d at 714 n.9. The court thus believed there were issues of
collateral estoppel present in Underwood-Gary that did not exist in Morgan. Id.
180. Id. at 681, 785 A.2d at 721 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). The dissent explained that the
defense's argument in the Thompson litigation that the surgery was unnecessary could
have been accepted by the jury. Id.
181. Id. at 681 n.3, 785 A.2d at 721 n.3.
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case.' 8 2 Although the defendant submitted such evidence over Un-
derwood-Gary's objection, Underwood-Gary only litigated the neces-
sity of the surgery to rebut the defense. 8 ' From the size of the
verdict, and the fact that Underwood-Gary did not fully litigate the
necessity of the surgery, it can be argued, as Chief Justice Bell noted,
that the jury in Thompson did not compensate Underwood-Gary for
her surgery.' 
84
Instead of automatically precluding Underwood-Gary from mak-
ing a second claim for damages arising from negligent medical treat-
ment, the court should have considered whether the amount paid in
damages in the satisfied judgment represented full compensation for
the total loss suffered by Underwood-Gary, resulting from both the
negligence of the original tortfeasors and the negligence of the doc-
tors. 8 ' The significant difference between the damages award in the
Thompson litigation and the malpractice litigation should have indi-
cated that the second jury considered an issue that the first jury over-
looked, and, therefore, that full compensation was not awarded to
Underwood-Gary after the Thompson litigation and the order of satis-
faction.' 8 6 Automatic preclusion after a satisfaction or release could
potentially, as it did in this case, leave the injured party with an award
too small to cover the costs resulting from the injury. Therefore, the
court in Underwood-Gary prematurely precluded a second damage
award for back surgery, because it did not investigate the issues and
injuries considered by the jury in the Thompson litigation.
b. The Court's Failure to Address Judicial Estoppel: Leaving Mary-
land in a State of Confusion.--The Court of Appeals' failure to consider
the issue of judicial estoppel and its applicability in Underwood-Gary
effectively protects negligent parties and fails to outline a clear stan-
dard for future application.
No Maryland court has ever employed the judicial estoppel doc-
trine to prevent a litigant patient from taking a position against a de-
fendant doctor in contrast to a previously asserted position, even
when the position was based on the "good faith reliance upon the
advice and presumed expertise of the doctor."' 87 The Court of Spe-
182. Id. at 683 n.4, 785 A.2d at 722 n.4.
183. Id. at 681 n.3, 785 A.2d at 721 n.3.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 687, 785 A.2d at 724.
186. Id. at 681, 785 A.2d at 721. Underwood-Gary was awarded only $8,337.00 for medi-
cal expenses and $750.00 for lost wages in the underlying litigation, as compared with
$437,073.69 in the subsequent medical malpractice action. Id. at 676-77, 785 A. 2d at 718.
187. Brief for Appellant at 10, Underwood-Gary (No. 107).
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cial Appeals' decision in Underwood-Gary fully addressed the issue of
judicial estoppel, recognizing that the negligence of the auto
tortfeasor and that tortfeasor's responsibility for any consequential
damages is not preclusive on the plaintiff's later determination that
her treating physicians were also negligent.18 8 Instead of either af-
firming or rejecting the Court of Special Appeals' holding regarding
judicial estoppel, the Court of Appeals ignored the issue
completely. '"
Additionally, the court overlooked persuasive case law, such as
Konstantinidis, which could have guided the court on the applicability
of judicial estoppel to this type of factual scenario. The situation in
Konstantinidis was nearly identical to that in Underwood-Gay, in that it
involved an underlying settlement followed by a medical malpractice
action. 90 Konstantinidis litigated and settled a workers' compensa-
tion claim for damages related to a work accident and subsequently
filed suit against his treating doctor for essentially the same dam-
ages.19' In the decision as to medical malpractice, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted that be-
cause judicial endorsement of either party's positions is not required
or implied in a settlement, the settlement does not give the prior suc-
cess needed for judicial estoppel.'92 The court provided that when a
plaintiff's prior position is found to be a good faith mistake, judicial
estoppel is inapplicable.' 93
Another persuasive case that the court in Underwood-Gay over-
looked was Horger.'94 In Horger, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York concluded that there was no case
law precluding a plaintiff from asserting a position in contrast to a
previously asserted position, so long as the previous position was re-
lied upon in good faith on the testimony or advice of the opposing
party. 19 5 Like Underwood-Gary, Mr. Horger brought a medical mal-
practice case against his doctors for unnecessary surgery after previ-
ously obtaining damages for injuries sustained in the course of his
employment. 196 In the underlying Thompson litigation, Underwood-
Gary asserted that her surgery was necessary in a good faith effort to
188. Mathews v. Gary, 133 Md. App. 570, 578, 758 A.2d 1019, 1023 (2000).
189. Underwood-Gary, 366 Md. at 667, 785 A.2d at 712.
190. Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 935 (D.C. 1980).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 939.
193. Id.
194. 642 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
195. Id. at 981.
196. Id. at 978.
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disprove the testimony of the opposing party. 197 Underwood-Gary was
expected to rely on the advice of Drs. Yousaf and Mathews. Her pur-
pose in seeing them was to obtain medical advice and treatment from
supposed experts in the medical field. 9 ' Drs. Yousaf and Mathews
agreed that the surgery was necessary; thus, Underwood-Gary, acting
reasonably and in good faith, adhered to the advice of her doctors
and underwent the surgery. 199
Previous cases note that one function of judicial estoppel is to
prohibit one party from obtaining an unfair advantage.2 °° It is not
Underwood-Gary who stood to gain unfairly, but rather the defendant
doctors. While some may argue that to hold the doctors liable would
allow Underwood-Gary to recover twice for the same injury, the ex-
treme difference between the two damages awards counters that argu-
ment. The doctors' negligence was not at issue in the underlying
case. The plaintiff, therefore, should not be estopped from asserting
a subsequent malpractice claim. However, the court's choice to over-
look the issue of judicial estoppel and its application to this type of
factual scenario leaves the Maryland court system without precedent.
c. Preventing Plaintiffs' Ability to Be Fully Compensated in Subse-
quent Medical Malpractice Actions.-In holding that Underwood-Gary's
claim was satisfied by the settlement in the Thompson litigation and
that she did not have a new and independent injury, the court pre-
vented Underwood-Gary from obtaining damages, including pain and
suffering, from the negligent doctors who treated her.20 ' To prove
malpractice on the part of the doctors, the court stated that Under-
wood-Gary would have had to join Drs. Yousaf and Mathews as defend-
ants in the Thompson litigation.202 This is an unreasonable request,
as Underwood-Gary was unaware of her doctors' negligence at the
time of the Thompson lawsuit. 20 3
As Chief Judge Bell noted in his dissent, dictating how and when
a patient needs to file suit against a treating physician for negligence
197. Underwood-Gary, 366 Md. at 681, 785 A.2d at 720.
198. Id. at 675, 785 A.2d at 717.
199. Id. at 676, 785 A.2d at 717.
200. See Horger, 642 F. Supp. at 980-81 (explaining that a litigant is not free to argue
whatever issues seem advantageous at the time since that always gives that party the upper
hand).
201. Underwood-Gay, 366 Md. at 667, 785 A.2d at 712.
202. Id. at 688, 785 A.2d at 724 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that the fact that the
auto tortfeasor was found to be negligent and thus liable for any consequential damages
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undercuts the trust and confidence critical to the doctor and patient
relationship.2 °4 It is especially difficult for an injured party to abide by
the majority's ruling in Underwood-Gary when that party calls a treating
physician as an expert witness on their behalf." 5 As in Welsh, where
the court examined the consentjudgment to ascertain whether it rep-
resented the complete equivalent of the plaintiffs damages, the Un-
derwood-Gary court should have upheld the prevention of double
recovery, and also clarified that not all settlements will release subse-
quent tortfeasors from proceeding litigation.20 6
Although the Underwood-Gay court had valid policy reasons un-
derlying its decision that two different tortfeasors should not be liable
for the same harm, its decision absolves doctors from getting potential
malpractice suits unless the malpractice occurs at the same time as the
underlying case. There was no recognized Maryland authority requir-
ing a party to try both claims simultaneously, and, therefore, Under-
wood-Gary should not have been placed in a position forcing her to
choose between believing or disbelieving her treating physicians at the
time she filed suit against a separate and distinct tortfeasor.
As a result of the court's decision, every time a doctor fails to
specify that medical treatment or surgery is necessary, a plaintiff will
be forced to choose between suing his or her own doctors or forever
waiving a separate plausible claim of medical malpractice. This result
is not only unjust, but it forces the injured party to make a premature
or uninformed decision.
5. Conclusion.-In Underwood-Gary, the Court of Appeals pre-
cluded Underwood-Gary from recovering damages in a medical mal-
practice action because she had obtained a satisfied judgment in the
underlying case against the original tortfeasor.2 °7 Without addressing
the issue of judicial estoppel, the court ignored the reasoning behind
Underwood-Gary's decision not to join Drs. Yousaf and Mathews in
the first lawsuit.2"' Moreover, the future applicability ofjudicial estop-
pel in Maryland is no longer clear. The Underwood-Gary decision
places plaintiffs in a difficult situation where they must determine the
204. Id. at 676, 785 A.2d at 717. Additionally, Chief Judge Bell stated that such a rule
may insulate a doctor used as an expert witness from liability for his or her own negligence.
Id.
205. Id.
206. Welsh v. Gerber Prods., Inc., 315 Md. 510, 523, 555 A.2d 486, 492. The Welsh court
examined the consent judgment to determine whether it represented a determination of
the complete equivalent of the plaintiff's damages. Id.
207. Underwood-Gary, 366 Md. at 663, 785 A.2d at 709.
208. Id. at 667, 785 A.2d at 713.
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negligence of their treating physicians as subsequent tortfeasors when
they file suit against an original tortfeasor, resulting in either untimely
allegations or no recognition of the doctor's negligence. Before ap-
plying such a requirement, the court should confirm that no new and
independent injury exists by reviewing the jury's verdict in the first
suit and verifying that all harms alleged in the second suit were con-
sidered for damages in the first suit. In failing to do so, the court
perpetuates injustice by undercompensating an injured party and al-
lows a subsequent tortfeasor to escape liability.
HEATHER J. SEITZ
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Morally Troublesome, Yet Legally Appropriate: The Court of Appeals
Clarifies a Disabled Person's Rights Under the ADA and Limits a Party's
Right to Be Present at Civil Trial
In Green v. North Arundel Hospital Ass'n, Inc.,' the Court of Appeals
of Maryland considered whether the trial court's exclusion of the
plaintiff, Darwin Green, from the courtroom during his bifurcated
trial's liability phase violated his rights under the Americans With Dis-
abilities Act (ADA),2 the Due Process Clause of the United States Con-
stitution,' and equivalent provisions of the Maryland Constitution.4
At the time of his trial, Green was a twenty-year-old male who had
been left in a permanent vegetative state as a result of a brain hemor-
rhage and cardiac arrest.5 In a 5-2 decision, the court affirmed the
Court of Special Appeals' ruling that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding Green from the trial.6 Concluding that
Green's condition prevented him from providing any assistance to his
counsel or even comprehending the proceeding, the court held that
his right to be present was substantially outweighed by the likely preju-
dicial effect his presence would have on the jury.7 Although the
court's conclusion that Green's permanent vegetative state was
equivalent to an evidentiary exhibit has potentially disturbing implica-
tions for the due process rights of disabled individuals, the court's
1. 366 Md. 597, 785 A.2d 361 (2001).
2. Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000). The purpose of
Title II of the ADA is to protect physically or mentally disabled citizens from discrimination
on the basis of their disability by public or private entities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
3. The Due Process Clause states in relevant part that "[n]o State shall make or en-
force any law which shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Green, 366 Md. at 602, 785 A.2d at 364. Article XIX of the Maryland Constitution
states:
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to
have remedy by the course of the Law of the land, and ought to have justice and
right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay,
according to the Law of the land.
MD. CONST. art. XIX (1867).
Article XXIV of the Maryland Constitution states: "[N]o man ought to be taken or
imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in
any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of
his peers, or by the Law of the Land." MD. CONST. art. XXIV.
5. Green, 366 Md. at 602, 604, 785 A.2d at 364-65.
6. Id. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378.
7. Id.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
decision under the circumstances appropriately protected the defend-
ants' right to a fair trial. In so doing, the court adhered to fundamen-
tal principles of evidence that juries should not see evidence, such as
Green's condition, when its probative value is greatly overshadowed by
unavoidable prejudice-in this case, sympathy for Green's condition.'
However, due to the narrowness of the court's holding and because
the question of exclusion necessitates a case-by-case balancing analy-
sis, it will be difficult to predict application of the party exclusion rule
where the circumstances resemble, but do not precisely mirror, this
case.
9
1. The Case.-Darwin Green was born on February 12, 1977 with
hydrocephalus, a medical condition that required a shunt to be
placed in his brain shortly after his birth to drain excess fluid and
alleviate irregularly increased brain pressure.' ° Doctors revised the
original shunt the following year and then inserted a second shunt
into Green's brain three years later." Although limited in his mental
capabilities, Darwin attended school with the help of special educa-
tion classes.1
2
On August 17, 1988, Green began suffering from severe head-
aches, vomiting, and drowsiness, and was taken by his father the next
day to the North Arundel Hospital Association (NAHA) emergency
room. 3 After several tests, including a CT scan, and consultation with
a NAHA radiologist and neurologist, the attending emergency room
physician determined that nothing beyond Green's existing condition
8. MD. R. 5403; see infra notes 142-146 and accompanying text (discussing the princi-
ple thatjuries are precluded from seeing evidence where the prejudice outweighs its pro-
bative value).
9. Green, 366 Md. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378. The court emphasized the fact that the trial
had been bifurcated and that its ruling applied only to the liability phase. Id. Further-
more, in limiting its holding, the court cautioned that "[w]hen all of [the] circumstances
exist, as they did here, the plaintiff's presence is not truly an exercise of his/her right of
presence, for the plaintiff is incapable of making a conscious decision in that regard." Id.
at 626-27, 785 A.2d at 378. The court also noted that the balancing of rights depends on
the particular facts of the case. Id. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378. Specifically, the court stated:
There is a right of presence, and it may not be denied, even in the liability phase
of a bifurcated trial, solely because the party's physical appearance may engender
jury sympathy. The right is not absolute, however. It must be balanced against
the defendant's equivalent right to a fair trial .... [Green's] presence is rather as
an exhibit-a piece of evidence-that is both irrelevant and prejudicial, and thus
invokes the balancing process enunciated in Maryland Rule 5403.
Id.
10. Id. at 602, 785 A.2d at 364.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 603, 785 A.2d at 364.
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was causing his symptoms and that he could return home once the
headache subsided.' 4 A prescription painkiller helped to relieve the
headache and Green was discharged the same day with the expecta-
tion that he would visit his pediatrician in the next day or two.1
Green's headaches, however, continued overnight.' 6 Upon seeing his
pediatrician the next morning, Green appeared drowsy and was stag-
gering.' 7 He was then immediately sent to the University of Maryland
Hospital (UMH) in Baltimore City where he was diagnosed with in-
creased intracranial pressure as a result of a probable shunt malfunc-
tion."8 Green remained overnight in the UMH neurosurgery unit.' 9
His condition deteriorated and before UMH doctors could operate,
Green suffered a cardiac arrest.1 ° Severely brain-damaged, Green was
left "in an essentially vegetative state, unable to communicate with an-
yone .... function[ing] at the level of a one-month old infant. "21
On their son's behalf, Green's parents filed a medical malprac-
tice claim against NAHA, UMH, and the emergency room physician,
neurologist, and radiologist that treated Green. 22 They reached an
out-of-court settlement with UMH; consequently, only NAHA and
each of the doctors remained as defendants once trial began.23 The
complaint was originally filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,
but was subsequently transferred to the Circuit Court for Anne Arun-
del County.24 The circuit court initially bifurcated the trial into liabil-
ity and damages phases. 25 The court then granted NAHA's pretrial
motion to exclude Green from the trial after concluding that he
lacked the ability to communicate, to participate in the case in any
meaningful way, to provide any assistance to his counsel, or even to





18. Id. at 603-04, 785 A.2d at 365.
19. Id. at 604, 785 A.2d at 365.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Green v. North Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 126 Md. App. 394, 398, 730 A.2d 221,
223 (1999).
23. Id. Green's parents released UMH from liability for $1,489,000. Id. at 398 n.1, 730
A.2d at 223 n.1.
24. Id. at 398-99, 730 A.2d at 223. The Greens attempted to have the trial moved back
to Baltimore City, but the motion to transfer was denied on August 2, 1999. Id. at 400, 730
A.2d at 224.
25. Id. at 400, 730 A.2d at 224.
26. Id. NAHA's motion to exclude assumed Green would exercise his right to be pre-
sent during the entire trial. Green, 366 Md. at 613, 785 A.2d at 370. Green's attorneys, in
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that Green's presence in the courtroom "served no purpose other
than to prejudice the jurors against the defendants."27 At the conclu-
sion of Green's case, the trial court granted motions for judgment for
NAHA and one of the doctors.28 The jury subsequently found in favor
of the remaining two doctors. 9
Green appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that
the trial court excluded the plaintiff from the courtroom in violation
of his rights under the ADA and the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution. ° The court affirmed the trial court's ruling, ad-
ding that even if it had erred by excluding Green, the error would
have been harmless. "1 Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals held
that "[Green] did not have an absolute right to attend the trial as an
observer-the trial judge had discretion to exclude anyone from the
courtroom in the interest of the fair administration of justice."32 Fur-
thermore, the court concluded that because Green's presence could
not have affected the answer to the standard of care question, his ex-
clusion from the trial's liability phase was not prejudicial.33
Green then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted certi-
orari to consider whether both the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland properly con-
cluded that venue lay in Anne Arundel County and whether both
courts erred in excluding Green from the trial because of his mental
and physical condition.
2. Legal Backgound.--Green marks the first instance where the
Court of Appeals of Maryland has addressed whether excluding a dis-
abled litigant from trial qualifies as a statutory or constitutional viola-
tion that constitutes reversible error. Although Title II of the ADA
prohibits courts as public entities from discriminating against disabled
persons in employment, public services, and programs, it is unclear
fact, had only requested that he be present for an hour or two on one day to demonstrate
his current condition. Id.
27. Green, 126 Md. App. at 400, 730 A.2d at 224.
28. Id. at 401, 730 A.2d at 224.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 401, 730 A.2d at 224-25. The Greens also reasserted their argument that
venue was improperly moved from Baltimore City to Anne Arundel County. Id.
31. Id. at 423, 730 A.2d at 237. The court also held that the change in venue from the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City to Anne Arundel County was proper because Green's
injury first occurred as a result of the alleged misdiagnosis at North Arundel Hospital. Id.
at 414, 730 A.2d at 232. The court added that any subsequent injuries that may have oc-
curred in Baltimore City are irrelevant for purposes of determining proper venue. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Green, 366 Md. at 602, 785 A.2d at 364.
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whether excluding a disabled litigant from trial to prevent jury
prejudice violates the ADA." With respect to a party's constitutional
and common law right to be present at trial, the majority of states
have determined that the right is not absolute and can be outweighed
under certain circumstances. 6 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has
suggested in several cases that it agrees with the majority position.37
a. The Application of the Americans With Disabilities Act to Courts
and Judicial Proceedings.-In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA to pro-
vide a legal cause of action for physically or mentally disabled citizens
subject to discrimination by either public or private entities on the
basis of their disability.38 The ADA seeks to ensure equal opportunity,
participation, and self-sufficiency in all personal and professional as-
pects of society, regardless of a physical or mental disability.39 To
date, claims brought under the ADA against courts in their capacity as
public entities have not challenged judicial processes, but instead
have centered primarily on accommodations to facilitate physical ac-
cess to the courtroom as well as services to enable meaningful partici-
pation in the proceedings.4" Thus, no case has specifically addressed
whether it is a violation of the ADA to exclude a disabled party from
trial solely because his disability would likely prejudice the jury.
A majority of state courts have held that, under the ADA, court-
houses must make reasonable accommodations to facilitate physical
access to all parts of the building. In Layton v. Elder,4 two disabled
individuals sued because the county courthouse lacked sufficient
handicapped parking, appropriate handicapped restrooms, and a
means to access a second floor courtroom.42 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the ADA required the local
government to alter the courthouse facilities to provide equal access
for the physically disabled.43 Similarly, in Matthews v. Jefferson,44 a par-
35. Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
36. See infra note 60 (referencing cases that support the proposition that certain cir-
cumstances justify a party's exclusion from the courtroom during the trial's liability phase).
37. See infra notes 66-83 (citing cases which recognize that the right to be present is not
absolute where a party's presence would prejudice the jury and the party's absence would
not hinder the court's fair administration and adjudication of the issues).
38. Americans With Disabilities Act, §§ 12131-12165.
39. See id. § 12101 (explaining the purpose of the ADA).
40. See infra notes 41-55 and accompanying text (detailing how courts have upheld
claims by the disabled for equal physical access to courtrooms as well as additional visual
accommodations within the courtroom).
41. 143 F.3d 469 (8th Cir. 1998).
42. Id. at 470-71.
43. Id. at 472.
44. 29 F. Supp. 2d 525 (W.D. Ark. 1998).
2003]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
aplegic man confined to a wheelchair sued the county because he was
unable to attend his hearing on the courthouse's second floor until
he was carried there by two men appointed by the court.4 5 As in Lay-
ton, the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkan-
sas held that the ADA required the county to update their courthouse
facilities to provide equal access for the physically disabled."6
With respect to providing additional services, the courts cannot,
for example, automatically exclude a juror from jury duty because of a
disability."7 In People v. Caldwell," the New York Criminal Court held
that it had an obligation under the ADA to reasonably accommodate a
prospective juror's visual deficiencies to enable her to participate
competently as a juror."9 The court required that the disabled juror
be provided with transcripts in enlarged print, be read aloud all evi-
dentiary documents, and be repositioned within the jury box.5° Thus,
as a public entity within the scope of the ADA, courts have to provide
additional services where such services are reasonable and enable dis-
abled individuals to participate competently as jurors.5"
Similarly, in Galloway v. Superior Court of the District of Columbia,52 a
blind individual successfully challenged a court policy automatically
preventing the blind from serving as jurors.5" The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia determined that because the
case primarily involved evaluating the credibility of witnesses' testi-
mony, the individual's blindness would not inhibit his competency as
a juror.5" Thus, the court held that the categorical exclusion of blind
persons from serving as jurors was a violation of the ADA because in
many cases, ajuror's blindness would not by itself prevent a fair trial.55
In sum, although Title II of the ADA prohibits courts from dis-
criminating against disabled persons in employment, public services,
and programs, 6 case law applying these restrictions has focused on
whether courts have provided for adequate physical access to court-
houses and allowed for equal participation in the functions of the
45. Id. at 528.
46. Id. at 534.
47. People v. Caldwell, 159 Misc. 2d 190, 603 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1993).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 194, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
50. Id. at 191-92, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 714-15.
51. Id.
52. 816 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993).
53. Id. at 14-15.
54. Id. at 16, 18.
55. Id. at 19-20.
56. Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
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court. The courts have yet to address whether it is a violation of the
ADA to exclude a disabled party from trial to prevent jury prejudice.
b. The Constitutional and Common Law Right to Be Present at
Trial.-In determining whether an individual's constitutional right to
a fair trial outweighs the constitutional right to be present at one's
trial, courts have analyzed whether the particular circumstances may
justify the exclusion to prevent likely prejudice of the jury. The right
to be present and to participate in one's trial stems generally from
common law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,5 7 and its Maryland equivalent in Articles 19 and 24 of the Decla-
ration of Rights.5 8 Courts have divergent views as to whether the right
to be present is absolute and, if not, what circumstances override that
right. Although a minority view holds that a party's right of presence
is absolute,5 9 the majority of the states, including Maryland, assert that
the right is not absolute and that certain circumstances require a
party's exclusion from the courtroom.6"
(1) Case Law Representing the Minority and Majority Views on the
Right to Be Present at Trial.-By asserting that a party's right to be pre-
sent at trial is absolute, the minority view reasons that no circum-
stances justify exclusion from trial. Representative of the minority
position is Odum v. Corn Products Refining Co.,6  in which a claim was
brought on behalf of a party who died as a result of injuries sustained
during an explosion in the corn mill where he worked as foreman of
the grain elevator.6 2 At trial, the defendant mill operator moved to
exclude the deceased's widow and children from the courtroom be-
cause of the likelihood that the jury would sympathize with them.6 3
57. See supra note 3 (providing the constitutional right to due process of law guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
58. See supra note 4 (providing the Maryland state due process right as guaranteed by
Articles 19 and 24 of the Declaration of Rights).
59. See, e.g., Rozbicki v. Huybrechts, 589 A.2d 363, 365 (Conn. 1991) (commenting that
the Supreme Court of Connecticut has held that the constitutional right to a civil jury trial
implies the parties' right to be present at trial).
60. See Casson v. Horton, 226 Md. 575, 576, 174 A.2d 581, 582 (1961) (citing Gorman v.
Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1956)) (denying the plaintiffs request for a continuance
until she recovered from a heart attack because the right to be present at trial is not abso-
lute); Helminski v. Ayerst Lab., 766 F.2d 208, 217 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a civil
litigant's right to be present during the trial's liability phase was not absolute where that
party's presence would likely prejudice the jury); In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 624 F.
Supp. 1212, 1224 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (emphasizing the court's responsibility under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 to ensure a fair trial for both parties).
61. 173 Ill. App. 348 (1912).
62. Id. at 350-51.
63. Id. at 351-52.
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The Court of Appeals of Illinois, however, allowed the widow and chil-
dren to be present because they were "interested parties in the result
of [the] suit" even though not parties to the suit.64 The Odum court
noted that no law existed that prevents "interested persons from being
present at the hearing of their case, even though their unfortunate
condition" would provoke jury sympathy.65
Other courts have disagreed with the minority view expressed by
the Odum court. Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories66 exemplifies the ma-
jority view that the right to be present at trial is not absolute. In
Helminski, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ex-
amined three situations where a party's exclusion from the courtroom
is likely to be requested.6 7 The Helminski court determined that in
cases in which the party is mentally and physically competent or suf-
fering from physical disabilities or injuries, the party should be al-
lowed in the courtroom.68 In contrast, however, when the party is
unable to assist his attorneys or even comprehend the proceeding, the
court concluded that the party could be properly excluded from the
courtroom. 69
Specifically, in Helminski, the Sixth Circuit examined why the ex-
clusion of an autistic and retarded child who was unable to speak was
necessary to "safeguard the jury's ability to decide the case based upon
the evidence presented rather than on emotional factors. ' 70 The
child's mother sued the laboratory where she worked as a nurse dur-
ing her pregnancy for regularly allowing her to come into contact dur-
ing surgery with a substance made by the laboratory that was known to
adversely affect young fetuses. 71 The court held that a party may not
be excluded from a trial's liability phase solely because of a physical or
mental condition. 72 However, when that party's presence will likely
prejudice the jury and he is unable to comprehend or to assist his
attorney in the proceedings, the court held that the trial court has the
discretion to exclude the party. 73
64. Id. at 352.
65. Id.
66. 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985).
67. Id. at 214.
68. Id. at 214-15.
69. Id. at 217.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 210.
72. Id. at 215.
73. Id. at 217.
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(2) Maryland Case Law Supports the Notion that Circumstances
Could Justify a Party's Exclusion from the Courtroom.-In Gorman v. Sabo, 4
a dispute between neighbors over an alleged nuisance, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying a party's request for a continuance until she recovered
from an illness that required her to rest at home.7 5 Despite a medical
certificate verifying the illness and need for rest, the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County proceeded to trial without the defendant.
76
In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, the Court
of Appeals noted that the defendant never claimed that she planned
to testify or that she "would have been a helpful or persuasive wit-
ness."7 7 The court further justified the trial court's decision by stating
that the defendant's right to be present at trial was not absolute and
that absent any consequent prejudice, the case could proceed without
her presence.7 8
Following Gorman, the Court of Appeals in Casson v. Horton7 9 held
that the plaintiffs right to be present at trial was not absolute, thus
denying her request for continuance until she recovered from a heart
attack.8 ° The plaintiff, Casson, allegedly suffered a heart attack the
night after testifying at trial.8" However, because the court deter-
mined that Casson's prior testimony did not constitute "legally suffi-
cient evidence" for the jury, the court reasoned that her absence
would not prejudice her case.8 2 Thus, the court upheld the trial
court's denial of her request for a continuance, concluding that her
absence from trial did not unfairly affect the court's administration
and decision.83
In contrast to Gorman and Casson, the Court of Appeals in Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Watson84 held that the trial court erred in excluding a
witness from the courtroom because, as the defendant's designated
74. 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1955).
75. Id. at 166-67, 122 A.2d at 480-81.
76. Id. at 167, 122 A.2d at 481.
77. Id.
78. Id. The court noted:
The right of a party to a cause to be present throughout the trial is not an abso-
lute right in a civil case and in the discretion of the court, with due regard to the
circumstances as to prejudice, the case may be tried or finished when a party,
including a defendant, is absent.
Id.
79. 226 Md. 575, 174 A.2d 581 (1961).
80. Id. at 576, 174 A.2d at 582.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 577, 174 A.2d at 582.
83. Id. at 576-77, 174 A.2d at 582.
84. 317 Md. 178, 562 A.2d 1242 (1989).
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representative, the witness had a right to be present at the trial.8 The
court highlighted that excluding the representative, who was also the
principal investigator working for the defendant in the worker's com-
pensation suit, deprived the defendant's attorney of the representa-
tive's firsthand knowledge and advisory assistance during trial.86
Thus, the court's determinations in Gorman, Casson, and Safeway
Stores suggest that the Court of Appeals of Maryland has adopted a
case-by-case analysis to determine what circumstances justify a party's
exclusion from trial.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Green, the Court of Appeals of Ma-
ryland held that the protections of the ADA did not include vacating a
judgment when a disabled litigant is excluded from the trial.8" Under
the circumstances, the court held that the likely prejudicial effect of
Green's presence on the jury substantially outweighed his common
law and constitutional right to be present at trial.88 Thus, the court
affirmed the trial court's ruling and upheld the reasoning of the
Court of Special Appeals that even if Green had been improperly ex-
cluded, such error would not have been reversible.89
Writing for the majority, Judge Wilner first addressed whether
the ADA was applicable to the issue for appeal in this case.9° As ap-
plied to "public entities," the majority explained that Title II of the
ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in employment
and public services and programs.91 The court observed that viola-
tions of the ADA involving courts have centered primarily on accom-
85. Id. at 184, 562 A.2d at 1245.
86. Id. The court added:
Moreover, a party is entitled to be present to have a firsthand view of the proceed-
ings for purposes of evaluating the constantly changing prospects or exigencies
for settlement, and to participate in tactical decisions that must be made, some-
times quickly, in the course of a trial.... [t]he attorney for [the defendant] was
deprived of the presence at his side of the principal investigator in the case.
Id.
87. Green, 366 Md. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378.
88. Id. at 618, 626, 785 A.2d at 373, 378. The Court of Appeals also considered
whether the change in venue from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to Anne Arundel
County was proper, and held that it was correct. Id. at 612, 785 A.2d at 370. On this issue,
the court held that transferring the case from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to Anne
Arundel County was proper because Green's injury first arose when he was allegedly mis-
diagnosed-at the North Arundel Hospital emergency room. Id. at 612, 785 A.2d at 370.
89. Id. at 618, 785 A.2d at 373.
90. Id. at 615, 785 A.2d at 371. Judges Eldridge, Raker, Cathell and Harrelljoined the
majority opinion. Id. at 601, 785 A.2d at 363. Judge Rodowsky concurred only on the issue
of whether venue was proper. Id. at 627, 785 A.2d at 378.
91. Id. at 615, 785 A.2d at 371-72. The court also noted that private entities are prohib-
ited from discrimination in the operation of public accommodations and services. Id.
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modations to facilitate physical access to the courtroom and services
to enable participation in its proceedings.9 2 Like the lower court, the
Court of Appeals was unable to find case law addressing whether ex-
cluding a disabled person from trial to prevent jury prejudice would
violate the ADA.9" Consequently, the court examined the ADA's com-
plaint procedures to determine if a judicial remedy such as the award-
ing of a new trial or reversal ofjudgment would be available if, in fact,
a violation of the ADA had occurred.9 4 The court determined that
such remedies were not affirmatively granted under the ADA and fur-
ther that a party-specific remedy did not make sense given the fact
that a claim of exclusion from a proceeding could also be brought by
a non-party.95 Concluding that such remedies were inappropriate, the
majority dismissed Green's claim under the ADA.9 6
The court then addressed whether excluding Green from the
proceedings violated his constitutional and common law right to be
present at trial.9 7 The court recognized that, although a party has a
right to be present and to participate in the trial, that right is not
absolute because there are circumstances where a party need not be
present or, as in Green's case, the party has been rightfully ex-
cluded.9 8 The court noted, however, that a party's exclusion under
the circumstances of Green's case was an issue of first impression for
the court.99 After surveying case law from other jurisdictions, the
court adopted the analysis of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in Helminski, adding that a case-by-case balancing of
the particular circumstances of each case was employed by the major-
ity of state and federal courts in addressing this issue. 1° °
The court then balanced Green's right to be present at trial and
the likely prejudicial effect his presence would have on the jury
against the defendants' right to a fair trial.' Because Green was una-
92. Id., 785 A.2d at 372.
93. Id. at 615-16, 785 A.2d at 372.
94. Id. at 616, 785 A.2d at 372.
95. Id. at 618, 785 A.2d at 373. The court noted that the ADA did not specifically
address whether excluding a disabled litigant from trial would violate its provisions. Id. at
617-18, 785 A.2d at 373. Furthermore, the court stated that even if the exclusion consti-
tuted a violation under the ADA, the ADA's remedial provisions did not include "setting
aside a judgment in favor of a private party because a disabled person was wrongfully ex-
cluded from the courtroom." Id, at 618, 785 A.2d at 373.
96. Id. at 618, 785 A.2d at 373.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 618-19, 785 A.2d at 373-74.
99. Id. at 619, 785 A.2d at 374.
100. Id. at 621-22, 626, 785 A.2d at 375, 378.
101. Id. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378.
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ble to communicate, participate in the trial, or comprehend the pro-
ceeding nor could he assist his counsel in any way,' 0 2 the court
reasoned that his presence at trial was not a meaningful exercise of
the right to be present at trial.' Due to his severe condition, he was
unable to consciously assert his right, and thus, the court analogized
Green's presence to an evidentiary exhibit.' 4 Under Maryland Rule
of Evidence 5-403, "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... o105
Consequently, the court concluded that the probative value of
Green's presence was substantially outweighed by its likely prejudicial
effect on the jury and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in excluding Green from the trial. 0 6
Whereas the majority concluded that Green, because of his con-
dition, should be excluded from the courtroom to prevent unfair sym-
pathy from the jury, Chief Judge Bell reasoned that proper jury
instructions would limit the potential prejudice of Green's pres-
ence. 10 7 Furthermore, ChiefJudge Bell cautioned that Green's exclu-
sion from trial because of his physical and mental disabilities
resembled an act of discrimination because it barred a disabled indi-
vidual from benefiting from the same rights as other citizens.1 0 ' Spe-
cifically, Chief Judge Bell argued that Green's exclusion contradicts
the ADA's basic premise of providing the disabled with equal opportu-
102. Id.
103. Id. at 626-27, 785 A.2d at 378. The court stated that "[Green's] presence is not
truly an exercise of his[ ] right of presence, for [he] is incapable of making a conscious
decision in that regard." Id.
104. Id. at 627, 785 A.2d at 378. Specifically, the court commented that "[Green's] pres-
ence is rather as an exhibit-a piece of evidence-that is both irrelevant and prejudi-
cial ...." Id.
105. MD. R. 5403.
106. Green, 366 Md. at 626-27, 785 A.2d at 378.
107. Id. at 655, 789 A.2d at 395.
108. Id. at 659, 785 A.2d at 397-98 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Bell quoted the
arguments of Green and amicus supporting Green stating that with respect to the disabled
party "exclusion broadcasts the message that disabled litigants do not have the same rights
as the rest of us by implying a lower legal status for the disabled, which keeps alive unneces-
sary and unwarranted stereotypes and prejudices against the disabled." Id. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Judge Rodowskyjoined ChiefJudge Bell in his dissent on the issue of
Green's exclusion from the courtroom. ld. at 627, 785 A.2d at 378 (Rodowsky, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). Incidentally, ChiefJudge Bell was alone in his dissent
from the court's holding that the change in venue from the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City to Anne Arundel County was proper. Id. at 627, 785 A.2d at 379 (Bell, C.J., dissent-
ing). ChiefJudge Bell disagreed with the majority's evaluation of when and where Green
first suffered the injury instead of merely deciding whether Baltimore City applied the
appropriate test in determining where the injury occurred. Id. at 641, 785 A.2d at 387.
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nities and access to all aspects of life.'0 9 In addition, Chief Judge Bell
warned that by equating Green's presence in the courtroom to an evi-
dentiary exhibit, and therefore subjecting his right to be present at
trial to the balancing test under Rule 5-403 of the Maryland Rules of
Evidence, the majority ignored the implications of their decision to
the disabled.110 Instead, Chief Judge Bell viewed Green as a disabled
litigant whose rights were discriminated against based on his disabil-
ity.' ' In contrast to the majority, by classifying Green's exclusion as
discrimination against a protected class, Chief Judge Bell applied a
heightened standard of review.'12 ChiefJudge Bell concluded that no
overarching legal ideal existed that was "necessary and compelling,
and narrowly tailored to meet the court's objective" to exclude Green
from the courtroom."' Thus, according to Chief Judge Bell, the
court's interests in excluding Green did not pass strict scrutiny and
therefore the court could not exclude Green because of his
disability.'
14
4. Analysis.-In Green, the Court of Appeals held that the ADA
did not confer an absolute right to a disabled litigant to be present at
trial." 5 The court also held that under the circumstances of the case,
the likely prejudicial effect on the jury of Green's presence at trial
substantially outweighed his common law and constitutional right to
be present at trial." 6 Although the court's holding may appear to
offend the purpose of the ADA and basic notions of due process, it
was the appropriate decision. The court correctly determined that
the remedial provisions of the ADA do not apply to judicial processes
such as participation during trial. 1 7 The court protected the defend-
ants' right to a fair trial,"' and by promoting a case-by-case balancing
test as to the question of exclusion of a party from trial, the court
upheld fundamental legal ideals premised on the court's responsibil-
ity to ensure fairness to all parties." 9 Although fair and correct, the
court's decision will nevertheless be problematic in determining






115. Id. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378
116. Id.
117. Id. at 616-18, 785 A.2d at 372-73.
118. Id. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378.
119. See supra note 100 (noting that the balancing of rights necessary to determine the
question of exclusion depends on the particular facts of the case).
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whether an individual's right to be present has been violated in future
cases. 1
20
a. The Court Correctly Determined that the ADA Does Not Provide
an Absolute Right to Be Present.-The court correctly found Green's
claim that his exclusion from the courtroom violated the ADA to be
misplaced. 12' For the claim to have survived, the ADA would have to
confer an absolute right to the disabled to be present during trial.
Moreover, because the court concluded that the right to be present is
not absolute, 122 the ADA would have to confer a right that was other-
wise not guaranteed by the Constitution. 123 Congress enacted the
ADA to provide a cause of action for discrimination based on a per-
son's disability in specific situations such as employment decisions and
physical access to public facilities, but the Act does not mention rights
within the judicial process as established by the Constitution. 124
Although the ADA seeks to protect the rights of the disabled to
equality in all aspects of life, this should not override the constitu-
tional rights of other citizens within the judicial process. 121 Arguably,
Green's exclusion from the courtroom may have contradicted the
ADA's overarching goals to prevent discrimination against the dis-
abled and to provide the disabled with equal opportunities. 26 Re-
gardless, the court correctly affirmed Green's exclusion from the trial
because of the likely prejudicial effect that his extreme physical and
mental condition would have had on the jury.127 Furthermore, al-
lowing Green to be in the courtroom during the trial's liability phase
would likely have compromised the defendants' right to a fair and
impartial trial.128
As a result, instead of specifically deciding the constitutional is-
sue, the court parried the question by stating that the ADA's scope did
120. The court emphasized a narrow application of its holding. Green, 366 Md. at 626,
785 A.2d at 378. Specifically, the court cautioned that "[our] holding is a narrow one ....
When all of [the] circumstances exist, as they did here, the plaintiffs presence is not truly
an exercise of his/her right of presence, for the plaintiff is incapable of making a con-
scious decision in that regard." Id. at 626-27, 785 A.2d at 378.
121. See id. at 616-17, 785 A.2d at 372 (noting that no provision of federal or state law
allows reversing ajudgment or awarding a new trial as a remedy for violations of the ADA).
122. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (adopting the view that the right to be
present at trial is not absolute).
123. Green, 366 Md. at 616, 785 A.2d at 372.
124. See Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2001) (explaining the legis-
lative intent of the ADA).
125. See id. § 12101 (explaining the purpose and scope of the ADA).
126. Green, 366 Md. at 659, 785 A.2d at 397-98 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
127. Green, 366 Md. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378.
128. Id.
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not extend to the judicial process. 29 Leaving the issue open was ap-
propriate because there is no federal or state statutory provision or
case law suggesting that the ADA applies to the judicial process. 130
Thus, due to the absence of any express or implied link between the
remedies provided by the ADA and the constitutional right to be pre-
sent at one's trial, the court correctly refused to inject additional rem-
edies for potential violations of the ADA by judicial process. 3 '
b. The Court's Balancing of the Circumstances of the Case Ensured
Fairness to Both Parties.-The Court of Appeals' earlier decisions in
Gorman, Casson, and Safeway Stores support its reasoning in Green that
circumstances could validate a party's exclusion from the courtroom
and that the appropriate analysis is a case-by-case determination of
whether the circumstances justify such exclusions.' 3 2 In accord with
the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Helminski, here the Court of Appeals
of Maryland recognized that Green could not be excluded from the
trial's liability phase solely because of his physical or mental condi-
tion.1 33 However, like the rationale asserted in Helminski to exclude
an autistic and retarded child who was unable to speak, because
Green's presence would likely prejudice the jury and he was unable to
comprehend or to assist his attorney in the proceedings, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court had the discretion to
exclude Green.'3 4 Thus, by upholding the trial court's exclusion of
Green, the court extended the logic of earlier Maryland case law and
adopted the reasoning of a majority of the states to determine
whether circumstances resembling those in Greenjustified a party's ex-
clusion from the courtroom.
135
Excluding Green from the liability phase of the trial did not vio-
late his constitutional rights because his presence was of little value to
his counsel or the jury. More importantly, Green's presence would
129. Id. at 616, 785 A.2d at 372.
130. Id. at 615-16, 785 A.2d at 372.
131. Id. at 617-18, 785 A.2d at 373; see 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2001) (Enforcement of Title II
of ADA).
132. Green, 366 Md. at 620, 785 A.2d at 375; see supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text
(discussing that a party's right to be present at trial is not absolute and may be outweighed
by the lack of prejudicial effect on the absent party or by the likelihood of prejudicial effect
on the jury).
133. Green, 366 Md. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378.
134. Id. at 626-27, 785 A.2d at 378.
135. Id. at 620-21, 626-27, 785 A.2d at 375, 378.
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have unfairly prejudiced the jury against the defendants.136 Because
of Green's permanent vegetative state, the court analogized his condi-
tion to an exhibit. 137 The court concluded that any demonstration to
the jury of Green's current condition would be the equivalent of
presenting evidence and, therefore, subject to a balancing test under
Maryland Rules of Evidence, Rule 5-403.13' The court's cold but hon-
est analogy is perhaps the most unsettling aspect of their reasoning
because it strips Green of any human reality that distinguishes him
from the wheelchair to which he is confined or a piece of paper of-
fered for evidence. 139 But as troubling as the analogy may be, it was
the critical logical link that allowed the court to avoid directly deter-
mining the difficult-if not unanswerable-question of which parties'
right to a fair trial is more important. 4 °
Thus, the court sidestepped elevating one party's constitutional
right above the other.141 By concluding that Green's extreme condi-
tion made him the equivalent of an evidentiary exhibit, the court em-
ployed a familiar and more manageable balancing test to determine
the admissibility of evidence.' 42 Accordingly the court determined
the outcome by using the following test: if Green's presence was likely
to unfairly prejudice the jury's determination of the defendants' liabil-
ity, and the prejudicial effect of this evidence substantially outweighed
its probative value, then Green's presence would be inadmissible.' 43
After watching a video of a typical day for Green, the court concluded
that because of his condition, he could not assist his counsel in any
meaningful way nor even comprehend the proceeding. 144 In contrast,
the court decided that Green's presence could only have the effect of
evoking sympathy from the jury for his unfortunate condition.'45 In
balancing these factors, the court concluded that the probative value
136. See id. at 626-27, 785 A.2d at 378 (holding that Green was properly excluded be-
cause the defendants' rights to a fair trial may have been jeopardized by jury sympathy for
Green's condition).
137. Id. at 627, 785 A.2d at 378.
138. Id. Under Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-403, "evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." MD. R. 5-403.
139. Green, 366 Md. at 627, 785 A.2d at 378.
140. See id. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378 (listing the factors present in the case, which pre-
vented Green from truly being able to realize his right to be present).
141. Id. The court's refusal to address the ultimate question of which party had the
greater constitutional right was enhanced by the court's emphasis that its holding was nar-
row. Id.
142. Id. at 627, 785 A.2d at 378; see supra note 138 (describing the balancing of factors
under Maryland Rule of Evidence 5403).
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as evidence of Green's current condition was substantially outweighed
by its likely prejudicial effect on the jury.146 Therefore, under the evi-
dentiary balancing test, Green was inadmissible.
By relying on a balancing test based on the rules of evidence, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland avoided directly determining whether
Green's right to be present was subordinate to the defendants' consti-
tutional right to a fair trial and ensured fairness within the judicial
process to both parties. 47 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees all parties the right to a fair trial. 4 ' The cir-
cumstances of Green's case highlighted a tension between Green's
right to be present at the trial and the defendants' right to a fair and
impartial jury. 4 0 Because fairness is an inherently subjective legal
ideal, determining whether each party received its proportionate
share of due process is best achieved by analyzing the particular cir-
cumstances of the case.150 Given the extreme circumstances in Green,
the court correctly determined that fairness to both Green and the
defendants required affirming the trial court's decision to exclude
Green. 15
1
Similarly, when deciding whether evidence is admissible, a court
must balance the interests of both parties to ensure a fair trial.152
More specifically, the admission of evidence is by its nature a subjec-
tive balancing of relevancy, probative value, and fairness to the parties
that necessarily depends on the disputed issue, the facts, and the pro-
position for which the evidence is offered to prove. Moreover it is the
judge, not the jury, who has the discretion to evaluate the interplay of
146. Id. at 627, 785 A.2d at 378 (stating "[Green's] presence is rather as an exhibit-a
piece of evidence-that is both irrelevant and prejudicial, and thus invokes the balancing
process enunciated in Maryland Rule 5-403"); see also In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 624 F.
Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985). In Richardson-Merre, the court explained:
A fair trial contemplates fairness to both sides. In accordance with Rule 403 a
trial judge must always balance probative value against prejudicial effect, confu-
sion of the issue or misleading the jury. The probative value of a deformed child
or children in the courtroom on an issue of liability alone is nonexistent. The
unfair prejudicial effect of the presence of that child is beyond calculation.
Id. at 1224.
147. Green, 366 Md. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
149. Green, 366 Md. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378.
150. Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md. App. 1, 24, 674 A.2d 1, 12 (1996) (stating that due
process is a flexible concept dependent on the totality of the facts).
151. Green, 366 Md. at 626-27, 785 A.2d at 378.
152. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1224 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
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these factors to determine whether to admit a piece of evidence. 153
Thus, in relying on a balancing test based on rules of evidence, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland appropriately upheld the trial court's
discretion to determine that Green's presence would be prejudicial
and exclude him from the trial.
c. Although Exclusion Was Appropriate for Green, for Mhom Ex-
clusion Becomes Inappropriate Remains Unclear.-Because the circum-
stances of this case are rare, extrapolating the court's narrow holding
to predict future rulings is difficult. The factors affecting the balanc-
ing analysis under Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-403 will change with
each case. Thus, excluding an evidentiary exhibit in one case will
mean little in a subsequent case, unless the numerous factors consid-
ered above mirror one another.
In Green, the court's holding is legally sound, yet subjective be-
cause the court's balancing of factors is unique to Green's extreme
physical and mental disabilities.1 54 Such subjective analysis, coupled
with the extraordinary circumstances of the case, makes it difficult to
predict the future application of the court's analysis to circumstances,
which resemble but do not mirror this case. Green was in a vegetative
state, unable to communicate, participate in his trial, assist his counsel
in any way, or even comprehend the proceedings. 155 Consequently,
the court's decision was appropriate. However, the appropriate result
when the party's physical and mental disabilities are not as debilitating
as Green's or when a child's age prevents full or partial comprehen-
sion of the proceedings remains unclear. 156 The court did not ex-
plain the extent to which an individual must communicate,
participate, assist counsel, or comprehend the proceedings before the
individual's right to be present at trial outweighs any possible jury
prejudice. As a result, even though the court found that Green's con-
dition justified his exclusion, where or how that justification will be
defined in the future remains vague. For these reasons, the court's
solid reasoning and conclusion under the difficult and unusual cir-
153. MD. R. 5-104(a) (providing "the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court...").
154. Green, 366 Md. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378.
155. Id.
156. Compare In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 624 F. Supp. at 1224 (noting that the prejudi-
cial effect of a deformed child in the courtroom during the trial's liability phase exponen-
tially outweighed the probative value of her presence), with Cary v. Oenok, Inc., 940 P.2d
201 (Okla. 1997) (holding that a severely burned young child could not be excluded solely
because of her physical appearance and its effect on the jury, but that her ability to mean-
ingfully comprehend the proceeding and to assist counsel must also be evaluated).
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cumstances of this case is ultimately restricted by the court's failure to
broaden the implications of its holding.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision in
Green to affirm the trial court's exclusion of Green from the court-
room was the appropriate legal conclusion for three reasons.157 First,
because the ADA's remedial provisions do not expressly or impliedly
specify their application to judicial processes, and because no statu-
tory or judicial precedent recommends such application, the court
correctly refused to apply them in this case.15 Second, the court
properly adhered to its responsibility to ensure fairness to all parties at
trial by not allowing Green's morally unsettling exclusion by the trial
court to jeopardize the defendants' equally valid constitutional right
to a fair trial. 59 Finally, the court adequately balanced the rights of
all parties by analogizing Green's severe condition to an evidentiary
exhibit whose admissibility lies within the discretion of the court.' 6°
As a result, the Court of Appeals appropriately concluded that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Green from the
courtroom. 16 ' Despite its legally sound analysis, however, the court's
adoption of a case-by-case balancing test to resolve questions of a
party's right to be present in the courtroom has the unfortunate effect
of rendering future application difficult to predict.
EDWARD S. DIGGES III
157. Green, 366 Md. at 626-27, 785 A.2d at 378.
158. Id. at 617-18, 785 A.2d at 373.
159. Id. at 626, 785 A.2d at 378.
160. See MD. R. 5-104(a). "[T]he admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court .... " Id.
161. Green, 366 Md. at 627, 785 A.2d at 378.
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III. CREDITORS RIGHTS
A. The Discovery Rule Should Apply to a Garnishment Creditor Defrauded
by its Debtor
In Bragunier Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. The Catholic University of
America,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered at what point
the Maryland statute of limitations begins to run for a fraudulent con-
veyance action by way of garnishment.2 The court upheld the Court
of Special Appeals' decision that the statute of limitations barred the
creditor, Bragunier Masonry Contractors, Inc. (BMC), from bringing
its claim more than three years after the cause of action accrued.3 In
affirming the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals premised its
analysis by reiterating that in a garnishment action, the creditor's
rights are limited to those of the debtor. The court, therefore, held
that because the three-year statute of limitations period had run for
the debtor, Edward M. Crough, Inc. (Crough, Inc.), it also had run for
BMC.4 The court then concluded that because the debtor was time
barred from initiating an action against the garnishee, Catholic Uni-
versity (Catholic), the creditor was also barred.' However, the court's
decision ultimately ignored notions of fundamental fairness by
prohibiting BMC's cause of action. Notably, the court should have
first analyzed whether the gift conveyed from Crough, Inc. to Catholic
constituted a fraudulent conveyance. This error notwithstanding, the
court failed to recognize that when an adverse party fraudulently con-
ceals knowledge of a cause of action from another party, the cause of
action cannot be viable until the party discovers the fraud.6 The court
should have held that a garnishment action initiated under the Mary-
land Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act accrues when the de-
frauded creditor knows or reasonably should have known of the facts
and circumstances giving rise to the garnishment action.7 By failing
1. 368 Md. 608, 796 A.2d 744 (2002).
2. Id. at 612-13, 796 A.2d at 747.
3. Id. at 613, 796 A.2d at 747.
4. Id. at 632, 796 A.2d at 758.
5. Id. at 629-30, 796 A.2d at 756-57.
6. See ME. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 5-203 (2002) (stating that "[i]f the knowl-
edge of a cause of action is kept from a party by the fraud of an adverse party, the cause of
action shall be deemed to accrue at the time when the party discovered, or by the exercise
of ordinary diligence should have discovered the fraud").
7. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW. II §§ 15-201 to -214 (2000) (encompassing fourteen
statutes which describe the laws pertaining to fraudulent conveyances). "This subtitle may
be cited as the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act." Id. § 15-214.
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to do so, the court allowed for the possibility that debtors will pur-
posely conspire to defraud creditors by not informing them of all the
facts and circumstances regarding the debt.
1. The Case.-In the late 1980s, Catholic hired Crough, Inc. as a
general contractor for the North Village Residence Project.8 Crough,
Inc. subcontracted with BMC to undertake the project's masonry
work.9 BMC received compensation for only ninety percent of its
work after completing the North Village Residence Project.a° Crough,
Inc. withheld the remaining ten percent, which amounted to
$211,742.42, as retainage." As a result, BMC initiated an action for
breach of contract against Crough, Inc. in the Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County. 12 On December 12, 1991, the court found in favor of
BMC, entering a judgment against Crough, Inc. in the sum of
$211,742.42 plus $5000.00 in attorney's fees.' 3
At approximately the same time that the North Village Residence
Project was being constructed, Catholic considered renovating an old
gymnasium on the University campus.' 4 Catholic's president, Rever-
end William J. Byron approached Edward Crough, the owner of
Crough, Inc., and a Catholic University alumnus,' 5 with a request to
donate funds for the Old Gymnasium Project in exchange for which
the renovated gym would be named the Crough Center for Architec-
ture. 6 Crough, through Crough, Inc., donated materials and services
to the Old Gymnasium Project as a gift-in-kind through the use of a
Construction Manager Agreement (CMA). t7 On June 3, 1988,
8. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 613, 796 A.2d at 747. The North Village Residence Project
was a construction project to add a dormitory to Catholic's campus. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 613-14, 796 A.2d at 747. The court noted that
"Retainage" is a percentage amount customarily withheld by an owner and/or a
general contractor from the general contractor or subcontractor, as the case may
be, until the total project, including "punch list" items, is complete and the job is
accepted by the owner. Generally, if there are no problems with the performance
of the contract or sub-contract, the retainage is paid upon the project's final
acceptance.
Id. at 614 n.2, 796 A.2d at 747 n.2.
12. Id. at 618, 796 A.2d at 749.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 614, 796 A.2d at 747.
15. Id. at 613, 796 A.2d at 747.
16. Id. at 614, 796 A.2d at 747.
17. Id. The CMA was a general contract for Crough, Inc. to construct a building on
Catholic's property. Id. The CMA was forty-five pages long and had seven pages of attach-
ments. Catholic Univ. v. Bragunier, 139 Md. App. 277, 286, 775 A.2d 458, 463 (2001).
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Crough, Inc. and Catholic executed the CMA.18 The written agree-
ment called for a total payment to Crough, Inc. of $3,149,000 but the
parties reached an understanding that no payments would be made
because the project was a gift.19 Although Catholic never made a pay-
ment pursuant to the oral understanding between the parties,
Crough, Inc. continued to reflect a charge to Catholic of $3,149,000
in its financial records.2 0
During the construction of the Old Gymnasium Project, Crough,
Inc. began to encounter financial difficulties. 2 ' Because of health
problems, Crough delegated management of the company to the Vice
President, Richard Johnson.2 2 Johnson was unaware that the Old
Gymnasium Project was a gift from Crough Inc. to Catholic and thus
became concerned that Catholic had not made any payments pursu-
ant to the CMA. z3
After completion of the project in October 1989, Johnson met
with Father Byron and other representatives of Catholic, on February
12, 1990, to discuss why Crough, Inc. had not yet received payment. 24
For the first time, Johnson was informed that the Old Gymnasium
Project was a gift from Crough Inc., and therefore no payment would
be forthcoming.2 5 Johnson, concerned the company could not afford
to donate its services, requested that Catholic pay Crough, Inc. a re-
duced amount of $2,000,000.26 In lieu of the requested payment,
Catholic's Board of Trustees offered to lend Crough, Inc. $1,257,000
to help Crough, Inc. pay the subcontractors for the Old Gymnasium
Project.27
Subsequently, Crough met with Father Byron and gave him a let-
ter stating that "it is now and always has been my intention to pay for
the total cost of the renovation of the old gymnasium as a gift to the





23. Id. at 616, 796 A.2d at 748.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id., 796 A.2d at 748-49. The $2,000,000 was requested in order to pay not only the
subcontractors on the Old Gymnasium Project, but also BMC for its work on the North
Village Residence Project. Id. at 616 n.5, 796 A.2d at 749 n.5. However, the record is
unclear as to whether Catholic knew that the $2,000,000 requested included payment to
the subcontractors on the North Village Residence Project. Id.
27. Id. at 617, 796 A.2d at 749. Catholic chose to lend Crough, Inc. the funds to pre-
vent subcontractor liens on the property. Id. at 617 n.6, 796 A.2d at 749 n.6.
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University. ' 28 Catholic, in turn, provided Crough with several checks
totaling $1,257,000 payable to both Crough, Inc. and the subcontrac-
tors who worked on the Old Gymnasium Project.2 9 Crough promised
to repay the loan over the next twelve years. 30 He then signed a "Final
Release of Claims and Lien Waiver," certifying that Crough, Inc. had
received payment of $1,275,000 as compensation for its work on the
Old Gymnasium Project, notwithstanding that the total cost of the
project, $3,149,000, was never due to be paid to Crough, Inc.31
Crough, Inc. paid its debts to the subcontractors on the Old Gymna-
sium Project but was still unable to satisfy BMC's claim of $211,742.42
for work on the North Village Residence Project.3 2 From this time
forward, Crough, Inc. became insolvent and was unable to pay the
remainder of its debts.3 3
In an effort to recover the $211,742.42 debt, BMC's attorney con-
ferred with Johnson on July 31, 1992. 3' During this conversation,
BMC first learned of Crough, Inc.'s gift to Catholic and its execution
of the "Final Release of Claims and Lien Waiver."3 5 Having learned
that Crough, Inc. had only received $1,257,000 from Catholic for the
Old Gymnasium Project, leaving a balance of $1,892,000 as an uncol-
lected account receivable on Crough, Inc.'s financial records, BMC
sought to collect the amount due directly from Catholic.3 6 After Cath-
olic refused to pay, BMC attempted to garnish the funds owed to
them.
On November 29, 1994, BMC filed a Request for Writ of Garnish-
ment in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against Catholic
predicated upon the judgment BMC obtained against Crough, Inc. in
1991.38 BMC alleged that the CMA between Catholic and Crough,
Inc. was a binding contract pursuant to which Catholic was to pay
Crough, Inc. the full $3,149,000 amount reflected in the contract and
not the lesser $1,257,000 "loan" amount.39 Thus, the unpaid balance
of $1,892,000 was Crough, Inc.'s property, but in possession of Catho-





33. Id. at 618, 796 A.2d at 749.
34. Id., 796 A.2d at 749-50.




39. Id. at 619, 796 A.2d at 750.
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lic and therefore subject to garnishment.4" Additionally, BMC
claimed that the execution of the Release and Waiver was a fraudulent
conveyance under section 15-209 of the Commercial Law Article of
the Maryland Code because Crough, Inc. was insolvent at the time it
was executed.4 1 Therefore, BMC argued that the debt forgiveness
rendered by Crough should be disregarded.4 2 BMC claimed the bal-
ance of $1,892,000 owed was still Crough, Inc.'s property, and because
it was in Catholic's possession, it was subject to attachment.4"
Catholic responded to BMC's complaint by denying that it was in
possession of Crough, Inc.'s property.4" Catholic also raised the de-
fense of limitations and upon this ground moved for summary judg-
ment, which was subsequently denied by the circuit court.45 After
trial, the circuit court entered judgment for BMC upon finding that
the complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations because
BMC filed its request for writ of garnishment within three years from
the date they discovered Catholic had possession of funds subject to
attachment by garnishment.46 BMC was awarded $381,136.53 in dam-
ages by the court.47
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court's award,
holding that BMC's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.48
The court held that the discovery rule did not apply to determining
the start of the general three-year statute of limitations period.49 BMC
and Catholic filed Petitions for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Ap-
peals, both of which were granted.50 The parties together presented
nine issues for adjudication by the court, however, the court focused
40. Id.
41. Id. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 15-209(a) (2000). Section 15-209(a) states:
If a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim has ma-
tured, the creditor ... may: (1) have the conveyance set aside or obligation an-
nulled to the extent necessary to satisfy the claim; or (2) levy on or garnish the
property conveyed as if the conveyance were not made.
Id. Under section 15-204, "[e]very conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a
person who is or will be rendered insolvent by it is fraudulent as to creditors without re-
gard to his actual intent, if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a
fair consideration." Id. § 15-204 (2000).
42. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 619, 796 A.2d at 750.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 619-20, 796 A.2d at 750.
46. Id. at 620, 796 A.2d at 751.
47. Id. The amount awarded to BMC consisted of $211,742.42 from its original judg-
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solely on the threshold issue of whether BMC's claim was time barred
by the statute of limitations, thus mooting the remaining issues.5"
2. Legal Background. -Maryland's general statute of limitations
provides a three-year time period for injured parties to file claims. 2
However, the strictness of the statute led to the creation of various
exceptions, including the discovery rule.5" The discovery rule delays
the statute of limitations from running until the injured party discov-
ers or reasonably should have discovered the cause of action. 54 In
particular, where a cause of action is induced by fraud, the Court of
Appeals has held that the action does not accrue until it is first discov-
ered by the injured party.55
The Court of Appeals has not considered the issue of whether the
discovery rule applies in the context of garnishment proceedings.
The nature of the garnishment proceeding is unique in that the rights
of third parties are implicated.5 6 In a garnishment proceeding, a
creditor's rights are subrogated to the rights of the debtor.5 7 Thus, if
a debtor could not bring a cause of action against a third party, the
creditor is generally precluded from bringing the same cause of ac-
tion.58 The Court of Appeals, however, has identified exceptions to
the subrogation rule when a creditor is defrauded by the debtor's ac-
51. Id. at 611-13, 796 A.2d at 745-46. BMC presented two questions for the court's
review, while Catholic presented seven questions. ld. Both parties posed the question of
whether BMC's claim was time barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 611-12, 796 A.2d
at 745-46. BMC also posed the question of whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in
reversing and remanding the trial court ruling because the trial court did not consider the
parole evidence rule and equitable estoppel principles in its analysis. Id. at 611, 796 A.2d
at 746. Catholic posed the additional questions of (1) whether the Court of Special Ap-
peals correctly decided that evidence establishing a lack of intent by Catholic to create a
binding contract with Crough, Inc. should have been considered by the trial court; (2)
whether District of Columbia law should have applied; (3) whether the mandatory lan-
guage of garnishment rules operates to preclude recovery; (4) whether the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals erred by allowing subject matterjurisdiction to stand in Maryland even though
the property was in the District of Columbia; (5) whether there was a lack of proof that
there was a fraudulent conveyance; and, (6) whether nine years of post-judgment interest
accumulated was properly imposed on Catholic. Id. at 612-13, 796 A.2d at 746.
52. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 5-101 (2002) (stating that "a civil action at law
shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the
Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced").
53. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 634, 431 A.2d 677, 679 (1981).
54. Id. at 634-35, 431 A.2d at 679.
55. See Brack v. Evans, 230 Md. 548, 554-55, 187 A.2d 880, 883-84 (1963).




tions involving a third party.59 In these situations, the creditor enjoys
rights greater than that of the debtor.60
a. Maryland's General Statute of Limitations and the Discovery
Rule Exception.--Maryland's general statute of limitations was enacted
for three reasons: (1) to provide adequate time for plaintiffs to file
suit, (2) to provide defendants recourse where a plaintiff has unrea-
sonably delayed in filing an action, and (3) to preserve judicial econ-
omy.6 Historically, the statute of limitations began to run when the
cause of action accrued.6 2 Under this rigid rule, claims were automat-
ically barred if the cause of action was discovered after the limitations
period had started.6" A plaintiff who had "slumbered on his rights"
was no different from one who was "blamelessly ignorant."6 4 The
Court of Appeals found this application of the general rule overly
harsh, and subsequently adopted the "discovery rule."6 5
The discovery rule delays the beginning of the statute of limita-
tions period for a cause of action when a plaintiff knows or reasonably
should have known about the claim.66 This rule was first recognized
in Hahn v. Claybrook,6" where a claim for medical malpractice was
barred because the plaintiff learned of her injury more than three
years before filing suit.6" The plaintiff, Mary Ellen Hahn, brought the
claim against her doctor for prescribing a drug, argentum oxide,
which caused discoloration of her skin.6 9 Although the court recog-
nized that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the
potential claim is discovered, the court determined this occurred
when Hahn discovered the discoloration in 1908.7o Therefore, when
59. See Arthur v. Morrow Bros., 131 Md. 59, 67-68, 101 A. 777, 780 (1917) (stating that
when property has been fraudulently conveyed, the grantee may also be charged as a
garnishee).
60. See Odend'hal, 48 Md. at 445.
61. Pennwalt Corp. v. Nastos, 314 Md. 433, 437-38, 550 A.2d 1155, 1158 (1988) (citing
Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 665, 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1983)); see
also supra note 52 (providing the language of the statute).
62. Doe v. Maskell, 342 Md. 684, 689, 679 A.2d 1087, 1089 (1996).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 690, 679 A.2d at 1089 (quoting Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324,
334, 635 A.2d 394, 399 (1994) (citing Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83,
394 A.2d 299, 306 (1978))).
65. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 634, 431 A.2d 677, 679 (1981).
66. Id. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680.
67. 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917).
68. Id. at 187, 100 A. at 86.
69. Id. at 180, 100 A. at 84.
70. Id. at 186-87, 100 A. at 86.
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she filed the cause of action in 1915 it was barred by the statute of
limitations.7'
The rule was eventually extended to include not only medical
malpractice cases, but all professional malpractice claims.7 2 Eventu-
ally, in Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp."3 the Court of Appeals
further extended the discovery rule to cases involving latent disease."
In Harig, Frances Harig brought an action against the Johns-Manville
Products Corporation claiming that her exposures to asbestos be-
tween 1940 through 1955 caused her to develop cancer.7 5 HaNg, how-
ever, did not discover she had cancer until late 1975 or early 1976,
more than thirty years after being exposed to asbestos. 76 Harig filed
her claim in 1977, in response to which Johns-Manville asserted a de-
fense of limitations.77 The Court of Appeals held that the discovery
rule should be applied to cases involving latent disease. 78 The court
reasoned that "[1]ike the victim of undiscoverable malpractice a per-
son incurring disease years after exposure cannot have known of the
existence of the tort until some injury manifests itself.' 79
The court continued to expand the discovery rule by making it
"applicable generally in all civil actions and [that] the cause of action
accrues when the claimant in fact knew or reasonably should have
known of the wrong."8 ° In Poffenberger v. Risser,8  Howard W. Pof-
fenberger sued the builder of his home for breach of contract and
negligence.82 In 1972, Poffenberger instructed the builder to con-
struct his house in the center of the construction lot and to comply
with all of the required building restrictions.8" The builder failed to
71. Id. at 187, 100 A. at 86.
72. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 635, 431 A.2d 677, 679 (1981).
73. 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978).
74. Id. at 83, 394 A.2d at 306.
75. Id. at 72, 394 A.2d at 300-01.
76. Id. at 72-73, 394 A.2d at 300-01.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 83, 394 A.2d at 306.
79. Id. at 80, 394 A.2d at 305.
80. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981). The court
expanded the definition of the discovery rule to include all civil actions because they
sensed "no valid reason why [the] rule's sweep should not be applied to prevent an injus-
tice in other types of cases." Id. Since Poffenberger, the discovery rule has been applied in
several contexts. See, e.g., Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 338-39, 635 A.2d
394, 401-02 (1994) (applying the doctrine of adverse domination to toll the running of the
statutes of limitations by a corporation against its officers and directors as long as they
constitute a majority of the board of directors).
81. 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981).
82. Id. at 633, 431 A.2d at 678.
83. Id. Poffenberger's home was built fifty-one feet from the North boundary line and
eight feet from the South boundary line. Id. This complied neither with the request that
20031
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
comply with the restrictions, which Poffenberger did not discover un-
til 1976, four years after he had been residing there.8 4 Because the
house was completed in 1972, the builder argued that the three-year
statute of limitations barred the cause of action.8 5 The court dis-
agreed, finding that to bar the action would be unfair to Poffenberger
and held that the statute of limitations began when the claimant knew
or reasonably should have known about the wrong. 6 Thus, the
court's broad application made the discovery rule the general rule
rather than the exception. 7
b. The Discovery Rule as Applied to Fraudulent Conveyances.-
The court further expanded application of the discovery rule in Brack
v. Evans,"8 holding that the statute of limitations should be tolled to
prevent fraudulent transactions.8 9 In Brack, William F. Brack brought
suit against the trading firm of Stein Bros. & Boyce and an employee
for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations made during a stock
transaction.9" The company asserted the statute of limitations as a de-
fense.9 Brack relied on Article 57, section 14 of the Maryland Code,
which provided:
In all actions where a party has a cause of action of which he
has been kept in ignorance by the fraud of the adverse party,
the right to bring suit shall be deemed to have first accrued
the home be built in the center of the lot, nor the restrictions, which provided that "no
portion of any building except open porches and steps shall be located within 15 feet of
any other side lot line." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 635-36, 431 A.2d at 680.
87. See id. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680; see also Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 442,
550 A.2d 1155, 1160 (1988). In Pennwalt, the Court of Appeals held that Nasios's medical
products liability claim began to accrue when she discovered that she was injured as a
result of an injection of the anesthetic Nesacaine, a Pennwalt Corporation product. Id. at
435, 455-56, 550 A.2d at 1156, 1166. The court determined the discovery rule to apply in
the interest of judicial economy and fairness to Nasios. Id. at 456, 550 A.2d at 1167. Al-
though the discovery rule is now the rule rather than an exception, its application is not
without limits. See Doe v. Maskell, 342 Md. 684, 695, 679 A.2d 1087, 1092 (1996) (holding
that the repression of memories as a result of sexual abuse does not activate the discovery
rule).
88. 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963).
89. Id. at 556, 187 A.2d at 884.
90. Id. at 550-51, 187 A.2d at 881.
91. Id. at 551, 187 A.2d at 881. Brack's suit was filed on December 28, 1961, which was
more than three years from when the stock was purchased on November 24, 1958. Id. at
550-51, 187 A.2d at 881. But the suit was filed less than three years from when Brack
discovered that the company, on January 3, 1959, had made negligent and fraudulent mis-
representations upon which he had relied in purchasing the stock. Id. at 553, 187 A.2d at
882-83.
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at the time at which such frauds shall or with usual or ordi-
nary diligence might have been known or discovered. 2
The court agreed with Brack's assertion and thus concluded that the
statute of limitations period did not begin until the time Brack discov-
ered the fraudulent misrepresentation.9"
c. The Discovery Rule as Applied to Fraudulent Conveyances in
Garnishment Proceedings. -Fraudulent conveyances were recognized at
common law "to protect the rights of creditors against all dispositions
of property which result in fraud."9 4 As early as the year 1570, the
British Parliament enacted the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, Chapter 5 de-
claring void "any conveyance made with intent to delay, hinder, or
defraud creditors."9 5 Today, it is well-established that a debtor cannot
voluntarily convey property or funds, which otherwise could be used
to pay its debts, because such a conveyance is fraudulent as to its
creditors.9
6
In Maryland, creditors have two remedies against those who
fraudulently transfer property to avoid paying their debts-have the
conveyance set aside or garnish funds.9 7 Garnishment proceedings
permit creditors to secure property or funds owned by the debtor, but
in the possession of a third party.9" However, the ability of the credi-
tor to garnish funds depends upon the rights that exist between the
92. Id. at 554, 187 A.2d at 883; MD. ANN. CODE art. 57, § 14 (1957). The current ver-
sion of the statute states that "[i] f the knowledge of a cause of action is kept from a party by
the fraud of an adverse party, the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue at the time
when the party discovered, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence should have discovered
the fraud." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-203 (2002).
93. Brack, 230 Md. at 556, 187 A.2d at 884.
94. Westminster Sav. Bank v. Sauble, 183 Md. 628, 630, 39 A.2d 862, 863 (1944). The
court concluded that funds willed to the decedent's daughters were fraudulent transfers as
to his creditors because the decedent was in "dire financial circumstances" at the time of
the conveyance and there was not sufficient consideration given. Id. at 631-33, 39 A.2d at
863-64.
95. Id. at 630, 39 A.2d at 863 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lutherville
Supply & Equip. Co. v. Dimon, 232 Md. 195, 197, 192 A.2d 496, 498 (1963). Maryland's
equivalent of this statute, the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (MUFCA),
states that "[elvery conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent as
distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud present or future
creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAw II § 15-207 (2000).
96. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 15-207; see also Lutherville, 232 Md. at 197, 192 A.2d
at 498 (holding that a cause of action alleging that a debtor attempted to circumvent col-
lection by his creditors by giving funds or property to his spouse was sufficient to withstand
a demurrer).
97. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw. II § 15-209 (2000).




garnishee and the debtor in respect to the attachment." Addition-
ally, the garnishee must have "funds, property or credits in his hands
belonging to the debtor," for which the garnishor would have a right
to sue. 00
The Court of Appeals established an exception to this general
rule in Odend'hal v. Devlin."°1 John Devlin filed suit against Sebastian
Odend'hal to garnish merchandise sold to his wife.' °2 Sebastian
Odend'hal argued that the cause of action was invalid because in or-
der for a creditor to recover from him, his wife would also have to be
able to recover from him.10 3 Because no cause of action could exist
between a husband and a wife, Odend'hal argued garnishment pro-
ceedings could not survive. 14 The court disagreed and found that
even if the debtor could not maintain a suit against the garnishee, the
garnishor may have a remedy if the garnishor can establish that the
debtor's property was fraudulently conveyed to a third party.10 5
The Court of Appeals applied this exception in Farley v. Colver. ' 6
Therein, the court held that Alonzo H. Colver was able to garnish
funds from James F. Farley for the debt owed to him by John E. Cop-
persmith.10 7 Farley conceded that he did have funds available to
cover the debt owed to Colver, but argued that the funds belonged to
Coppersmith's wife and not to Coppersmith."0 8 The court deter-
mined that Coppersmith's transfer of property to his wife was made
with the intent to defraud his creditors, after the attachment had been
issued, and without consideration. 1 9 Thus, the court concluded that
the garnishee had funds and property which were subject to
attachment. 110
Similarly, in Arthur v. Morrow Brothers,"' the court found that Ar-
thur & Boyle brought a valid garnishment action against general con-
tractors, Morrow Brothers." 2 Morrow Brothers contracted with
subcontractor, James G. Parlett to perform construction work for the
99. Odend'hal v. Devlin, 48 Md. 439, 444 (1878).
100. Id.
101. 48 Md. 439.
102. Id. at 443-44.
103. Id. at 444.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 445.
106. 113 Md. 379, 77 A. 589 (1910).
107. Id. at 381, 387-88, 77 A. at 590, 592.
108. Id. at 381-82, 77 A. at 590.
109. Id. at 387, 77 A. at 592.
110. Id. at 387-88, 77 A. at 592.
111. 131 Md. 59, 101 A. 777 (1917).
112. Id. at 69, 101 A. at 780.
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State Normal School Building."' 3 Parlett then subcontracted to Car-
ozza Brothers & Company, who in turn subcontracted the tunneling
work to Arthur & Boyle. 14 For their work, Arthur & Boyle received
$1,890 as partial payment.' 15 Arthur & Boyle sued Parlett for the re-
maining amount due, resulting in a $4,409.05 judgment." 6 An at-
tachment was issued on the judgment and given to Morrow Brothers
to satisfy the judgment. 7 Morrow Brothers claimed to only have
$250 in funds or property value that belonged to Partlett." s The
court agreed and ruled that Arthur & Boyle were limited to a judg-
ment of $250.19 On appeal, Arthur & Boyle argued that Morrow
Brothers had more of Partlett's funds in their possession because Mor-
row Brothers still owed Partlett the balance from the work completed
on the tunnel.1 20 Morrow Brothers countered that because Partlett
and Carozza Brothers & Company had released Morrow Brothers
from all possible suits and debts, Arthur & Boyle had no remaining
cause of action. 21  Notwithstanding the release of all claims, the court
held that the release did not specifically cover tunneling and there-
fore Partlett had standing to sue Morrow Brothers for those funds sub-
ject to garnishment by Arthur & Boyle. 122 The court further stated
that even if releasing all claims included tunneling, the release was
still fraudulent because it rendered Partlett insolvent and lacked ade-
quate consideration. 23  Thus, Arthur & Boyle had a valid claim
against Morrow Brothers. 124
In Dodson v. Temple Hill Baptist Church, Inc.,1 25 the court held that
where a gift was deemed a fraudulent conveyance, the creditor had a
right to pursue the property, funds or credit in an attachment pro-
ceeding.126 Dodson was an attorney who represented Reverend Wil-
113. Id. at 60, 101 A. at 777.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 61, 101 A. at 777.
116. Id. Originally, Arthur & Boyle sued Morrow Brothers for this debt, but lost. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. This amount was the amount that Morrow Brothers claimed was owed to Par-
tlett for grading and landscaping. Id., 101 A. at 777-78.
119. Id., 101 A. at 778.
120. Id. at 62, 101 A. at 778.
121. Id. at 62-63, 101 A. at 778.
122. Id. at 67, 101 A. at 779. Partlett's release specifically referred to grading and land-
scaping, therefore the court determined that had the parties intended to refer to tunnel-
ing, they could have easily done so. Id. at 64, 101 A. at 778.
123. Id. at 68, 101 A. at 780.
124. Id. at 68-69, 101 A. at 780.
125. 248 Md. 697, 238 A.2d 239 (1967).
126. See id. at 703, 238 A.2d at 242.
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liam B. Adams, pastor of Temple Hill Baptist Church. 2 7 Dodson's
attorney's fees were contingent upon Adams prevailing in a lawsuit
against the United States. 2 ' The suit was successful and Adams was
awarded $9,552 from the government, but refused to pay any attor-
ney's fees to Dodson.129 Dodson initiated a fee action against Adams
and recovered a $1,611.82 judgment.3 0 Adams claimed that the
funds were in fact not available because he had previously given the
money to the church as a gift.' Dodson subsequently brought a gar-
nishment action against the church to recover the fees owed.' 3 2 The
court found that even though Adams was prohibited from suing the
church to recover the funds, because it was a gift, Dodson had a valid
claim because as his debtor, Adams fraudulently conveyed the prop-
erty in question to the church.
133
Maryland law is thus well-established as it pertains to the rights of
creditors making claims against debtors who voluntarily convey prop-
erty to circumvent the rights of their creditors.13 1 Pre-existing credi-
tors and subsequent creditors have a right of action against a debtor
who voluntarily conveys property when it is determined that the con-
veyance is fraudulent or made with the intent to defraud. 5 Even if
there is valid consideration for the voluntary conveyance, the court
may still find that a fraudulent intent existed when elements such as
"insolvency or heavy indebtedness of the grantor . . . [and] conceal-
ment or secrecy" are evident.
36
Thus, the court has held that a creditor's rights are generally sub-
rogated to the rights of the debtor. 37 If a debtor has no standing to
file suit against a third party then neither does the creditor. 38 How-
ever, where the debtor fraudulently transferred funds or property to
the garnishee, then the creditor can bring a cause of action and is not




131. Id. at 700, 238 A.2d at 241.
132. Id. at 700-01, 238 A.2d at 241. The trial court found in favor of the church and did
not allow Dodson to offer any evidence indicating that the $9,552, which Adams gave to
the church, was a fraudulent conveyance. Id. at 701-02, 238 A.2d at 241-42.
133. Id. at 703, 238 A.2d at 242.
134. Turner v. Hudson Cement & Supply Co., 133 Md. 134, 142, 104 A. 455, 458 (1918).
135. Id. at 143, 104 A. at 458.
136. Westminster Sav. Bank v. Sauble, 183 Md. 628, 631, 39 A.2d 862, 864 (1944); see also
MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW II § 15-207 (2000).
137. Odend'hal v. Devlin, 48 Md. 439, 444 (1878).
138. Id.
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subrogated to the rights of the debtor.'39 This exception discourages
fraud and protects those who are innocent and honest. 140
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Bragunier, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland upheld the Court of Special Appeals' finding that Mary-
land's general three-year statute of limitations period barred BMC's
garnishment action against Catholic."' The court reiterated that in a
garnishment proceeding, "the creditor steps into the shoes of the
debtor" and is "subrogated to any rights the judgment debtor [might]
ha[ve] against the garnishee. 14 2 The court then determined that the
statute of limitations period for a potential claim against Catholic be-
gan to run in October 1989, when the Old Gymnasium Project was
completed; therefore, the claim brought by BMC more than five years
later was barred. 1
4 3
The court concluded that the only possible cause of action
Crough, Inc. could have against Catholic was a breach of contract
claim for nonpayment of its work on the Old Gymnasium Project com-
pleted in October 1989.144 Thus, Crough, Inc. had three years to pur-
sue such a claim, from October 1989 through October 1992.145 When
BMC initiated its garnishment action against Catholic, in 1994, BMC
only possessed the same rights as Crough, Inc.'4 6 In response, the
court concluded that the statute of limitations for Crough, Inc. to pur-
sue a claim had tolled, and thus Crough, Inc. was not entitled to re-
lief.'4 7 Therefore, when BMC, as ajudgment creditor, "step [ped] into
the shoes" of Crough, Inc., they were similarly barred by the statute of
limitations. 148
The court recognized, however, that BMC could successfully
bring a claim against Catholic if the discovery rule applied.149 In ap-
139. Id. at 445.
140. Arthur v. Morrow Bros., 131 Md. 59, 68, 101 A. 777, 780 (1917).
141. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 632-33, 796 A.2d at 758.
142. Id. at 629, 796 A.2d at 756. The court reasoned that had it reached the conclusion
that the statute of limitations period started to run in November 1992, the time when BMC
discovered that Catholic had funds which could be attached, then the court would be
granting BMC greater rights then its debtor, Crough, Inc. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 629-30, 796 A.2d at 756. In Maryland, the general statute of limitations pe-
riod is three years. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 5-101 (2002).
146. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 629, 796 A.2d at 756.
147. Id. at 630, 796 A.2d at 756-57.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 632, 796 A.2d at 758 (noting that the discovery rule did not apply because
Crough, Inc. had adequate notice). The discovery rule applies to claims such that the
limitation period does not run until a plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known
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plying the discovery rule to the case, the court limited its application
to conduct between Crough, Inc. and Catholic, excluding conduct be-
tween BMC and Catholic.15 ° The court determined that Crough, Inc.
was aware of the completion of the "Old Gymnasium Project" in Octo-
ber 1989.151 Therefore, when Catholic's payment was not made to
Crough, Inc. on the date of completion of the project, the "discovery"
of a potential breach occurred. 152 Thus, if Crough, Inc. had standing
to bring an action against Catholic, the statute of limitations would
begin to run at the time Crough, Inc. discovered or should have dis-
covered the potential breach. 153 The fact that BMC discovered the
potential breach at a later date, the court concluded, was irrelevant to
the issue of when the statute of limitations period began.
1 54
Therefore, the court affirmed the Court of Special Appeals' judg-
ment that the discovery rule does not apply to garnishment proceed-
ings to extend the statute of limitations until the judgment creditor
learns of funds which can be garnished. "1 5 5 The court held that ajudg-
ment creditor is not entitled to greater rights than that of the judg-
ment debtor. 156 Thus, BMC's garnishment action was barred by the
statute of limitations from recovering funds from Catholic.' 57
4. Analysis.-In Bragunier, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that BMC's garnishment action against Catholic was barred by
the statute of limitations.1 5' The discovery rule, as established in Pof-
fenberger, should apply to garnishment proceedings such that the stat-
ute of limitations does not begin to run until a defrauded creditor
knows or reasonably should have known of the facts and circum-
stances giving rise to the cause of action. 151 In Bragunier, the Court of
Appeals should have held the three-year statute of limitations began
to run from July 31, 1992, the day that BMC discovered the alleged
when a cause of action accrues. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677,
680 (1981).




154. Id. at 628, 796 A.2d at 755-56. The court also noted that there was no indication
that Catholic was aware of the debt Crough, Inc. owed to BMC. Id. Thus, the court con-
cluded that Catholic had not interfered with the timing of BMC's garnishment action. Id.
155. Id. at 632, 796 A.2d at 758.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 632-33, 796 A.2d at 758.
158. Id. at 613, 796 A.2d at 746.
159. See Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981) (expanding
the discovery rule to "all actions").
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fraudulent conveyance.' 60 The court, instead of first considering
whether a fraudulent conveyance had in fact been made, chose not to
apply the discovery rule, reasoning that its application would give
BMC greater rights than held by the debtor, Crough, Inc.'61 As a re-
sult, the court held that the statute of limitations began to run in Oc-
tober, 1989 when the project for which Crough, Inc. could have
maintained a possible cause of action was completed. 162
Although it is well-established that a creditor's rights are subro-
gated to the rights of its debtors, the court missed an opportunity to
carve out an appropriate exception to this rule for situations when the
debtor may have fraudulently conveyed property or funds to a third
party.163 By focusing on whether BMC's rights against Catholic would
have exceeded those enjoyed by Crough, Inc., the court failed to rec-
ognize that the actions of Crough, Inc. in fact reduced the ability of
BMC to recover the funds it was owed. The Court of Appeals has rec-
ognized the basic injustice in permitting the statute of limitations to
run before a claimant knows or reasonably should have known of a
cause of action, and thus has extended the discovery rule to all actions
in law.' 6 4 Similarly, the Maryland legislature has concluded that when
a claimant is prevented from learning of a cause of action because of
an adverse party's fraudulent conduct, the statute of limitations pe-
riod begins when the claimant discovers or reasonably should have
discovered a cause of action exists. 165 Because of the injustices to
BMC and the breadth of the discovery rule's application, the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that BMC's cause of action was time
barred. 66
a. The Court of Appeals Should Have Applied the Discovery Rule to
BMC.-The court missed an opportunity to carve out an appropriate
exception to the general statute of limitations. Maryland's statute of
limitations provides for a three-year period of time before a claimant
must file an action.' 6 7 In Bragunier, the court determined that the
statute of limitations began running in October 1989 upon comple-
160. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 618, 796 A.2d at 749-50.
161. Id. at 629, 796 A.2d at 756.
162. Id. at 616, 628-29, 796 A.2d at 748, 756.
163. Odend'hal v. Devlin, 48 Md. 439, 444-45 (1878).
164. Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680.
165. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-203 (2002).
166. See supra notes 66-93 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the dis-
covery rule).
167. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (2002).
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tion of construction of the Old Gymnasium Project.1 68 The court rea-
soned that this was the earliest point at which Crough, Inc. could have
brought an action against Catholic arising out of the Old Gymnasium
Project, and therefore the earliest date that BMC, as a creditor, could
bring an action against Catholic. 169 However, the court, in identifying
October 1989 as the starting point for the statute of limitations, failed
to recognize that BMC had no knowledge of the alleged fraudulent
conveyance untilJuly 31, 1992.170 Therefore, BMC should have been
able to exercise its right to bring a cause of action beginning from July
31, 1992 until three years later on July 31, 1995. Because the garnish-
ment proceeding in this case was commenced on November 29, 1994,
within the permitted three years, the cause of action should not have
been time barred.
The discovery rule allows a claimant's cause of action to accrue
when the wrong is first discovered or reasonably should have been
discovered.17 t If the discovery rule is not applied, there is no way to
differentiate between a plaintiff who has "slumbered on his rights"
and one who was ignorant of the cause of the action. 17 2 The plaintiff
who is ignorant of the cause of action suffers harsh consequences by
learning of the claim after the statute of limitations has run. 17 3 In this
case, BMC suffered by not being able to bring a direct action against
Crough, Inc. to recover on the funds owed. 17 4 The court should have
applied the discovery rule so as not to infringe on BMC's rights and
preclude them from filing suit.17
5
b. The Court ofAppeals Failed to Recognize Crough Inc. 's Potential
Fraudulent Conveyance to Catholic.-In Bragunier, the court's first error
was its failure to first consider the potential fraudulent conveyance
made by Crough, Inc.'7 6 After completion of the Old Gymnasium
Project, Catholic "loaned" Crough, Inc. $1,257,000 of the $3,149,000
that it potentially owed for the project, leaving a balance of
168. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 629-30, 796 A.2d at 756.
169. Id. at 629, 796 A.2d at 756 (reasoning that the creditor is subrogated only to the
fights of its debtor).
170. Id. at 618, 796 A.2d at 749-50.
171. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981).
172. Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 334, 635 A.2d 394, 399 (1994).
173. Id.
174. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 610, 796 A.2d at 745.
175. See Hecht, 333 Md. at 334, 635 A.2d at 399.
176. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 628, 796 A.2d at 755 (explaining that there was not a fraudu-
lent conveyance between Crough, Inc. and Catholic because Catholic had no knowledge of
any debts which Crough, Inc. owed to BMC when it accepted the gift from Crough, Inc.).
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$1,892,000.1 77 The potential fraud perpetrated by Crough, Inc. was its
extinguishment of the balance due by executing the Final Release of
Claims and Lien Waiver.'17  This extinguishment could qualify as a
fraudulent conveyance under section 15-204 of the Commercial Law
Article of the Maryland Code, which states a conveyance cannot be
made by one who is insolvent or without consideration because to do
so is fraudulent as to its creditors.17' Because Crough, Inc. was insol-
vent at the time that the release was signed and there was no consider-
ation paid for the release of all debts, 8 ' it could likely have been
deemed a fraudulent conveyance. The court, however, relegated the
issue of whether there was a fraudulent conveyance to a reaffirmation
of the rule that a creditor steps into the shoes of its debtor and is
subrogated to the rights of its debtors.1 81 The court determined that
because the case was time barred, it did not have to decide whether a
fraudulent conveyance existed.18 2 However, if the court would have
decided the fraud issue first, then it could have better framed its anal-
ysis for determining whether the discovery rule applied."8 '
c. The Court Ignored the Fraudulent Conveyance Exception to the
Rule of Subrogation in Garnishment Cases.-In focusing on whether
BMC's rights as a creditor would exceed those of the debtor, Crough,
Inc., the court ignored several cases recognizing the exception to the
general rule of subrogation in garnishment cases. As early as 1878, in
Odend'hal, the court held that a creditor can be a garnishor even if a
debtor could not maintain a suit if the property in question was fraud-
ulently conveyed.' 84 The Bragunier court completely disregarded the
fact that such exceptions have been applied and simply held that al-
lowing BMC to maintain a cause of action would violate the general
rule of subrogation.185
177. Id. at 617, 796 A.2d at 749.
178. Id. at 619, 796 A.2d at 750.
179. MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW. II § 15-204 (2000) (stating that "[e]very conveyance
made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will be rendered insolvent by it is
fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent, if the conveyance is made or
the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration").
180. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 617-18, 796 A.2d at 749.
181. Id. at 628, 796 A.2d at 756.
182. Id. at 613, 796 A.2d at 746-47.
183. See, e.g., Arthur v. Morrow Bros., 131 Md. 59, 101 A. 777 (1917) (holding that fraud
is an exception to the rule of subrogation in garnishment proceedings).
184. Odend'hal v. Devlin, 48 Md. 439, 445 (1878) (holding that even though a wife as
debtor would be unable to sue her husband as garnishee, the garnishor could still bring a
valid cause of action if the wife fraudulently conveyed property to her husband).
185. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 628, 796 A.2d at 755-56.
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In a later case, the court was again faced with this issue. In Arthur
v. Morrow Brothers, the court reiterated that if property is fraudulently
conveyed, then a creditor can bring a suit against a garnishee, even if
the debtor could not.18 6 In that case, the final subcontractor, Arthur
& Boyle, was only paid for part of its work on the project, and insti-
tuted a garnishment proceeding against the general contractors, Mor-
row Brothers, for the remainder."i 7 Morrow Brothers argued that
because it did not have property, funds, or credits for which either of
the intermediate subcontractors, Parlett or Carozza Brothers & Com-
pany, could sue, Arthur & Boyle could similarly not bring suit because
as creditors they stood in the shoes of their debtors. 88 The court,
however, disagreed and found that Partlett's release of all claims was
fraudulent because there was no consideration paid and it rendered
Parlett insolvent. 8 9 Thus, the exception to the subrogation of
debtor's rights applied to Arthur & Boyle giving them standing to ini-
tiate a suit. 9 ° The Bragunier court ignored the holding set forth in
Morrow Bros. The court simply reiterated the fact that the creditor is
subrogated to the rights of the debtor and disregarded Morrow Bros.
holding that when property is fraudulently conveyed, the rule of sub-
rogation does not necessarily apply. 9 '
More recently, in Dodson, the court found that Reverend William
B. Adams, the judgment debtor, had given funds to the garnishee,
Temple Hill Church, while it was indebted to its creditor, Philip F.
Dodson. l"2 The issue for determination was whether Adams's gift to
the church of $9,552 constituted a fraudulent conveyance.' 93 The
court found that Dodson was not subrogated to the rights of his
debtor, Adams, because Adams's conveyance of funds was deemed
fraudulent."9 4 Again, the Bragunier court did not apply this exception
to the general rule which provides that where a debtor fraudulently
conveys property, the creditor is not subrogated to the rights of its
debtor. 5
186. Arthur v. Morrow Bros., 131 Md. 59, 67-68, 101 A. 777, 780 (1917).
187. Id. at 61, 101 A. at 777.
188. Id. at 67-68, 101 A. at 779.
189. Id. at 68, 101 A. at 780.
190. Id. at 67-68, 101 A. at 779-80.
191. Id., 101 A. at 780; Bragunier, 368 Md. at 623, 796 A.2d at 752.
192. Dodson v. Temple Hill Baptist Church, Inc., 248 Md. 697, 699-700, 238 A.2d 239,
240-41 (1968).
193. Id. at 702, 238 A.2d at 242.
194. Id. at 703, 238 A.2d at 242.
195. Id.
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d. The Discovery Rule Applies When There Is a Fraudulent Convey-
ance. -The Maryland legislature enacted a statute, which provides that
the accrual of a cause of action will be delayed if knowledge of a cause
of action is fraudulently secreted from a plaintiff.'9 6 The plaintiffs
burden of proof does not require subsequent concealment.' 97 The
plaintiff only needs to show that a fraudulent conveyance occurred
which was not disclosed or reasonably known to the plaintiff. 9 ' In
Brack, the court held that for a cause of action concealed by fraud, the
statute of limitations is tolled until the injured party discovers or rea-
sonably should have discovered the fraud.1 99 For instance, William F.
Brack brought a cause of action against his trading firm, Stein Bros. &
Boyce, and its employees for negligent and fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions in a stock transaction.' ° ° The defendant company asserted that
the suit was time barred. 20 1 The court disagreed and held that the
statute of limitations was tolled until the discovery of the fraud and
misrepresentation.20 2 BMC's cause of action was similarly concealed
by fraud and thus the statute of limitations should have begun when
BMC discovered the fraud.
e. The Court's Holding Has the Potential to Encourage Defrauding
of Creditors.-In holding that BMC's claim was barred by the statute of
limitations, the court's decision opens the door to the possibility that
a debtor and a third party can work together to defraud a creditor.
The court determined that the statute of limitations began to run in
October 1989, the date that construction on the Old Gymnasium Pro-
ject was complete.20 3 Therefore, the statute of limitations period
would have ended in October 1992.204 BMC, through its attorney, dis-
covered the fraudulent conveyance by chance in July 1992.205 BMC
had very little time to act upon learning of Crough, Inc.'s actions, and
was closed, under the court's reasoning, from being barred from
bringing a claim even before they knew one existed.
196. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-203 (2002) ("If the knowledge of a cause of
action is kept from a party by the fraud of an adverse party, the cause of action shall be
deemed to accrue at the time when the party discovered, or by the exercise of ordinary
diligence should have discovered the fraud.").
197. O'Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 287, 503 A.2d 1313, 1316 (1986).
198. See id.
199. Brack v. Evans, 230 Md. 548, 555, 187 A.2d 880, 883-84 (1963).
200. Id. at 550-51, 187 A.2d at 881.
201. Id. at 551, 187 A.2d at 881.
202. Id. at 556, 187 A.2d at 884.
203. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 629-30, 796 A.2d at 756.
204. See MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 5-101 (2002).
205. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 618, 796 A.2d at 749-50.
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By disallowing BMC's claim, the court has set a trap for future
creditors. The debtor could purposely or inadvertently conceal the
existence of a fraudulent conveyance from creditors until after the
limitations period has expired. This would directly undermine the
purpose of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule excep-
206tions. The court has caused a plaintiff who is unaware of a cause of
action to suffer harsh consequences by learning of the claim after the
statute of limitations has already run. To prevent this injustice, the
discovery rule should apply when the actions of a debtor and a third
party prevent the creditor from learning of its cause of action.
The court should have first considered whether the release con-
stituted a fraudulent conveyance prior to reaching the statute of limi-
tations issue. Crough, Inc. released Catholic from payment of
$1,892,000 that was still owed to it. 20 7 Crough, Inc. claimed that they
were not owed money by Catholic because Crough intended upon giv-
ing the building as a gift.20 However, the court should have ex-
amined whether this donation was really a gift or just a way for
Crough, Inc. to avoid payment to his subcontractors. The fact that
Johnson, Vice President of Crough, Inc., was unaware of Crough's in-
tentions to gift the building could be suspect.2 9 Additionally,
Crough, Inc.'s gift could be deemed a fraudulent conveyance because
it rendered Crough, Inc. insolvent and unable to fulfill its debts to its
creditors. 210 As a defrauded creditor, BMC should then be allowed to
do more than just step into the shoes of its debtor in order to prevent
an injustice. As a result, the statute of limitations should not have
started to run until July 31, 1992 the date of BMC's discovery of the
potential fraudulent conveyance.
5. Conclusion.-In Bragunier, the Court of Appeals erred by mis-
applying the discovery rule, thus barring BMC's garnishment action
against Catholic. 21 ' The court should have held that the statute of
limitations began on July 31, 1992, the day BMC discovered the fraud-
ulent conveyance between Crough, Inc. and Catholic.2 12 Although
206. See Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 334, 635 A.2d 394, 399 (1994)
(noting that before the discovery rule was established plaintiffs suffered harsh conse-
quences because they were prevented from filing suit when they did not even know that
any harm existed).
207. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 617, 796 A.2d at 749.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 616, 796 A.2d at 748.
210. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 15-204 (2000).
211. 368 Md. at 632-33, 796 A.2d at 758.
212. Id. at 618, 796 A.2d at 749-50.
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the general rule in a garnishment action is that a creditor's rights are
subrogated to the rights of the debtor, exceptions to the rule have
been recognized.213 When a debtor conveys property or funds fraudu-
lently to a third party, then the creditor is allowed to recover from the
third party even though the debtor might be precluded.21 4 There-
fore, even though Crough, Inc. would have been unable to bring an
action against Catholic for the balance of funds owed on the Old
Gymnasium Project, BMC should not have been equally barred be-
cause of Crough, Inc.'s extinguishing of potential debt owed to it by
Catholic. Moreover, Crough, Inc. was insolvent at the time all claims
against Catholic were released, thus there was no consideration given
in exchange for the release. 215 The court failed to recognize that pur-
suant to section 15-204 of the Commercial Law Article of the Mary-
land Code, Crough, Inc.'s conveyance was fraudulent and in
accordance with section 5-203 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article, the discovery rule should apply to toll the statute of limita-
tions. 2 16 Therefore, the court erred and BMC's claim against Catholic
should not have been barred by the statute of limitations.
ASHLEY ROSEN
213. Odend'hal v. Devlin, 48 Md. 439, 444-45 (1878).
214. See id.
215. Bragunier, 368 Md. at 619, 796 A.2d at 750.
216. MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW II § 15-204 (2000); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 5-203 (2002).
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IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
A. Handcuffing the Police While Freeing the Criminal
In Drury v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether a police officer who showed a suspect physical evidence from
a robbery and stated that it would be examined for fingerprints en-
gaged in the functional equivalent of an interrogation.2 The court
held that such conduct did constitute the functional equivalent of in-
terrogation, and accordingly, held that statements made to the sus-
pect prior to his being advised of his Miranda rights must be
suppressed.' In so holding, the court unwisely expanded the defini-
tion of interrogation established by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona4 and refined by its progeny.5 In
finding the police action in this case to be the functional equivalent of
an interrogation, the court undermined a police practice that was pre-
viously legitimized in Maryland and several other states. As a result,
the court has compromised a legitimate police practice.
1. The Case.--On July 14, 1996, the Hillside Market in Centre-
ville, Maryland was burglarized.6 Corporal Mark Whaley (Officer
Whaley) of the Centreville Police Department responded to a report
of the burglary.7 The owner of the market informed Officer Whaley
that he had found a tire iron behind the counter.8 Upon investiga-
tion, Officer Whaley determined that the door to the store had been
pried open with a tire iron.' In addition, Officer Whaley discovered
that adult magazines, cartons of cigarettes, bottles of liquor, and lot-
tery tickets were missing from the store.' °
After receiving a tip from a fellow officer and interviewing an-
other suspect, Officer Whaley picked up Dwayne Anthony Drury and
brought him to the police station for questioning.1" Prior to reading
Drury his Miranda rights, Officer Whaley placed the tire iron recov-
1. 368 Md. 331, 793 A.2d 567 (2002).
2. Id. at 332, 793 A.2d at 568.
3. Id. at 337, 341, 793 A.2d at 571, 573.
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (clarifying the definition of
interrogation for purposes of Miranda).




10. Id., 793 A.2d at 569.
11. Id.
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ered from the scene of the crime and a bag containing magazines
found near the crime scene on a table in front of Drury.' 2 Officer
Whaley then told Drury that this evidence was going to be examined
for fingerprints.' 3 At that point, Drury admitted that his fingerprints
could be on the tire iron, as well as "hundreds of tire irons around
Centreville." 4 In addition, upon picking up the bag that contained
the magazines, Drury identified its contents and admitted that he
touched the magazines in the bag.15
Drury was indicted by a grand jury for second degree burglary,
fourth degree burglary, and theft.1 6 Prior to his trial, Drury filed a
motion to suppress the statements he made to Officer Whaley, argu-
ing that the statements were inadmissible because "they were made in
custody, in response to interrogation, and prior to his being advised of
his Miranda rights." 7 The Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County
denied Drury's motion to suppress and allowed the statements to be
admitted."8 Drury was subsequently convicted by a jury on all counts
charged in the indictment.1 9
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in an unre-
ported opinion, upheld the circuit court's decision, finding that Of-
ficer Whaley's actions were not the functional equivalent of
interrogation.2" The court's analysis focused on Officer Whaley's
comments regarding the evidence. 2' The court reasoned that Officer
Whaley's statement was brief, not "particularly 'evocative,"' and that
Drury "was not subjected to compelling influences, psychological
ploys or direct questioning."22 Thus, the court held that Officer Wha-
ley's statement was not "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse from [Drury]. '"23 Drury again appealed and the Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted Drury's petition for writ of certiorari to
determine whether Officer Whaley's conduct was the functional
equivalent of an interrogation.
24
12. Id. at 333-34, 793 A.2d at 569.
13. Id. at 334, 793 A.2d at 569.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 333, 793 A.2d at 568.
17. Id. at 335, 793 A.2d at 569.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id., 793 A.2d at 569-70.
21. Drury v. State, No. 75 (Md. App. Jan. 23, 2001).
22. Id. at 15.
23. Id.
24. Drury, 368 Md. at 335, 793 A.2d at 570. The State conceded that Drury was in
custody at the time he made the incriminating remarks. Id.
20031
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
2. Legal Background.--Subsequent to the United States Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Miranda, which held that the Fifth
Amendment requires police officers to inform suspects of their consti-
tutional right to be free from compelled self-incrimination prior to
custodial interrogation, courts have struggled to determine what con-
stitutes an interrogation in various situations.25 In Rhode Island v. In-
nis,26 the Supreme Court attempted to provide a workable definition
of what constitutes an interrogation and has continued to refine this
definition in subsequent cases. 27 Despite these efforts, determining
whether actions by police officers constitute interrogations remains a
troublesome inquiry.
Consequently, Maryland courts have had difficulty applying the
somewhat amorphous Innis test for interrogation to various interac-
tions between police officers and persons accused of a crime.28 In an
attempt to create a consistent body of law in this area, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, like the Supreme Court, has focused on the
presence or absence of police coercion as the dispositive factor in the
interrogation determination.
a. United States Supreme Court Case Law on Interrogation.-The
Supreme Court first considered the need for procedures to protect
persons subjected to custodial interrogations from compelled self-in-
crimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in Miranda.29 In Miranda, the Court was concerned with
police interrogation tactics that might not render a confession invol-
untary in the traditional sense, but nonetheless compel a suspect to
25. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
26. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
27. Id. at 301; see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (holding that routine
booking questions do not constitute interrogation); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990)
(concluding placing an undercover officer in a cell with the defendant is not interroga-
tion); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987) (holding that recording conversation be-
tween suspect and wife is not an interrogation).
28. See infra notes 91-123 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland cases on inter-
rogations); see also White v. State, 140 Md. App. 520, 781 A.2d 902 (2001) (reading a state-
ment of charges to the defendant was not the functional equivalent of interrogation);
Ciriago v. State, 57 Md. App. 563, 471 A.2d 320 (1984) (informing the defendant he was
not under arrest was not the functional equivalent of interrogation, nor is stating the de-
fendant's bail amount); Gaynor v. State, 50 Md. App. 600, 440 A.2d 399 (1982) (telling the
defendant that police received a phone call informing them of his whereabouts did not
constitute the functional equivalent of interrogation); Souffle v. State, 50 Md. App. 547,
439 A.2d 1127 (1982) (informing defendant that a codefendant made a deal and impli-
cated her was the functional equivalent of interrogation).
29. 384 U.S. at 439; U.S. CONST. amend. V. (providing in relevant part, "No person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .. ").
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incriminate himself.3 0 Such tactics included interrogations lasting for
days,"' trickery, isolation, emotional appeals, 4 and positing the
suspect's guilt.35 To prevent these tactics, the Court in Miranda an-
nounced a bright-line rule that police officers must inform a suspect
of his constitutional rights prior to subjecting the suspect to custodial
interrogation.3 6 Any statements obtained in violation of this rule may
not be used against the suspect.37 Because the Court recognized the
importance of confessions to criminal investigations and because the
burdens placed on law enforcement officers who investigate crime are
already significant, the Court was careful to emphasize that not all
confessions made without the benefit of warnings violate the freedom
from self-incrimination." Confessions that are not the product of a
custodial interrogation are not subject to the rule.3 ' Thus, the Court
in Miranda distinguished between coerced or compelled confessions
that are unlawful and volunteered statements that are not.
40
Almost two decades after the decision in Miranda, the Supreme
Court considered whether interrogation was limited to express ques-
tioning.4 ' In Innis, the police arrested a man suspected in a murder
and robbery.4 2 After being advised of his rights on three separate oc-
casions by three different police officers, the suspect said he under-
stood his rights and wished to speak with a lawyer.4" Three officers
then drove the suspect to the police station with the suspect sitting in
the back of the patrol car behind a wire screen.4 4 On the way to the
police station, two of the officers engaged in a conversation about the
gun that had been used to commit the murder and robbery but had
30. 384 U.S. at 445-60.
31. Id. at 476.
32. Id at 461.
33. Id. at 445.
34. Id. at 451.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 444. Specifically, the Court said that a suspect must be warned that "he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed." Id. The Court also defined custodial interrogations as "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom in any significant way." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 478.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298 (1980).





not yet been located.4 5 The officers mentioned that there was a
school for handicapped children in the area where the crime was
committed, and they expressed concern that a handicapped child
might pick up the gun and shoot herself with it. 4 6 Neither the third
officer, nor the suspect participated in this conversation, but both
could hear what was said.47 After hearing about the possibility that a
handicapped child could hurt herself with the gun, the suspect inter-
rupted the conversation and told the officers to turn the car around
so he could show them the location of the gun.4 ' The suspect then
led the officers to the gun.49 The suspect was then indicted for kid-
napping, robbery, and murder.5" Prior to trial, the defendant moved
to suppress the gun and the statements he made about the gun.5 1
The court admitted the evidence, and in the subsequent trial, the de-
fendant was convicted on all counts.5 2 On appeal, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, concluding that the defen-
dant had been interrogated in violation of Miranda.5"
Following the Rhode Island Supreme Court's reversal, the state
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.54 The Supreme Court
ruled that an interrogation under Miranda was not limited to express
questioning and announced a new test.55 The Court held that Mi-
randa safeguards come into play "whenever a person in custody is sub-
jected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. 56
Thus, interrogation can be defined as "any words or actions on the
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect. '57 The Court further ex-
plained that the determination of whether the police conduct was rea-
sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response was to be made from
the perspective of the suspect.58 In addition, any knowledge that the
45. Id. at 294-95.
46. Id.




51. Id. at 295-96.
52. Id. at 296.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 297.
55. Id. at 300.
56. Id. at 300-01.
57. Id. at 301.
58. Id. The Court did note, however, that police intent is not irrelevant, stating that it
is likely that conduct designed to elicit an incriminating response is also conduct that the
police should have known was likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 301-02 n.7.
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police have of a particular susceptibility the suspect may have to cer-
tain methods of persuasion, should be considered when applying this
test.
5 9
The Court then applied the test to the facts of the case and con-
cluded that the defendant had not been subjected to the functional
equivalent of interrogation.6 ° The Court's reasoning focused on coer-
cion, stating that not all statements obtained while a defendant is in
custody are the result of an interrogation.6" Rather, an interrogation
"must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inher-
ent in custody itself."6 2 The Court listed several factors that influ-
enced its decision that compulsion was not present in the case.63
First, the comments by the police were a dialogue between them and
did not prompt a response from the defendant.64 Second, there was
nothing in the record to suggest the defendant was particularly sus-
ceptible to appeals to his conscience, nor was he unusually disoriented
or upset.6 5 Third, the conversation was short and not "particularly
evocative."" Finally, the Court agreed with the trial court's assertion
that it was understandable for the police to be concerned for the
safety of nearby children.67 Thus, although the Court conceded that
the officers' remarks might amount to subtle compulsion, the Court
stated that subtle compulsion does not equate to an interrogation.68
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Innis, the Court has re-
fined the definition of interrogation in its application to various situa-
tions. For example, in Arizona v. Mauro,69 police officers arrested a
man suspected of killing his child."y After being advised of his Mi-
randa rights, the suspect indicated that he wished to remain silent un-
til he had the advice of counsel." The suspect's wife, who had been
speaking with police officers, asked to speak with her husband. 2 The
officers granted her request with the condition that a police officer be
59. Id. at 302 n.8.
60. Id. at 302.
61. Id. at 299.
62. Id. at 300.
63. Id. at 302-03.
64. Id. at 302.
65. Id. at 302-03.
66. ld. at 303 (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. at 303 n.9.
68. Id. at 303.
69. 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
70. Id. at 521.




present to record the conversation. 7' Even though the suspect knew
the conversation was being recorded, he proceeded to make incrimi-
nating statements. 7' The trial court admitted the recorded statement,
but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed. 5
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court in Mauro again fo-
cused on coercion in holding that the police conduct was not the
functional equivalent of an interrogation. 76 The Court stated that al-
though the police knew there was a possibility that the suspect would
incriminate himself if he were permitted to speak with his wife, that
possibility did not amount to an interrogation.77 According to the
Court, "[o]fficers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that
he will incriminate himself."'78 In comparing the facts of Mauro to
those in Innis, the Court further concluded that Mauro presented a
much less compelling case for suppression, since the incriminating
statements were not prompted by coercive police conduct.7
9
In Illinois v. Perkins,8 0 the Supreme Court, in order to avoid com-
ing to a conclusion that was completely counterintuitive, all but aban-
doned the "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" test
set forth in Innis."a In Perkins, an undercover officer was placed in a
jail cell with the suspect for the purpose of eliciting a confession.82
The suspect engaged in conversation with the officer and implicated
himself in a burglary and murder.8 3 The suspect was then charged
with both crimes.84 His motion to suppress the statements was
granted by the trial court and the Appellate Court of Illinois
affirmed.85
The United States Supreme Court overruled the Illinois court,
holding that an undercover officer is not required to administer Mi-
randa warnings before asking questions that may elicit an incriminat-
ing response.86 In so holding, the Court did not rely on the Innis test.
Instead, the Court focused on the coercive effects of the officers' con-
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 524.
76. Id. at 529-30.
77. Id. at 528-29.
78. Id. at 529.
79. Id. at 528-29.
80. 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
81. Id. at 296; Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
82. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 294.
83. Id. at 295.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 300.
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duct on the suspect.87 The Court reasoned that a suspect cannot feel
compelled to speak in violation of the Fifth Amendment when he is
speaking with a person he believes to be a fellow inmate, rather than a
police officer. 8 In such an instance, there is no "police dominated
atmosphere."8 " Accordingly, the Court concluded that the statements
were not the product of an interrogation and, as a result, they should
not have been suppressed. 0
In summary, since its decision in Innis, the Supreme Court has
focused its interrogation inquiry on police coercion, finding that
where there is no police coercion, there can be no interrogation.
b. Maryland Case Law on Interrogation.-Maryland cases on
interrogation under Miranda have always focused on the presence or
absence of police coercion. Before and after the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Innis, there could not be police interrogation without some
element of police coercion. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has failed to find confronting a suspect with evidence to be
coercive.
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Innis, the Court of Ap-
peals attempted to define what constitutes an interrogation under the
guidelines established in Miranda. In Vines v. State,"1 the court held
that confronting a suspect with evidence did not constitute an interro-
gation.92 In Vines, police officers showed the suspect an inventory
sheet from a search conducted of his home, as well as several packets
of heroin seized in the search." The suspect was then told that these
items were recovered from his home during the search.94 When faced
with this evidence, the suspect made incriminating statements. 5 The
statements were admitted into evidence at trial, and the defendant was
convicted of possession with intent to distribute heroin. 6 Although
the court recognized that interrogation encompasses police conduct
other than express questioning, the court explained that the officers'
conduct in Vines was not an interrogation because there was no psy-
chological coercion, deceit, or subterfuge involved.97 Accordingly,
87. Id. at 297.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 300.
91. 285 Md. 369, 402 A.2d 900 (1979).
92. Id. at 378, 402 A.2d at 904-05.
93. Id. at 372, 402 A.2d at 901-02.
94. Id. at 373, 402 A.2d at 902.
95. Id
96. Id. at 371, 402 A.2d at 901.
97. Id. at 376, 381 n.10, 402 A.2d at 903, 906 n.10.
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the court concluded that the defendant's incriminatory statements
should have been admitted into evidence.98
In State v. Conover,99 the Court of Appeals again addressed the
issue of what constitutes an interrogation, this time with the benefit of
the Supreme Court's decision in Innis.'00 In Conover, the suspect was
arrested on a warrant for murder, burglary, and related offenses.' °'
Upon being advised of his Miranda rights, the suspect stated that he
wished to speak to an attorney.'0 2 As a result, no further questions
were asked.10 3 At that point, a police officer read the suspect a state-
ment of the charges against him and gave him copies of the charging
document and application."" The suspect then made incriminating
statements.1 0 5 The statements were admitted into evidence at trial,
and the defendant was convicted." 6 In analyzing the case, the Court
of Appeals emphasized that the purpose of the Innis test is to elimi-
nate coercive police practices like those described in Miranda.'°7 The
court in Conover, however, concluded that the coercive practices envi-
sioned in Miranda were absent. Therefore, the defendant was not sub-
jected to the functional equivalent of an interrogation and his
statements were properly admitted into evidence.'0 8
The court's most recent application of the Innis test occurred in
Williams v. State.'09 In Williams, the defendant was suspected in the
murder of two Annapolis attorneys."i1 Among the items taken from
the victims' home was an ATM card."' The suspect was arrested and
taken to the police station by two officers and shown pictures taken of
him at an ATM machine, at which time he made an incriminating
statement." 2 After being read the Miranda warnings, the defendant
stated that he did not want to answer any more questions before
speaking to a lawyer." 3 After this statement, the officers reminded
Williams that he was being charged with two murders, and one of the
98. Id. at 381, 402 A.2d at 906.
99. 312 Md. 33, 537 A.2d 1167 (1988).
100. Id. at 35, 537 A.2d at 1168.
101. Id. at 36, 537 A.2d at 1168.




106. Id. at 37-38, 537 A.2d at 1169.
107. Id. at 40, 537 A.2d at 1170.
108. Id. at 45, 537 A.2d at 1172.
109. 342 Md. 724, 679 A.2d 1106 (1996).
110. Id. at 731, 679 A.2d at 1110.
111. Id. at 732, 679 A.2d at 1110.
112. Id. at 759, 679 A.2d at 1124.
113. Id.
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officers said, "[t]his is going to work." '114 Williams then responded
with another incriminating remark." 5
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge suppressed the
first statement because it was made prior to the administration of the
Miranda warnings.16 However, the judge refused to suppress the
statements the suspect made after he received his Miranda warn-
ings." y The defendant was tried by ajury for murder, robbery with a
deadly weapon, theft, burglary, and a handgun violation.1 8 He was
convicted and sentenced to death." 9 The defendant appealed his
conviction directly to the Court of Appeals. 2 °
The Court of Appeals ruled that the statement was not the prod-
uct of an interrogation under the Innis test.' 2 ' The court described
the officers' remarks as being advisory, innocuous, and not reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response.' 22 The court further rea-
soned that the definition of interrogation was not broad enough to
include all statements made to suspects by police officers concerning
the nature of the evidence against the suspect.123
In conclusion, since the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda,
the Supreme Court and the state courts have further clarified what
constitutes an interrogation. The decisions have stayed true to the
overriding purpose of Miranda: to prevent police coercion. 124
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. This ruling was not appealed to the Court of Appeals. Id at 760 n.11,679 A.2d
at 1124 n.11.
117. Id. at 759, 679 A.2d at 1124.
118. Id. at 731, 679 A.2d at 1110.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 761, 679 A.2d at 1125.
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1992)).
124. Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621,
621 (1996).
Other states have similarly held that confronting a suspect with evidence does not
constitute interrogation. Examples include: Arizona, Arizona v. Rainey, 672 P.2d 188, 192
(Ariz. App. 1983) (handing evidence back and forth between investigators in the defen-
dant's presence is not an interrogation); Florida, Lewis v. 7lorida, 509 So. 2d 1236, 1237
(Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1987) ("It may be that police should have known that showing the appel-
lant the evidence against him would be likely to elicit an incriminating response. How-
ever... from the appellant's perspective such police procedure did not impinge upon his
will in a coercive manner."); Michigan, People v. Benjamin, 300 N.W.2d 661, 667 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1980) (holding up knives confiscated from the suspect was not an interrogation
within the meaning of Innis); Texas, Wiley v. Texas, 699 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. App. 1985)
(confronting defendant with a bloody knife and clothing recovered from the crime scene
does not constitute an interrogation); and Wisconsin, Wisconsin v. Cunningham, 423
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Drury, the Court of Appeals held
that Officer Whaley's display of a tire iron and bag containing evi-
dence against Drury, accompanied by Officer Whaley's statement that
the evidence would be examined for fingerprints, was the functional
equivalent of an interrogation.1 25 In reaching this conclusion, the
court emphasized the importance of identifying the intent behind
such conduct.126 The court reiterated that whether the conduct of a
police officer constitutes an interrogation depends on whether such
action is likely to illicit an incriminating response. 127 Because the
court concluded that Officer Whaley must have known his conduct
was likely to elicit an incriminating response from Drury, the court
held the trial court should have suppressed any statements made by
Drury prior to his being warned of his rights.1 28
The court first reviewed the basic principle from Miranda that a
statement obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation prior to the
administration of certain warnings may not be used by the State
against the defendant. 129 The court further explained that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Innis expanded what constitutes interroga-
tion beyond express questioning.1 31 Interrogation, according to the
court, now refers to "'any words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse from the suspect.'" 3' Because the State conceded that Drury
was in custody at the time of the interaction in question, the court
explained that the only question remaining was whether Officer Wha-
ley's conduct constituted the functional equivalent of an
interrogation. 1
3 2
In response, the court applied the Innis test to the facts of Drury's
case.133 In its analysis, the court identified several relevant facts. First,
the court noted that Officer Whaley brought Drury to the police sta-
N.W.2d 862, 863 (Wis. 1988) (confronting a suspect with a gun seized in a search was not
the functional equivalent of an interrogation).
125. Drury, 368 Md. at 337, 793 A.2d at 571. The case was argued before Chief Judge
Bell and Judges Eldridge, Raker, Wilner, Cathell, Harrell, and Battaglia. Judge Raker deliv-
ered the majority opinion. Id. at 332, 793 A.2d at 568. Judge Battaglia filed a dissenting
opinion, which Judge Cathell joined. Id. at 341-42, 793 A.2d at 573-74,
126. Id. at 336-37, 793 A.2d at 571.
127. Id. at 335-36, 793 A.2d at 570.
128. Id. at 341, 793 A.2d at 573.
129. Id. at 335, 793 A.2d at 570; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
130. Drury, 368 Md. at 336, 793 A.2d at 570.
131. Id. (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 300).
132. Id. at 335, 793 A.2d at 570.
133. Id. at 337, 793 A.2d at 571.
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tion for the express purpose of questioning him about the burglary.' 3 4
Next, the court reasoned that Officer Whaley was not engaged in rou-
tine booking procedures, nor acting pursuant to any Maryland Rule of
Procedure when he placed the tire iron and trash bag containing the
stolen magazines on the table in front of Drury prior to administering
the Miranda warnings.135 Finally, the court noted that Officer Whaley
admitted he "was presenting the evidence that was going to be used
for questioning. "136
Applying these facts, the court stated "that the only reasonable
conclusion" was that Officer Whaley should have known that his ac-
tions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
Drury.13 7 The court even implied that Officer Whaley's actions were
calculated to produce such a response. 3 ' While the court conceded
that application of the Innis test focuses primarily on the perception
of the suspect, it did not consider the defendant's perspective in
arriving at its conclusion. 14  Instead, the court found Officer Wha-
ley's intent to elicit an incriminating response to be dispositive.' 4 ' To
support that conclusion, the court emphasized the Supreme Court's
consideration of police intent as relevant to the interrogation determi-
nation."' Police intent is relevant, according to the Court of Appeals,
because when an officer intends to elicit an incriminating response
from a suspect, it logically follows that the officer should have known
such a response was likely.'
4 3
The court then distinguished previous Court of Appeals decisions
cited by the State in support of its position. 44 Each of these cases
involved defendants who were confronted with evidence, yet not sub-
jected to the functional equivalent of interrogation according to the
court. First, the court addressed Vines,'45 distinguishing that case on
the basis that the officer in Vines acted pursuant to a Maryland Rule of
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 336, 793 A.2d at 571.
140. Id. at 337-38, 793 A.2d at 571.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 337, 793 A.2d at 571.
143. Id. (discussing Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.7; People v. Ferro, 472 N.E.2d 13, 17 (N.Y.
1984)).
144. See, e.g., Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 378, 402 A.2d 900, 904-05 (1979) (holding that
confronting the suspect with evidence against him was not the functional equivalent of
interrogation).
145. For a discussion of the facts of Vines, see supra text accompanying notes 91-98.
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Procedure.146 The court then distinguished Conover"4 7 on the similar
basis that the police officers were acting pursuant to a Maryland
Rule. 4 ' The court also quickly dismissed the State's argument that
the Court's decision in Williams was controlling.'49 According to the
court, Williams 50 was distinguishable because the officers in that case
were engaged in routine booking procedures when the incriminating
remarks were made. 151 The court added that the comments made by
the officers in Williams were "innocuous" and not likely to elicit an
incriminating response, whereas Officer Whaley's comments were de-
signed to produce such a response. 152 The court thus concluded that
prior Maryland cases were " [i]n stark contrast" to the facts of Drury.15 1
Concluding its analysis by again emphasizing police intent, the
court reasoned that Drury was subject to a custodial interrogation be-
cause Officer Whaley should have known, and, indeed, expected, that
his comments regarding the evidence were reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from Drury.154 As a result, the court held
that Drury's incriminating statements made prior to receiving his Mi-
randa warnings should have been suppressed.' 55 The court thus re-
versed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals upholding the
trial court's admission of the statements. 156
Judge Battaglia wrote the dissenting opinion focusing on police
coercion. 15  She stated that the majority properly focused on coer-
cion, but that the majority's definition of coercion was too extreme. 58
Judge Battaglia first noted that the situation in Drury was not signifi-
146. Druiy, 368 Md. at 339, 793 A.2d at 572; see Vines, 385 Md. at 377-78, 402 A.2d at 904
(relying on Maryland Rule 707 (now Rule 780), which requires a police officer who takes
property pursuant to a search warrant to make a written inventory of any property taken in
the presence of the property owner to support the conclusion that there was no
interrogation).
147. For a discussion of the facts of Conover, see supra text accompanying notes 101-106.
148. Drury, 368 Md. at 340, 793 A.2d at 572-73; see State v. Conover, 312 Md. 33, 42, 537
A.2d 1167, 1171 (1988) (relying on Maryland Rule 4-212(e) which requires that the officer
promptly furnish the defendant with a copy of the charging document).
149. Drury, 368 Md. at 341, 793 A.2d at 573.
150. For a discussion of the facts of the Williams case, see supra text accompanying notes
109-123.






157. Id. at 342, 793 A.2d at 574 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). Judge Cathell joined in the
dissent. Id. at 350, 793 A.2d at 579.
158. Id. at 344 (stating that "[i]n [the majority's] view, being taken to the police station
itself could be sufficient to trigger the administration of Miranda warnings").
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cantly different from a situation involving routine booking questions
for which no Miranda warnings are constitutionally required."'' Sec-
ond, Judge Battaglia emphasized that Drury was not asked any ques-
tions, rather Officer Whaley simply provided Drury with factual
information. 60 Judge Battaglia also cited numerous cases from other
states and federal circuits holding that confronting a suspect with
physical evidence is not the functional equivalent of interrogation.
161
Finally, Judge Battaglia intimated that Drury's comment was intended
by him to be exculpatory, and thus logically was not the result of po-
lice coercion.' 62 Based on this reasoning, Judge Battaglia concluded
that Drury's statements were completely voluntary and not the result
of the functional equivalent of interrogation.
163
4. Analysis.-In Dru?y, the Court of Appeals of Maryland failed
to apply the proper test to determine whether the defendant was in-
terrogated under the Supreme Court's definition of interrogation as
expressed in Miranda and its progeny when it held that the defendant
had been subjected to the functional equivalent of interrogation by
being confronted with evidence against him. In so doing, the court
effectively undermined a legitimate and beneficial police practice that
had previously been accepted in Maryland and many other jurisdic-
tions. Had the court applied the proper test for interrogation by fo-
cusing on the presence or absence of police coercion, the court
undoubtedly would have concluded that the defendant was not sub-
jected to interrogation nor its functional equivalent, thus not requir-
ing a Miranda warning.
a. By Focusing on Police Intent, Rather Than Police Coercion, the
Drury Court Failed to Properly Apply Supreme Court Precedent.-Police of-
ficers are not required to read Miranda warnings to every person with
whom they have contact. Instead, the rights of the accused to be in-
formed are balanced against the legitimate desire of the police to ob-
tain voluntary confessions. To that end, in Miranda, the Supreme
Court held that a suspect must be informed of his constitutional free-
dom from self-incrimination prior to a custodial interrogation. 64 The
159. Id. at 344, 793 A.2d at 575 (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990)).
160. Id. at 345, 793 A.2d at 575.
161. Id. at 349, 793 A.2d at 578.
162. Id. at 345, 793 A.2d at 575.
163. Id. at 350, 793 A.2d at 578 (stating that Drury's statements "concerning the physical
evidence of his crime were the product of his own free will and consciousness, rather than
the result of interrogation").
164. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). See supra text accompanying notes 29-40 for a detailed
discussion of the Court's decision in Miranda.
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Court defined interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers."' 6 5 Since then, the Supreme Court has qualified the
definition of custodial interrogation and reduced the number of situa-
tions in which Miranda warnings are required.166 In each of these
cases, the Court emphasized that its rulings were designed to elimi-
nate coercive police practices, not outlaw the use of confessions or
examine the subjective intent of police officers. 16 7 In contrast, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Drury, focused on the implied intent
of the police officer and failed to address the issue of coercion.1
61
Consequently, when the court concluded that Officer Whaley con-
ducted the functional equivalent of interrogation by displaying evi-
dence and informing Drury that it would be examined for
fingerprints, the court did not properly apply Supreme Court prece-
dent as it claimed.169
When the Supreme Court ruled that a police officer must inform
a suspect of his constitutional rights prior to conducting a custodial
interrogation, the Court intended to eliminate what it described as
"menacing police interrogation procedures" such as extended interro-
gation, trickery, and subjugation.' 7 0 It was these types of compelling,
or coercive, police practices that the Court outlawed.
An examination of Miranda's progeny further demonstrates the
Court's desire to eliminate police coercion while preserving voluntary
confessions. For example, in Innis, the Supreme Court recognized
that interrogation under Miranda was not limited to express question-
165. 384 U.S. at 444.
166. Charles E. Glennon & Tayebe Shah-Mirani, Illinois v. Perkins: Approving the Use of
Police Trickery in Prison to Circumvent Miranda, 21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 811, 815 (1990). Various
authors have criticized this narrowing of Miranda's application. See, e.g., Irene Merker Ro-
senberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68
N.C. L. Rav. 69, 81 (1989) (referring to the Court's decisions as indicating a "policy of
chilling containment of the controversial ruling").
167. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 466 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (noting that "Miranda [sic]
safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection
against coercive police practices without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent
of the police"). As a result, the Miranda decision may have caused a decline in confession
and conviction rates as well as the additional functions of interrogation such as implicating
accomplices, clearing crimes, and recovering property. Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Inno-
cent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions-and From Miranda, 88J. CRIM, L. & CRIMINOL-
oGx, 497, 548-50 (1998). But see Evan J. Charkes, Letters to the Editor: Warning: Don't Eliminate
Miranda, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1995, at A15 (arguing that the decline in the number of
confessions is "warranted as a matter of public policy," because many pre-Miranda confes-
sions were involuntary).
168. Drury, 368 Md. at 337, 793 A.2d at 571.
169. Id.
170. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-81.
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ing, but included "express questioning or its functional equivalent."17'
Still, the Court's focus remained on coercion. The Court specifically
stated that Miranda warnings are designed to protect suspects from
police coercion. The intent behind the police officer's actions is in-
significant in the interrogation inquiry. 7 2 The Court further ex-
plained that custody alone cannot create the level of coercion
necessary to trigger the Miranda safeguards. 7 ' Most importantly, the
Court reasoned that some level of compulsion was permissible. 74
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Drury is not congruent
with the Supreme Court's decision in Innis, because the court in Drury
neglected to address the issue of compulsion. Instead, the court fo-
cused on the intent of the police officer.'75 In fact, during oral argu-
ment, the Court of Appeals judges repeatedly referred to Officer
Whaley's implied intent.176 The court was convinced that Officer
Whaley intended to make Drury confess.17 7 Thus, the court con-
cluded that " [it] he only plausible explanation for the officer's conduct
is that he expected to elicit a statement from petitioner. ' 78
Under Supreme Court precedent, however, the Court of Appeals'
emphasis on police intent in Druy was misplaced. Although the Innis
Court did refer to the intent of the police officers,1 79 the Court fo-
cused on whether the suspect perceived the police conduct to be coer-
cive. i"' This emphasis is logical since Miranda was concerned with the
171. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
172. Id. at 301.
173. Id. at 300.
174. Specifically, the Court pronounced, "The Rhode Island Court erred, in short, in
equating 'subtle compulsion' with interrogation." Id. at 303.
175. Drury, 368 Md. at 337, 793 A.2d at 571.
176. Audio tape: Oral Argument: Drury v. State, No. 23, Sept. Term, 2001 (on file with
author).
177. Id.
178. Drury, 368 Md. at 337, 793 A.2d at 571. However, there are other plausible explana-
tions for Officer Whaley's conduct, like keeping the suspect informed.
179. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02 n.7. The Court further explained:
This is not to say that the intent of the police is irrelevant, for it may well have a
bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions
were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. In particular, where a
police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it
is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have
known was reasonably likely to have that effect.
Id.
In contrast, Justice Stevens stated: "This factual assumption is extremely dubious. I
would assume that police often interrogate suspects without any reason to believe that
their efforts are likely to be successful in the hope that a statement will nevertheless be
forthcoming." Id. at 311 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 302.
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coercive atmosphere that can only be present when the suspect is
aware both that he or she is in custody and is being interrogated.'
To illustrate this point, the Supreme Court posited a hypothetical vari-
ation of the Innis facts where the police merely drove past the location
where Innis had placed the gun on the way to the police station. 182 In
this scenario, assuming the suspect was not aware of any police coer-
cion, the Court would have reached a similar result, regardless of the
intent of the police.' Conversely, while the Drury court conceded
that the primary focus of the Innis test should be the perception of the
suspect and not police intent,8 4 the court never explicitly discussed
or even hypothesized how Drury perceived the police conduct.
Two Supreme Court decisions interpreting Innis provide further
support for the contention that the focus of the court in Drury was
misplaced. Like Miranda and Innis, these decisions focused on police
coercion rather than the intent of the police. In Mauro, the Supreme
Court held that allowing a suspect's wife to talk to him while police
recorded the conversation was not the functional equivalent of inter-
rogation, because the suspect did not feel coerced.8 5 The Court rea-
soned that Mauro was not subjected to police coercion, since he was
talking to his wife not the police.' 86 Furthermore, although the police
admitted that they knew it was possible that Mauro might incriminate
himself, "[o]fficers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping he
will incriminate himself."' 87
The Supreme Court placed an even greater emphasis on coer-
cion in Perkins.8 ' In fact, the Court in Perkins seemed to disregard
police intent altogether.'89 In Perkins, the police clearly intended to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect by sending an un-
dercover officer into his cell to discuss the suspect's alleged participa-
tion in a murder. Indeed, there was no other articulated or implied
purpose for the police conduct.' 90 Yet, the Supreme Court found that
conduct constitutional.' 9 ' In contrast, the Drury court improperly em-
181. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.7(a) (2d ed. 2002).
182. Innis, 446 U.S. at 303 n.10.
183. LAFAVE, supra note 181, § 6.7(a).
184. Drury, 368 Md. at 336-37, 793 A.2d at 571.
185. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 528 (1987).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 529.
188. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990).
189. Id. (noting that "[c]oercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect").
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phasized the probative value of Officer Whaley's intent and ignored
the issue of coercion,19
2
Not only did the Court of Appeals in Drury misapply Supreme
Court precedent, the court's treatment of Maryland precedent further
illustrates its unfounded emphasis on police intent and its disregard
for police coercion. In Vines, the defendant made incriminating re-
marks after he was confronted by a police officer with an inventory
taken pursuant to a search of his home and cocaine seized in that
search.19" The court in Drury distinguished Vines by stating that the
officer in Vines acted pursuant to Maryland Rule of Procedure 707.'
The court thus focused once again on the officer's intent. While, ac-
cording to the court, Officer Whaley intended to make Drury confess,
the officer in Vines was merely doing his job by carrying out a rule. 19 5
Nevertheless, police intent is not the proper determinant of what con-
stitutes interrogation. Even if the officer in Vines was acting according
to police procedure, the suspect still may have felt coerced to speak.
In fact, many of the police practices that the Supreme Court identi-
fied as coercive in Miranda were practices that were in accordance
with police procedure and even printed in police manuals. 196 Hence,
adherence to a rule cannot shield police conduct from inquiry into its
constitutionality. Without coercion, there can be no interrogation,
and there was no evidence that Drury felt coerced by Officer Whaley
to speak.
As in Vines, the Drury court also distinguished its ruling in Cono-
ve 97 by improperly relying on police intent. Once again, the court
inappropriately focused on the application of a procedural rule re-
quiring the police conduct.'98 In determining that Conover was not
applicable to Drury, the court noted that "there was no analogous offi-
cial basis or procedural rule requiring Officer Whaley to act as he
192. Drury, 368 Md. at 337, 793 A.2d at 571.
193. Vines v. Maryland, 285 Md. 369, 372, 402 A.2d 900, 901-02 (1979). It is important
to note that the Vines decision predated Innis. However, the Drury court specifically stated,
"the qualifying language of Innis was not a consideration." Drury, 368 Md. at 339 n.3, 793
A.2d at 572 n.3. In other words, the court believed that application of the Innis test would
not have led to a different conclusion in Vines. Id.
194. Drury, 368 Md. at 339, 793 A.2d at 572; see also supra note 146 (describing Maryland
Rule of Procedure 707).
195. Drury, 368 Md. at 339, 793 A.2d at 572.
196. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-55 (1966).
197. State v. Conover, 312 Md. 33, 537 A.2d 1167; see supra text accompanying notes 101-
108 (describing the holding in Conover).
198. Maryland Rule 4-212(e) requires that a copy of the warrant and charging docu-
ment be served upon the defendant promptly after arrest. Id. at 42, 537 A.2d at 1171.
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did." '19 9 Still, the proper focus of the interrogation inquiry is on
whether the suspect felt coerced, not on the officer's intent.200
In short, by holding that the police conduct in Drury violated the
Fifth Amendment freedom from compelled self-incrimination, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland failed to accurately apply the Supreme
Court's decisions defining the functional equivalent of interrogation
and its own decisions addressing confronting a suspect with evidence.
The Supreme Court proclaimed the purpose of its Miranda and re-
lated decisions to be "preventing government officials from using the
coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not
be given in an unrestrained environment."20' Thus, the proper focus
for the Druy analysis should have been on police coercion, not police
intent. Yet, this was not the course the Court of Appeals followed.
Instead, it improperly emphasized the intent of Officer Whaley while
ignoring whether Drury felt compelled to respond to the officer's
statements.
b. Application of the Correct Test for Interrogation Should Have
Led the Court to Admit Drury's Incriminating Remarks.-If the Court of
Appeals of Maryland had properly concentrated its analysis on the is-
sue of coercion as required by Supreme Court precedent, rather than
Officer Whaley's alleged intent, it likely would have found that Drury
was not subjected to interrogation or its functional equivalent. No
compelling or coercive police practices were present in the Drury case.
There was no evidence presented that Drury perceived Officer Wha-
ley's conduct to be coercive.20 2 Officer Whaley simply confronted
Drury with evidence that had been seized from an apartment where
he was staying and truthfully stated to Drury that the evidence would
be examined for fingerprints. 20 3 There was no extended interroga-
tion. No tricks were played on Drury to compel him to confess. Of-
ficer Whaley did not subjugate Drury against his will. While Drury's
statements to Officer Whaley may have been ill-advised, they were not
compelled within the meaning of the Miranda decision.
Application of the Supreme Court's ruling in Innis to the facts of
Drury supports the proposition that Drury's statements were not com-
199. Drury, 368 Md. at 340, 793 A.2d at 573.
200. It is important to note that the Vines decision predated Innis. However, the Drury
court specifically stated, "the qualifying language of Innis was not a consideration." Id. at
339 n.3, 793 A.2d at 572 n.3.
201. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1987).
202. In fact, Officer Whaley was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing.
State v. Drury, Criminal No. 4709 at 3 (Cir. Ct. of Queen Anne's Co., Md. Nov. 26, 1996).
203. Drury, 368 Md. at 333-34, 793 A.2d at 569.
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pelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because the level of com-
pulsion exerted by the police officers in Innis was far stronger than
any compulsion exerted by Officer Whaley on Drury. The officers in
Innis carried on a conversation in the presence of the suspect describ-
ing the possibility that his actions could bring grievous harm to handi-
capped children.2" 4 In contrast, Officer Whaley did not manipulate
Drury, appeal to his conscience, or suggest that Drury's actions might
harm someone.2 °5 Officer Whaley merely showed Drury a tire iron
and a bag containing stolen goods and made the truthful statement
that the items would be examined for fingerprints. 20 6 Drury's re-
sponse to that brief remark was completely voluntary.
Comparing the facts of Drury and Innis, one would assume that if
coercion was present in either case, it would be in Innis. Nevertheless,
while the Court of Appeals held Drury had been subjected to the func-
tional equivalent of interrogation, the Supreme Court concluded that
Innis had not, reasoning that the conversation between the police of-
ficers "consisted of no more than a few offhand remarks" and were
not "particularly 'evocative. ' ' 20 7  The Court further reasoned that
there was nothing in the record to indicate that the officers had
knowledge of any particular susceptibility on the part of the sus-
pect.2 0 8 In short, the Court concluded that the police officers should
not have known that Innis would make an incriminating statement,
emphasizing that subtle compulsion does not equal interrogation.2 0
If there was any measure of compulsion present in Officer Whaley's
actions, it surely did not exceed that level of "subtle compulsion" held
to be constitutional in Innis.2"
Furthermore, even if Officer Whaley believed Drury might in-
criminate himself upon hearing that the tire iron was going to be ex-
amined for fingerprints, 21 that does not equate to interrogation
204. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1980); see supra text accompanying
notes 45-47 (describing the conversation between the police officers).
205. Drury, 368 Md. at 334, 793 A.2d at 569.
206. Id.
207. Innis, 446 U.S. at 303.
208. Id. at 302.
209. Id. at 303. However, there are several reasons to believe the officers did intend to
elicit a confession from Innis. For example, they initiated the conversation as soon as they
began the trip knowing that the trip would be short and wanting Innis to be present to
overhear the conversation. William A. Fragetta, What Constitutes Interrogation: Rhode Island
v. Innis, B.C. L. Rv. 1177, 1192 (1981).
210. Innis, 446 U.S. at 303 ("The Rhode Island Supreme Court erred, in short, in equat-
ing 'subtle compulsion' with interrogation.").
211. There was no evidence that Officer Whaley intended to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse from Drury or that he even considered that Drury might confess. Still, the majority
stated that Officer Whaley must have predicted Drury's reaction as it was "the only reasona-
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under Mauro.2 12 Any wishful thinking by Officer Whaley did not
equate to coercion, nor did it render Drury's statements as any less
voluntary. It follows that a proper application of Supreme Court pre-
cedent should have led the Maryland Court of Appeals to conclude
that Drury was not subjected to the functional equivalent of
interrogation.
Likewise, an analysis of the court's prior holdings in Vines, Cono-
ver, and Williams provides further support for the premise that Officer
Whaley's remarks to Drury would not have been deemed coercive,
and therefore, not the functional equivalent of interrogation had the
proper test been applied. As explained above, the court inappropri-
ately focused on police intent to distinguish Vines from Drury. Once
the focus of inquiry is properly placed on police coercion, the facts of
these two cases are analogous. In both cases, evidence was placed
within the view of the suspect.213 In both cases, the police officer
made truthful statements to the suspect regarding that evidence.21 4
Furthermore, although police intent is not dispositive, the officer in
Vines admitted that he hoped that the suspect would give up evi-
dence.21 5 Because there was no such admission in Drury, the facts of
Drury make an even stronger case for admissibility. 21 6 Regardless, the
statements made by Officer Whaley were no more coercive than those
made by the officer in Vines.
Similarly, the police conduct in Conover was no more coercive
than the police conduct in Drury. Yet, it was not found by the Court of
Appeals to be the functional equivalent of interrogation. 217 In Cono-
ver, the police officer gave the suspect a copy of the charging docu-
ment and the application showing the evidence the police had against
the suspect.218 It is difficult to see how Officer Whaley's showing evi-
dence to Drury could have been any more coercive than being given a
list of the evidence in police possession as in Conover.
Finally, the officer's comments in Williams were no less coercive
than those of Officer Whaley. The officer in that case, after con-
ble conclusion that [could] be drawn from the foregoing facts." Drury, 368 Md. at 337, 793
A.2d at 571.
212. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 530 (1987).
213. Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 372, 402 A.2d 900, 902 (1979); Drury, 368 Md. at 333-
34, 793 A.2d at 569.
214. Vines, 285 Md. at 373, 402 A.2d at 902. Vines was told that the evidence was recov-
ered from a search of his home. Id. Drury was told the items would be examined for
fingerprints. Drury, 368 Md. at 334, 793 A.2d at 569.
215. Vines, 285 Md. at 373, 402 A.2d at 902.
216. Drury, 368 Md. at 334, 793 A.2d at 569.
217. State v. Conover, 312 Md. 33, 45, 537 A.2d 1167, 1172 (1988).
218. Id. at 37, 537 A.2d at 1169.
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fronting the suspect with an incriminating photo, commented "[t] his
is going to work. '21  By implying that he would confess, this statement
posited the guilt of the suspect, a tactic that is frequently used to co-
erce confessions.2 2 ° Still, the court in Williams found the officer's re-
marks to be "innocuous comments ... not reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from Williams.212 1 Thus, even if Officer
Whaley's remark posited the guilt of Drury, it was no less "innocuous"
and no more "aimed at invoking an incriminating statement" than the
officers' statements in Williams.222 If Williams' statement was volun-
tary, then Drury's statement should have also been considered volun-
tary. Thus, had the Drury court applied the proper test for
interrogation and focused on coercion, it would have arrived at the
same conclusion as it did in Williams and held that Officer Whaley's
conduct was not the functional equivalent of interrogation.
Moreover, even assuming police intent is relevant, the Court of
Appeals' conclusion about Officer Whaley's intent did not necessarily
follow from the facts of the case. There was no evidence that Officer
Whaley intended to elicit a confession from Drury. Therefore, even if
police intent was the proper focus of the interrogation inquiry, the
court's reliance on an unfounded assumption does not justify its
conclusion.
c. The Holding in Drury Effectively Undermined a Legitimate Po-
lice Practice.-By contradicting Maryland and Supreme Court prece-
dent in holding that Officer Whaley interrogated Drury when he
showed Drury evidence and told him it would be inspected for finger-
prints, the Court of Appeals of Maryland seriously undermined a po-
lice practice that had previously been sanctioned in Maryland as well
as other state and federal courts. 2 23 To be sure, the court did not state
a bright-line rule that any time an officer confronts a suspect with evi-
dence, the officer's conduct is the functional equivalent of interroga-
tion. However, in examining the facts of Drury, it is difficult to
imagine a factual situation involving confronting a suspect with evi-
219. Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 759, 679 A.2d 1106, 1124 (1996).
220. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450 ("[T]he manuals instruct the police to dis-
play an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt .... The guilt of the subject is to be posited
as a fact.").
221. Williams, 342 Md. at 761, 679 A.2d at 1125.
222. Compare Drury, 368 Md. at 334, 793 A.2d at 569 (explaining that Officer Whaley told
Drury that he was going to "send this evidence off for fingerprints"), with Williams, 342 Md.
at 761, 679 A.2d 1125 (noting that the officer stated "this is going to work" to a fellow
officer after confronting the suspect with a photo taken of him at the crime scene).
223. Drury, 368 Md. at 349, 793 A.2d at 578 (Battaglia, J., dissenting); see also supra notes
91-123 and accompanying text (describing Maryland cases upholding that police practice).
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dence that would pass constitutional muster as a result of the court's
decision. Undoubtedly, the officers' play on the suspect's sympathy in
Inni 224 and the use of undercover agents in Perkin225 would not be
permissible under Drury.
As explained earlier, the issue in Drury is not an issue of first im-
pression in Maryland. The Court of Appeals has addressed this issue
in three previous cases, holding in each case that confronting the sus-
pect with evidence accompanied by remarks from the police was not
the functional equivalent of interrogation, 226 thus, legitimizing that
police practice. While the court did not specifically overrule Vines,
Conover, and Williams and definitively declare that confronting sus-
pects with evidence is a form of interrogation, the court in Drury
seemed to be heading in that direction. Under this new precedent, a
police officer in Maryland would likely jeopardize a conviction by con-
fronting a suspect with evidence in any situation, coercive or not, with-
out first administering the Miranda warning.
In addition to Maryland, several other states have addressed the
issue of confronting a suspect with evidence and have held that such
conduct is perfectly legitimate even without issuing Miranda warn-
ings. 227 For example, in Wisconsin v. Cunningham,228 a police officer
found a gun and showed it to the defendant, a convicted felon, telling
224. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 290, 302 (1980) (holding that comments by police
officers to the suspect regarding the possible danger his disposal of the murder weapon
may have caused to disabled children was not the functional equivalent of interrogation).
The Court stated that the intent of the police officers could have been be to express a
genuine concern for the children. Id. at 303 n.9. However, this seems counterintuitive.
See Fragetta, supra note 209, at 1191 (stating "[w]hile there is some support for a finding
that the officers were putting innocently into words their pent-up worries and anxieties
about the potential fate of the young students, on balance it seems likely that the police
intended their conversation to elicit a response from the suspect").
225. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990) (concluding that statements made by a
suspect in response to statements made by undercover agents were not the product of
interrogation or its functional equivalent). Here the police clearly intended to elicit a
confession from the suspect. In fact, "[the agents] were instructed to engage respondent
in casual conversation and report anything he said about the Stephenson murder." Id. at
295.
226. See Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 378, 402 A.2d at 900, 904-05 (1979) (holding that
showing a suspect an inventory taken pursuant to a search of his home and cocaine seized
in that search was not the functional equivalent of interrogation); State v. Conover, 312
Md. 33, 45, 537 A.2d 1167, 1172 (1988) (ruling that showing a suspect the charging docu-
ment was not the functional equivalent of interrogation); Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724,
761, 679 A.2d 1106, 1125 (1996) (holding that statements positing the suspect's guilt were
not the functional equivalent of interrogation).
227. Clearly, the court is not required to follow other state rulings. However, an exami-
nation of how other states have addressed the issue provides a useful comparison. See
Drury, 368 Md. at 349-50, 793 A.2d at 578 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
228. 423 N.W.2d 862 (Wis. 1988).
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him where it had been found, and saying to another officer, "[t]his
was apparently what Mr. Cunningham was running into the bedroom
for."2 29 The defendant then made an incriminating statement before
being read the Miranda warnings. 230 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
concluded that the officer's words and conduct were not coercive and
accordingly, w,. ere not the functional equivalent of interrogation. 231
Although the practice of confronting a suspect with evidence is
considered interrogation in some jurisdictions,232 other states have
considered this issue and arrived at the same conclusion as the Wis-
consin Supreme Court. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that
showing a defendant a concealed weapon found in her possession,
which prompted incriminating remarks by the defendant, was not the
functional equivalent of interrogation. 233 Similarly, when one investi-
gator handed over evidence to another investigator in the defendant's
presence, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that was not the func-
tional equivalent of interrogation.234 In addition, the Texas Court of
Appeals held that showing a defendant a bloody knife found in the
defendant's home and bloody clothes belonging to the defendant,
without questioning the defendant, did not violate the defendant's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.235 Finally, the
Florida District Court of Appeals held that showing a defendant a
videotape of a robbery, including footage of him shooting the victim,
229. Id. at 863.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 866.
232. See, e.g., People v. Ferro, 472 N.E.2d 13, 15 (N.Y. 1984) (ruling that placing stolen
furs recovered from the victim one foot in front of the defendant's jail cell after the defen-
dant asked to speak to a district attorney was the functional equivalent of interrogation.);
Oregon v. Guayante, 663 P.2d 784, 785-86 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (showing the defendant
stolen property found on the defendant's premises and stating, "Look we already know you
did it. Here is the stuff you took from him," constitutes the functional equivalent of inter-
rogation); Connecticut v. Krajger, 438 A.2d 745, 746 (Conn. 1980) (tricking a suspect into
identifying ajacket found at the crime scene is the functional equivalent of interrogation).
These cases are distinguishable from Drury, because they involve exactly the kind of police
trickery that the Miranda decision was designed to eliminate. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-54
(describing coercive police practices like positing the suspects' guilt, isolation, minimizing
the moral seriousness of the offense, emotional appeals and tricks, relentlessness, domina-
tion of the suspect, the good cop-bad cop routine, fake line-ups, and discouraging commu-
nication with counsel).
233. People v. Benjamin, 300 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
234. State v. Rainey, 672 P.2d 188, 192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). One officer, without saying
a word, handed an illegal device used to jolt horses in a race to another officer. The
suspect stated: "It's a cheap one." Id. at 190.
235. Wiley v. State, 699 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
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was not the functional equivalent of interrogation.236 In each of those
cases the police conduct was significantly more coercive than Officer
Whaley's conduct in Drury. Certainly being confronted with evidence
linking a suspect to a murder (like a bloody knife or a gun) is much
more coercive than being shown a tire iron that may have been used
in a break-in.
In summary, the court's decision in Drury unduly interferes with
the work of the police. The Miranda decision was not designed to
eliminate confessions.2 3 7 In fact, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that confessions play a vital role in the investigation of crime. 23' Fur-
thermore, it does not follow from the Innis decision that all "state-
ments regarding the nature of the evidence against the suspect
constitute interrogation as a matter of law."'23 9 Such a rule is "neither
realistic nor desirable, ' 24" because confessions are a valuable tool for
convicting criminals. Not only can confessions help remove danger-
ous criminals from our streets, truthful confessions can also protect
the innocent from wrongful convictions. 2 1 The Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution protects the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination, 242 but "[there is no privilege against inad-
vertent self-incrimination or even stupid self-incrimination. '"243
Rather, effective criminal investigation depends upon criminals mak-
ing mistakes and inadvertent statements. 24 Moreover, a suspect's in-
criminating statement is not necessarily the product of coercive police
conduct or the suspect's ignorance. People confess to crimes for vari-
236. Lewis v. State, 509 So. 2d 1236, 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1036 (1988).
237. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. Unfortunately, there is evidence that Miranda has de-
creased the likelihood that suspects will cooperate with police and has slightly decreased
conviction rates. Leo, supra note 124, at 648.
238. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. Researchers have also emphasized the importance of
confessions, claiming that "'virtually every detective . . . insisted that more crimes are
solved by police interviews and interrogations than by any other investigative method."'
Cassell, supra note 167, at 498 (citation omitted).
239. Drury, 368 Md. at 348, 793 A.2d at 577 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 203 (1992)).
240. Id.
241. Cassell, supra note 238, at 498. Cassell refers to this as the "lost confession" prob-
lem. Id.
242. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
243. Ciriago v. State, 57 Md. App. 563, 574, 471 A.2d 320, 325 (1984). The framers of
the Constitution did not intend to prevent criminals from incriminating themselves.
George C. Thomas, A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
79, 85 (1993) (stating "historical evidence suggests that the Framers were concerned about
purposive, governmental coercion rather than compulsion in any broad, empirical sense").
244. Ciriago, 57 Md. App. at 575, 471 A.2d at 326.
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ous reasons including their hopes of being granted leniency or their
desire to ease their conscience.245
Drury's incriminating statements about his fingerprints on the
tire iron and the contents of the bag may not have been intelligent.
He probably did not intend to incriminate himself. In fact, the con-
tent of his statement suggests that he was trying to explain the evi-
dence against him without admitting guilt.246 Nevertheless, Drury's
statement was voluntary, not coerced, and the product of a legitimate
police practice.
5. Conclusion.-By finding the police actions in Drury to be the
functional equivalent of interrogation and thus in violation of the
Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland contradicted Supreme Court prece-
dent as well as its own prior rulings. The court improperly focused
the interrogation inquiry on police intent rather than police coercion
as required by Miranda and its progeny. In so doing, the court has
undermined a legitimate police practice that helps to maintain the
balance between the rights of the accused and the duty to protect
public safety.
KIMBERLY A. ROEMER
245. Not all scholars support a broad moral obligation to confess. Still, "a person has a
moral obligation to confess when confessing is 'necessary to provide restitution, to prevent
his commission of future similar acts, or to avoid injustice to others."' JOSEPH D. GRANO,
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 41 (1999).
246. Drury, 368 Md. at 345, 793 A.2d at 576 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
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B. A Strict Adherence to the Complex Theory of Limited Voir Dire:
Continuing the Tedious Guessing Game of Voir Dire While Risking a
Defendant's Right to a Fair and Impartial Juy
In State v. Thomas,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland examined
whether a defendant charged with distribution and possession of a
controlled dangerous substance was entitled to question the venire
panel concerning its feelings regarding violations of narcotics laws
and its ability to render an impartial and fair verdict.2 In affirming
the intermediate court's decision,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland
agreed that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to pro-
pound the voir dire question.4 The court reasoned that the proposed
question focused on an issue specific to the defendant's case and was
directed at ascertaining bias crucial to the defendant's trial. 5 Addi-
tionally, the court held that the question actually proffered to the ve-
nire panel in lieu of the defendant's proposed question did not
adequately cover the specific area of bias that the defendant sought to
uncover.6 Although the Court of Appeals evaluated the proposed
question under the traditional principles enunciated during decades
of Maryland case law, thereby continuing the expansion of the scope
of limited voir dire in Maryland, the court should, as noted in the
concurring opinion, "once and for all, join the rest of the country and
expand the purpose of voir dire in Maryland."7
In Thomas, the court struggled with the complexity of deci-
phering the scope of limited voir dire.' Rather than continue to carve
exceptions to the vague rule, which entitles the accused to a fair and
impartial jury without exceeding the scope of limited voir dire, the
court should have adopted the theory of expanded voir dire. In so
doing, the court would forever end the tedious guessing game played
1. 369 Md. 202, 798 A.2d 566 (2002). I would like to thank ProfessorJerome E. Deise,
Jr. for his assistance, guidance, and encouragement with this Note.
2. Id. at 204, 798 A.2d 566.
3. Thomas v. State, 139 Md. App. 188, 775 A.2d 406 (2001), affd, 369 Md. 202, 798
A.2d 566 (2002).
4. Thomas, 369 Md. at 204, 798 A.2d at 567. The question, referred to by the court as
"Question No. 10," asked "[d]oes any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings
regarding violations of the narcotics laws that it would be difficult for you to fairly and
impartially weigh the facts at a trial where narcotics violations have been alleged?" Id.
5. Id. at 214, 798 A.2d at 573.
6. Id. at 214-17, 798 A.2d at 573-75.
7. Id. at 218, 798 A.2d at 575 (Raker, J., concurring, joined by Harrell, J.).
8. See, e.g., Thomas, 369 Md. at 206-08, 798 A.2d at 568-70 (explaining the difficulty in
applying the controlling principles of limited voir dire to the facts of the case at issue).
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by attorneys in their questioning of the venire panel, while properly
guaranteeing the defendant his or her right to a fair and impartial
jury. By expanding the voir dire process, the court would also curb
the stereotypical judgments and prejudicial beliefs that currently
plague the voir dire process due to the inability of attorneys to exer-
cise informed peremptory challenges.
1. The Case.-Jerrod Thomas was arrested for selling cocaine to
an undercover detective and charged with distribution and possession
of cocaine.9 During voir dire at the start of trial, Thomas and his
counsel requested that two questions be asked in addition to those
propounded by the judge. 10 One of the questions proposed (herein-
after "Question No. 10"), was "[d]oes any member of the jury panel
have such strong feelings regarding violations of the narcotics laws
that it would be difficult ... to fairly and impartially weigh the facts at
a trial where narcotics violations have been alleged?"'" In refusing the
defendant's request, the circuit court judge explained that the pro-
posed question was adequately addressed by the court's other ques-
tions.12 In lieu of the requested questions, the trial judge asked
"whether any member of the panel knew anything about the case, had
formed an opinion regarding it or had other information about the
case." 
1 3
The trial court also inquired as to whether any member knew any-
thing about the case that would make him or her unable to render a
fair verdict and whether anyone had "involvements" with the parties of
the case.14 Finally, the trial judge asked whether the members would
have a problem with a two-day trial and whether any member's family
had been a recent victim of crime. 15 In rendering its decision not to
proffer the defendant's additional questions, the trial court claimed
that these questions adequately targeted the areas of bias that the de-
fendant sought to uncover with his proposed question.16
9. Thomas, 139 Md. App. at 193, 775 A.2d at 409-10.
10. Id. at 194, 775 A.2d at 410.
11. Thomas, 369 Md. at 204, 798 A.2d at 567. In addition to this question, Thomas
requested that the court ask "[h] as any prospective juror or any member of your immedi-
ate family ever been employed by or associated with any municipal, state, or federal police
force, law enforcement agency, prosecutor's office, public defender's office or other law
office of any type?" Thomas, 139 Md. App. at 195, 775 A.2d at 410.
12. Thomas, 139 Md. App. at 195, 775 A.2d at 411.
13. Thomas, 369 Md. at 205, 798 A.2d at 568.
14. Id. at 205 n.3, 798 A.2d at 568 n.3.
15. Id. at 206 n.3, 798 A.2d at 569 n.3.
16. Thomas, 139 Md. App. at 195, 775 A.2d at 411.
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On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the defendant raised
five issues,1 7 including whether the trial court erred in refusing to pro-
pound "Question No. 10.""8 After reviewing a brief history of the de-
velopment of voir dire in Maryland, the Court of Special Appeals held
that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to proffer "Ques-
tion No. 10," because a strong belief about violations of the narcotics
law would prevent ajuror from rendering a fair verdict in the case.' 9
The court conceded that it was not extraordinary for people to
harbor bias against criminal acts, but noted that there are many rea-
sons, which could prevent a juror from making an impartial decision
concerning drug violations.2" Additionally, the court recognized that
the prejudice presented in this case may not exhibit itself unless pro-
voked by proper questions intended to uncover the specific bias.21
The court reasoned that it is not uncommon for potential jurors to
harbor bias concerning drug laws and cited various judicial opinions
explaining the controversies surrounding drug laws.2 2 The court thus
determined that although there are no questions the judge is re-
quired to ask during voir dire, there are areas, such as the one
targeted by "Question No. 10," which should be examined due to
their potential for thwarting a fair verdict.23 Accordingly, the court
held that the actual questions propounded were too general to un-
cover bias because they did not address the "area of undue
influence." 24
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to determine
whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that "Question
17. First, the defendant questioned whether it was proper for the court to exclude both
"Question No. 10" and "Question No. 5." Id. at 194-95, 775 A.2d at 410. In addition, the
defendant questioned whether the identification of his photograph should have been sup-
pressed, as unnecessarily suggestive. Id. at 208, 775 A.2d at 418. Finally, the defendant
questioned whether the court erred in permitting the State to cross-examine him with
evidence of his prior convictions. Id. at 211, 775 A.2d at 420. The court declined to ad-
dress whether a specific juror should have been stricken. Id. at 193 n.1, 775 A.2d at 409
n.1.
18. Id. at 193, 775 A.2d at 409. The court determined that it was not an abuse of
discretion to refuse to propound Question No. 5. Id. at 202, 775 A.2d at 414-15.
19. Id. at 202, 775 A.2d at 415.
20. Id. at 203, 775 A.2d at 415-16.
21. Id. at 203-04, 775 A.2d at 416.
22. Id. at 204, 775 A.2d at 416. These opinions led the court to determine that the
"war on drugs" is still a common phrase, thus supporting the fact that many people are
affected by drugs and, therefore, may harbor prejudice or bias. Id.
23. See id. at 206, 775 A.2d at 417.
24. Id. at 207-08, 775 A.2d at 418. The court relied on Judge Bell's dissent in Davis v.
State, 333 Md. 27, 633 A.2d 867 (1993) (Bell, C.J., dissenting) in its determination that the
propounded questions were too general. Thomas, 139 Md. App. at 207, 775 A.2d at 418.
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No. 10" was a valid question to ask in seeking information as a cause
for disqualification.25
2. Legal Background.--Maryland has strictly adhered to the the-
ory of limited voir dire and rejected adoption of the alternative theory
of expanded voir dire. 26 Unfortunately, adhering to the theory of lim-
ited voir dire has proven problematic for Maryland courts. Specifi-
cally, Maryland has struggled with guaranteeing the accused his or her
right to a fair and impartial jury without broadening the scope of lim-
ited voir dire.27 Although the courts in Maryland have argued that
expanded voir dire would create judicial inefficiency, states such as
New York, Texas, and Kentucky have successfully implemented ex-
panded voir dire with fewer problems than Maryland's use of limited
voir dire.2' Rather than switch to the theory of expanded voir dire,
Maryland courts have simply created numerous expansions in the
scope of the limited theory of voir dire, without establishing a clear
rule.
a. The History of VoirDire.-Voir dire is a process designed to
effectuate an accused person's fundamental right to a fair and impar-
tial jury and verdict pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution 29 and Article XXI of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.3" During voir dire, judges and attorneys examine the venire
panel through questioning to determine whether any of the members
25. Thomas, 369 Md. at 204, 798 A.2d at 566-67.
26. See infra notes 54-88 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland's rejection of
expanded voir dire).
27. See Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 14, 759 A.2d 819, 826 (2000) (discussing the diffi-
culty in keeping within the scope of limited voir dire while impaneling a fair and impartial
jury).
28. See, e.g., People v. Boulware, 272 N.E.2d 538, 540 (N.Y. 1971) (citing Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)) (explaining that expanded "voir dire is necessary so that the
concomitant right to challenge prospective jurors may be intelligently and effectively used
by the parties"); Sullivan v. State, 678 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (allowing
broad and unlimited voir dire examination); Lightfoot v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.2d 984,
989 (Ky. 1949) (explaining that "a litigant is entitled to make inquiry ofjurors in respect to
any matter which will throw light on the background of the juror" to assist the litigant with
making informed peremptory challenges).
29. U.S. CONST. amend XI. The Sixth Amendment states in pertinent part: "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." Id.
30. MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21, § V (2002). Article XXI of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights states "[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right.., to a speedy
trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found
guilty." Id.; see also MD. R. 4-311 (stating that criminal defendants in circuit court are guar-
anteed a right to a trial by jury pursuant to Maryland's Constitution and Declaration of
Rights).
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harbor bias or prejudice against any aspect of the upcoming case.3
Attorneys select the best jury for their client through the use of chal-
lenges to excuse any member whom they perceive will hinder their
efforts.32
There are two types of challenges that an attorney can use to ex-
cuse unfavorable members: challenges for cause "33 and peremptory
challenges. 34 An attorney who believes that ajuror is biased and una-
ble to set aside his or her feelings to render a fair verdict can chal-
lenge that juror for cause. 3  A challenge for cause is defined as "[a]
party's challenge supported by a specified reason, such as bias or
prejudice, that would disqualify that potential juror. ' 36 Peremptory
challenges are defined as "a party's limited number of challenges that
need not be supported by any reason, although a party may not use
such a challenge in a way that discriminates against a protected minor-
ity. ''37 Even though both challenges can be used in any trial regardless
of the theory of voir dire adopted by the state, the range of questions
that may be used to obtain the information to exercise the challenges
may vary.3
Although there are no specific statutes guiding the management
of inquiry during the voir dire process, 9 various principles have been
adopted by states through decades of case law to aid judges in their
31. Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 35, 633 A.2d 867, 871 (1993) (discussing the two areas of
mandatory inquiry for uncovering issues subject to challenges for cause).
32. See id. at 36, 633 A.2d at 872.
33. Id. at 62, 633 A.2d at 884-85 (Bell, C.J., dissenting); see also Adams v. State, 200 Md.
133, 140, 88 A.2d 556, 559 (1952) (citing Emery v. Asher, 196 Md. 1, 7-8, 75 A.2d 333, 336)
(explaining that a purpose of voir dire is to "ascertain 'the existence of cause for disqualifi-
cation and for no other purpose"').
34. See Vaccaro v. Caple, 33 Md. App. 413, 414-15, 365 A.2d 47 (1976) (explaining the
function of peremptory challenges); see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-301
(2002).
35. Davis, 333 Md. at 62, 633 A.2d at 884-85 (Bell, J., dissenting).
36. BlACK's LAw DICTIONARY 223 (7th ed. 1999).
37. Id.
38. See Handy v. State, 101 Md. 39, 40-41, 60 A. 452, 453 (1905) (explaining that there
are no statutes governing the voir dire process). Under the theory of limited voir dire, a
party may not propound questions for the sole purpose of making informed peremptory
challenges. Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 13-14, 759 A.2d 819, 826 (2000).
39. Whittemore v. State, 151 Md. 309, 314, 134 A. 322, 323 (1926). Although there are
no statutes specifically governing the management of the voir dire process, there are stat-
utes that govern the procedure. For example, the statutes do not set forth guidelines for
judges to use in determining whether a proposed question falls within the scope of limited
voir dire. However, the legislature detailed specific procedures for challenging, and guide-
lines controlling the number of challenges permitted. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JUD.
PROC. § 8-301 (setting forth the number of peremptory challenges permitted in criminal
cases); MD. R. 4-312 (explaining the procedure for challenging the array, the procedure
controlling alternate jurors, the information provided on the jury list, the procedure for
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decisions concerning the voir dire process.4° Currently, there are two
theories of the voir dire process in the United States: limited voir dire
and unlimited, or expanded, voir dire. 4' Both theories differ drasti-
cally from one another with respect to scope; however, the main pur-
pose of both theories is to eliminate any person who is biased against
the defendant for any reason.42
Limited voir dire requires judges to inquire about any areas "rea-
sonably likely to disclose cause for disqualification. '43 Alternatively,
the theory of expanded voir dire allows the judge to propound ques-
tions on any topic so long as it is "reasonably related to the intelligent
exercise of peremptory challenges." 44 Unlike limited voir dire, ex-
panded voir dire allows attorneys to question the venire panel for the
sole purpose of gaining information to better exercise their peremp-
tory challenges.4 5 In direct contrast, limited voir dire restricts the ex-
ercise of peremptory challenges to the information mandated by the
statutory requirements or any information gained through the ques-
tions geared toward challenges for cause.46 Beyond this information,
parties are not provided with much assistance in determining when or
how to use their peremptory challenges or whether voir dire questions
are permissible, especially in those states that have adopted limited
voir dire.
At issue in most voir dire cases is whether a particular question
can be properly characterized as eliciting an answer for purposes of a
challenge for cause as required by limited voir dire.4 7 Generally, if a
examining jurors and challenging for cause, as well as the procedure governing the need
for additional jurors and impaneling the jury).
40. See Handy, 101 Md. at 41-44, 60 A. at 453-54 (exploring other courts' case law to
decide whether to allow informed peremptory challenges); see also Bedford v. State, 317
Md. 659, 670-71, 566 A.2d 111, 117 (1989) (explaining that "[c]ertain guidelines for the
scope of voir dire ... have developed through the years").
41. Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 39, 633 A.2d 867, 873 (1993) (explaining the differences




45. Id. at 38-39, 633 A.2d at 872-73.
46. Id.; see also MD. R. 4-312(c) (explaining the contents of the information provided to
the parties on each potential juror); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROc. §§ 8-207 & 8-210
(2002) (explaining the qualifications of potential jurors for the venire panel).
47. See Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627
(1958) (determining whether the plaintiff was entitled to a voir dire question regarding
the ability of the jury panel to impartially decide the case against the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Baltimore); Grossfeld v. Braverman, 203 Md. 498, 101 A.2d 824 (1954)
(considering whether a plaintiff is entitled to question the venire panel about biases con-




question is posed for purposes of using the answer to challenge a ju-
ror for cause, the question will be accepted if an affirmative answer
would reveal bias of a juror that would hinder the juror's ability to
render a fair verdict.48 Often, attorneys use this guise of challenges
for cause to exercise informed peremptory challenges. 49 That is, at-
torneys propose questions arguing that the question would reveal bias,
when the true purpose of the question is to assist them in using a
peremptory challenge and not to successfully excuse a juror for
cause.5" This result is only a problem in the states that adopt limited
voir dire because the informed exercise of peremptory challenges is
prohibited under that theory.51 Under limited voir dire, courts are
forced to delicately balance the defendant's right to a fair and impar-
tial jury with the goal of restricting the scope of limited voir dire, al-
lowing only questions geared towards exercising challenges for
cause.5' This problem is illustrated by the case law interpreting the
limited voir dire process in Maryland.
b. The Evolution of Voir Dire in Maryland.-The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland adopted the theory of limited voir dire and has re-
jected every attempt to switch to expanded voir dire. Instead, the
court continues to expand the scope of limited voir dire, on a case-by-
case basis.
(1) The Adoption of Limited Voir Dire. -- Over a hundred years
ago, in Waters v. State,5" the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that
each juror in the jury should be entirely impartial and as unbiased as
possible. 54 To accomplish this principle, the court articulated two
rules to assist judges in conducting voir dire.55 The first rule set forth
specific qualifications that must be met for a person to serve on a
48. See Davis, 333 Md. at 36-37, 633 A.2d at 872 (explaining that a proposed question is
acceptable if an affirmative answer will reveal cause for disqualification).
49. See McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58-59, 146 A.2d 194, 196-97 (1959) (affirming the
trial court's refusal to propound questions asking for a juror's opinion on a matter of law
or hypothetical situations because these questions do not focus on an issue which would be
cause for disqualification).
50. See id.
51. Davis, 333 Md. at 39, 633 A.2d at 873.
52. Id.
53. 51 Md. 430 (1879).
54. Id. at 436. The court was asked to determine whether a juror should be excluded
who admitted to forming an opinion on the case, but concluded that he was confident that
he could give the defendant a fair and impartial trial. Id. at 435. The court affirmed the
trial court's decision that the man was a competent juror. Id. at 438-39.
55. Id. at 436.
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jury.5 6 The second rule allowed for the exclusion of jurors who for
one reason or another were unable to render a fair and impartial ver-
dict.5 7 The court discussed the difficulties that arise in determining
whether a person is able to render a fair and impartial verdict noting
that "the nature and character of the opinion, and the source or infor-
mation upon which it is founded" result in diverse decisions by the
courts.5 8
In response to that problem, the court in Handy v. State59 adopted
the theory of limited voir dire. 61 In Handy, the defense counsel ob-
jected to the court's refusal to ask a potential jury member whether he
was married, arguing that he intended to use the information to bet-
ter exercise his peremptory challenge. 6 1 In rejecting defense coun-
sel's request, thereby adopting the theory of limited voir dire, the
court held that the trial judge is given discretion to regulate the ques-
tions propounded to the venire panel.6 2 Accordingly, the court held
that speculative questions or questions which are immaterial to the
issues presented by the case, such as marital status, may be excluded.6 3
Following the adoption of limited voir dire by the court in Handy,
numerous cases came before the court in which it had the opportu-
nity to expand the voir dire process. The first case requesting the
adoption of expanded voir dire was Whittemore v. State.64 In Whittemore,
counsel for a man accused of killing a prison guard wanted to ques-
tion a jury member's age and occupation because the defense feared
that the man, who had listed his occupation as retired, originally
worked for a penitentiary and was thus prevented from rendering a
56. Id.; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text (establishing the current qualifica-
tions for jury members).
57. Waters, 51 Md. at 436.
58. Id. The court stated that it would not "consider in detail the many cases to be
found on the subject, much less attempt the impossible task of reconciling conflicting
opinions." Id.
59. 101 Md. 39, 60 A. 452 (1905).
60. Id. at 43, 60 A. at 454.
61. Id. at 40, 60 A. at 453. Additionally, the court would not allow the attorney to
question the panel. Id. Instead, the attorney was required to submit the questions to the
judge, and if the judge found the questions acceptable, the judge would then ask the ques-
tion to the jury. Id.
62. See id. at 43, 60 A. at 454. The court found that there were no statutes or cases in
Maryland on the issue. Id. at 40-41, 60 A. at 453. Therefore, the court relied on English
cases to adopt the use of limited voir dire. Id. at 4142, 60 A. at 453. Additionally, the court
looked at the decisions of other courts in this country, which resulted in conflicting ap-
proaches. Id. at 4243, 60 A. at 453-54. However, the court chose to adopt limited voir dire
in an effort to protect ajury member from attorneys improperly convincing jurors of non-
existent biases. Id. at 43-44, 60 A. at 454.
63. Id. at 44, 60 A. at 454.
64. 151 Md. 309, 134 A. 322 (1926).
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fair and impartial verdict.6 5 In rejecting counsel's argument, the
court reasoned that counsel could have asked a question specifically
addressing that issue instead of a vague question about his age and
occupation.66 In reaffirming the use of limited voir dire, the court
explained that there were to be no examinations of 'jurymen which
[are] characterized as speculative, inquisitorial, catechising, or fish-
ing, to aid in deciding on peremptory challenges,"67 because ques-
tions of that nature lacked purpose and did not target areas which
would disqualify the jury members for cause.68 Instead, the questions
were to be used to assist attorneys in their exercise of peremptory
challenges, a procedure previously rejected in Handy.69 Thus, the
Whittemore court established a rule requiring questions to be directed
at specific reasons for disqualification."y Questions falling outside the
rule articulated in Whittemore are left to the judge's discretion as to
whether to propound them to the venire panel.7i
Thirty years later, the procedure of asking questions to the venire
panel was challenged again in an effort to persuade the court to adopt
expanded voir dire. In Bryant v. State,72 counsel wanted to question
the venire panel himself as to whether anyone had been a client of
either of the State's Attorneys and, thus, requested that the process set
forth in Handy be ignored. 73 Again, the Court of Appeals refused to
allow this change, fearing that attorneys would abuse this process by
attempting to obtain useful information for the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges. 74 The court stated that there was no reason to
change a principle that had been consistently reaffirmed. 75 Addition-
ally, the court held that the question requested by the defense,
whether any of the potential jurors were clients of the State's Attor-
neys, was properly refused because there is no statute in Maryland re-
quiring the judge to ask such questions.76 Therefore, the court
reaffirmed that the trial judge should be given discretion to decide
whether to ask certain questions.77
65. Id. at 311-14, 134 A. at 322-24.
66. Id. at 314-15, 134 A. at 324.
67. Id. at 313-14, 134 A. at 323 (citing Handy, 101 Md. 39, 60 A. 452).
68. Id. at 315-16, 134 A. at 324.
69. Id.; see also Handy, 101 Md. at 43, 60 A. at 454.
70. Whittemore, 151 Md. at 315-16, 134 A. at 324.
71. Id. at 315, 134 A. at 324.
72. 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1995).
73. Id. at 581-82, 115 A.2d at 509.
74. Id. at 582, 115 A.2d at 509.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 583, 115 A.2d at 510.
77. Id.
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In Davis v. State,78 the court was again requested to adopt the al-
ternative theory of expanded voir dire in determining whether the
lower court erred when it refused to ask whether any venire panel
members were related to law enforcement personnel. 79 After review-
ing the two mandatory areas of inquiry that can uncover cause for
disqualification, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to re-
fuse the submitted question.8 ° Explaining that an affirmative answer
would not automatically disqualify that person, the court held that the
question submitted was actually an attempt to exercise an informed
peremptory challenge.8 ' Had the question focused on the state of
mind of the jurors as it related to specific areas pertinent to the case,
and not simply their associations, the court indicated, such a question
might be acceptable.8 2 However, in the court's view, the submitted
question was intended to assist in the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges, a practice the court "ha[d] long since rejected."8 3
The most recent attempt to persuade the court to change theo-
ries of voir dire occurred in Boyd v. State,8 4 when the court was asked
whether the trial court erred in refusing to question the venire panel
regarding physical impairments.8 5 In Boyd, the court affirmed the
trial court's decision because the question was not related to the ve-
nire panel member's state of mind and, thus, would not be cause for
disqualification."6 The court reasoned that physical disabilities, such
as poor eyesight or hearing, would not influence a juror in favor of
one party over another.87 The court further explained that a court
must accommodate any jurors with physical inabilities, instead of dis-
qualifying them. Therefore, a physical disability alone is insufficient
to establish cause for disqualification.
88
(2) Expanding the Scope of Limited Voir Dire.--In lieu of adopt-
ing expanded voir dire, the Court of Appeals, on a case-by-case basis,
has permitted exceptions to the vague theory of limited voir dire and
allowed numerous specific expansions in the scope of limited voir
dire. Since the adoption of limited voir dire, the court has recognized
78. 333 Md. 27, 633 A.2d 867 (1993).
79. Id. at 33, 633 A.2d at 870.
80. Id. at 35-38, 633 A.2d at 871-73.
81. Id. at 37-38, 633 A.2d at 872-73.
82. Id. at 37, 633 A.2d at 872.
83. Id. at 38, 633 A.2d at 872-73.
84. 341 Md. 431, 671 A.2d 33 (1996).
85. Id. at 436, 671 A.2d at 34.
86. Id. at 436-37, 671 A.2d at 36.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 440, 671 A.2d at 37.
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the necessity of guaranteeing the accused the right to a fairjury, while
keeping the scope of voir dire limited. 9
Beginning in 1943, the court first expanded the scope of limited
voir dire to include financial bias in suits concerning the liquidation
of a company. In Alexander v. RD. Grier & Sons Co., Inc.,9" the court
was asked to determine whether the venire panel could be questioned
about whether they or any of their immediate family members were
"assessables in the Keystone Indemnity Exchange," which was a party
to the suit.91 The court concluded that the question should have
been asked because it is possible that a jury member's financial inter-
est could make him biased in favor of the liquidator and, therefore,
prevent a fair and impartial verdict.92 Because an affirmative answer
to the question would reveal cause for disqualification, the answer
would allow the defendant to challenge for cause, which the court
found permissible under the theory of limited voir dire.93
Soon after the decision in Alexander, the court in Corens v. State 4
was asked to determine whether the defendant's counsel could ask if a
venire panel member would convict the plaintiff based on circumstan-
tial evidence.9 5 The court upheld the question, reasoning that the
State should be able to challenge a person who is unable to convict on
circumstantial evidence.96 Because the question was propounded to
discover the venire panel's state of mind in relation to the issues
presented by the case, the court allowed the question.97 Again, an
affirmative answer to this question would reveal cause for disqualifica-
tion and would give the State a basis for a successful challenge.98
Thus, the court expanded the scope of limited voir dire to include this
question. 99
89. Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 14, 759 A.2d 819, 826 (2000).
90. 181 Md. 415, 30 A.2d 757 (1943).
91. Id. at 417, 30 A.2d at 758.
92. Id. at 419, 30 A.2d at 759.
93. See id.
94. 185 Md. 561, 45 A.2d 340 (1946).
95. Corens, 185 Md. at 563-64, 45 A.2d at 343. Specifically, the court asked "' [h]ave you
any such conscientious scruple[s] or opinions as would prevent or preclude you from ren-
dering a verdict of guilty in a case where the penalty prescribed by law may be death upon
what is commonly called circumstantial evidence?"' Id. at 563, 45 A.2d at 343. The defen-
dant argued that this question was framed in terms such that a juror might imply that the
judge concluded that the defendant was guilty. Id. at 563-64, 45 A.2d at 343.
96. Id. at 564-65, 45 A.2d at 344.
97. Id., 45 A.2d at 343-44.
98. Id.
99. Id., 45 A.2d at 344.
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The third expansion in the scope of limited voir dire concerned
the permissible use of questions regarding a venire panel member's
religious affiliations for cases concerning the crime of abortion. In
1952, the Court of Appeals in Adams v. State"'0 expanded the scope of
limited voir dire to include questions concerning whether prospective
jurors' religious beliefs or church affiliations would impair their ability
to give a fair trial to the defendants, who were charged with the crime
of abortion."' In Adams, the appellate court concluded that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing questions of this nature
because the questions properly framed the issues sought to be uncov-
ered by the defendants. 0 2 Because the questions sought to uncover
bias related to a challenge for cause, they were deemed permissible.10 3
Another expansion arose in Grossfeld v. Braverman,10 4 a case where
a sister was injured in an automobile accident when she was a passen-
ger in her brother's car.1 0 5 The court affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion to propound a question that asked the venire panel whether any
of the members would be prejudiced against the parties given their
relationship.'0 6 The court explained that the questions were calcu-
lated to uncover bias and prejudice related to a pertinent issue of the
case and, therefore, an affirmative answer would reveal a cause for
disqualification. 0 7
A fifth expansion arose in Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Baltimore, °8 where the court acknowledged that counsel is allowed to
inform the venire panel that an entity being sued is a corporation and
not an individual religious figure.'0 9 However, the court held that
general questions that fail to apprise the jury panel of the nature of
the possible bias or prejudice being explored are unacceptable be-
cause defendants are entitled to juries that are completely unbiased,
100. 200 Md. 133, 88 A.2d 556 (1952).
101. Id. at 140-41, 88 A.2d at 559-60.
102. Id. The court asked:
Is there any reason which will prevent any one of you from giving each of the
defendants a fair and impartial trial and finding a verdict based only on the law
and the evidence, such as your knowledge of the case or the parties or religious
scruples or any other reason?
Id. at 140, 88 A.2d at 559. In response to this question, onejuror admitted that he did not
approve of abortions, and was challenged for cause. Id.
103. Id.
104. 203 Md. 498, 101 A.2d 824 (1954).
105. Id. at 499, 101 A.2d at 825.
106. Id. at 500-01, 101 A.2d at 825-26.
107. Id. at 501, 101 A.2d at 826.
108. 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627 (1958).
109. Id. at 606-07, 143 A.2d at 631.
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and not simply juries who are free of general or abstract prejudices.1"t
Therefore, the jurors were entitled to know the specific church and its
relationship to the lawsuit, because the general question proffered by
the trial court did not inform the jurors of the prejudices being
examined."'
In addition, the court allowed a question that concerned the ve-
nire panel's willingness to give more weight to the credibility of one
witness over another witness because of the person's status as a law
enforcement agent. In Langley v. State,"2 the court held that if a ma-
jor portion of the State's evidence depends on a law enforcement of-
ficer's testimony, the defendant has a right to question the jury about
whether they will give more credibility to the police officer's testi-
mony, strictly as a result of the officer's status.' 13 The court reasoned
that a juror who will give more or less credit to a witness based solely
on the status of the witness's occupation cannot fairly evaluate the
case, because the juror will have already "prejudged an issue of credi-
bility."' "4 Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that defendants are
entitled to question the venire panel about a witness's credibility if the
state's evidence relies heavily on the testimony of a police officer."15
One of the most controversial questions permitted within the
scope of limited voir dire asks whether racial bias will reveal a valid
reason to challenge for cause. In Hill v. State, 1 6 where an African-
American defendant was arrested by a Caucasian police officer," 7 the
Court of Appeals expanded the scope of limited voir dire to include
questions about racial or ethnic bias."' In Hill, the trial court refused
to ask a question about racial bias or prejudice, instead asking a gen-
eral question about whether there was anything that would prevent
the venire panel from rendering a fair or impartial verdict." 9 The
court held that the trial court erred in refusing the question because
race was a pertinent issue in the case and the defendant's verdict
could be greatly affected by the jury's bias towards a particular race.'12
110. Id., 143 A.2d at 631-32.
111. Id.
112. 281 Md. 337, 378 A.2d 1338 (1977).
113. Id. at 349, 378 A.2d at 1344. However, the court must phrase the question to reflect
that the bias is a result of the police officer's status. Id. (citing Brown v. United States, 338
F.2d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1964)).
114. Langley, 281 Md. at 348, 378 A.2d at 1343.
115. Id. at 349, 378 A.2d at 1344.
116. 339 Md. 275, 661 A.2d 1164 (1995).
117. Id. at 277, 661 A.2d at 1165.
118. Id. at 285, 661 A.2d at 1169.
119. Id. at 278, 661 A.2d at 1165.
120. Id. at 281, 661 A.2d at 1167.
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Additionally, the court stated it is unlikely that the general question
would be considered adequate in uncovering racial bias. 1 2' Again, a
question aimed at uncovering bias related to a pertinent issue of the
case is permissible under the scope of limited voir dire.1 22
Finally, in Dingle v. State,12 3 the court was asked to review a trial
court's decision to propound a question that would excuse potential
jury members if they, their family or close friends were ever victims of
crimes, where the victimization would prevent them from rendering a
fair verdict. 124 The problem in Dingle resulted from the judge's failure
to inquire further about why the juror would be unable to render a
fair verdict. 125 Although the trial judge recognized that the effect of
victimization was pertinent to the case and could present cause for
disqualification, it was within the judge's discretion to determine
whether the juror was unable to render a fair verdict.12 6 In signaling
the expansion of limited voir dire in the area of victimization, the
Court of Appeals reaffirmed that a trial judge should not rely on the
word of ajuror. To rely on the word of ajuror without further inquiry
would deprive the defendant of the ability to challenge any of the
venire persons for cause, shift the burden of discretion from the judge
to the juror, and frustrate the purpose of voir dire instead of advanc-
ing it. t 2 7 Therefore, questions concerning victimization are permissi-
ble under the scope of limited voir dire, so long as the judge inquires
how the victimization affects the juror and gives the defendant an op-
portunity to challenge for cause. 128
Even though Maryland courts have struggled to determine
whether a question falls within the scope of limited voir dire and
whether refusal of a voir dire question will deny a defendant his or her
right to a fair trial, 121 the Court of Appeals has continued to cite sev-
121. Id.; see Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 595, 606-07, 143
A.2d 627, 631-32 (1958) (prohibiting general questions that do not indicate to the jury
what bias is being questioned).
122. Hill, 339 Md. at 281, 661 A.2d at 1167.
123. 361 Md. 1, 759 A.2d 819 (2000).
124. Id. at 4 n.4, 759 A.2d at 820 n.4.
125. Id. at 17, 759 A.2d at 828.
126. Id., 759 A.2d at 827-28.
127. Id. at 19, 21, 759 A.2d at 829-30.
128. Id. at 17, 759 A.2d at 828.
129. See Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 37, 633 A.2d 867, 872 (1993) (explaining that a
proposed question is proper if an affirmative answer will reveal cause for disqualification);
but see McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58-59, 146 A.2d 194, 196-97 (1959) (refusing to question
the jury panel on whether a man can use a weapon in self-defense, whether liability of
consequences attaches to the possession of a gun, whether illegal possession of a gun will
prevent an acquittal, and whether the jury can decide reasonable doubt); King v. State, 287
Md. 530, 537, 414 A.2d 909, 913 (1980) (holding that the lower court erred when it dis-
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eral reasons for its adherence to the theory of limited voir dire. First,
the court has argued that judicial efficiency outweighs the process of
ferreting out all biases in a jury, especially given the increasing num-
ber of cases on the dockets and the lack of respective judicial re-
sources.'30 The court has reasoned that expanded voir dire would
"waste . . . precious courtroom and human resources"' ,'- and not out-
weigh the "minimally incremental benefit that soon passes the point
of diminishing returns.""3 2 Moreover, fears that voir dire would be-
come an unreasonable process, creating additional unnecessary work,
have kept the court from adopting expanded voir dire.133
In addition, the Court of Appeals fears that the extra time taken
to impanel a jury would hinder other litigants by preventing them
from obtaining speedy resolutions of their cases.'34 Further, the court
believes that expanded voir dire would allow an attorney to entrap a
juror into making a statement that later could be used to argue that
the juror was biased."3 5 Hinting that it would be close to impossible to
impanel a completely unbiased jury, the court has noted that even the
strictest rules would be unable to uncover all biases. 136 Thus, the
court clings to the tradition of "remain[ing] faithful to the Handy
rule." 13 7
c. Alternative Theories of Voir Dire Adopted in Other States. -De-
spite its potential for numerous problems, several states, including
Kentucky, New York, and Louisiana, have adopted the theory of ex-
qualified jurors for cause without questioning whether their belief that the marijuana laws
and possession of marijuana laws were wrong would prevent them from rendering a fair
verdict).
130. Davis, 333 Md. at 4243, 633 A.2d at 874-75.
131. Id. at 42, 633 A.2d at 874.
132. Id.
133. Whittemore v. State, 151 Md. 309, 314, 134 A. 322, 323 (1926). In Whittemore, the
court noted that other states subscribe to expanded voir dire; however, the court argued
this was a "seemingly unreasonable encumbering and prolongation of the work of securing
a jury to proceed with the trial." Id.
134. Davis, 333 Md. at 42, 633 A.2d at 874 (explaining that "[i]n a world of finite re-
sources, if the fabled 'day in court' is permitted casually to multiply into twenty days in
court, the inevitable consequence is that, by the inexorable law of mathematics, nineteen
other litigants are denied any time in court at all") (quoting Davis v. State, 93 Md. App. 89,
94, 611 A.2d 1008, 1010 (1992))).
135. Handy v. State, 101 Md. 39, 43, 60 A. 452, 454 (1905) (quoting Stagner v. State, 9
Tex. Ct. App. 440 (1880)).
136. Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430, 436, 1879 Md. Lexis 1, 9 (1989).
137. Davis, 333 Md. at 42, 633 A.2d at 875. The court has never come close to adopting
expanded voir dire, and constantly cites the Handy decision as the reason to stay with lim-
ited voir dire, even though that case fails to explain why limited voir dire is better or neces-
sary. See Handy, 101 Md. 39, 60 A. 452.
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panded voir dire. These states advocate the benefits of expanded voir
dire, such as exposing concealed prejudgments.. 8 and efficiently exer-
cising the right to peremptorily challenge, 13' and believe that such
benefits outweigh any inherent potential problems.
The Kentucky Constitution, like Maryland's Declaration of
Rights, guarantees an impartial jury to a criminal defendant."4 ° How-
ever, unlike Maryland, Kentucky subscribes to the theory of expanded
voir dire.'4 1 Criminal defendants in Kentucky are permitted to ques-
tion the venire panel about anything that could provide the defendant
with information to help him or her exercise challenges both for
cause and peremptory challenges. 142 In allowing this wide range of
questioning, Kentucky courts uphold the defendants' right to a jury
free of actual or implied bias, and members who are disinterested in
the matter at issue.14 Specifically, the range of voir dire is extensive,
especially because the Kentucky Court of Appeals has recommended
that the scope of inquiry be given wide and liberal discretion. 144 De-
spite this wide range of scope, expanded voir dire is not absolutely
unlimited, in that judges are permitted to curtail the questioning if it
is necessary for judicial efficiency.14 5 The decision to restrict voir dire,
however, could amount to reversible error if there is clear abuse of
138. King v. State, 790 So. 2d 1253, 1254-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
139. Lightfoot v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.2d 984 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949) (allowing a party
to inquire about anything that will help him or her intelligently exercise his or her per-
emptory challenge); People v. Corbett, 418 N.Y.S.2d 699 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (explaining
that voir dire is necessary to a party's right to intelligently challenge prospective jurors);
State v. Hills, 120 So. 2d 12 (La. 1961) (explaining that a party has a right to question the
venire panel to help him or her better exercise his or her peremptory challenge).
140. Ky. CONsT. § 11 (2002). The Kentucky Constitution states that "[the accused] shall
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the -Acinage." Id. It is well-settled in
Kentucky that an impartial jury is "composed of members who are disinterested and free
from bias and prejudice, actual or implied or reasonably inferred." Tayloe v. Common-
wealth, 335 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960).
141. See Lightfoot, 219 S.W.2d at 989.
142. Id. at 989 (providing that "[a] litigant is entitled to make inquiry of jurors in re-
spect to any matter which will throw light on the background of the juror in order that the
litigant may better exercise his discretion in respect to peremptory challenges"). In Ken-
tucky, the judge asks the questions submitted to him by counsel. Ky. R. Cr. 9.38. However,
the judge may permit the attorneys to question the venire panel directly. Id.
143. See Tayloe, 335 S.W.2d at 557 (defining "actual bias" as "'the existence of such a
state of mind on the part of the juror, in regard to the case, or to either party, as satisfies
the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that he cannot try the case impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the parties challenging,"' pursuant to Ky.
CODE CRIM. PRAc. § 209).
144. Webb v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958) (citing 31 AM.
JUR. Jury §§ 138-140).
145. Woodford v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
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discretion. 146 Finally, erring on the side of caution, the court draws all
inferences of unfairness and doubt in the favor of the defendant.
1 47
These guidelines governing expanded voir dire were created to pro-
vide counsel with the tools necessary to ferret out any information
that can better assist him or her in exercising the challenges in pursuit
of a fair and impartial jury.1 48
Similar to Kentucky, New York has been adamant about a defen-
dant's right to an impartial jury because, in its absence, the protec-
tions safeguarding the defendant, such as the State's heavy burden of
proof or the presumption of innocence, are useless unless those sit-
ting in judgment are capable of being fair and impartial. 49 There-
fore, New York has continued to subscribe to a theory of expanded
voir dire by encouraging attorneys to question the jury for the pur-
pose of efficiently exercising their challenges. 5 ° Thus, New York de-
fendants are permitted to question jurors about their qualifications in
order to provide a sufficient basis for challenges for cause and for per-
emptory challenges.' 5 ' During the voir dire process, New York judges
retain broad discretion to control the scope of voir dire, and may limit
questioning, so long as the accused is given a reasonable opportunity
to question the venire panel about any relevant or material aspect of
the case.' 5 9 Thus, New York courts have made clear that the purpose
146. Id.; see also Webb, 314 S.W.2d at 545 (citing 31 AM. JUR. Jury §§ 138-140 (holding the
standard of review with regard to discretionary trial court rulings to be a clear abuse of
discretion)).
147. Tayloe, 335 S.W.2d at 557. The court explained that "[i]t is always of vital impor-
tance to the defendant in a criminal prosecution that doubt of unfairness be resolved in
his favor." Id.
148. Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957). The court
articulated the purpose of voir dire as the process by which an accused can
determine whether a juror possesses necessary qualifications, whether he has
prejudged the case, and whether his mind is free from prejudice or bias so as to
enable the party to ascertain whether a cause for challenge exists, and to ascertain
whether it is expedient to exercise the right of peremptory challenge.
Id. Additionally, the court has declared that another "purpose of the voir dire examina-
tion . . . is to afford the challenging party true information concerning any possible basis
for bias or prejudice in order not to be misled." Jackson v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.2d
874, 875 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959).
149. People v.Johnson, 730 N.E.2d 932, 937 (N.Y. 2000) (quoting People v. Branch, 389
N.E.2d 467, 469 (N.Y. 1979)).
150. People v. Boulware, 272 N.E.2d 538, 540 (N.Y. 1971) (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202 (1965)) (explaining that "[s]ince the right to ajury means ajury which, as far as
possible, is unbiased and unprejudiced, some form of voir dire is necessary so that the con-
comitant right to challenge prospective jurors may be intelligently and effectively exercised
by the parties").
151. People v. Corbett, 418 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (citing Boulware, 29
N.Y.2d at 141)).
152. Id. at 702-03.
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of voir dire is to empanel an impartial jury, and not an opportunity for
counsel to present their case or acquire jurors who will favor their
position.15-
Similarly, in Louisiana, the courts have consistently held that
criminal defendants are entitled to question the venire panel about
any pertinent areas that will assist the accused in efficiently exercising
the right to peremptorily challenge. 15 4 Louisiana's adoption of ex-
panded voir dire was necessary to uphold the state's constitution,1 55
which guarantees a criminal defendant a full voir dire in which he or
she may examine the venire panel to peremptorily challenge. 56 Be-
cause Louisiana recognizes the peremptory challenge as a substantial
right that should not be hindered,1 57 the scope of voir dire encom-
passes a wide range of questions governed by liberal discretion that an
accused can rid the jury of a member who might be precluded from
rendering a fair verdict due to a subconscious prejudice. 158 Under
Louisiana's adoption of expanded voir dire, the trial judge's discre-
tionary rulings will not be set aside except for a clear abuse of discre-
tion,1 59 and appellate courts must view the record of the examination
as a whole.' 60 Thus, the accused is entitled to ensure that each juror is
competent and impartial.' 6' However, expanded voir dire is still not
an absolute privilege to unlimited questioning. 62 The trial judge is
permitted to restrict the scope if counsel questions the venire about
153. Id. at 703.
154. State v. Hills, 129 So. 2d 12 (La. 1961) (explaining that "each party has the right to
put questions to a juror not only to show that there exists proper grounds for a challenge
for cause, but to elicit facts to enable him to decide whether or not he will make a peremp-
tory challenge").
155. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (2002). The Louisiana Constitution states that a criminal
defendant is entitled "to full voir dire examination of prospective jurors and to challenge
jurors peremptorily." Id.
156. Hills, 129 So. 2d at 31.
157. Id. The Hills court agreed with the court in State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 233-34, 198
So. 910, 915 (La. 1940), when it reiterated that a party has a substantial right to reasonably
question the venire panel for the purpose of intelligently exercising peremptory challenges
and challenges for cause. Moreover, a court cannot exclude voir dire questions that are
relevant to either challenge, because to do so would be error. Id.
158. Hills, 129 So. 2d at 31.




162. State v. Burton, 464 So. 2d 421, 425 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (citing State v. James, 431
So. 2d 399 (La. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983) (explaining that voir dire is not an
opportunity to question "all possible prejudices of prospective jurors, nor their opinions
on evidence (or its weight) to be offered at trial, not even hypothetical questions and
questions of law which call for any prejudgment of supposed facts").
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their opinions on evidence, the weight of that evidence, hypothetical
questions, or any "questions of law which call for any prejudgment of
supposed facts."' 63 Furthermore, counsel may not ask repetitious
questions. 164 Despite these limitations, counsel is permitted to ques-
tion the venire panel about their "'occupation, habits, associations,
and predisposition . . . [because] they might tend to bias or pervert
[their] judgment."165 The underlying goal is to ensure that the ac-
cused is given the opportunity to a full voir dire examination.' 66 Fi-
nally, the court answered the question of judicial inefficiency by
explaining that the trial judge who retains broad discretion in limiting
the examination retains the remedy.' 6 7
These states, and several others, have successfully utilized ex-
panded voir dire without the problems feared by the Court of Appeals
of Maryland.168 Instead of examining every voir dire question re-
quested for propounding, courts in these states permit the parties to
question the venire panel on any aspect that will assist them with their
challenges. In so doing, these courts guarantee the accused their
rights to a fair and impartial jury.
3. Court's Reasoning.--In Thomas, the Court of Appeals held that
Thomas was entitled to propound a voir dire question asking potential
jurors whether they harbored biases regarding violations of narcotics
laws that would prevent them from rendering a fair verdict.16 9 In per-
mitting criminal defendants to question potential jurors about their
biases regarding the laws the defendant allegedly breached, the court
made clear that this allowance was still within the scope of limited voir
163. Id. (citing James, 431 So. 2d 399).
164. State v. Thomas, 589 So. 2d 555, 565 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
165. State v. Guidry, 107 So. 479, 481 (La. 1926).
166. State v. Jackson, 358 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (La. 1978) (citing Holmes, 347 So. 2d 221
(La. 1977)).
167. Guidry, 107 So. at 481. The court addressed the problem of judicial inefficiency
explaining that the trial judge is capable and responsible for managing the examination of
a juror on voir dire. Id.
168. See People v. Lobb, 161 N.E.2d 325, 332-33 (111. 1959) (citing People v. DeLordo,
182 N.E. 726 (111. 1932) (explaining that limiting a party from making inquiries geared
towards exercising challenges for cause or peremptory challenges may constitute reversible
error)); see also Sullivan v. Texas, 678 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (explaining
the scope of voir dire is "broad and may not be unnecessarily limited"); see also King v.
State, 790 So. 2d 1253, 1254-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that the criminal
defendants are entitled to question "about their latent or concealed prejudgments, [but]
the trial court has the discretion to limit repetitive, improper and argumentative voir dire
questions").
169. Thomas, 369 Md. at 214, 798 A.2d at 573.
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dire. Thus, the court's opinion should not be read as a move towards
expanded voir dire.'
Chief Judge Bell, writing for the majority, began his analysis by
exploring the well-settled principles governing voir dire in Mary-
land. ' After noting that the voir dire process is used to ascertain
cause for disqualification of potential jury members7 2 and to ensure
an unbiased jury,17 3 the court noted the difficulty of applying those
principles to the specific facts of individual cases.174 The court stated
that voir dire questions should focus on issues that are specific to the
individual case. 175 In addition, the court reiterated its holding in Bed-
ford that a defendant is entitled to question jurors if there is the possi-
bility of any prejudices affecting the verdict. 76
The court next examined the State's arguments, which relied
heavily on Judge Chasanow's opinion in Davis.'7 7 The State first ar-
gued that under the basic principles of voir dire, it was not error for
the trial court to refuse to ask the question even though the trial court
could have offered it.1 78 The court rejected this argument, explaining
that the Davis court was faced with a question asking about "the pro-
spective jurors' statuses, associations, or affiliations, not their atti-
tudes.' 79 In contrast to the situation in Davis, the court noticed that
Thomas involved the potential jurors' position on the crime the defen-
dant allegedly committed and whether it would interfere with their
ability to render a fair verdict. 80 The court then used the Davis opin-
ion to invalidate the State's argument because the Davis court stressed
that "it is the venire person's state of mind ... whether there is some
bias, prejudice or preconception, that is the proper focus of voir dire,
rather than the professional, vocational, or social status of a prospec-
tive juror, which is not a dispositive factor establishing cause to dis-
170. Id. at 216-17, 798 A.2d at 574-75.
171. Id. at 206-09, 798 A.2d at 568-70.
172. Id. at 206, 798 A.2d at 568 (quoting Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9, 259 A.2d 819, 823
(2000)).
173. Id. at 207, 798 A.2d at 569.
174. Id. at 208, 798 A.2d at 570.
175. Id. at 207, 798 A.2d at 569 (quoting Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 649, 671, 566 A.2d
111, 117 (1989)).
176. Id. at 208, 798 A.2d at 569; see also Bedford, 317 Md. at 671, 566 A.2d at 117 (noting
that "any circumstances which may reasonably be regarded as rendering a person unfit for
jury service may be made the subject of questions and a challenge for cause") (quoting
Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 564, 45 A.2d 340, 343 (1946)).
177. Thomas, 369 Md. at 209, 798 A.2d at 570.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 210, 798 A.2d at 571.
180. Id. at 211, 798 A.2d at 571.
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qualify."'' Thus, the court stated that a question asking about strong
feelings regarding the law allegedly breached is properly within the
guidelines articulated in Davis.'82 Therefore, the Court of Appeals
agreed that the defendant was entitled to the proposed voir dire ques-
tion because Thomas had a right to question the venire panel about
an area of law that was "directly relevant to, and focuse [d] on, an issue
particular to [his] case and, so, should [have been] uncovered."' 8 3
The court then addressed the State's second argument and ex-
amined whether the other questions propounded by the court were
sufficient to unearth the information sought by the defendant.'8 4 The
State argued that the questions were adequate because the potential
jury members were advised of the charges against the defendant
before the trial judge asked them a general question inquiring
whether there was anything else that would prevent the potential jury
members from rendering a fair verdict."t 5 The court similarly re-
jected this argument.1 8 6 Based on its holding in Casey, the court in
Thomas held that the questions actually propounded by the trial court
were too general, in that such questions did not emphasize the infor-
mation sought by the defendant. 87 In addition, the court discussed
the trial court's duty to ask voir dire questions that would provoke
prejudices that could interfere with an impartial verdict.' 8 In
Thomas, the question propounded in lieu of "Question No. 10" was
too general and did not call attention to the specific information
sought.8 9 The court held that the trial judge had a duty to ask the
defendant's proposed question because it was directed towards uncov-
181. Id.
182. Id. The court also addressed the various judicial opinions cited by the Court of
Special Appeals to support the notion that potential juror bias exists with respect to drug
violations and noted its approval of that proposition. Id. at 211-13, 798 A.2d at 571-72.
183. Id. at 214, 798 A.2d at 573.
184. Id. at 210, 214, 798 A.2d at 571, 573; see supra note 13 and accompanying text
(providing the text of the questions propounded by the trial judge in lieu of Question No.
10).
185. Thomas, 369 Md. at 210, 798 A.2d at 571.
186. Id. at 214, 798 A.2d at 573.
187. Id.; Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 592, 143 A.2d 629
(1958). The Casey court stated that the question propounded in that case "was in a form so
general that it is likely it did not sufficiently indicate to the panel of jurors what possible
bias or prejudice was being probed." Id. at 606, 143 A.2d at 631.
188. Thomas, 369 Md. at 214-15, 798 A.2d at 573 (quoting Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 47,
633 A.2d 867, 877 (1993)).
189. Id. at 214, 798 A.2d at 573; see supra note 4 and accompanying text (stating "Ques-
tion No. 10").
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ering bias about the law the defendant allegedly broke and, therefore,
was directly relevant to a specific issue of the defendant's case.' 90
Finally, the court addressed the State's cautionary remark that
the approval of this question would create a slippery slope with re-
spect to limited voir dire. 9 ' The State argued that allowing this ques-
tion would permit the creation of expansive or unlimited voir dire. 9 2
The court rejected this argument as well and explained that this mi-
nor expansion was simply the enforcement of already established voir
dire principles.19 The court also commented that the additional one
or two questions could hardly be interpreted as unlimited or ex-
panded voir dire.194 Although the court conceded that this was a mi-
nor expansion of limited voir dire, it held that it was not unreasonable
to do so.' 95 Finally, the court noted that limited voir dire often com-
petes with the goal of discovering cause for disqualification,' 96 necessi-
tating the court to allow for exceptions to uncover disqualifying bias
without exceeding the scope of limited voir dire. 197
Concurring with the majority opinion, Judge Raker wrote sepa-
rately to explain her belief that allowing the proposed question was
really an expansion of informed peremptory challenges. 98 In advo-
cating that Maryland adopt the informed exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges into its voir dire process, Judge Raker referred to the court's
trend towards removing the trial judge's control over the cases and
190. Thomas, 369 Md. at 214, 798 A.2d at 573.
191. Id. at 216, 798 A.2d at 574.
192. Id.
193. Id. The court conceded that questioning the venire panel on their "attitude or
mental state" concerning the crime at issue may expand the scope of limited voir dire and
require additional questions. However, the court clearly states that it did not "regard en-
forcing that which is already required during voir dire as an expansion of the voir dire
process." Id.
194. See id. at 216 n.8, 798 A.2d at 574 n.8.
195. Id.
196. Id at 216-17, 798 A.2d at 574-75 (quoting Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 14, 759 A.2d
819, 826 (2000)). In Dingle, the court stated "there may be, and often is, a conflict between
keeping the voir dire process limited and the goal of ferreting out cause for disqualifica-
tion." Dingle, 361 Md. at 14, 759 A.2d at 826.
197. Thomas, 369 Md. at 216-17, 798 A.2d at 574-75. The court again quoted language
from its opinion in Dingle stating that:
[t]he broad discretion of the trial court and the rigidity of the limited voir dire
process are tempered by the importance and preeminence of the right to a fair
and impartial jury and the need to ensure that one is impaneled. Thus, we have
made clear that "this Court will prescribe the juror voir dire process ... as is
necessary... to uncover disqualifying bias."
Id.
198. Id. at 217-18, 798 A.2d at 575 (Raker and Harrell, JJ., concurring).
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replacing the discretion with mandatory areas of inquiry.' Judge
Raker acknowledged that Maryland has not abolished peremptory
challenges and, therefore, she encouraged the opportunity for attor-
neys to acquire adequate information to be used for challenging ju-
rors, regardless of the type of challenge used.2 0 ' Despite Judge
Raker's proposal, she made clear that she did not advocate the length-
ening of the jury selection process, and further stated that voir dire
was for the purpose of obtaining information to challenge jurors, and
not to present the attorneys' case in chief.20'
Judge Battaglia dissented, asserting that this question was the ex-
ercise of an informed peremptory challenge that would not reveal a
cause for disqualification. 02 Judge Battaglia contended that the ma-
jority distorted the difference between challenges for cause and per-
emptory challenges.2z 3 To demonstrate this point, she compared
Thomas's proposed question to a question asking about feelings re-
garding breaches of the motor vehicle laws for a defendant accused of
driving while intoxicated. 0 4 She argued that this comparison is simi-
lar in that it would uncover too many responses, all of which could be
used to peremptorily challenge a juror °.2 5 Additionally, in arguing
that Thomas's question was too broad, Judge Battaglia asserted that
the proposed question was not analogous to the question proposed by
the court in Casey because the Casey question focused on the specific
church and parish, unlike Thomas's question, which was not as metic-
ulously composed. 2 6 This comparison illustrated that the question
improperly shifted the burden to potential jurors and asked them to
determine what was meant by "strong feelings" and whether the biases
would affect them in rendering their verdict.2 7 However, in her con-
clusion, Judge Battaglia conceded that if the question was properly
phrased, the trial court should question the venire "panel about their
attitude or mental state with regard to the specific crime involved. '2 8
199. Id. at 217-18, 798 A.2d at 575.
200. Id. at 218-19, 798 A.2d at 575-76. Judge Raker advocated for Maryland to "once and
for all, join the rest of the country and expand the purpose of voir dire in Maryland to
include the informed exercise of peremptory challenges." Id. at 218, 798 A.2d at 575.
201. Id. at 219, 798 A.2d at 576.
202. Id. (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 219, 798 A.2d at 576.
204. Id. at 221, 798 A.2d at 577.
205. Id. at 221-22, 798 A.2d at 577-78.
206. Id. (explaining how the current question and the question in Casey were "not suffi-
cient to determine possible cause for disqualification by reason of bias or prejudice or
otherwise") (quoting Casey v. Church, 217 Md. 595, 606, 143 A.2d 627, 631 (1958)).
207. Id. at 222, 798 A.2d at 578.
208. Id.
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4. Analysis.-In Thomas, the Court of Appeals held that Jerrod
Thomas was entitled to question the members of the venire panel
about their biases regarding violations of the narcotics laws. 20 9 In
reaching this decision, the court continued its adherence to the vague
and confusing parameters governing limited voir dire.2 '0 This proce-
dure ultimately denies criminal defendants their right to a fair and
impartial jury by preventing defendants their opportunity to question
the venire panel on any issue that might cloud the jurors' judg-
ment.2 1' In allowing Thomas to question the venire panel about bi-
ases leading to challenges for cause,2 12 the court nevertheless denied
him his right to a jury composed entirely of fair and impartial individu-
als by refusing to ask about other specific areas. For example, the
court rejected "Question No. 5," which asked about the relationship
between the potential jurors and any law enforcement agency or law
office, which could potentially cloud a juror's judgment.2 13 Rather
than continue to expand the scope of limited voir dire on a case-by-
case basis, 2 14 the court should have joined the rest of the country and
adopted expanded voir dire, thereby actually assuring criminal de-
fendants their right to a jury made up entirely of impartial individu-
als.2 15 Although the court expressed fears that expanded voir dire
would lead to judicial inefficiency caused by the shrewd use of per-
emptory challenges, this apprehension is misguided, as many other
states have successfully adopted unlimited voir dire without the
problems cited by the Court of Appeals.2 1 6 In addition, by adopting
209. Id. at 214, 798 A.2d at 573.
210. See id. at 206-14, 798 A.2d at 568-73 (reviewing the history ofvoir dire); see also id. at
208, 798 A.2d at 570 (admitting that the principles from previous case law are difficult to
apply to issues concerning the admissibility of voir dire questions).
211. See, e.g., Webb v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958) (ex-
plaining that a defendant may question the venire panel on any issue that will assist him or
her in exercising the peremptory challenges to ensure that he or she will obtain a fair and
impartial jury).
212. Thomas, 369 Md. at 214, 798 A.2d at 573.
213. See id. at 213, 798 A.2d at 573 (stating "[w]e have been emphatic, even in civil cases,
that 'a party is entitled to a jury free of all disqualifying bias or prejudice without excep-
tion, and not merely ajury free of bias or prejudice of a general or abstract nature'" (quot-
ing Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 595, 606, 143 A.2d 627, 631
(1958))); see also Thomas v. State, 139 Md. App. 188, 195 n.3, 775 A.2d 406, 410 n.3 (2001)
(stating the discussion concerning the trial court's refusal to propound Question No. 5).
214. In her concurring opinion, Judge Raker "discern[ed] a trend in Maryland, on a
case-by-case basis, to expand voir dire." Thomas, 369 Md. at 217, 798 A.2d at 575 (Raker, J.,
concurring).
215. Id. at 218, 798 A.2d at 575.
216. Id. at 220, 798 A.2d at 576 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. State, 333 Md.
27, 42, 633 A.2d 867, 874 (1993)); see supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing
other states' voir dire process).
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expanded voir dire, the court would finally end the stereotypical judg-
ments and prejudicial beliefs encouraged by the existing voir dire pro-
cess with respect to peremptory challenges."1 7
a. Limited Voir Dire Causes Unnecessary Confusion.-The lim-
ited voir dire process in Maryland requires attorneys, parties, and
judges to guess about the admissibility of suggested voir dire questions
because the scope of limited voir dire is decided on a case-by-case ba-
sis, with little guidance as to what constitutes an admissible ques-
tion."' Although the court established vague guidelines to test the
admissibility of a proposed question, 9 these principles are subject to
interpretation, which leads to a lack of uniformity in admitting the
questions. 2
20
The Court of Appeals' decision in Thomas highlights the complex
nature of limited voir dire and demonstrates how the vague criterion
leads to problems of interpretation. For example, in reaching their
decision, the majority reasoned that "Question No. 10" directly fo-
cused on a matter that was specific to Thomas's case.221 In contrast,
Judge Battaglia in dissent argued that "Question No. 10" was too
broad,222 and would elicit information geared towards exercising a
peremptory challenge rather than a challenge for cause.223 Unlike
the majority opinion, Judge Battaglia distinguished between the
meaning of "strong feelings" and "mental state" or "attitude," and con-
cluded that the question violated the scope of limited voir dire.224
Judge Battaglia conceded, however, that she would not be opposed to
questions asking the venire panel about their mental state on the spe-
cific crime at issue. 225 The rationale behind each opinion demon-
217. Maryland Rule 4-312(c) (2003) states that each party will receive "the name, age,
sex, education, occupation of each juror [and] the occupation of each juror's spouse."
This information, as well as the sparse information gained through questions specifically
geared towards challenges for cause, are the basis for each party's peremptory challenge.
Without the ability to question about any aspect the party fears will interfere with ajuror's
judgment, the party is essentially left with demographic information as the basis of their
peremptory challenges. See also Davis, 333 Md. at 46, 633 A.2d at 876 (remarking on the
criticism of peremptory challenges, including the view that peremptory challenges allow
for "jury selection based on stereotypes").
218. Thomas, 369 Md. at 217, 798 A.2d at 575.
219. See Davis, 333 Md. at 36-37, 633 A.2d at 872 (explaining that an answer to a pro-
posed question must reveal cause for disqualification to be allowed).
220. See infra notes 221-225 and accompanying text (providing an example of the subjec-
tivity involved in deciding whether a question is admissible).
221. Thomas, 369 Md. at 214, 798 A.2d at 573.
222. Thomas, 369 Md. at 221, 798 A.2d at 577 (Battaglia, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 219, 798 A.2d at 576.
224. Id. at 221-23, 798 A.2d at 577-78.
225. Id. at 222, 798 A.2d at 578.
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strates the subjectivity involved in determining whether a question
falls within the scope of limited voir dire and how idiosyncrasies affect
the process. This specific situation demonstrates the need for careful
crafting of voir dire questions, as one word, such as "feelings" instead
of "mental state," could exclude the question from the entire voir dire
process.
The court's decision in Thomas is not unique. Since the adoption
of limited voir dire, the court has often selectively allowed some pro-
posed voir dire questions while refusing others. For example, in Da-
vis, the court refused to ask a voir dire question inquiring as to
whether any member of the venire panel was related to law enforce-
ment personnel. 226 In Dingle, however, the court approved a question
requesting whether any of the members on the venire panel had a
close friend or family member who was recently a victim of a crime
because a member unable to set aside that bias should be disqualified
for cause. 22 ' The Davis court reasoned that an affirmative answer to
the proposed question would not reveal cause for disqualification and,
therefore, was not permissible under limited voir dire.228 However,
the court in Dingle, stated that the effect of victimization could be a
disqualifying factor if the member was unable to render a fair and
impartial verdict.229
Both of these questions ultimately requested information about a
relationship with a close friend or family member that could poten-
tially affect the ability of a venire panel member to render a fair ver-
dict. However, the court reached the opposite result in the two cases.
There was nothing extremely different about the style of the two ques-
tions, except for the individual interpretation by the judge. Specifi-
cally, the court in Davis refused to question the venire panel on their
relationship or association with law enforcement, because the ques-
tion should have concentrated on the jurors' states of mind and the
presence of bias.23° In Dingle, however, the court approved of the pro-
pounding of questions concerning the jurors' relationships and as-
sociations with victims or the legal field, 23 ' because the questions
would reveal prejudices that could adversely affect the defendant's
right to a fair and impartial jury. Although both questions similarly
226. Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 36-37, 633 A.2d 867, 872 (1993) (stating that the pro-
posed question was not related to a cause for disqualification).
227. Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 17, 759 A.2d 819, 827-28 (2000).
228. Davis, 333 Md. at 37, 633 A.2d at 872.
229. Dingle, 361 Md. at 17, 759 A.2d at 827-28.
230. Davis, 333 Md. at 37, 633 A.2d at 872.
231. Dingle, 361 Md. at 4 n.4, 759 A.2d at 821 n.4.
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requested information about the jurors relationships with the legal
field, the court judged the requests differently with little guidance in
its rationales.232
A voir dire process that allows for such different results cannot
effectively guarantee the defendant his or her right to a fair and im-
partialjury.23" Not only is the process difficult for the trial judges who
are forced to make a decision based on blurred parameters, it is also
extremely difficult for the parties to prepare proposed questions, un-
less they can interpret the idiosyncrasies of everyjudge. 2 4 Thus, this
problematic process creates difficulty for the parties to anticipate the
acceptance of proposed voir dire questions. Rather than risk a defen-
dant's rights and continue to play this guessing game, the court
should adopt the theory of expanded voir dire.235 Under the theory
of expanded voir dire, an accused may question the venire panel on
any issue as long as it will assist him or her with exercising his or her
peremptory challenges.236 Thus, the subjectivity of determining the
purpose behind a proposed question and its admissibility becomes vir-
tually irrelevant because most issues could assist an accused with his or
her peremptory challenges. 23" Finally, adopting the theory of ex-
panded voir dire would provide uniformity in decision making, be-
cause most questions would be permissible.
b. The Adoption of Expanded Voir Dire Will Not Lead to Judicial
Inefficiency.-The court has consistently rejected all efforts to adopt
the theory of expanded voir dire because it mistakenly believed that
expanded voir dire would lead to judicial inefficiency. 238 Specifically,
the court feared that attorneys would abuse the process by trapping
jurors into making statements not intended to reveal bias, but which
may be used after trial to question a juror's impartiality.239 In addi-
tion, the court believed that attorneys might attempt to try their case
232. Id. at 14, 759 A.2d at 826.
233. See supra notes 220-225 and accompanying text (highlighting the problems of inter-
pretation caused by the vague criterion of limited voir dire).
234. See id.
235. Thomas, 369 Md. at 218, 798 A.2d at 575 (Raker, J., concurring).
236. Davis, 333 Md. at 39, 633 A.2d at 873.
237. See id. (discussing the requirements under expanded voir dire).
238. See supra notes 64-88 and accompanying text (providing discussion of Maryland's
consistent rejection to adopt expanded voir dire).
239. See Handy v. State, 101 Md. 39, 43, 60 A. 452, 454 (1905) (agreeing with the view in
Stagner v. State, 9 Tex. App. 440 (1880), that expanded voir dire would allow an attorney to
trap a juror into making statements that may form the basis for questioning the juror's
impartiality).
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during voir dire 4 ° and that expanded voir dire would deny other indi-
viduals with pending cases their right to prompt resolution.2 4 ' Finally,
the court feared that expanded voir dire would significantly lengthen
the voir dire process due to the unlimited nature of the theory.242
However, all of these fears are misguided. Several states have success-
fully utilized expanded voir dire without the problems feared by the
Court of Appeals. 2
43
The theory of expanded voir dire is not an unqualified process
entitling parties and their attorneys to unlimited questioning. On the
contrary, the expanded process incorporates safeguards designed to
protect the process from abuse, many of which are already employed
by the Maryland courts to prevent such misuse. 244 For instance, Ken-
tucky courts permit attorneys to extensively question potential jurors
during voir dire.245 The courts, however, protect the process by be-
stowing discretion on trial judges to curtail questioning if the attorney
or party takes too much time.246 Similarly, New York courts permit
the parties to question the venire panel on a wide range of issues, 247
but allow the trial judge to restrict the process if he or she chooses,
provided the parties are given a sufficient opportunity to question po-
tential jurors about any relevant or material aspect of the case. 48
Another precaution associated with expanded voir dire is a re-
striction on the types of questions permitted. In New York, attorneys
are prohibited from asking irrelevant or repetitious questions, or pro-
pounding any questions that seek the venire panel's position on mat-
ters of law.2 49 Likewise, Louisiana courts prohibit counsel from
240. See Thomas, 369 Md. at 219, 798 A.2d at 576 (Raker, J., concurring).
241. Thomas, 369 Md. at 220, 798 A.2d at 576 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis,
333 Md. at 42, 633 A.2d at 874).
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 140-168 and accompanying text (explaining the successful utiliza-
tion of expanded voir dire in Kentucky, New York, and Louisiana).
244. For example. Maryland instills broad discretion in the trial judge. Dingle v. State,
361 Md. 1, 13, 759 A.2d 819, 826 (2000). Additionally, Maryland provides the opportunity
for the judge to propound the question or permit the attorneys to question the venire
panel. MD. R. 4-312.
245. See Lightfoot v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.2d 984, 989 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949) (explain-
ing that parties are permitted to question the venire panel on any issue that will help the
parties better exercise their peremptory challenges).
246. See Woodford v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (explain-
ing the trial judge's discretion during expanded voir dire).
247. See People v. Corbett, 418 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (citing People v.
Boulware, 29 N.Y.2d 135, 141 (N.Y. 1971) (discussing New York's scope of expanded voir
dire).
248. See id. at 702-03 (discussing the requirements for curtailing expanded voir dire in
New York).
249. See id. (discussing the limitation on expanded voir dire in New York).
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questioning the venire panel on the weight of evidence or hypotheti-
cal situations. 25" Louisiana courts also require a clear abuse of discre-
tion to entitle a party to a reversal for error in their due process, while
mandating appellate courts to view the record of the examination as a
whole. 25 1 These safety measures effectively provide the courts with
remedies to address problems with an "unlimited" process. Despite
the fears of the Court of Appeals, expanded voir dire is not an un-
guided and boundless process.
Many remedies exist for the remaining fears held by the Court of
Appeals that are not resolved by protections in the expanded voir dire
process. In the past, the Court of Appeals cited Stagner v. State,25 2 a
Texas case, as a good description of why the court should not adopt
expanded voir dire. In Stagner, the Texas Court of Appeals feared that
expanded voir dire would permit attorneys to trap ajuror into making
a statement that, while not intended to express bias, would provide
the attorney and his or her client with a basis for later questioning the
juror's impartiality. 253 The Handy court used this concern as part of
its rationale in Maryland for rejecting expanded voir dire.254 How-
ever, the current voir dire process already has implemented proce-
dures to remedy this problem. First, Maryland's limited voir dire
process requires the attorneys to submit their suggested questions to
the judge for the judge to propound, which weeds out inappropriate
queries before they are propounded to the venire panel.255 Addition-
ally, Maryland trial judges are responsible for permitting exploration
of the venire panel for possible bias and must excuse the juror if the
judge believes that the juror will be unable to render a fair and impar-
250. See State v. Burton, 464 So. 2d 421, 425 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (citing State v. James,
431 So. 2d 399 (La.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983) (discussing the limitations on the
scope of Louisiana's expanded voir dire)).
251. See State v. Jackson, 358 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (La. 1978) (citing State v. Ford, 349 So.
2d 300 (La. 1977) (discussing the standard of review and record examination on appeals in
Louisiana)).
252. See Handy v. State, 101 Md. 39, 43, 60 A. 452, 454 (1905) (agreeing with the view
that the trial judge should prevent the questioning from trapping ajuror into believing he
or she is biased).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See MD. R. 4-312(d) (explaining the permissible procedures for propounding ques-
tions to the venire panel). It is within the discretion of the trial court to itself question the
venire or permit the attorneys to do so. Id. Even if the attorney was permitted to question
the venire and would inappropriately entrap a juror into unwittingly making a statement
that may later form the basis for questioning the juror's impartiality, the trial judge still
retains discretion in curtailing the process. See Thomas, 369 Md. at 207-08, 798 A.2d at 569
(reviewing the underlying principles, including the trial judge's discretion).
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tial verdict.256 Therefore, if the attorneys are not given the opportu-
nity to question the venire panel and inappropriately entrap a juror
into unknowingly giving an objectionable answer, then the venire
panel would be protected from this potential problem. Moreover,
even if the attorney was permitted leave to question the panel, the
trial judge could still preclude the attorney from this "problem"
through liberal discretion to curtail the process.257
Another potential problem cited by the Maryland courts that can
be resolved without difficulty is the fear that attorneys will attempt to
try their case-in-chief during voir dire. 258 Again, there are safeguards
already in place to prevent this occurrence. 259 The procedure that
requires attorneys to submit their questions to the judge for pro-
pounding directly addresses this fear and makes it obsolete. 260 An at-
torney can only rehearse his or her case if the judge permits it. And
even if the attorney were permitted to directly address the jury and
began to try the case during voir dire, the judge could curb the attor-
ney's questioning, on the condition that the attorney was permitted to
question every material and relevant issue. 26 ' Finally, a tougher stan-
dard for reversal would encourage trial judges to end unnecessary or
256. See id. (reviewing the procedure for propounding voir dire questions); see also supra
notes 29-30 and accompanying text (explaining that an accused has a right to a fair and
impartial jury pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article XXI of the Maryland Declaration of Rights); see also Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 39,
633 A.2d 867, 873 (1993) (explaining that the voir dire process adopted by Maryland re-
quires judges to permit examination of the venire panel if the questions could potentially
uncover cause for disqualification); see also Dingle v. State, 361 Md. at 1, 14, 759 A.2d 819,
826 (2000) (explaining that parties should be permitted to question the venire if there is
any chance that a prejudice held by the juror will effect his or her ability to render a fair
verdict).
257. See, e.g., People v. Boulware, 272 N.E.2d 538, 543 (N.Y. 1971) (explaining that trial
judges have "broad discretion to control and restrict the scope of the voir dire examina-
tion"); see also, e.g., State v. Burton, 464 So. 2d 421, 425 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that
the trial judge has discretion in controlling the scope of the voir dire examination, and his
or her ruling will not be disturbed unless there was a clear abuse of discretion).
258. Thomas, 369 Md. at 219, 798 A.2d at 576 (Raker, J., concurring) (explaining that
expanded voir dire should not allow parties to abuse or prolong the process or indoctri-
nate the jurors).
259. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing the applicable principles
under Maryland's current theory of voir dire that would keep expanded voir dire from
running rampant).
260. See supra note 255 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of Rule 4-
312(d)).
261. See, e.g., People v. Corbett, 418 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702-03 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (allowing
the judge to limit voir dire questioning, so long as the accused is given a reasonable oppor-
tunity to question the venire about relevant or material aspects of the case); see also, e.g.,
State v. Burton, 464 So. 2d 421, 425 (La, Ct. App. 1985) (permitting thejudge to curtail the
voir dire process if the parties attempt to question the venire panel on their opinions on
evidence, questions of law or any "question of law that would call for any prejudgment of
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inappropriate questioning from attorneys who are abusing the
process.
262
The Court of Appeals also unnecessarily feared that adopting the
expanded theory of voir dire would significantly lengthen the voir dire
process, thereby preventing others from obtaining prompt resolution
to their cases. 263 This fear is also unwarranted because the limited
voir dire process is equally inefficient as it hinders multiple courts for
several years through appeals.264 In addition, states that have adopted
the expanded process have implemented guidelines governing the
process to prevent attorneys from delaying the system, many of which
are used in Maryland's limited process.265
On the whole, reversing cases based on voir dire issues is far more
time consuming than allowing extra time to query the panel about
issues that the parties feel are necessary to empanel a fairjury.26 6 For
example, the Thomas case took approximately three years to settle is-
sues pertaining to the voir dire process alone; 267 however, under an
expanded theory, it is probable that this case could have been quickly
resolved if Thomas had been permitted to inquire about issues that he
felt were pertinent to a fair trial.268 If any process is time consuming,
it is a process that denies parties their right to a fair and impartial jury,
generating numerous appeals and reversals. Instead, Maryland
should adopt the theory of expanded voir dire, including restrictions
such as the trial judge's ability to prohibit attorneys from ever address-
ing the venire panel directly by retaining the right to propound the
questions. 269 A tougher standard for appellate review on discretionary
supposed facts") (citing State v. James, 431 So. 2d 399 (La. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908
(1983).
262. See id. (discussing appellate review in states who successfully use expanded voir
dire).
263. Thomas, 369 Md. at 220, 798 A.2d at 576 (quoting Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 42, 633
A.2d 867, 874 (1993)).
264. The Thomas cases took approximately three years to resolve issues involving the voir
dire process alone.
265. See, e.g., MD. R. 4-312(d) (giving the trial judge discretion in determining who will
ask the questions; thereby allowing the judge an opportunity to review the questions before
proffering them to the jury).
266. See Thomas, 369 Md. at 218, 798 A.2d at 575 (Raker, J. concurring).
267. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
268. Under the theory of expanded voir dire, a party is permitted to question the venire
panel on any issue that will assist him or her exercise a peremptory challenge. Davis, 333
Md. at 39, 633 A.2d at 873. Thus, under the expanded theory, Thomas's question would
likely have fallen within the scope as a question for the exercise of his peremptory chal-
lenges, because it was "reasonably related" to an issue that would have assisted him in
exercising his peremptory challenges. Id.
269. See MD. R. 4-312(d) (explaining the procedure of questioning the venire panel).
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rulings will also encourage the trial judge to actively regulate the pro-
cess without fear of reversal.27 °
Finally, the courts have pointed out that it is impossible to em-
panel a jury entirely consisting of impartial people despite the most
rigid rules.271' However, the process of expanded voir dire is not a
system that requires the jury to be completely impartial.272 Instead, it
is an instrument that provides parties with an opportunity to make the
jury as impartial as it chooses. Therefore, an accused should be enti-
fled to make the jury as impartial as he or she sees fit, no matter how
many extra hours might be required.
c. The Adoption of Expanded Voir Dire Would Prevent Stereotypi-
cal Judgments Inherent in Limited Voir Dire.-The theory of limited voir
dire, by preventing informed peremptory challenges, encourages at-
torneys and parties to make stereotypical judgments.27 In denying
the attorneys and parties information sufficient to make intelligent
decisions with their peremptory challenges, the courts knowingly deny
the parties their rights to a fair and impartial jury, while ignoring vio-
lations of Maryland's laws. 2 7 4
Under Maryland's theory of limited voir dire, attorneys and par-
ties are provided with each potential juror's name, age, sex, educa-
tion, occupation and occupation of the juror's spouse to use as basis
for exercising their peremptory challenges. 275 However, Maryland law
prevents attorneys and parties from discriminating against jurors on
the basis of that information.2 76 Therefore, the attorneys are left to
guess who they want to exclude, without discriminating against the
270. See State v.Jackson, 358 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (La. 1978) (citing State v. Ford, 349 So.
2d 300 (La. 1977)) (discussing Louisiana's tough standard of review).
271. See Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430, 436 (1879) (arguing the impossibility of empanel-
ling a jury entirely consisting of impartial individuals).
272. See id. (stating that each juror must "so far as it is possible be entirely impartial and
unbiased," even though it may not be practicable even by the most rigid rules of exclusion
to secure the impartiality which the law in the abstract contemplates).
273. See Davis, 333 Md. at 46, 633 A.2d at 876 (discussing the criticism of peremptory
challenges, including the view that peremptory challenges allow for "jury selection based
on stereotypes").
274. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-103 (2002) (prohibiting the exclusion of
jurors on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status").
275. MD. R. 4-312(c). The venire panel is composed of individuals who are registered to
vote or drive a car. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 8-207 (2002) (setting forth the
qualifications for jury service).
276. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 8-103; see Laura A. Giantris, The Necessity of
Inquiry into Racial Bias in Voir Dire, 55 MD. L. REV. 615 (1996); see also Robert D. Frizell,
Extending to White Potential Jurors the Equal Protection Right to a Racially Neutral Jury Selection




jurors on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or
economic status. 277 Unfortunately, there is very little information re-
maining for the intelligent use of peremptory challenges, placing a
defendant's ability to obtain a fair and impartial jury in doubt.2 78
Without the opportunity to question the venire panel about other is-
sues that may influence the case, the parties are left with the basic
information on the juror information sheet, encouraging them to
break the law and make stereotypical judgments based on the juror's
social status and demographic information to obtain the bestjury pos-
sible, despite specific provisions prohibiting discrimination.
Unlike Maryland, states that adopt expanded voir dire can easily
identify stereotypical judgments and prevent them from plaguing
their systems because the rationale for striking jurors on the basis of
peremptory challenges will be obvious. 279 Those states recognize the
importance of peremptory challenges 28 ° and, therefore, allow attor-
neys and parties sufficient opportunity to obtain the information
needed to make intelligent decisions with respect to challenges for
cause and for peremptory challenges. 28 ' By adopting the theory of
expanded voir dire, Maryland can provide the parties opportunities to
obtain information necessary to achieve ajury as impartial as practica-
ble, while preventing stereotypical judgments from continuing to
plague the process.
Finally, by limiting the voir dire process, as Maryland currently
does, a court could potentially abuse its discretion if the defendant
did not receive an impartial jury because the court knowingly failed to
provide the parties with sufficient information to accurately exercise
their peremptory challenges.282 Therefore, rather than encourage
277. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 8-103.
278. See Thomas, 369 Md. at 206-08, 798 A.2d at 568-70 (relying on the principles articu-
lated in Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9-11, 759 A.2d 819, 823-24 (2000)) (discussing the
courts' adherence to the principles of limited voir dire). Those principles only permit
questions that will lead to challenges for cause and, therefore, leaves the information pro-
vided by Maryland Rule 4-312(c) as the basis for peremptory challenges).
279. States who adopt the theory of expanded voir dire allow attorneys to question the
venire panel about issues that will assist the parties in exercising their peremptory chal-
lenges. Therefore, it will be easier to perceive any stereotypical judgments.
280. See State v. Hills, 129 So. 2d 12, 31 (La. 1960); see also supra note 157 and accompa-
nying text (explaining peremptory challenges as a substantial right that should not be
hindered).
281. See supra notes 150-151 (discussing the purpose of voir dire questioning in New
York).
282. Since the informed exercise of peremptory challenges is prohibited by limited voir
dire, and the attorneys are limited to the juror information sheets containing very little
information, the court knowingly denies attorneys and their clients the right to seek the
information necessary to empanel a jury entirely composed of unbiased individuals. See
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stereotypical judgments in the voir dire process, Maryland should
adopt the theory of expanded voir dire so that it can effectively guar-
antee criminal defendants their right to a fair and impartial jury.
5. Conclusion.-In Thomas, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
once again struggled to determine the proper scope of limited voir
dire without compromising the rights of the accused to a fair and im-
partial jury. The court's decision is consistent with the traditional
case-by-case expansion of the scope of limited voir dire, but carving
out exceptions to these vague parameters ultimately denies the ac-
cused the right to a fair and impartialjury. Rather than continue the
confusing application of limited voir dire, the court should join the
other states that successfully utilize expanded voir dire. Doing so
would allow Maryland courts to guarantee criminal defendants their
rights to a fair and impartial jury and curb the stereotypical judgments
inherent in the limited voir dire process, while not leading to judicial
inefficiency.
KATHLEEN L. HENLEY
MD. R. 4-312(c) (providing specific demographic information on the potential jurors); see
also Thomas, 369 Md. at 217, 798 A.2d at 574-75 (explaining that informed peremptory
challenges are prohibited under the theory of limited voir dire).
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C. Clarifying the "Fairly Covered" Component of Maryland Rule 4-325(c)
In General v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether a trial judge is obligated to give a criminal defendant's re-
quested mistake of factjury instruction when the trial judge had previ-
ously instructed the jury on the mental elements of the charged
offense.2 In a 6-1 decision, the court held that a defendant is entitled
to an instruction on his theory of defense even if the trial court has
instructed the jury on the intent elements of the crime.3 The majority
determined that while the trial court's instructions explained the
same mental elements necessary to convict the defendant as the mis-
take of fact instruction would have explained, the latter was necessary
to focus the jury on the defendant's theory of the case, which was a
conceptually different consideration than the mens rea elements of the
crime.' The court thus found that jury instructions covering the mens
rea element of the crime do not "fairly cover" the mistake of fact de-
fense.5 Prior to General, case law conflicted as to when a trial judge
was required under Maryland Rule 4-325(c) 6 to give an instruction on
the defendant's theory of defense and when it was within the discre-
tion of the trial judge to grant such an instruction.7 The General court
prudently clarified the interpretation of Rule 4-325(c) by recognizing
the difference between jury instructions that explain the law and jury
instructions that encompass the defendant's theory of defense. In so
doing, the court established a fair standard and a workable applica-
tion of Rule 4-325(c) that will preserve the rule's "fairly covered" com-
ponent and ensure the validity of recognized affirmative defenses.
1. The Case.-On the evening of December 11, 1997, Damian
Ramon General was driving on Interstate 95 in Beltsville, Maryland
1. 367 Md. 475, 789 A.2d 102 (2002).
2. Id. at 483, 789 A.2d at 106.
3. Id. at 490, 789 A.2d at 111.
4. Id.
5. See id. (rejecting the State's argument that the mens rea instruction "fairly covered"
the mistake of fact defense).
6. MD. R. 4-325(c). The full text of Maryland Rule 4-325(c) provides:
The court may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct the jury as to the
applicable law and the extent to which the instructions are binding. The court
may give its instructions orally or, with the consent of the parties, in writing in-
stead of orally. The court need not grant a requested instruction if the matter is
fairly covered by instructions actually given.
Id.
7. See infra notes 31-86 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of such case
history).
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when he struck and killed a woman on the shoulder of the highway.8
According to his statement to the Prince George's County police the
day after the accident, General did not know he had struck a woman;
he simply thought he had hit a trash bag.' General also informed the
police that when he pulled over at the next gas station and checked
the damage to his car, he saw nothing to indicate that he had struck a
person.l" General was subsequently charged with failure to remain at
the scene of an accident, failure to return to the scene of an accident,
failure to render reasonable assistance, and negligent driving."
There was no dispute at trial as to whether General's car was the vehi-
cle that struck and killed the victim.1 2
At trial, the State relied on General's statement to the police in its
case-in-chief, and General did not testify."3 General's sole defense was
that he acted based upon a mistake of fact.14 Specifically, General
contended that because he mistakenly thought he hit a trash bag and
not a person, he did not have the criminal intent necessary to be con-
victed of his charges.'" At the close of all evidence, General requested
a jury instruction on mistake of fact, as provided for in Maryland Pat-
tern Jury Instruction 5:06.16 The trial judge denied this instruction,
finding mistake of fact inapplicable to the case because there was cir-
cumstantial evidence relating to the defendant's knowledge of the ac-
cident. 17 Instead, the judge instructed the jury on the intent and
8. General, 367 Md. at 479, 789 A.2d at 104.
9. Id. at 483, 789 A.2d at 106.
10. Id. at 479-80, 789 A.2d at 104. General voluntarily went to the police station after
seeing a police broadcast the next morning describing the accident and the car involved in
the accident. Record at 118-19, 120-21, 127, General (No. 32-2001).
11. General, 367 Md. at 478-79, 789 A.2d at 104.
12. Record at 189, 191, General (No. 32-2001).
13. General, 367 Md. at 479, 789 A.2d at 104.
14. Id. at 488, 789 A.2d at 109.
15. Id. at 483, 789 A.2d at 106.
16. Id. at 480, 789 A.2d at 105. The Maryland mistake of fact defense instruction pro-
vides that the jury is required to find the defendant not guilty if all of the following factors
are present: first, "the defendant actually believed ([the] alleged mistake)"; second, "the
defendant's belief and actions were reasonable under the circumstances"; and third, "the
defendant did not intend to commit the crime of (crime) and the defendant's conduct
would not have amounted to the crime of (crime) if the mistaken belief had been correct,
meaning that, if the true facts were what the defendant thought them to be, the [defen-
dant's conduct would not have been criminal] [defendant would have the defense of (de-
fense)]." Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 5:06 Defenses (1995).
The State can convict the defendant if it shows beyond "a reasonable doubt that at
least one of the three previously [factors] stated was absent." Id.
17. General, 367 Md. at 482, 789 A.2d at 106; Record at 227, General (No. 32-2001).
While the judge found that the mistake of fact defense instruction did not apply to the
"factual scenario" of the case, he nevertheless allowed defense counsel to argue mistake of
fact in her closing arguments. Record at 227.
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knowledge elements of failure to remain at the scene of an accident,
failure to return to the scene of an accident, and failure to render
reasonable aid charges."8 The jury convicted General on all four
offenses.1"
General appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that it
was an error for the trial court to refuse the mistake of fact instruc-
tion.20 The court applied Maryland Rule 4-325(c) to determine
whether General's requested mistake of fact instruction was
required. 2
1
Knowledge is a required mental element of failure to remain at the scene of an acci-
dent, failure to return to the scene of an accident and failure to render reasonable assis-
tance. Constock v. State, 82 Md. App. 744, 755, 573 A.2d 117, 123 (1990) (holding that
"knowledge of both the underlying accident and injury is logically and legally necessary" to
be found guilty of leaving the scene of a personal injury accident).
18. The trial court's intent instructions provided:
[A] defendant's intent may be shown by surrounding circumstances. In deter-
mining the defendant's intent, you may consider the defendant's acts and state-
ments, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Further, you may but are not
required to infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable conse-
quences of his acts.
[T] he charges of failing to remain at the scene of an accident involving bodily
injury or death, failing to return to the scene of an accident involving personal
injury or death, and failing to render assistance to a person injured in an accident
require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had
knowledge of both the accident and the underlying injury in order for the defen-
dant to be found guilty of each of the three charges ... knowledge . . . can be
proven in one of two ways. The first way is actual knowledge. In other words, did
the state produce any evidence that the defendant actually saw or perceived the
accident or injury? The second way.., is by showing that the defendant should
have known that an accident occurred or... resulted in an injury to a person ....
It means that given all the evidence that you believe you are to determine
whether a reasonable person who possessed all of the information at the time of
the collision should have known that a collision occurred and should have antici-
pated that an accident resulted in an injury to a person.
General, 367 Md. at 481-82, 789 A.2d at 105-06.
19. Id. at 482, 789 A.2d at 106. The fourth charge, negligent driving, does not contain
an "intent" element and therefore, mistake of fact cannot be a defense. See MD. CODE
ANN., TRANSP. II § 21-901.1 (b) (2002) (stating that an individual is guilty of negligent driv-
ing if he drives "in a careless or imprudent manner" endangering person or property).
20. General, 367 Md. at 482, 789 A.2d at 106. On appeal to the Court of Special Ap-
peals, neither party argued that mistake of fact was not applicable or that the trial court's
instructions were incorrect or incomplete. Id. at 480-81 n.4, 789 A.2d at 105-06 n.4 (stating
that "[t]he parties sole argument is whether a proper and full intent instruction relieves
the court of the obligation to instruct on the defense of mistake of fact").
21. See id. at 482-83, 789 A.2d at 106 (noting that the intermediate appellate court held
that the trial court's instructions "fairly covered" the requested mistake of fact instruction).
See supra note 6 for full text of Rule 4-325(c). Although the trial court did not expressly
rely on Maryland Rule 4-325(c), upon objection by defense counsel that the trial judge did
not address mistake of fact in the jury instructions, the judge responded that mistake of
fact was part of the instructions on "knowledge." General, 367 Md. at 481, 789 A.2d at 105.
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The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion, reasoning that the mistake of fact instruction would have been
"superfluous. ' 22 The court held that General was not entitled to the
mistake of fact instruction because it was "fairly covered," as defined
by Rule 4-325(c), by the trial court's given instructions on the intent
requirements for the crimes. 2' The Court of Appeals of Maryland sub-
sequently granted certiorari to decide whether a requested and applica-
ble mistake of fact instruction is required when the trial judge has
already correctly instructed the jury on the mental elements of each
24crime.
2. Legal Background.-The purpose ofjury instructions is to help
the jury come to a correct judgment of law while simultaneously pro-
tecting the criminal defendant. 25 Maryland Rule 4-325(c), entitled
"Instructions to the Jury-How Given" is comprised of two portions.
The first portion provides that "[t] he court may, and at the request of
any party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law .... -"26 This
first portion is referred to as the mandatory component, and is quali-
fied by a second discretionary provision, which states "[t]he court
need not grant a requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered
by instructions already given."27 Maryland courts have attempted to
determine the meaning of "fairly covered," which provides the decid-
ing factor between a requested instruction that will be mandatory and
one that will be granted only at the discretion of the trial judge.28
While the meaning of "fairly covered" has been addressed in Mary-
land, it has not been applied specifically in the context of mistake of
fact jury instructions. As evidenced by case law in other jurisdictions,
a mistake of fact jury instruction is difficult to grant because it is both
22. Genera 367 Md. at 482-83, 789 A.2d at 106 (explaining that "[blecause elements of
the offense set forth in the trial court's charge forced the jury to consider appellant's
alleged mistake of fact before conviction, the omission of a mistake of fact instruction did
not cause appellant any actual harm") (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. at 483, 789 A.2d at 106.
24. Id.
25. MD. R. 4-325 I. General Consideration.
26. MD. R. 4-325(c) (emphasis added). Rule 4-325, enacted on July 1, 1984, replaced
Rule 757. Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 80 n.1, 486 A.2d 196, 198 n.1 (1985). Rule 757(b),
the corresponding subsection to Rule 4-325(c), provided that "[t]he court may, and at the
request of any party shall, give those advisory instructions to the jury as correctly state the
applicable law .... [T] he court need not grant any requested instruction if the matter is
fairly covered by the instructions actually given." MD. R. 757(b) (1984).
27. See MD. R. 4-325(c); see also MD. R. 4-325 I. General Consideration.
28. See MD. R. 4-325(c) (providing that the court "shall" grant requested and applicable
jury instructions, but "need not" grant instructions that were "fairly covered" by instruc-
tions already given to the jury).
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applicable, and therefore mandatory, but is also often encompassed in
the instructions as to the intent elements of the crime, and therefore
"fairly covered."29 By considering the purpose and impact of jury in-
structions, however, other jurisdictions have formed a basis to require
the mistake of fact jury instruction, despite its facial similarity to the
trial court's given instructions on intent.3
0
a. The Mandatory Component of Rule 4-325(c).-Prior to the
adoption of Rule 4-325(c), judges were not required to grant a party's
requested advisory instructions; 31 however, following its adoption, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland has interpreted the first component of
Rule 4-325(c) as a requirement that the trial judge grant applicable
jury instructions once they are requested. 32 The cases have since con-
sidered how and when jury instructions are applicable and thus
mandatory under the rule.
Maryland courts have held that an applicable jury instruction is
required when it is supported by the evidence produced at trial.3 3 Ac-
cording to Maryland Rule 4-325(c), before the grant of an affirmative
defense instruction, the evidence must first sufficiently generate the
issue of that defense.34 In Smith v. State,3 5 the Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether a defendant was entitled to an alibi instruction.36 The
trial court denied the defendant's request, finding that there was in-
sufficient evidence of an alibi to warrant the instruction because the
29. See supra note 16 (providing the mistake of fact instruction). To find that a defen-
dant acted under a mistake of fact requires a finding that the defendant's actions were
both "reasonable" and that the defendant lacked the intent to commit the charged of-
fense. Id. Both findings are essentially a restatement of a trial court's instructions that a
reasonable person would have had "knowledge" that his actions resulted in the underlying
injury and accident and that the defendant intended the consequences of his acts. See
supra note 18 (providing jury instructions on failure to remain at the scene of an accident,
failure to return to the scene of an accident, and failure to render reasonable assistance).
30. See, e.g., People v. Crane, 585 N.E.2d 99, 102 (Ill. 1991) (finding that despite the
mistake of fact instruction's similarity to the trial court's instruction, the former was neces-
sary to "draw to the jury's attention" to the contested issue of mistake of fact in the case).
31. See MD. R. 4-325: III. Instruction Request (stating that "[a]though a judge was al-
ways permitted to give advisory instructions, prior to 1950 he could not be required to give
them, and a refusal to do so upon request of counsel was held not erroneous").
32. Couser v. State, 36 Md. App. 485, 374 A.2d 399 (1977). The trial judge is not,
however, required to grant the exact language requested by counsel. Gunning v. State, 347
Md. 332, 349-50, 701 A.2d 374, 382-83 (1997).
33. Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 179, 486 A.2d 196, 198 (1985).
34. Id. at 180, 486 A.2d at 196, 198.
35. 302 Md. 175, 486 A.2d 196 (1985).
36. Id. at 177, 486 A.2d at 196. The defendant was charged with armed robbery of a
Holiday Inn. Id. His defense was that he was in Texas at the time of the robbery. Id., 486
A.2d at 196-97.
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defendant was unable to provide any other witnesses, besides himself,
to the alibi." The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that under Rule
757(b) a defendant was entitled to an instruction on "every essential
question and point of law" for which there is "sufficient evidence"
presented at trial.38 The court held that the trial court could not deny
the "specific alibi instruction" because the "alibi" issue was in fact gen-
erated by the evidence, even if only by the defendant. "
Five years later, the court extended the mandatory component of
Rule 4-325(c) in Sims v. State.4 ° In Sims, the court held that a defen-
dant is entitled to an instruction on multiple theories of defense, even
if the theories are "inconsistent."'" The court found that a defendant
has the burden of producing enough evidence to "fairly support" his
requested instructions.4 2 Once the defendant has produced such evi-
dence, jury instructions relating to that evidence become "applicable
law" and Rule 4-325(c) requires the trial judge to give all requested
and applicable instructions.4 3 Thus, the court's holding in Sims ex-
panded the mandatory component of Rule 4-325(c) by requiring that
a trial judge grant a defendant's requested jury instruction on his the-
ories of defense in addition to "question[s]" or "point[s] of law,"
whenever the theory is supported by the evidence.4 4
In Binnie v. State,4 5 the court held that a defendant is always enti-
tled to an honest belief defense when it is generated by the evi-
dence.4 6 The court first noted that the honest belief defense was
applicable to the case because of the defendant's testimony that he
37. Id. at 178, 486 A.2d at 197.
38. Id. at 179, 486 A.2d at 196, 200; see also supra note 26 (providing the text of Rule
757(b)).
39. Smith, 302 Md. at 180, 183, 486 A.2d at 198, 200.
40. 319 Md. 540, 573 A.2d 1317 (1990).
41. Id. at 550, 573 A.2d at 1321. The trial judge found that because the defendant had
testified that he did not perform the killing, he could not have at the same time produced
evidence that he performed the killing in response to hot-blooded provocation. Id. at 550,
573 A.2d at 1321. Therefore, the trial judge held that the evidence was insufficient to
warrant the defendant's requested voluntary manslaughter instruction. Id. at 548, 573
A.2d at 1321.
42. Id. at 550, 573 A.2d at 1321.
43. Id., 573 A.2d at 1322 (stating that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on every
question or point of law supported by evidence).
44. Id.
45. 321 Md. 572, 583 A.2d 1037 (1991).
46. Id. at 582-83, 583 A.2d at 1042. The court noted that the legislative history of Mary-
land's theft statute fails to provide a definition of "honest belief." Id. at 579-80, 583 A.2d at
1040. The court thus analogized the honest belief defense to the claim of right defense,
which negates the mens rea of theft. Id.
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had a claim of right to the allegedly stolen property.4 7 By joining to-
gether its prior holdings in Smith and Sims, the court recognized that
an applicable instruction on "any theory of defense" and "every essen-
tial question or point of law" is mandatory under Rule 4-325(c), once
the defendant has requested the instruction. 48 The court then sup-
ported its holding by reiterating that the legislature explicitly enumer-
ated honest belief as a defense to theft.49 Thus, the court concluded
that the legislative intent required that the defendant be entitled to
an honest belief instruction under the mandatory component of Rule
4-325(c).5 °
Despite the apparent trend to broaden the mandatory compo-
nent of Rule 4-325(c), the court narrowed the scope of this provision
in its decision in Patterson v. State.5' In Patterson, the court held that
"generally [a defendant] is not entitled to a missing evidence instruc-
tion. ' ' 5 2 The court provided that even when there is evidence to sup-
port the defendant's requested instruction, and that instruction
represents the defendant's theory of the case, Rule 4-325(c) does not
entitle a defendant to instructions on inferences. 53 The court deter-
mined that a missing evidence instruction was not mandatory under
Rule 4-325(c) because the mandatory component of the rule first re-
quires that the instruction be applicable to the case and a correct
statement of the law.54 The court also reasoned that allowing jury in-
structions about inferences creates a "'danger that the jury may give
the inference undue weight"' by considering the inference as if it
were the law. 55 Therefore, the court held that Rule 4-325(c) only re-
quires instructions on applicable law, and inferences are to be argued
in closing arguments. 56
47. Id. at 579, 583 A.2d at 1040. A "claim of right," by definition, is an assertion that
the defendant "honestly, (but mistakenly)" believed he had rights to the property. BLACK'S
LAw DIcrIONARY 242 (7th ed. 1999).
48. Binnie, 321 Md. at 581-82, 583 A.2d at 104142 (quoting Sims v. State, 319 Md. 540,
550, 573 A.2d 1313 (1990)).
49. Id. at 582-83, 583 A.2d at 1042.
50. Id.
51. 356 Md. 677, 741 A.2d 1119 (1999).
52. Id. at 681, 741 A.2d at 1120.
53. Id. at 694, 741 A.2d at 1127. The missing evidence instruction allows jurors to make
an inference that the missing evidence might have been "unfavorable" to the state's case. I&
at 682, 741 A.2d at 1121.
54. Id. at 683, 741 A.2d at 1122.
55. Id at 684, 741 A.2d at 1122 (quoting Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 52, 633 A.2d 867,
879 (1993)). The court also noted that "'[a]t the very least, the trial judge's jury instruc-
tion . . . may have the effect of overemphasizing just one of the many proper inferences
that ajury may draw."' Id.
56. Id
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b. The Evolution of the Fairly Covered Component of Rule 4-
325(c).--Even a requested and applicable jury instruction may not be
mandatory if it has been "fairly covered" by a trial court's previously
given instruction.5 7 When analyzing whether a defendant's requested
instruction was "fairly covered" by a prior instruction, Maryland courts
initially just considered the specific points of law explained by both
the requested instruction and the instruction previously given by the
court.58 But as certain instructions that were mandated under the first
portion of Rule 4-325(c) also fell under the "fairly covered" compo-
nent of the rule, the court began to analyze the purpose behind the
requested instruction-in addition to the elements of the law ex-
plained by the instruction-to carefully determine whether the in-
struction had, in fact, already been "fairly covered."59
In Lansdowne v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, for one
of the first times, recognized that the purpose of jury instructions was
not merely just an explanation of the law.6" In Lansdowne, the Court
of Appeals considered whether a trial judge who had explained the
applicable law to the jury in his preliminary remarks was required to
explain the same law to the jury after the close of evidence.6" Because
the trial judge explained the reasonable doubt standard to the jury
before the presentation of evidence, he denied the defendant's re-
quest to explain it again before jury deliberations.62 The court held
that the instructions covered in a trial judge's preliminary remarks did
not "fairly cover" the instructions requested after the close of evi-
dence.6" Although the trial judge's instructions in preliminary re-
marks would have been identical to the instructions after the close of
evidence, the court found that the preliminary remarks did not "focus
[the jury's] attention on the specific factual issues" raised by the evi-
dence because the jury could not relate the instructions to the facts of
57. MD. R. 4-325(c). The second portion of Rule 4-325(c) allows the trial judge the
discretion to deny an applicable, requested instruction that has been "fairly covered" by
the instructions already given. Id.
58. See supra notes 26-27 (providing discussion of the mandatory component of Rule 4-
3 25(c), which requires that a requested instruction be generated by the evidence and cor-
rectly explain the law).
59. See, e.g., Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232, 246-47, 412 A.2d 88, 95-96 (1980) (ana-
lyzing the purpose of jury instructions given at the close of evidence in comparison to
identical instructions given during the judge's preliminary remarks).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 234, 412 A.2d at 89. The court initially considered and decided that the law
was applicable, and therefore, mandatory under Rule 4-325(c). Id. at 239-40, 412 A.2d at
92.
62. Id. at 235-36, 247, 412 A.2d at 90, 95.
63. Id. at 247, 412 A.2d at 95-96.
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the case until after the close of evidence.6 4 Therefore, instructions
given during preliminary remarks did not "fairly cover" the requested
instruction after the close of evidence.6 5
In Sibert v. State,66 the court considered whether the trial court's
standard intent instruction "fairly covered" the defendant's requested
instruction on his honest belief defense.67 The court first acknowl-
edged that the honest belief defense did not include any new informa-
tion regarding the instructions already given on the mental elements
of theft.68 The court concluded, however, that because honest belief
was a legislatively created defense, the legislature intended to require
its instruction when applicable.6 9 The court then held that any in-
struction that "merely delineates the mental elements of theft" does
not fairly cover the honest belief defense.7 0 The court determined
that to conclude otherwise would ignore the intent of the legislature
by allowing for the possibility that jury instructions as to specific af-
firmative defenses may never be necessary.7 '
In addition to instructions that explain the charged offense, the
court has considered the purpose and impact of instructions that em-
body underlying principles of law. In Williams v. State,72 the court held
that a trial judge is required to give a requested instruction on the
principle of law pertaining to the presumption of innocence in crimi-
nal trials. 7' The Williams court considered whether the trial judge was
required to give such an instruction when it already instructed the
jury on burden of proof and reasonable doubt.74 The majority admit-
ted that an instruction on the presumption of innocence is merely a
64. Id., 412 A.2d at 95.
65. Id., 412 A.2d at 95-96. The court supported its holding by restating the reasoning
of the Court of Appeals of New York that "a charge should do more than merely articulate
the legal principles applicable to the case to be decided. Among other things, it should
focus the jury's attention on the specific factual issues raised by the evidence to which the
principles are to be applied." Id. at 245, 412 A.2d at 94 (quoting People v. Newman, 385
N.E.2d 598, 600-01 (N.Y. 1978)).
66. 301 Md. 141, 482 A.2d 483 (1984).
67. Id. at 143, 482 A.2d 484; see supra note 46 and accompanying text (providing a
description of the honest belief defense).
68. Sibert, 301 Md. at 153, 482 A.2d at 489.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 154, 482 A.2d at 490.
71. Id.
72. 322 Md. 35, 585 A.2d 209 (1991).
73. Id. at 47, 585 A.2d at 215.
74. Id. at 37-38, 585 A.2d at 210. The majority first noted and dismissed the argument
that the phrase "presumption of innocence" had been considered inaccurate because the
word "presumption" implies that the defendant is probably innocent. Id. at 42-43, 585
A.2d at 213.
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restatement of the burden of proof, that the prosecution must prove
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury can
convict him, in that both indicate that the defendant is innocent until
proven guilty.7 5 The court, however, recognized the importance of
the presumption of innocence as a "firmly fixed" principle in Mary-
land common law.7 6 While the burden of proof serves as an instruc-
tion on evidence, the court found that the presumption of innocence
serves as a "caution" to consider only the evidence from which the "lay
jurors" might "draw significant additional guidance" in deliberation.7 7
Lastly, the court found that because presumption of innocence and
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are similar instructions,
the former might aid the jury in understanding the latter.7" Thus,
even though the essential points of presumption of innocence were
covered by the burden of proof instruction, the court found that the
positive impacts of the presumption of innocence instruction out-
weighed any "possible adverse effects."7 9 These positive impacts led
the court to conclude that the presumption of innocence instruction
was not fairly covered by the burden of proof and reasonable doubt
instructions, and therefore, was mandatory.8 0
The court found additional reasons to require a seemingly "fairly
covered" instruction under Rule 4-325(c) in Gunning v. State.8 1 The
issue in Gunningwas whether the defendant was entitled to an instruc-
tion on mistaken identification when the prosecution's case rested on
the testimony of one eyewitness and the defendant's only defense was
mistaken identification. 82 Like the court in Williams, the Gunning
75. Id. at 41, 585 A.2d at 212. That the prosecution must prove that the defendant is
guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt necessarily means that up until that point,
the defendant is innocent of the charge against him. Id. at 41, 789 A.2d at 212. Despite
the fact that presumption of innocence could be considered misleading, and that it was a
restatement of the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the court found many
positive aspects of requiring a presumption of innocence instruction, including the fact
that such an instruction could help to further explain the prosecution's burden of proof.
Id. at 43-44, 585 A.2d at 213-14.
76. Id. at 39, 585 A.2d at 211.
77. Id. at 43, 585 A.2d at 213 (internal quotation marks omitted) (providing "[T]he
presumption of innocence.., conveys for the jury a special and additional caution (which
is perhaps only an implied corollary to the [burden of proof] to consider, in the material
for their belief, nothing but the evidence .... This caution is indeed particularly needed in
criminal cases.") (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-85, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1934
(1978)).
78. Id. at 44, 585 A.2d at 214.
79. Id. at 45, 585 A.2d at 214.
80. Id. at 44-46, 585 A.2d at 214-15.
81. 347 Md. 332, 701 A.2d 372 (1997).
82. Id. at 335, 701 A.2d at 375. The mistaken identification instruction acts as a guard
against false eyewitness testimony by explaining to the jury how and why certain eyewit-
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court evaluated the benefits and drawbacks of the mistaken identifica-
tion instruction.8" The court held that the trial judge abused his dis-
cretion when he refused to give the mistaken identification
instruction. 84 The court explained that when a mistaken identifica-
tion defense is central to an issue in a case, a requested instruction
might assist the jury in properly evaluating eyewitness testimony.85
Thus, the court implied that a trial judge may determine whether an
issue of the case was "fairly covered" by the trial court's given jury
instructions by considering whether that issue was important to the
defense.86
c. The Mistake of Fact Cases.-Whether the mistake of fact in-
struction is "fairly covered" by a court's instruction on the mens rea of
the offense has never been considered in Maryland. Jurisdictions
outside of Maryland have looked to the impact and purpose of jury
instructions to interpret the meaning of "fairly covered" and have
found a basis on which to require affirmative defense instructions,
such as mistake of fact, that are otherwise "fairly covered" by the trial
court's given intent instructions. Mistake of fact, like the honest belief
defense, is a recognized affirmative defense in Maryland.87 By claim-
ing mistake of fact, the defendant is explaining to the trier of fact that
although he committed the act for which he was charged, he did not
have the intent necessary to be guilty of the charged offense. 88 Juris-
dictions that have jury instruction rules similar to the "fairly covered"
nesses could incorrectly identify an individual. Id. at 343-44, 701 A.2d at 379-80. For in-
stance, the jury could be instructed to consider "'the opportunity of the witness to view the
defendant at the time of the crime . . . the witness's degree of attention, . . . [and] the
[witness's] level of certainty ... ". ' Id. at 344, 701 A.2d at 379-80 (quoting State v. Warren,
635 P.2d 1236, 1240 (1981)).
83. Id. at 350, 701 A.2d at 383. For instance, the court noted that "if the jury is not
instructed to consider [mistaken identification], it 'might reasonably conclude that the
admission of the [eyewitness testimony] by the trial court vouched for its reliability.'" Id. at
344, 701 A.2d at 380 (quoting Warren, 635 P.2d at 1244). On the other hand, the court
noted that mistaken identification instructions "are duplicitous of the general instructions
on credibility of witnesses and proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 344-45, 701 A.2d at
380 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 335, 701 A.2d at 375.
85. Id. at 350, 701 A.2d at 383.
86. Id. at 344-50, 701 A.2d at 382.
87. See Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 577, 632 A.2d 797, 798 (1993). The court cited
Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 643, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988), for the proposition that "[a]t
common law, a crime only occurred upon the concurrence of an individual's act and his
guilty state of mind." Id.
88. See Garnett, 332 Md. at 571, 632 A.2d at 797. Specifically, the court in Garnett
explained:
[M]istake of fact negates the mental state required to establish a material element
of the crime. A person who engages in proscribed conduct is relieved of criminal
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component of Maryland Rule 4-325 (c) have struggled to justify requir-
ing the mistake of fact instruction because it often restates the stan-
dard intent instruction to the charged offense.89
In 1978, the Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Freeman held that a
trial court may deny a requested and applicable jury instruction if the
"substance" of that instruction is included in the court's given instruc-
tions.9" The court considered whether ajury instruction on a mistake
of fact defense was adequately covered by the trial court's standard
intent instruction when a defendant charged with shoplifting pro-
duced evidence in defense of the charge that he had mistakenly
thought that his girlfriend paid for the property.91 The court con-
cluded that because mistake of fact was the defendant's only theory of
the case, it was not covered by standard instructions on the mental
elements of the offense.92 Although the court realized that the mis-
take of fact instruction replicated the standard intent instruction, the
court stated that mistake of fact remains a "separate and distinct issue"
as a theory of defense.93
Similarly, in People v. Crane,94 the Supreme Court of Illinois con-
sidered whether the trial court erred by refusing to give a mistake of
fact instruction when it found that the "standard jury instruction ade-
quately covered the mental state" required to convict the defendant.95
The court noted that the defendants were entitled to an instruction
on their "theory of the case" whenever any basis for the defense was
presented at trial.96 Like the court in Freeman, the Crane court admit-
ted that the trial court's intent instruction encompassed the same
liability if, because of ignorance or mistake of fact, he or she did not entertain the
culpable mental state required for the commission of the offense.
Id. at 605, 632 A.2d at 814 (citations omitted).
89. See, e.g., Iowa v. Freeman, 267 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Iowa 1978) (finding that a mistake of
fact instruction should be granted when it is the defendant's only theory of the case even if
it replicated the given intent instructions); People v. Crane, 585 N.E.2d 99, 102 (Ill. 1991)
(recognizing that the mistake of fact instruction restates the trial court's intent instruction
but requiring that the mistake of fact instruction be given to "draw" the jury's attention to
the "concept" of the defendant's theory of the case).
90. 267 N.W.2d 69, 70 (Iowa 1978).
91. Id. at 69-70.
92. Id. at 71.
93. Id.
94. 585 N.E.2d 99.
95. Id. at 102. The defendant was charged with murder and his mistake of fact defense
was based on his mistaken belief that the victim was already dead when he burned the
body, which was the actual cause of the victim's death. Id. at 100-01.
96. Id. at 102. Mistake of fact is a statutory affirmative defense in Illinois. See id. (not-
ing that "[m]istake of fact is a valid defense if the mistake negates 'the existence of the
mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense"') (cit-
ing ILL. REV. STAT. 1987, ch. 38, par. 4-8).
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mental elements as mistake of fact, but found that the former did not
"expressly draw to the jury's attention the concept of mistake of fact."97
The court also determined that an instruction on the mistake of fact
defense served not only to explain the mens rea required for convic-
tion, but also to inform the jury of the "validity" of the defendant's
theory of the case.98
In Bang v. State,99 the Court of Appeals of Texas similarly consid-
ered whether it was error for the trial court to deny the defendant's
requested mistake of factjury instruction."°' The court found that the
defendant was entitled to the mistake of fact instruction because his
testimony indicated that he did not know the crime of burglary had
taken place.' Even though Texas courts had previously found that
such an instruction was unnecessary when it was consistent with the
requisite intent of the offense, the court noted that recent cases in
Texas held that a mistake of fact instruction is necessary whenever
supported by the evidence. 10 2 The court held that the trial court's
refusal to instruct the jury on the mistake of fact was harmful because
it denied the defendant a fair trial by not allowing the jury to consider
"the credibility of [his] defense." '03
The Supreme Court of Wyoming used similar reasoning in hold-
ing that due process requires providing a defendant's applicable mis-
take of fact instruction as part of the defendant's right to present a
defense and the jury's "right to weigh and assess evidentiary valid-
ity."'0 4 In Stagner v. State, the court found that once any evidence gen-
erates a mistake of fact defense, the jury alone is granted the right to
assess whether that defense is "credible," and therefore, the trial court
is precluded from denying the instruction.'0 5 The court further con-
cluded that an instruction on a party's theory of the case is procedur-
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. 815 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). Like Illinois, mistake of fact is a statutory
affirmative defense in Texas. Id. at 841.
100. Id. at 838.
101. Id. at 842. Specifically, the defendant claimed that he did not know that he was
participating in a burglary. Id. at 840.
102. Id. at 841.
103. Id. at 841. The court explained that "[t]he giving of a proper instruction ... when
raised by the evidence in the case simply guarantees the jury the opportunity to make a
fully informed decision. [The defendant] was entitled to have the jury specifically rule
upon the defense." Id. at 842 (citation omitted).
104. Stagner v. State, 842 P.2d 520, 523 (Wyo. 1992); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(providing that "[ n ] o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ).
105. 842 P.2d 520, 522 (Wyo. 1992).
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ally entwined to the defendant's due process right to defend himself
against criminal charges. 0 6 Thus, the court provided a strong basis
for determining that an instruction as to a mistake of fact is required
whenever it is supported by the evidence.1
0 7
In Cheser v. Commonwealth,' the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
held that a defendant charged with murder was entitled to a jury in-
struction on mistake of fact when her defense presented the belief
that she thought the victim she had killed was already dead.0 9 The
court found that it was the trial court's duty to instruct on all applica-
ble law, while it was the jury's duty to "determine the merits of any
lawful defense."" 0 The court concluded that an affirmative defense,
such as mistake of fact, is more than a simple denial of the charges,
but an affirmative introduction of evidence as part of the defendant's
theory of the case, and therefore, is not satisfied by the jury instruc-
tion on mental elements of murder."'
Thus, jurisdictions outside of Maryland having a rule similar to
the "fairly covered" component of Maryland Rule 4-325 (c) have found
that an applicable mistake of fact jury instruction is not adequately
covered by a standard intent instruction. These courts reason that the
mistake of factjury instruction serves many purposes that the standard
intent jury instruction cannot serve, such as reinforcing the state's
burden to prove criminal intent, informing the jury as to the validity
of the defendant's defense, and guaranteeing the defendant's due
process right to put forth his best defense. Maryland, however, has
previously required only a jury instruction on an affirmative defense
that simply restates the jury instruction on the intent elements of the
crime when the court has determined that the legislature intended
the additional jury instruction to be given.' 12
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In General, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held, in a 6-1 decision, that in addition to the trial court's
instructions on the requisite mental elements of the crime, Damian
Ramon General was entitled to ajury instruction on his mistake of fact
106. Id.; see supra note 104 (providing the text of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution).
107. See Stagner, 842 P.2d at 522.
108. 904 S.W.2d 239 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).
109. Id. at 241.
110. Id. at 242.
111. Id. at 242-43. Mistake of fact is also a statutory affirmative defense in Kentucky. Id.
112. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (providing discussion of the Binnie
court's analysis of statutorily created defenses).
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defense.' 13 Writing for the majority, Judge Raker concluded that
while the trial court's intent instructions were complete and accurate
as to the elements of the charged offenses, they did not "direct the
jury's attention" to the legal principle at issue in the case, whether or
not the defendant acted under a mistake of fact.114 Therefore, the
trial court's standard intent instructions did not "fairly cover" the de-
fendant's requested mistake of fact instruction under Rule 4-
325(c). i t5
The court initially examined the statutes under which General
was charged to determine whether mistake of fact was applicable to
his case. 16 The mental elements for failure to return to the scene of
an accident, failure to remain at the scene of an accident, and failure
to render reasonable assistance require an individual to have both
knowledge and intent that his actions caused both the accident and
injury to the victim.' 1 7 The trial court's instructions explained knowl-
edge and intent, which were also encompassed in General's requested
mistake of fact instruction."11 The court then turned to Maryland
Rule 4-325 (c) for guidance regarding when the trial court is required
to instruct the jury on the applicable law upon request of a party." 9
Because General's defense relied solely upon his mistake of fact, and
mistake of fact is a recognized defense in Maryland, the court found
that mistake of fact was applicable to the case.120
113. General, 367 Md. at 490, 789 A.2d at 111.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 483-85, 789 A.2d at 106-07.
116. Id. at 480-81 n.4, 789 A.2d at 105 n.4 (citing Comstock v. State, 82 Md. App. 744,
573 A.2d 117 (1990)). The court also noted that "[i]n evaluating whether competent evi-
dence exists to generate the requested instruction, . .. [the court] view[s] the evidence in
the light most favorable to the accused." Id at 487, 789 A.2d at 109.
117. Id. at 480-81 n.4, 787 A.2d at 106 n.4 (citing Comstock v. State, 82 Md. App. 744, 573
A.2d 117 (1990)). The charges for which criminal intent was an element were failure to
remain at the scene of an accident, failure to return to the scene of an accident, and
failure to render reasonable assistance, thereby making mistake of fact a complete defense
to those charges. Id. at 488, 789 A.2d at 109. The Court of Appeals expressly refused to
discuss whether mistake of fact was a defense to the defendant's fourth charge of negligent
driving because it was neither briefed nor argued by either party. Id. at 488 n.9, 789 A.2d
at 109 n.9. The knowledge element is satisfied by a finding that the defendant had either
actual or constructive knowledge of the accident. See supra note 16 (providing the mistake
of fact instruction).
118. Cf supra notes 15-16. The court noted that General's sole defense at trial was that
he was under the mistaken belief that he had hit a trash bag and not a person. General, 367
Md. at 483, 789 A.2d at 106. The Court of Special Appeals and Court of Appeals immedi-
ately established that mistake of fact was applicable, thereafter focusing their analysis to
whether it was fairly covered by the trial court's jury instructions. Id. at 480 n.4, 789 A.2d at
105 n.4.
119. General 367 Md. at 485, 789 A.2d at 107-08.
120. Id. at 488, 789 A.2d at 109.
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After recognizing that a mistake of fact defense was applicable,1 2'
the court focused on whether mistake of fact was fairly covered by the
trial court's jury instructions. 122 The court reiterated that the purpose
of jury instructions is to clarify the law to the jury.123 The court then
evaluated the importance of the mistake of fact instruction in light of
the purpose of jury instructions. 124 The court prefaced its discussion
by acknowledging the importance of a core concept in criminal law,
that an individual cannot be guilty of a crime without establishing the
concurrent actus reus and mens rea of the offense.1 25 Given that mis-
take of fact negates the mental element of certain crimes, 2 6 it stands
as a complete defense whenever it is applicable. 127 The court thus
noted that because mistake of fact was applicable it would have oper-
ated as a complete defense to General's charges. 12' The court found
that while the trial court's intent instruction and the requested mis-
take of fact instruction were similar, the two instructions were concep-
tually disparate. 129  Unlike the trial court's intent instructions, the
mistake of fact instruction amplified the mental elements necessary to
convict the defendant in the trial court's intent instruction, thus "di-
rect[ing] the jury's attention" to the legal principles at issue in the
case.130 The court also found it essential that the jury be informed
that even though the defendant initiated the mistake of fact issue, it
was the State's burden to prove that mistake of fact was not true, not
the defendant's obligation to prove it was true.13 '
121. In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied on its reasoning in Smith, in which
it held that the defendant was entitled to his alibi instruction because it was sufficiently
generated by the evidence at trial. Id. at 484, 78 A.2d at 107; see supra notes 35-39 and
accompanying text (providing a discussion of Smith).
122. General, 367 Md. at 483, 789 A.2d at 106.
123. Id. at 485, 789 A.2d at 108.
124. ld-
125. Id. at 484, 789 A.2d at 107.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 483-84 n.5, 789 A.2d at 106-07 n.5 (finding that "[t]he requirement that an
accused have acted with a culpable mental state is an axiom of criminal jurisprudence").
128. Id. at 488, 789 A.2d at 109. The court explained this point stating:
As we have noted, knowledge that the defendant struck a person is an element of
the charged offense of [failure to return to the scene of an accident, failure to
remain at the scene of an accident] and [failure to render reasonable assistance].
If [General] did not know that he struck a person and reasonably believed that he
merely struck a white bag, then his mistake of fact was a defense to those crimes.
Id.
129. Id. at 490, 789 A.2d at 111.
130. Id. The court cited Crane and Freeman in concluding that the jury must hear a
mistake of fact instruction to understand the defense's full weight and implications. Id.
131. See id. at 485-86, 789 A.2d at 108 (stating that "[o]nce the defendant properly has
generated the defense of mistake of fact, he or she is entitled to have the jury understand
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Having acknowledged the necessity of the mistake of fact instruc-
tion, the court determined that the trial court's standard intent in-
structions did not "fairly cover" the mistake of fact instruction as a
theory of defense, even though both instructions explained the same
mental elements of the charged offense.1 32 Thus, the court held that
it is not the elements covered in one instruction that cause it to be
"fairly covered" by another instruction; it is the concept of the instruc-
tion itself.133 The court made clear, however, that a defendant is not
entitled to a "mirror-image" of all instructions to the jury, only an in-
struction that "fairly covers" his theory of defense and focuses the
jury's attention on that theory.'
Judge Battaglia dissented from the court's opinion."' judge Bat-
taglia found that the trial court's instructions fairly covered the mis-
take of fact defense.1 36 Like the majority, Judge Battaglia interpreted
Rule 4-325(c) as having both mandatory and discretionary provi-
sions. 13 7 Comparing the trial court's intent and knowledge instruc-
tions specifically to the mistake of fact instruction, Judge Battaglia
found that the two instructions were in fact "mirror-images" as de-
fined by the majority.' Judge Battaglia did not accept the majority's
conclusion that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on the con-
cept of his theory of defense because she flatly disagreed with the ma-
jority over the meaning of the "substance" of a jury instruction. 139
Judge Battaglia interpreted the "substance" of the jury instruction as
being embodied in the elements of the law, in contrast to the major-
ity's finding that an instruction could include the concept of the de-
fendant's theory of his case in addition to an outline of the requisite
mens rea elements. 4
The dissent also distinguished the majority's reliance on Crane
and Freeman, pointing out that Crane involved a statutorily created de-
that the State must still prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and
that the burden never shifts to the defendant").
132. Id. at 487-88, 490, 789 A.2d at 109, 111. Both the trial court's instructions and
General's mistake of fact instruction explained actual and constructive knowledge and in-




135. Id. at 491, 789 A.2d at 111 (Battaglia, J. dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 491-92, 789 A.2d at 111-12.
138. Id. at 495, 789 A.2d at 114.
139. Id. at 493, 495, 789 A.2d at 112, 114 (stating that "[tlhese instructions are mirror-
images; a finding of one outcome necessarily requires the absence of the other").
140. Id. at 493, 789 A.2d at 112.
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fense, which was distinguishable from the common law defense of mis-
take of fact.' 4 1 According to Judge Battaglia, Freeman was also
distinguishable because in that case, the trial court gave only an intent
instruction, whereas the trial court in General gave both an intent and
knowledge instruction. 4 2 Because Judge Battaglia's understanding of
the substance of the mistake of fact instruction-the elements of
knowledge and intent-were in fact covered in the trial court's given
instruction, she concluded that the trial court's standard intent in-
struction and General's requested mistake of fact instruction were in
fact "mirror-images" of each other.'4 3 Therefore, Judge Battaglia con-
cluded that mistake of fact instruction was "fairly covered" under Rule
4-325(c). 14 4
4. Analysis.-In General, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that Damian Ramon General was entitled to an instruction on his mis-
take of fact defense because that theory was supported by the evidence
and the concept of that theory was not "fairly covered" by the trial
court's previously given instructions. 4 5 Although the court recog-
nized that such an instruction would have essentially restated informa-
tion already provided to the jury, the court believed the requested
instruction was necessary to direct the jury's attention to the defen-
dant's theory of his defense. 146 By recognizing the importance ofjury
instructions as not only explanations of elements of an offense, but
focal points of the central issues argued in the case, the court's deci-
sion resolved an inherent tension in Maryland Rule 4-325(c). Specifi-
cally, the court clarified the meaning of "fairly covered," by
recognizing the difference between instructions that explain elements
of an offense to the jury and instructions that explain the defendant's
theory of defense. The clarification provided that affirmative defense
instructions could no longer inevitably qualify under both the
mandatory and discretionary components of the rule. 147 In so doing,
141. Id. at 499-501, 789 A.2d at 116-18.
142. Id. at 499, 789 A.2d at 116, Judge Battaglia did suggest that she would not have
dissented had the trial court in General only given an intent instruction, because that would
not have "fairly covered" the mistake of fact instruction on both knowledge and intent. Id.
at 499-50, 789 A.2d at 116.
143. Id. at 493-496, 789 A.2d at 113-15.
144. Id. at 503, 789 A.2d at 119.
145. General, 367 Md. at 490, 789 A.2d at 111.
146. Id.
147. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (explaining how the prior interpreta-
tion of Rule 4-325(c) created a situation where the mistake of fact jury instruction could be
applicable to the case and therefore mandatory, but "fairly covered" by the trial court's
standard intent instructions, and therefore, discretionary).
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the court's decision presents a workable standard for applying Rule 4-
325(c), which preserves the purpose of the "fairly covered" compo-
nent of the rule, while ensuring a fair standard for affirmative defense
cases.
a. The Court Confronted an Inherent Tension in Rule 4-325(c).-
A tension exists within Rule 4-325 (c) as to affirmative defense instruc-
tions in that once a defendant generates evidence for an affirmative
defense, an instruction is mandatory under the rule, but because the
same information is often covered by the court's instructions on the
intent elements of the crime, it is discretionary at the same time. 148
Prior to the court's decision in General, it was unclear under Rule 4-
325(c) when a trial judge was required to grant an affirmative defense
instruction and when the instruction was considered "fairly cov-
ered." '149 Maryland courts chose to circumvent the conflict in Rule 4-
325(c) by granting the requested instructions under alternative
grounds, such as legislative intent.150 Because mistake of fact is a com-
mon law defense, however, the General court had to confront the in-
herent tension within the rule rather than continue finding
alternative reasons to mandate instructions that were considered
"fairly covered."'
1 51
The court's expansive interpretation of the mandatory compo-
nent of Rule 4-325(c) suggests that a trial judge is always required to
grant a recognized and applicable affirmative defense instruction. In
fact, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that a trial judge is
required to give an instruction on the defendant's theory of his de-
148. See, e.g., supra notes 46-47 (describing the honest belief defense and claim of right).
Manyjury instructions on affirmative defenses are by nature covered injury instructions on
the charged offense. For example, "theft" is defined as "the felonious taking and removing
of another's personal property with the intent of depriving the true owner of it." BLACK'S
LAw DIC-iONARY, supra note 47, at 1486. If the defendant asserts that he honestly but
mistakenly thought that the stolen property belonged to him, which is the basis of the
affirmative defense of claim of right, it would essentially mean the defendant lacked the
intent required to be found guilty of the crime. Id. at 242. However, a claim of right will
always be generated by the evidence at a trial for theft because it applies directly to the
elements of theft. See id. Therefore, the claim of right defense is an example of an affirma-
tive defense that can be generated by the evidence, thus rendering an instruction
mandatory, but covered by the trial court's instructions on the intent elements of the
crime.
149. See, e.g., supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (providing court's analysis of the
honest belief defense, which qualified tinder both the mandatory and discretionary com-
ponents of the rule).
150. See, e.g., supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (providing the court's analysis in
Sibert, where the court required the honest belief defense instruction despite its repetition
of the trial court's intent instructions because it was a statutorily created defense).
151. See, e.g., supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
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fense when it is generated by the evidence at trial. 5 2 The case law
also has been clear that the trial judge may not "weigh" the evidence
to determine whether it has generated the defense, but must give the
instruction when even the slightest amount of evidence supports the
defendant's defense.' 5 3 Thus, courts examining this aspect of Rule 4-
325(c) have held that when a defense is applicable to the case and a
correct statement of the law is present, a trial judge is required to
grant the defendant's requested instruction.15 4
Despite this interpretation, courts have struggled to resolve when
the trial judge has the discretion to decline to give jury instructions
that are "fairly covered" by previous instructions, which is often the
case with affirmative defense instructions. 155 Affirmative defenses
often reiterate the intent elements of the charged offense. 156 For ex-
ample, the honest belief defense, when applied as a defense to a
charge of theft, explains to the jury that if they find the defendant
possessed an honest belief that the stolen property "d[id] not belong
to another," then the defendant lacks the intent necessary to be guilty
of theft by possession. 157 However, because the trial court will always
include an explanation of the intent necessary in its instructions, the
jury could just as easily acquit the defendant if honest belief is not
explained by the trial judge.'5 8 Thus, the tension in Rule 4-325(c)
152. Sims v. State, 319 Md. 540, 550, 573 A.2d 1317, 1321 (1988) (holding that a defen-
dant is entitled to an instruction on "any theory of defense that is fairly supported by the
evidence" at trial).
153. Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 178, 486 A.2d 196, 196 (1983); see supra notes 33-39
and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the evidence deemed sufficient to gener-
ate the defendant's defense instruction).
154. Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 683, 741 A.2d 1119, 1122 (1999).
155. Presumption of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
instructions are other examples of instructions that qualified under the mandatory and
discretionary components of the rule until the court clarified the differences between
them. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Maryland Court of
Appeals' treatment of presumption of innocence and burden of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt instruction under Rule 4-325(c)).
156. See, e.g., Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 583 A.2d 1037 (1991) (finding that the honest
belief defense reiterates the lack of intent necessary to convict the defendant for theft by
possession).
157. See id. at 580, 583 A.2d at 1040 (finding that the honest belief defense negates the
claim of right mental element of theft by possession).
158. Some criminal offenses do not contain an element of intent. A state legislature
may exclude mens rea when defining a criminal offense by eliminating "intent" as an ele-
ment of the crime; such a crime is defined as a "strict liability" offense. See Garnett v. State,
332 Md. 571, 578, 632 A.2d 797, 800 (1993) (explaining the reasons for legislatively cre-
ated strict liability offenses, such as concerns for "pubic health and welfare arising from the
complexities of society after the industrial revolution"). For generally all other criminal
offenses, mens rea, or intent, is a required element to find the defendant guilty of the
charge. Id. at 595, 632 A.2d at 799-800.
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with respect to affirmative defense instructions was that, even though
they could qualify as applicable law by nature, the requested instruc-
tions were often covered by the intent instructions given by the trial
court. 
1 59
Maryland courts previously circumvented this tension by reason-
ing that statutorily created affirmative defenses evidenced a legislative
intent to require the additional instruction under Rule 4-325(c). 16 °
For instance, the courts in both Binnie and Sibert examined requested
instructions for the statutorily created honest belief defense, which
was a reiteration of the trial court's standard intent instruction. 6 '
Even though those courts recognized the tension in Rule 4-325 (c),
they avoided directly confronting that conflict. 62  Instead, those
courts found that although the elements of the honest belief defense
instruction were "fairly covered" by the standard intent instruction,
the legislature, in enacting the affirmative defense of honest belief,
intended it to be a mandatory instruction.'6
Because mistake of fact is a common law defense rather than stat-
utorily created,' 64 the rationale of the Binnie and Sibert courts was not
available to the court in General. 16 5 Thus, the court was forced to con-
front the inherent tension in the rule. The court's holding in General
clarified this tension by broadening the meaning of "fairly covered."
Instead of interpreting "fairly covered" as applying to elements of a
crime, the court held that a defendant is entitled to an instruction
which "directs the jury's attention" to his theory of defense. 166 The
159. For example, the claim of right defense to a theft charge provides that the defen-
dant mistakenly believed he had a right to the stolen property. BLACK'S LAW DrCiONARV,
supra note 47, at 242. However, that concept is akin to a finding that the defendant lacked
the mens rea to be found guilty of theft which would require that the defendant intended to
deprive the true owner of the property. Id, at 1486.
160. See Binnie, 321 Md. at 582-83, 583 A.2d at 1042 (noting that when the legislature
"'enumerated ... defenses to the crime of theft, it intended a defendant to be entitled to a
jury instruction"').
161. See id.; Sibert v. State, 301 Md. 141, 482 A.2d 483 (1983); see also note 46 (stating
that the honest belief defense merely negates the mens rea necessary to convict the
defendant).
162. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (providing discussion of Binnie); see
also supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (providing discussion of Sibert).
163. Binnie, 321 Md. at 582, 583 A.2d at 1041; Sibert, 301 Md. at 153, 482 A.2d at 489.
164. General, 367 Md. at 483, 789 A.2d at 106-07 (stating that "[a]s a general rule, mis-
take of fact is a recognized common law defense to certain crimes").
165. See supra notes 45-50, 66-71 and accompanying text (explaining that both cases re-
quired the honest belief defense, which was otherwise "fairly covered" by the trial court's
intent instructions, on the premise that it is a statutorily created defense and therefore,
mandatory).
166. General, 367 Md. at 490, 789 A.2d at 111. While the court had held that a defen-
dant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense the court never clarified when
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court explained that Rule 4-325(c) requires a trial judge to grant a
requested instruction, which helps to identify the defendant's theory
of defense even if the elements of law were adequately explained by
the trial court's instructions. In so doing, the court recognized and
stated that the purpose of jury instructions, which was to explain the
"law," would be best served by explaining both the "elements" of law
as well as the concept or "legal theory" of the law.
b. The Court Clarified the Meaning of "Fairly Covered" Under
Rule 4-325(c).-By broadening the interpretation of "fairly covered" to
include instructions that help direct the jury's attention to the defen-
dant's theory of defense, the General court created a fair standard that
both satisfies the purpose of jury instructions and protects a defen-
dant who chooses to argue an affirmative defense. The purpose of
jury instructions is to help the jury understand the law so that they
may apply the law to the facts of the case.1 67 Accordingly, instructions
on the defendant's theory of his defense should help the jury under-
stand the defense in order to determine whether it is supported by the
facts. Because the court in General reiterated that a defendant's re-
quested instruction must be a correct statement of the law and appli-
cable to the case,' 6 8 the instruction ensures the jury is properly
applying the theory of defense to the facts of the case. 169
By mandating jury instructions on a defendant's theory of the
case, the court's decision in General focuses the jury's attention on
contested issues in the case, and assures the jury that the affirmative
defense is legitimate law to consider in deliberation. Prior to General,
the court recognized that instructions that merely explain the mental
elements of an offense do not necessarily help the average juror un-
that theory was "fairly covered" by the trial court's instructions on the intent elements of an
offense. Sims v. State, 319 Md. 540, 550, 573 A.2d 1317, 1321 (1988). By clarifying that a
defendant is not only entitled to an instruction on the elements of the theory of defense,
but an instruction that "expressly" focuses the jury on the defense, the court has broad-
ened the meaning of "fairly covered." General, 367 Md. at 490, 789 A.2d at 111.
167. General, 367 Md. at 485, 789 A.2d at 108. The court specifically noted: "We have
often said that the main purpose ofjury instructions is to aid the jury in clearly understand-
ing the case, to provide guidance for the jury's deliberations, and to help the jury arrive at
a correct verdict." Id. (citing Chambers v. State, 337 Md. 44, 650 A.2d 727 (1994)).
168. The requested instruction must first pass the mandatory component of Rule 4-
325(c) before it can apply to the "fairly covered" component of the rule. See supra notes 31-
86 and accompanying text (discussing the mandatory component and the "fairly covered"
component).
169. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing Lansdowne, in which the
court mandated jury instructions be given in preliminary remarks after the close of evi-




derstand the overall issues in the case. 170 The defendant's theory of
defense instruction, however, brings the specific issues of the case to
the jury's attention for deliberation."' It also assures the jury that the
defendant's theory of the case is supported by a recognized defense
and is therefore worthy of consideration. 172 Without such instruc-
tions, the average juror could believe that the defendant was merely
refuting the State's charges, rather than presenting a valid defense
that the jury was permitted to consider. 173 Thus, in recognizing the
important differences between an instruction covering the elements
of an offense and an instruction focusing the jury on the validity of
the defendant's central theory of the case, the court ensures that ju-
ries will be properly instructed on the applicable law.
In addition, by creating a middle ground for instructions that fo-
cus on the "concept" of a defense, as opposed to the individual ele-
ments, the General court reinforces the State's burden of proof and
permits defendants to argue common law defenses completely and ef-
fectively, without running the risk that they would be denied an in-
struction at the end of the case. 1 74 An instruction on the defendant's
theory of defense reminds the jury that although the defendant has
produced evidence in support of a defense, the burden of proof re-
mains with the State to prove each of the elements of the crime and it
is the State's burden to disprove the defendant's affirmative de-
170. General, 367 Md. at 490, 789 A.2d at 111; see Sibert v. State, 301 Md. 141, 154, 482
A.2d 483, 490 (1983) (finding that "an instruction that merely delineates the mental ele-
ments of [the offense] .. .does not fairly cover the [ ]defense").
171. For instance, in General, the defendant was not denying that he was driving the
vehicle that struck and killed the victim. General, 367 Md. at 479, 789 A.2d at 104. He was
only arguing that because he thought he had hit a trash bag, and not a person, he lacked
the knowledge of the accident and injury and therefore, could not have intended to leave
the scene, fail to give aid, or fail to return. Id. at 483, 789 A.2d at 106. The court reasoned
that a mistake of fact instruction would have alerted the jury to the point that the only
contested issue at trial was the defendant's intent, as opposed to a case where the defen-
dant was denying guilt altogether. Id. at 490, 789 A.2d at 111.
172. See Williams v. State, 322 Md. 35, 43, 585 A.2d 209, 213 (1990) (finding that be-
cause the presumption of innocence instruction could aid the average juror in understand-
ing the reasonable doubt principle, the instruction's possible positive impacts outweighed
any negative risks); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of
the purpose ofjury instructions by informing the jury of the validity of the defendant's
theory).
173. Williams, 322 Md. 35, 585 A.2d 209.
174. See, e.g., Bang v. State, 815 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a trial
court's refusal to grant an applicable instruction on the defendant's theory of the case
denies that defendant a fair trial because it prevents the jury from considering the "credi-
bility of [his] defense").
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fense.' 7 5 Furthermore, as evidenced in jurisdictions outside of Mary-
land, the court's holding also assures defendants their due process
rights by guaranteeing a full defense, which includes ajury instruction
on their theory of the case.' 76 Otherwise, under the previous inter-
pretations of the rule, it would have been futile for the defendant to
bear the burden of producing evidence to support his affirmative de-
fense if he was not entitled to instruct the jury on the very theory of
his case after the close of evidence.
Thus, the court's decision ensures that juries are informed of the
legally recognized defenses that apply to the case, while maintaining
the burden of proof and guaranteeing the defendant an instruction
on his defense for which he has presented supportive evidence at trial.
c. The Court's Decision Provides a Workable Standard for Applying
Rule 4-325(c).-The court's holding provides a workable standard for
applying Rule 4-325(c) by ensuring the validity of common law de-
fenses while maintaining the "fairly covered" component of the rule.
Without the court's recognition of the value of all affirmative defenses
as theories of the case, jury instructions on common law affirmative
defenses would not survive under Rule 4-325(c). The court, however,
could not have simply provided a blanket rule granting all affirmative
defense instructions without at the same time negating the purpose of
the "fairly covered" component of the rule.1 77 The court thus created
a middle ground that allows for instructions on common law affirma-
tive defenses while preserving the purpose of the "fairly covered" com-
ponent of Rule 4-325(c).
Moreover, by recognizing the importance of affirmative defenses
as theories of the case and not merely instructions on the law, the
court ensured that affirmative defenses, such as mistake of fact, would
not become obsolete because of their unavoidable similarity to a trial
175. See General, 367 Md. at 486-87, 789 A.2d at 108 (stating that "[o]nce the defendant
properly has generated the defense of mistake of fact, he or she is entitled to have the jury
understand that the State must still prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt and that the burden never shifts to the defendant") (emphasis added).
176. SeeStagnerv. State, 842 P.2d 520, 522 (Wyo. 1993) (stating that "[t]he theory of the
case instruction, where appropriate evidence exists, is a basic tenant of criminal law and a
procedural concomitant of due process"). Just as the presumption of innocence instruc-
tion can help the jury understand the burden of proof and reasonable doubt instructions,
the mistake of fact instruction can help the jury understand the burden the state bears to
prove the requisite intent elements of the charged offense. See supra notes 74-80 and ac-
companying text (discussing the necessity of the presumption of innocence instruction,
despite its similarity to the burden of proof and reasonable doubt instructions).
177. A rule that granted all affirmative defense instructions, without providing the trial
judge the discretion to review those instructions could create a situation where the affirma-
tive defense instructions replicate the trial court's given instructions.
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court's standard intent instructions. 178 The very definition of mistake
of fact replicates the General trial court's instruction on the intent ele-
ments of the crime.179 In fact, since the definition of mistake of fact
includes an instruction on intent, it will necessarily replicate any trial
court's instruction of an offense to which the defendant's knowledge
and intent are at issue."' The fact that mistake of fact is a recognized
common law defense, however, is evidence that the overall idea that a
defendant acted under a mistake of fact is a concept the justice system
entitles the jury to hear and not simply a reiteration of the elements of
the offense. "8"
In addition to maintaining the validity of common law affirmative
defenses, the court's holding preserved the "fairly covered" compo-
nent of Rule 4-325(c) and created a standard that allows trial courts to
uniformly and consistently apply the rule. Although the court has im-
plied that issues "central" to the defendant's case might assist the jury
to understand the law, its prior decisions did not provide guidance for
lower courts to decide what is "central" to a case. 82 Different trial
judges could decide differently as to the meaning of "central" which
would lead to inconsistent applications of the "fairly covered" compo-
nent of the rule.'83 If the General court had merely held that the mis-
take of fact defense is required because it is a recognized common law
affirmative defense, then there would never be an opportunity to ap-
ply the "fairly covered" component once an affirmative defense was
178. See General, 367 Md. at 490, 789 A.2d at 11l (finding that "[w]ere we to accept the
State's argument that the instruction on intent and knowledge fairly covered the mistake
of fact defense, there would never be an occasion to give the instruction").
179. See supra note 16 (providing the full text of the mistake of fact instruction). Simi-
larly, the honest belief defense, which is an assertion that the defendant honestly, but
mistakenly, thought he had a right to the stolen property in a theft case, is essentially a
restatement of the claim of right element of the theft charge. See supra notes 46-47 and
accompanying text (discussing the Maryland Court of Appeals' treatment of the honest
belief defense).
180. General, 367 Md. at 489, 789 A.2d at 110. Relying on the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in People v. Crane, the General court stated "[t]he [trial court's] instruction, while
significantly informing the jury of the mental state requirement, does not expressly draw to
the jury's attention the concept of mistake of fact." Id. (quoting People v. Crane, 585
N.E.2d 99, 102 (I11. 1991)).
181. SeeGarnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 578, 632 A.2d 797, 800 (1995) (stating that "[t]he
requirement that an accused have acted with a culpable mental state is an axiom of crimi-
nal jurisprudence").
182. See Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 350, 701 A.2d 374, 383 (1996) (discussing the
various subject-matter that has been considered "central" to a case, depending on the
jurisdiction).
183. For instance, the court never explained the reason the missing witness instruction,
while recognized, was not "central" to the defendant's case in Gunning. Id. at 350, 701 A.2d
at 382-83.
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raised at trial.' 84 Rather than broadly holding that a defendant is enti-
tled to an instruction on a "central" issue, or narrowly holding that a
defendant is entitled to the mistake of fact instruction, the court enti-
tled a defendant to an instruction on his recognized and applicable
theory of defense. 85 As the court's holding is supplemented with the
assurance that a defendant is not entitled to a "mirror-image" of his
requested instruction,1 86 the court preserves the "fairly covered" com-
ponent of Rule 4-325(c) by leaving the trial judge discretion to appro-
priately phrase the defendant's theory of defense. 87 So long as the
trial court specifically directs the jury's attention to the theory of de-
fense, the defendant is not entitled to the exact language of his re-
quested instruction.
By holding that the "fairly covered" component of Rule 4-325(c)
applies to theories of defense and not merely the mental elements of
the crime, the court's decision will lead to a more workable applica-
tion of Rule 4-325(c). Trial judges will no longer be uncertain when
presented with requested affirmative defense instructions that are
both mandatory and discretionary under Rule 4-325(c) .188 While the
elements of a requested instruction could be fairly covered by the trial
court's standard intent instructions, the "theory of defense" may not
necessarily be covered by the standard intent instructions.1 89 Moreo-
184. If all affirmative defense instructions, whether statutory or common law, were re-
quired despite their repetition of the intent elements of the charged offense, then there
would be no need to apply the "fairly covered" component to requested affirmative de-
fense instructions because the court would have created a uniform rule with regard to such
cases.
185. General, 367 Md. at 490, 789 A.2d at 111. The instruction must first be a correct
statement of the law to pass the mandatory component of Rule 4-325(c). Id. at 485, 789
A.2d at 108.
186. Id. at 483-85, 789 A.2d at 106-07. Even prior to General, trial judges were not re-
quired to grant an instruction in the "exact language" requested by counsel, in case that
language led to cumulative or confusing instructions. MD. R. 4-325 III. Instruction Request
(citing Nelson v. State, 5 Md. App. 109, 245 A.2d at 606 (1968)).
187. General, 367 Md. at 487-88, 789 A.2d at 111. The General court explained:
A skilled advocate could take nearly any of the instructions typically given by a
court and, with some imagination, create a negative mirror image of it. [There-
fore], [tlhe principle articulated in Maryland Rule 4-325(c) still governs: "the
court need not grant a requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered by
instructions already given."
Id. (quoting MD. R. 4-325(c)).
188. See supra notes 33-39, 49-50 (providing a discussion of the court's prior holdings on
legislatively created affirmative defenses).
189. For example, General's requested knowledge and intent elements of the mistake of
fact defense instruction replicated the trial court's given instructions. See supra notes 16-18
(providing General's requested mistake of fact instructions and the trial court's intent in-
structions). The trial court's given instructions did not mention mistake of fact, however,
or bring to the jury's attention the defense's theory of defense. Id.
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ver, trial judges will no longer be required to evaluate whether an is-
sue was "central" to the case, a standard that could have led to
inconsistent applications of Rule 4-325(c).19 ° The court's holding as-
sures that in all cases where any evidence is presented in support of a
recognized theory of defense, the defendant's requested instruction
will be granted.' 9 ' The court's holding is clear and will lead to uni-
form application of the rule, in contrast to the prior application which
looked to whether the elements of the trial court's standard intent
instructions guided or helped the jury understand the law and the
essential points in argument at trial. 192
5. Conclusion.-By holding that Maryland Rule 4-325(c) entitles
a defendant to an instruction on his theory of defense that expressly
directs the jury's attention to that theory, the court's decision in Gen-
eral resolved the inherent conflict between the mandatory and discre-
tionary components of Rule 4-325(c). 9 An affirmative defense, such
as mistake of fact, will no longer qualify as both mandatory and discre-
tionary because once it is found to be applicable and a correct state-
ment of the law, it cannot be "fairly covered" by the trial court's
standard intent instructions. 194 However, if the trial court's instruc-
tions draw the jury's attention to the theory of defense, then the trial
judge may choose whether to grant the requested instruction.' 95 The
court also provides a fair standard that helps juries make informed
decisions and thus ensures that defendants enjoy their due process
right to present a complete defense. Finally, the court's decision in
General maintains the "fairly covered" component of Rule 4-325(c)
while also guaranteeing the validity of common law defenses, which
ensures a workable application of the rule with regard to affirmative
defense cases.
PRATHYusHA REDDY
190. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (providing discussion of Gunning in
which the court suggested that the trial court should consider whether a requested instruc-
tion was a "central issue" in the case).
191. General, 367 Md. at 490, 789 A.2d at 111.
192. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 322 Md. 35, 44, 585 A.2d 209, 214 (1990) (granting the
presumption of innocence instruction after extensive analysis that the instruction would
guide the jury during deliberation).
193. Id.
194. Id. (finding that even if the trial court's instructions "sufficiently" inform the jury of
the requisite mental elements of the crime, they cannot, by themselves, "fairly cover" the
concept of the mistake of fact defense).
195. See General, 367 Md. at 487, 789 A.2d at 109 (stating that "[i]f the instructions given




A. Adoption of the Exposure Test to Determine When a Cause of Action
Arises for Latent Asbestos-Related Injuries Gives Maryland Courts a Clear,
Fact-Based Standard to Apply in Asbestos Cases
In John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
considered the appropriate test for determining when asbestos-related
claims arise for the purpose of applying the statutory cap on non-eco-
nomic damages.' The court held that Maryland courts should use the
exposure test, which requires courts to look at a plaintiffs last asbestos
exposure to determine whether the cause of action arose before or
afterJuly 1, 1986.' In so holding, the court clarified an uncertain area
of the law previously governed by the inapplicable standard an-
nounced by the Court of Special Appeals in Anchor Packing Co. v. Grim-
shaw.4 The Grimshaw test relied on conflicting expert testimony
unsupported by any confirmed or peer-reviewed scientific evidence.5
In response to the confusion that ensued after the Grimshaw decision,
the Court of Appeals in Scribner pronounced an approach that utilizes
the facts of when the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos-containing
products to determine the time a cause of action arises.6 This deci-
sion has resulted in an easily applicable test that will help resolve when
injuries in asbestos cases arise. It is consistent with the legislature's
intent in enacting the statutory cap and it will not result in a marked
increase in asbestos litigation in Maryland.
1. The Case.-In 1971, James Scribner enlisted in the Navy and
was trained in Maryland and New York to operate nuclear powered
1. 369 Md. 369, 800 A.2d 727 (2002).
2. Id at 372, 800 A.2d at 729; see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b)(1)
(2002) (stating "[i]n any action for damages for personal injury in which the cause of
action arises on or afterJuly 1, 1986, an award for noneconomic damages may not exceed
$350,000").
3. Scribner, 369 Md. at 394, 800 A.2d at 742. The court choseJuly 1, 1986 as the cut-off
date because it is "the effective date of the cap on non-economic damages in a personal
injury action." Id. at 375, 800 A.2d at 730.
4. 115 Md. App. 134, 160, 692 A.2d 5, 18 (1997) (holding that a cause of action under
section 11-108 arises when an asbestos exposure causes cellular changes which "develop
into an injury or disease, such as asbestosis or cancer"), cert. granted sub nom. Hayden v.
Bullinger, 346 Md. 373, 697 A.2d 112 (1997), and vacated sub nom. Porter Hayden Co. v.
Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998).
5. Scribner, 369 Md. at 391, 800 A.2d at 739-40.
6. See id. (relying on a factual determination of the date of a plaintiffs last exposure
to asbestos, rather than trying to reconcile "competing expert testimony as to the timing of
an event that no one can precisely define").
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submarines.7 After completing his training in 1972, Scribner worked
on the submarine U.S.S. Sturgeon.8 For a six-month time period on the
U.S.S. Sturgeon, Scribner worked twelve hours a day, seven days a week
in areas where contractors were removing old asbestos pipeline insula-
tion and installing new insulation.9 In his deposition testimony,
Scribner stated that he worked in the vicinity of the cutting and form-
ing of insulation which resulted in "very dusty" working conditions. 1°
In 1975, Scribner left the Sturgeon and returned to work at the nuclear
training facility in New York until he left the Navy in 1978.' From
1972 until 1978, Scribner also cut and fit gaskets made byJohn Crane,
Inc. (Crane) and Garlock, Inc. (Garlock) and used packing material
made by Crane on pipe valves. 12 These procedures exposed Scribner
to substantial amounts of asbestos dust. t3 After completing his service
with the Navy, Scribner worked for the Potomac Electric and Power
Company as an analyst and power plant operator until 1995.1' In
March 1995, after suffering from several months of severe illness,
Scribner tested positive for mesothelioma. 15 Scribner underwent ex-
tensive surgery and chemotherapy, but neither therapy was successful
in combating his disease.' 6 Scribner, ultimately, succumbed to
mesothelioma and died in November 1995.17
Before his death, Scribner filed suit against several defendants,
including both Crane and Garlock, claiming that his exposure to as-
bestos from these companies' gaskets and packing materials was a
proximate cause of his mesothelioma.' 8 After his death, Scribner's
widow continued the action as a survival suit on behalf of Scribner's
estate, while she and the Scribners' children additionally filed a
7. Id. at 377, 800 A.2d at 731.
8. Id.
9. Id., 800 A.2d at 731-32.
10. Id.
11. Id., 800 A.2d at 731.
12. Id., 800 A.2d at 732.
13. Id. at 377-78, 800 A.2d at 732. At trial, an expert witness testified that the Crane
and Garlock gaskets contained eighty percent asbestos, while the Crane packing material
contained eighty-five percent asbestos. Id. at 379, 800 A.2d at 733.
14. Id. at 378, 800 A.2d at 732.
15. Id. Mesothelioma is a malignant tumor that forms mainly in the thoracic cavity. Id.
Within the thoracic cavity, the tumor encases the pleura, which is the outside lining of the
lung, and over time, destroys the pleural region. Id. at 378-79, 800 A.2d at 732. The tumor
often grows into the lung and metastasizes to other parts of the body, such as the dia-
phragm and the abdominal cavity. Id. at 379, 800 A.2d at 732.
16. Id. at 378, 800 A.2d at 732.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 373, 800 A.2d at 729.
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wrongful death action.1" The ensuing trial occurred in two distinct
phases with two different juries. 20
a. Phase I. -The issue considered during Phase I of the trial
was whether Crane and Garlock were negligent and strictly liable for
Scribner's mesothelioma based on his exposure to asbestos from their
products. 2' After presenting evidence, the plaintiffs moved for judg-
ment on whether Scribner developed his mesothelioma prior to July
1, 1986, which would preclude application of the statutory cap on
non-economic damages.22 The court denied this motion because it
believed determining when the cause of action arose was an issue for
the court, and not the jury, to decide. 23 After deliberations, the jury
determined on a special verdict sheet that Scribner's exposure to the
defendants' asbestos-containing products was "a substantial contribut-
ing factor in the development of the mesothelioma that caused his
death, and that those defendants were both negligent in and strictly
liable for the manufacture, sale, supply, or distribution of asbestos-
containing products. ' 24 The jury then awarded damages in the sur-
vival and wrongful death actions totaling $5,241,500.25
Before entry of the final judgment, the Court of Special Appeals
issued two decisions affecting Scribner's case.26 In these cases, the
court decided that in litigation involving asbestos-related diseases the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove that his or her claim arose before
19. Id. The Scribner family consolidated its suits with four other asbestos-related cases,
which resulted in the initial involvement of more than thirty-five defendants. Id. Eventu-
ally, the various parties settled the majority of these suits, leaving only Scribner's claim
against petitioners Crane and Garlock along with Crane and Garlock's cross-claims and
third-party claims against several former defendants. Id.
20. Id. at 375-76, 800 A.2d at 731.
21. Id. at 373, 800 A.2d at 729.
22. Id.; Mn. CODE ANN., CTS. & Jun. PROC. § 11-108(b) (1) (2002).
23. Scribner, 369 Md. at 373-74, 800 A.2d at 729. Crane and Garlock simultaneously
moved for judgment claiming that Scribner had not provided sufficient evidence of his
"exposure to their products, of Garlock's failure to warn of the danger of asbestos, and of a
respirable release of asbestos fibers from Crane's products." Id. at 373, 800 A.2d at 729.
The trial court denied this motion. Id. at 373-74, 800 A.2d at 729.
24. Id. at 374, 800 A.2d at 729.
25. Id., 800 A.2d at 729-30. The jury also found that the parties in Crane and Garlock's
third-party and cross-claims "were negligent in and strictly liable for the manufacture, sale,
supply, or distribution" of the asbestos-containing products to which Scribner was exposed.
Id., 800 A.2d at 730.
26. Id. at 374, 800 A.2d at 730; Owens-Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md. App. 454, 482, 726
A.2d 745, 759 (1999) (concluding that "harm for a fatal and irreversible disease arises as
soon as the cellular change develops" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Owens-Corn-
ing v. Walatka, 125 Md. App. 313, 334, 725 A.2d 579, 589 (1999) (finding that a "cause of
action arises when cellular changes develop into a disease"); see also infra notes 122-136 and
accompanying text for discussion of these cases.
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the effective date of the statutory cap on non-economic damages. If
there is a factual dispute between the parties, then the trier of fact
must decide when the plaintiffs cause of action arose.27 As a result of
these decisions, the trial court decided to empanel a new jury for the
survival action to consider the question of whether Scribner's cause of
action arose before July 1, 1986.28
b. Phase !.-During Phase II of the trial, both parties
presented old and new scientific evidence to the new jury concerning
how mesothelioma grows in the body, the doubling time for growth of
the disease, and information about post-operative and explosive
growth theories.29 The evidence not presented in Phase I was intro-
duced in Phase II to help the jury determine when Scribner's
mesothelioma first developed."0 The jury concluded that "the first
cellular changes which led to the existence of Scribner's mesothe-
lioma began prior to July 1, 1986, and . . . the mesothelioma itself
arose in Scribner prior to July 1, 1986.31 As a result, the trial court
determined that the statutory cap did not apply to Scribner's survival
action and entered judgments against Crane and Garlock for a total of
$2,137,000.32
c. The Appeals.--Crane and Garlock appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland on many different issues, including
the trial court's failure to apply the statutory cap as a matter of law.3
The companies also argued that empanelling a second jury allowed
the Scribners to present inconsistent evidence during the second
phase.34 Also, they contended that the trial court erred when it in-
cluded on the Phase II verdict sheet a question regarding when
Scribner's cells first began to change before he developed mesothe-
lioma.3 " The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the trial court
27. Scribner, 369 Md. at 374, 800 A.2d at 730.
28. Id. at 375, 800 A.2d at 730. The trial court did not need to reconsider when
Scribner's cause of action arose for the wrongful death suit. Id. In wrongful death actions,
the effective date of the statutory cap for non-economic damages is October 1, 1994. MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 11-108(b)(2)(i) (2002). It was undisputed that Scribner's
death occurred after October 1, 1994, thus the trial court reduced the damages in the
wrongful death action from $1,740,000 to $772,500. Scribner, 369 Md. at 375, 800 A.2d at
730.
29. Scribner, 369 Md. at 375-76, 800 A.2d at 731.
30. Id. at 376, 800 A.2d at 731.
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erred, but found the error to be harmless and thus affirmed the judg-
ments against both Crane and Garlock.3 6 The defendants again ap-
pealed and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address several
issues.37 The central issue considered was the standard the court
should apply in determining when a claim arises under section 11-
108(b) for diseases resulting from exposure to asbestos-containing
products. 38
2. Legal Background.-In 1986, the Maryland General Assembly
enacted a statutory cap limiting non-economic damages for personal
injury claims to $350,000 when the cause of action arises on or after
July 1, 1986."9 This statute has survived several constitutional chal-
lenges.40 In Murphy v. Edmonds,'" the Court of Appeals upheld section
11-108 as constitutional because the cap was "reasonably related to a
legitimate legislative objective."42 In so holding, the court explained
that Maryland's purpose in enacting a statutory cap was to ensure that
liability insurance would be available in Maryland at a reasonable
price to cover personal injury claims.4 3 The court also explained the
General Assembly's expectation that a statutory cap would result in
more predictable damage awards.4 4
Since the enactment of the statutory cap on non-economic dam-
ages, Maryland courts continuously have been confronted with the is-
sue of when a cause of action arises, particularly in cases involving
diseases with long latency periods. In the context of identifying when
an asbestos-related injury occurs for purposes of the applicable insur-
ance coverage, the Court of Appeals in 1991 adopted the exposure
test.45 The exposure test provides that a bodily injury occurs upon
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Court of Appeals also considered the following issues: who bears the bur-
den of proof for when the cause of action for asbestos exposure arises, who decides if the
statutory cap applies when there is a genuine factual dispute, and whether the trial court
erred in not resolving the issue as a matter of law and in empanelling a second jury to
determine the issue. Id. at 376-77, 800 A.2d at 731.
39. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 11-108(b)(1) (2002).
40. See, e.g., Simms v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D. Md. 1990) (finding
that Maryland's statutory cap on damages did not violate the Seventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution and that Maryland had a legitimate reason in enacting the
legislation).
41. 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992).
42. Id. at 370, 601 A.2d at 115.
43. Id. at 369, 601 A.2d at 115.
44. Id.
45. Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 324 Md. 44, 62, 595 A.2d 469, 478 (1991).
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exposure to asbestos.46 Thus, in insurance cases, the policy in effect
when the insured was exposed to asbestos is the policy that applies.47
As a result of adopting the exposure test, the issue of when bodily
injury occurs in latent disease insurance claims has been settled law in
Maryland for over ten years.48
However, in the context of personal injury claims resulting from
asbestos exposure, Maryland courts have struggled with determining
when a cause of action arises for purposes of the statutory cap on non-
economic damages. Until recently, the courts hesitated to adopt the
exposure test, but instead utilized a test that fell in between exposure
and manifestation of symptoms.49 While the courts have explicitly re-
jected use of the manifestation test, often their application of the
Court of Special Appeals' test has been similar to that of the manifes-
tation test, especially when applying it to asbestos-related conditions.50
a. Bodily Injury Occurs upon Exposure to Asbestos for Insurance
Purposes.-In Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,5  the
Court of Appeals considered when a cause of action under a compre-
hensive insurance policy would arise for an asbestos-related injury.52
Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. (Mitchell) was a mechanical contractor in-
volved in selling, distributing, and installing asbestos-containing prod-
ucts from 1955 through 1976.5' The Maryland Casualty Company
(Maryland Casualty) insured Mitchell under several comprehensive
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Chantel Assocs. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 338 Md. 131, 144, 656
A.2d 779, 785-86 (1995) (extending Mitchell's holding to similar cases involving lead paint
poisoning).
49. Compare Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 122, 604 A.2d 47,54 (1992)
(implying that the exposure test might be the correct test, but declining to adopt any test
since the facts did not necessitate choosing one), with Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw,
115 Md. App. 134, 160, 692 A.2d 5, 18 (1997) (adopting a test where asbestos-related inju-
ries occur "when the inhalation of asbestos fibers causes a legally compensable harm").
50. See ACandS, Inc. v. Abate, 121 Md. App. 590, 695, 710 A.2d 944, 996 (1998) (find-
ing that a claim for an asbestos-related condition did not arise until the plaintiff exper-
ienced functional impairment).
51. 324 Md. 44, 595 A.2d 469 (1991).
52. Id. at 46, 595 A.2d at 470. The court in Mitchell, although focusing on when the
injury occurred, did not address the issue in the context of the statutory cap on non-eco-
nomic damages. This case is included in the legal background because the Scribner court
relied on its holding in deciding to use the exposure approach. See John Crane, Inc. v.
Scribner, 369 Md. 369, 391-92, 800 A.2d 727, 740 (2002).
53. 324 Md. at 46, 595 A.2d at 470.
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general liability policies until the late 1970s. 4 Subsequent to the expi-
ration of Mitchell's insurance coverage, several plaintiffs sued Mitchell
for personal injuries resulting from exposure to Mitchell's asbestos-
containing products.55 Mitchell requested that Maryland Casualty in-
demnify it in these suits, but Maryland Casualty refused and filed a
declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Harford County
asserting that it had no duty to defend Mitchell against any of the
pending claims because it no longer insured Mitchell.56 Mitchell filed
a counter-complaint requesting the court to determine that Maryland
Casualty was required to indemnify and defend Mitchell in these suits
because the coverage was in effect when the plaintiffs were exposed to
Mitchell's asbestos-containing products.57 The circuit court ruled in
Maryland Casualty's favor on summary judgment holding that the as-
bestos-related injuries did not manifest themselves until after the in-
surance coverage expired.58 Thus, Maryland Casualty was not liable to
Mitchell for the costs of defending and indemnifying the company.59
On appeal, Mitchell argued that the plain language of the insur-
ance policies indicated that a plaintiffs exposure to asbestos-contain-
ing products was an "occurrence" that resulted in "bodily injury," and
thus triggered the insurance coverage regardless of when the injuries
were diagnosed.6" The Court of Appeals noted the conflicting testi-
mony from two medical experts, one who contended that asbestos-
related diseases arise upon exposure to asbestos and one who argued
that they arise only upon the manifestation of symptoms.61 The court
emphasized that, regardless of these different conclusions, the experts
agreed, "that the inhalation and retention of asbestos fibers may cause
immediate harm to the cells and tissues of the lung."62 Thus, the
54. Id. The exact expiration date of Mitchell's insurance coverage was in dispute in
this case. Id. at 46 n.1, 595 A.2d at 470 n.1. Mitchell believed it expired on January 1,
1978, while Maryland Casualty believed it ended on January 1, 1977. Id.
55. Id. at 47, 595 A.2d at 470.
56. Id.
57. Id., 595 A.2d at 471.
58. Id. at 50, 595 A.2d at 472.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 51-52, 595 A.2d at 472. "Occurrence" under the insurance policy was defined
as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of
the insured." Id. at 47, 595 A.2d at 470. "Bodily injury" under the insurance policy was
defined as "bodily injury, sickness, or disease sustained by any person which occurs during
the policy period including death at any time resulting therefrom." Id.
61. Id. at 52-53, 595 A.2d at 472-73.
62. Id. at 61, 595 A.2d at 477.
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court held that a bodily injury triggering insurance coverage occurs
upon exposure to asbestos.63
The court also stated that the trial court erred when it adopted
the manifestation test for determining when the cause of action
arose.6" The manifestation test for insurance purposes is that insur-
ance companies will not afford coverage until harm manifests itself.65
In rejecting the manifestation test and adopting the exposure test, the
Court of Appeals noted that its holding was consistent with legal au-
thority throughout the United States.6 6
b. Conflicting Tests for Determining When a Cause of Action Arises
in Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Cases.-The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land first addressed when a cause of action for an asbestos-related in-
jury arises in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong.67 In that case, Othello
Armstrong and several other individuals, all of whom had worked in
the Bethlehem Steel Corporation shipyards, sued Owens-Illinois.68
They alleged that during the years they worked at Bethlehem Steel
their exposure to clouds of dust from Kaylo, an asbestos-containing
insulation manufactured by Owens-Illinois, caused them to contract
asbestosis. 69 The trial court returned verdicts for the plaintiffs and the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision. 6
Owens-Illinois appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the statutory cap on
non-economic damages did not limit Armstrong's damage award."'
Owens-Illinois urged the court to apply the discovery rule to deter-
mine when the cause of action arose.7 2 Owens-Illinois argued that
63. Id. at 62, 595 A.2d at 478; see also Chantel Assocs. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co.,
338 Md. 131, 144, 656 A.2d 779, 785-86 (1995) (finding that cellular damage occurring
upon exposure to lead dust constituted bodily injury for purposes of the insurance policy).
64. Mitchell, 324 Md. at 62, 595 A.2d at 478.
65. Id.
66. See id. (stating "we align ourselves with the overwhelming weight of authority in the
country . . .").
67. 326 Md. 107, 604 A.2d 47 (1992).
68. Id. at 110-11, 604 A.2d at 48-49.
69. Id. at 111, 604 A.2d at 48-49. Asbestosis is a disease where prior exposure to asbes-
tos fibers causes functional impairment of the lung tissue. Mitchell, 324 Md. at 66, 595 A.2d
at 480.
70. Armstrong, 326 Md. at 111, 604 A.2d at 49.
71. Id. at 120, 604 A.2d at 53. Owens-Illinois only contested the validity of Armstrong's
damage award, presumably because the other plaintiffs were diagnosed prior to July 1,
1986. Id. at 120 n.2, 604 A.2d at 53 n.2.
72. Id. at 120, 604 A.2d at 53. For statute of limitations purposes, the discovery rule
means that the statute of limitations tolls until a plaintiff, either through express or im-
plied knowledge, discovers the harm. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 634-35, 431
A.2d 677, 679 (1981).
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Armstrong's cause of action did not arise until 1987, when a doctor
diagnosed him with asbestosis. 73 Applying the discovery rule, Owens-
Illinois contended that a cause of action under section 11-108 arises
when a plaintiff discovers his disease, not when it actually comes into
existence.74 In so arguing, Owens-Illinois was essentially asking the
court to equate the meaning of "accrues" in the statute of limitations
context to that of 'arises' in the statutory cap language. 75
The Court of Appeals rejected Owens-Illinois' interpretation,
finding in the alternative that 'arise' means when a cause of action
"first comes into existence," not when the plaintiff experiences symp-
toms or discovers the disease. 76 In so holding, the court expressly re-
jected the manifestation test, or as the court referred to it, the
discovery rule.7 7 The court also noted the difficulties of pinpointing
exactly when an asbestos-related injury occurs. 7 However, the facts of
the case did not require the court to determine when Armstrong con-
tracted asbestosis.79 Consequently, the court did not have to reach a
conclusion about which test courts should apply to determine the ex-
act time an asbestos-related injury arises."0
The Court of Special Appeals first attempted to find a workable
standard for determining when an asbestos-related injury arises in
Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw.8" Grimshaw involved four plaintiffs
who contracted mesothelioma from exposure to Anchor Packing's as-
73. Armstrong, 326 Md. at 120, 604 A.2d at 53.
74. Id. at 121, 604 A.2d at 54.
75. Id. at 120-21, 604 A.2d at 53-54; see also Harig v.Johns-Manville Prods., 284 Md. 70,
83, 394 A.2d 299, 306 (1978) (holding that a cause of action for an asbestos-related injury
under the statute of limitations "accrues when [the plaintiff] ascertains, or through the
exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of
his injury").
76. Armstrong, 326 Md. at 121, 604 A.2d at 54.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 122, 604 A.2d at 54.
79. Id. at 123-24, 604 A.2d at 55. Armstrong worked for Bethlehem Steel from 1942 to
1963. Id. at 111, 604 A.2d at 48. Thus, the court determined that because Armstrong had
been exposed to asbestos during this time, his asbestosis probably originated "relatively
early in the course of his exposure." Id. at 124, 604 A.2d at 55. The court stated that even
if the exposure that resulted in Armstrong's disease did not occur until the end of his
career in 1963, the expert testimony showing the fifteen- to twenty-year latency period
demonstrated that he still would have developed asbestosis by 1983, prior to the statutory
cap date of July 1, 1986. Id.
80. See id. at 122, 604 A.2d at 54 (noting simply that Armstrong's damage award should
be reduced "only if his injury came into existence on or after July 1, 1986").
81. 115 Md. App. 134, 692 A.2d 5 (1997), cert. granted sub nom. Hayden v. Bullinger, 346
Md. 373, 697 A.2d 112 (1997), and vacated by sub nom. Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350
Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998).
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bestos-containing products.82 Subsequent to trial, all four plaintiffs
received non-economic damage awards exceeding the $350,000 statu-
tory cap limit.8" Anchor Packing filed motions at trial to reduce these
damage awards under section 11-108, but the trial court denied the
motions without justification.84 As a result, Anchor Packing appealed
to the Court of Special Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in
refusing to apply section 11-108 to the damage awards. 5
On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that Armstrong held that the stat-
utory cap did not apply to any damages awarded in asbestos-related
disease cases due to the long latency of these diseases.86 The Court of
Special Appeals, however, refused to accept this interpretation, stating
that Armstrong only concluded that the statutory cap was inapplicable
to Armstrong based on the particular facts of his case. 87 Anchor Pack-
ing urged the court to adopt the manifestation test and hold that the
plaintiffs' causes of action did not arise until they had apparent symp-
toms of the disease.88 The court rejected this view as well, holding
that "an injury occurs in an asbestos-related injury case when the in-
halation of asbestos fibers causes a legally compensable harm."89 The
court thus adopted a test falling somewhere between the manifesta-
tion and exposure tests.9"
In adopting this middle ground test, the Court of Special Appeals
explicitly rejected the exposure approach by dismissing several cases
in which other jurisdictions had adopted that method.9 1 The plain-
tiffs in Grimshaw relied on Mitchell to argue that a cause of action for
asbestos-related injuries arises at the time of exposure to asbestos.92
However, the court refused to apply Mitchell on the basis that Mitchell
involved the interpretation of the term "bodily injury" as used in an
82. Id. at 144, 692 A.2d at 10. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City consolidated the
four cases for trial. Id.
83. Id. at 149, 692 A.2d at 12-13. All four of the verdicts were over $1,000,000, while
three of them surpassed $3,000,000. Id.
84. Id., 692 A.2d at 13.
85. Id. at 149, 692 A.2d at 13.
86. Id. at 151, 692 A.2d at 13-14.
87. Id., 692 A.2d at 14.
88. Id. at 160, 692 A.2d at 18.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 160-61, 692 A.2d at 18-19; see also Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1066
(La. 1992) (concluding "that the key relevant events giving rise to a claim in long-latency
occupational disease cases are the repeated tortious exposures"); see also Koker v. Arm-
strong Cork, Inc., 804 P.2d 659, 662-64 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the cause of
action arose when the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos fibers).
92. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 162, 692 A.2d at 19.
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insurance policy. 3 Accordingly, the court determined that different
contexts required different interpretations of the word "injury. 9 4 Ap-
plying the middle ground test, the court in Grimshaw concluded that
the statutory cap on non-economic damages did not apply to the indi-
vidual plaintiffs.9 5 Doctors diagnosed each of the plaintiffs with
mesothelioma in either 1993 or 1994.96 Based on the testimony of
medical experts that mesothelioma begins to grow ten years prior to
diagnosis, the court held that a cause of action for each plaintiff arose
when they developed the disease, which in each case was prior to July
1, 1986. 7
In 1998, however, the Court of Special Appeals further confused
the issue by essentially applying the manifestation test in ACandS, Inc.
v. Abate.9" In Abate, the court addressed when a cause of action arises
for the asbestos-related lung condition of pleural plaques, which is the
scarring and fibrosis of the lining around the lung and inside the
chest wall. 99 Abate was a complex class action suit that originally in-
volved six illustrative plaintiffs and over eight thousand common issue
plaintiffs against more than one hundred defendants. l ° The trial
court decided in favor of the plaintiffs, leading the defendants to ap-
peal on approximately twenty issues. 10 ' One of these issues con-
cerned whether the trial court should have used section 11-108 to
limit the non-economic portion of the damages awarded to Leonard
Ciotta, one of the plaintiffs.
10 2
Ciotta was exposed to asbestos from 1950 to 1956 when he helped
install and replace pipes and other equipment at an oil refinery.' 0 3 In
order to install the new equipment, Ciotta first had to tear off insula-
tion containing asbestos.1 0 4 In addition to this exposure, Ciotta also
worked in other parts of the refinery where other insulation installers
were creating asbestos dust while performing their work.'0 5 In 1990,
Ciotta began to experience shortness of breath that worsened until he
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 165, 692 A.2d at 21.
96. Id., 692 A.2d at 20.
97. Id., 692 A.2d at 20-21.
98. 121 Md. App. 590, 710 A.2d 944 (1998).
99. Id. at 667, 691-95, 710 A.2d at 982, 994-96.
100. Id. at 602-03, 710 A.2d at 950. The majority of the defendants settled their claims,
and the jury only assessed verdicts against six defendants. Id. at 603, 710 A.2d at 950.
101. Id. at 609, 710 A.2d at 953.
102. Id. at 611, 710 A.2d at 954.





did not have enough stamina to climb steps or walk a golf course. °6
In 1992, a chest X-ray showed that Ciotta had scar tissue on his lungs
and a doctor subsequently diagnosed him with pleural plaques.10 7 Ex-
pert testimony adduced at trial indicated that the condition of pleural
plaques was permanent and put Ciotta at a greater risk for contacting
other asbestos-related diseases.' 0 8
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the statutory cap
applied to Ciotta because his cause of action did not arise until 1990,
when he first experienced shortness of breath.'0 9 In so holding, the
court disregarded the fact that the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos
between 1950 and 1956 and that, according to the medical testimony,
his pleural plaques could have appeared as early as 1960.11" The
court noted that exposure to asbestos and cellular changes resulting
from that exposure would not alone constitute a legally compensable
injury."' Instead, the court focused on the time Ciotta first exper-
ienced functional impairment from his pleural plaques, curtailing his
everyday activities." 2 Thus, while claiming to adhere to the test ar-
ticulated in Grimshaw, the Court of Special Appeals essentially applied
a test more closely resembling the manifestation test.' 13
In Ford Motor Co. v. Wood," 4 the Court of Special Appeals contin-
ued to cloud the appropriate test for when a cause of action for an
asbestos-related injury arises." 5 In this case, the court addressed
when a cause of action arose for asbestos-related mesothelioma.'
6
From 1957 to 1992, one of the plaintiffs, Keith Grewe, worked in Balti-
more as a mechanic.'1 7 He claimed that installing and repairing Ford
brakes regularly exposed him to asbestos dust and he developed
mesothelioma as a result." 8 The court concluded that Grewe's cause
of action arose before July 1, 1986, because a doctor diagnosed him
with mesothelioma in 1993."' The court based its decision on medi-
cal testimony that the disease usually begins to develop ten years
106. Id. at 667, 710 A.2d at 982.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 668, 710 A.2d at 982.
109. Id. at 695, 710 A.2d at 996.
110. See id. at 665, 695, 710 A.2d at 981, 996.
111. Id. at 695, 710 A.2d at 996.
112. Id.
113. See id. (explaining the decision in Grimshaw).
114. 119 Md. App. 1, 703 A.2d 1315 (1998).
115. Id. at 44-49, 703 A.2d at 1336-38.
116. Id. at 46, 703 A.2d at 1337.
117. Id. at 11, 703 A.2d at 1319.
118. Id., 703 A.2d at 1319-20.
119. Id. at 48-49, 703 A.2d at 1338.
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before diagnosis. 12 1 In so holding, the court once again rejected the
manifestation test, focusing instead on the point at which the inhala-
tion of asbestos fibers caused a legally compensable harm.
121
In 1999, the Court of Special Appeals in Owens Coming v.
Bauman122 made the test even more unclear. 23 This case involved a
plaintiff who was exposed to asbestos while serving in the Navy from
1975 to 1978.124 During that time, the plaintiff worked in small com-
partments to sand asbestos-containing insulation around pipes for
running a cable down a 600-foot passageway. 125 The sanding process
created a cloud of asbestos dust that drifted over the plaintiff while he
worked.1 26 In 1995, a doctor diagnosed the plaintiff with mesothe-
lioma. 127 The trial court awarded non-economic damages in the
amount of $15,000,000 and $1,286,000 in economic damages against
Owens Corning.1 28 Owens Corning appealed the verdict, asserting
several issues, including "[w]hether a cause of action for personal in-
jury 'arises' for purposes of Maryland's statutory cap on noneconomic
damages when plaintiffs disease comes into existence or when it is
diagnosed or manifests itself.'
'1 29
In considering this issue once again, the court determined that
Grimshaw, Wood, and Abate all agreed upon the standard that a legally
compensable harm arose when cellular changes became a bodily in-
jury or a disease.' 30 However, the court distinguished these cases
from each other by asserting that Wood and Grimshaw involved asbes-
tos-related diseases, while Abate involved an asbestos-related condi-
tion. ' The court explained that the Abate court held that a legally
compensable harm did not arise until a plaintiff manifested symptoms
from pleural plaques, because there was no functional impairment
until these symptoms existed.' 3 2 The Bauman court distinguished the
facts of Grimshaw and Wood from Abate because in Grimshaw and Wood
the plaintiffs contracted a disease resulting from asbestos exposure.
133
120. Id.
121. Id. at 47-48, 703 A.2d at 1337-38.
122. 125 Md. App. 454, 726 A.2d 745 (1999).
123. Id. at 462-63, 726 A.2d at 749.




128. Id. at 463, 726 A.2d at 749.
129. Id., 726 A.2d at 750.
130. Id. at 478-79, 726 A.2d at 757.





Thus, the Bauman court noted that when a plaintiff brings an asbestos-
related disease claim, a court can trace the legally compensable harm
to the moment when the plaintiff first experienced cellular change.1
3 4
In contrast, the court further explained that "when a plaintiff con-
tracts the condition of pleural plaques, the legally compensable harm
only arises with the onset of a symptom."'1 35 Because the plaintiff con-
tracted an asbestos-related disease prior to July 1, 1986, the court in
Bauman held the statutory cap on non-economic damages did not
apply.1
3 6
The Court of Special Appeals further confused the application of
the Grimshaw test in Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Connor.13 7 Charles
Connor filed suit against twenty-seven defendants claiming that their
products, which he had used both at his job and personally, exposed
him to asbestos, causing him to contract mesothelioma. 38 The vast
majority of the defendants settled their claims, leaving Hollingsworth
& Vose as one of only two defendants. 13 9 Connor claimed, and the
jury agreed, that the cigarettes he smoked from 1952 to 1956 substan-
tially contributed to the development of his mesothelioma because
the cigarette filters, made by Hollingsworth & Vose, contained asbes-
tos. 4 ' The jury returned a damage award against Hollingsworth &
Vose that included two million dollars in non-economic damages.
1 41
Hollingsworth & Vose appealed the verdict on several grounds,
including whether the trial court erred in giving the jury an instruc-
tion on whether the first cellular changes that developed into
mesothelioma began in Connor prior to July 1, 1986.142 The Court of
Special Appeals decided that the court should have directed the jury
to determine whether Connor had "contracted mesothelioma before July
1, 1986,"'13 rather than whether Connor had "experienced cellular
change before July 1, 1986."' The court said that its holding ad-
134. Id. at 482, 726 A.2d at 759.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 483, 726 A.2d at 759. The Court of Special Appeals once again applied the
disease-condition distinction in Owens-Corning v. Walatka, holding that a "cause of action
arises when cellular changes develop into a disease." 125 Md. App. 313, 334, 725 A.2d 579,
589 (1999). In Walatka, the court determined that the plaintiffs mesothelioma could not
have developed prior to July 1, 1986. Id.
137. 136 Md. App. 91, 764 A.2d 318 (2000).
138. Id. at 99, 764 A.2d at 322.
139. Id. Lorillard Tobacco Company, which manufactured and distributed asbestos-con-
raining cigarettes, was the other defendant. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 99-100, 764 A.2d at 322-23.
142. Id. at 124, 764 A.2d at 336.
143. Id. at 130-31, 764 A.2d at 339.
144. Id. at 130, 764 A.2d at 339.
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hered to the Grimshaw standard that a plaintiff experiences a legally
compensable harm when cellular changes develop into an injury or
disease."'145 However, in contrast to Grimshaw, the court focused on
when the plaintiff actually contracted the asbestos-related disease, not
when the cellular changes first turned into a disease. 146 The court
supported its decision by explaining that once an asbestos-related con-
dition turns into a disease, the harm is irreversible and the cause of
action arises upon the initial development of the disease.14 7
c. Subsequent Legal Background in Maryland and OtherJurisdic-
tions.-The Court of Appeals applied the exposure test in the case of
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Pransky.'48 Pransky involved an individual who
contracted mesothelioma from exposure to an asbestos-containing
joint compound that her father utilized in renovating their basement
in 1972.149 Pransky was eight years old in 1972 and was frequently in
the basement watching her father while he worked with the joint com-
pound, exposing her to a significant amount of asbestos dust. 5 °
Once her father finished renovating the basement, Pransky played
there at various times over the following ten years and was exposed to
asbestos dust emanating from the ceiling.
15 1
The Court of Appeals in Pransky utilized the exposure test to find
that Pransky's cause of action arose prior to July 1, 1986.152 The court
reiterated Scribner's holding, noting that "the court may look initially
to when the plaintiffs last exposure to asbestos occurred and that, if
that last exposure undisputedly was prior to July 1, 1986" then the
statutory cap would not apply.15' By using this approach, the court
was able to determine that Pransky's cause of action arose prior to July
1, 1986, because she left her parents' home, and therefore the expo-
sure to asbestos dust, in 1982.154 Since there was no evidence to estab-
lish that Pransky had ever been exposed to asbestos other than during
145. Id. (quoting Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 160, 692 A.2d 5,
18 (1997), cert. granted sub nom. Hayden v. Bullinger, 346 Md. 373, 697 A.2d 112 (1997),
and vacated sub nom. Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998)).
146. Id. at 130-31, 764 A.2d at 339.
147. Id. at 128, 764 A.2d at 338.
148. 369 Md. 360, 800 A.2d 722 (2002). Pransky was decided on June 11, 2002, the same
day that the court issued its opinion in Scribner. Id. at 360, 800 A.2d at 722; Scribner, 369
Md. at 369, 800 A.2d at 727.
149. Pransky, 369 Md. at 363, 800 A.2d at 723.
150. Id. at 364, 800 A.2d at 724.
151. Id.





the 1972 to 1982 period, the court was able to determine, without a
doubt, that Pransky's exposure to asbestos occurred before July 1,
1986.155
In 2002 the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Austin v. Abney Mills,
Inc.1 56 likewise applied the exposure test to decide the question of
when an asbestos-related claim was triggered.1 57 The plaintiffs work
with Abney Mills during the 1950s to the 1970s exposed him to asbes-
tos-containing products, but he was not diagnosed with mesothelioma
until 1998.158 The plaintiff wanted to sue Abney Mills for tort dam-
ages, but Louisiana had amended its worker's compensation laws in
1975 making mesothelioma an occupational disease for which em-
ployees could only seek reimbursement through the worker's com-
pensation fund.1 59 The plaintiff, Hogue, claimed that his cause of
action arose before 1975, because that was when his asbestos exposure
occurred. 160 Thus, Hogue argued that he could sue Abney Mills in
tort rather than under the worker's compensation laws.161
The court's analysis examined the manifestation test, the contrac-
tion theory (which is equivalent to the Grimshaw standard), and the
exposure theory.'6 2 The court began by summarily rejecting the man-
ifestation approach.' 61 It believed the manifestation test "would be a
dangerous precedent" that would injure many plaintiffs' vested rights
in instances when the plaintiff was unknowingly injured long before
symptoms of the damage ever appeared. 164
In discussing the contraction theory, the court explained that sev-
eral Louisiana courts had adopted the approach, but focused on a
prior decision where the Louisiana Supreme Court said the approach
was difficult to apply because it was virtually impossible to pinpoint
the exact date on which the plaintiff contracted the disease.' 6 5 The
Abney Mills court concluded that it was not going to use the contrac-




156. 824 So. 2d 1137 (La. 2002).
157. Id. at 1154-55.
158. Id. at 1140.
159. Id. at 1140-41.
160. Id. at 1141.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1148-55.
163. Id. at 1149.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1150 (citing Cole v. Celotex, 599 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1992)).
166. See id.
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Instead the court adopted the exposure test to determine
whether Hogue's cause of action arose before 1975.167 It explained
that the exposure approach was consistent with the accrual of a tort
action for a long-latency disease.16 The court emphasized that the
exposure test was workable because there is no dispute that every as-
bestos-related injury arises from the plaintiffs inhalation of asbestos
fibers; thus, the injury arose upon the plaintiffs exposure to asbes-
tos. 16 9 In applying the exposure test, the Louisiana Supreme Court
said that it would require the plaintiff to present evidence proving
that his or her exposure to asbestos was significant and that it was
those exposures that later caused the plaintiff to contract an asbestos-
related disease.' 70 The court felt that its holding was consistent with
general tort theory that it is easier for industry, and not the injured
victim, to bear the risk of potential tort claims by including such liabil-
ity coverage in its business insurance coverage.' 71 Thus, the court
held that Abney Mills had not met its burden in proving that Hogue's
cause of action arose after 1975.172
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Scribner, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a court dealing with a claim based on an asbestos-
related disease should look at the last time the plaintiff was exposed to
the defendant's asbestos-containing product to decide whether to ap-
ply the statutory cap. 171 The court, in a unanimous opinion written by
Judge Wilner, began its analysis by discussing Armstrong, the first case
to address when an asbestos-related injury arises in the context of the
statutory cap.1 74 The court noted that the Armstrong decision relied in
part on the Mitchell court's rejection of the "manifestation" test.175
The court described how the Armstrong court focused on the fact that
a legally compensable injury in a disease involving a long latency pe-
riod will almost certainly happen before a doctor diagnoses the dis-
ease. 176 In rejecting the manifestation approach, the court pointed
167. Id. at 1154.
168. Id. at 1151.
169. Id. at 1154.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1155.
173. 369 Md. at 394, 800 A.2d at 742.
174. Id. at 383-85, 800 A.2d at 735-36. See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text for
further discussion of Armstrong.
175. Scribner, 369 Md. at 383-84, 800 A.2d at 735.
176. Id. at 384, 800 A.2d at 736.
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out the Armstrong court's failure to adopt an alternative test such as
the exposure test adopted in Mitchell.177
The court further noted the Court of Special Appeals' reluctance
in Grimshaw to hold that the cause of action arose upon the plaintiffs
exposure to asbestos, despite its rejection of the manifestation test. 178
Thus, the Court of Special Appeals, according to the Scribner court,
instituted a middle ground test, whereby the decision whether to ap-
ply the statutory cap could be decided by looking at a time before the
manifestation of the disease, but after the plaintiffs exposure to asbes-
tos. 179 The court ultimately concluded that the Court of Special Ap-
peals subsequently adhered to this middle ground test, but that its
application was consistent. 80
The court then evaluated several of the cases in which the Court
of Special Appeals muddied the waters by applying its middle ground
test.18' The first of these cases was Abate, in which the Court of Special
Appeals applied the Grimshaw test to the condition of pleural plaques
in a manner that was essentially equivalent to the manifestation
test.'82 The Abate court held that for an asbestos-related condition,
such as pleural plaques, a cause of action did not arise until the plain-
tiff began experiencing functional impairment. 1 3
The court then analyzed the Court of Special Appeals' decision in
Bauman.'84 The court noted that Bauman was distinguished from
Abate on the basis that if the alleged injury is a condition, then there
must be some manifestation of harm, while if it is a type of cancer the
Grimshaw test would still apply.'85 Nonetheless, the court pointed out
that in spite of the Court of Special Appeals' concern over differenti-
ating between asbestos-related conditions and diseases, it failed to clearly
177. Id. at 385, 800 A.2d at 736.
178. Id. at 384-85, 800 A.2d at 736. See supra notes 81-97 and accompanying text for
further discussion of Grimshaw.
179. Scribner, 369 Md. at 386, 800 A.2d at 737.
180. Id. (stating that the Court of Special Appeals' attempts to redefine or apply the
middle ground test has "engendered some confusion").
181. Id. at 386-94, 800 A.2d at 737-42.
182. Id. at 386-87, 800 A.2d at 737. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text for
further discussion of Abate. Following its discussion of Abate, the court gave a brief descrip-
tion of Wood. Scribner, 369 Md. at 387, 800 A.2d at 737. In particular, the court noted a
footnote from Wood stating that "unlike certain other conditions, 'a condition such as can-
cer is a compensable injury when it comes into existence even without symptomatology."'
Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md. App. 1, 45 nAl1, 703 A.2d 1315, 1336 n.ll
(1998)). See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text for further discussion of Wood.
183. Scribner, 369 Md. at 386, 800 A.2d at 737.
184. Id. at 387-88, 800 A.2d at 737-38.
185. Id. at 387, 800 A.2d at 737.
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delineate which test the Maryland courts should apply to make such a
determination. 186
The court went on to note how the Grimshaw test, as outlined in
Bauman, became even more confusing in Walatka and Hollingsworth.1
8 7
The court first focused on a parenthetical reference made by the
Court of Special Appeals in Walatka.'88 In this parenthetical, the
Walatka court articulated the holding in Bauman to be that an asbes-
tos-related injury arises when cellular changes result in a disabling dis-
ease, rather than when the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos or when
the plaintiff manifested symptoms of the disease."8 9 The court then
observed that the Hollingsworth court nevertheless "expressly dis-
avowed the statements from Bauman regarding the retracing to the
first moment of cellular change."'19 Instead, the Hollingsworth court
confirmed the Bauman court's statements that once an asbestos-re-
lated condition becomes a disease the harm is irreversible upon con-
traction, so the cause of action will arise once the plaintiff develops
the disease.' 1 The Scribner court emphasized that by these interpreta-
tions, the Court of Special Appeals changed the inquiry so that it cen-
tered on whether the plaintiff contracted an asbestos-related disease
before July 1, 1986, instead of whether the plaintiff experienced any
cellular change before that date.
9 2
After reviewing the legal background and the resulting confusion
surrounding statutory cap issues, the court in Scribner discussed three
tests that it could adopt: (1) the manifestation test, which considers
when the plaintiff was first diagnosed or shows symptoms of the dis-
ease; (2) the exposure test, which considers when the plaintiff was first
exposed to asbestos; and (3) the Grimshaw test, which considers when
a disease first develops in the body. 9 3 While the court admitted that
none of these tests were perfect, it concluded that the exposure test
was the least problematic and the most consistent with Maryland's leg-
186. Id.; see supra notes 130-136 and accompanying text (discussing that with asbestos-
related conditions, the plaintiff must manifest symptoms before a court will find a legally
compensable harm, while with an asbestos-related disease, the court needs to determine
the first instance the plaintiff experienced cellular change).
187. Scribner, 369 Md. at 389, 800 A.2d at 738-39.
188. Id., 800 A.2d at 738; see supra note 136 (describing Walatka's disease-condition
distinction).
189. Scribner, 369 Md. at 389, 800 A.2d at 738 (quoting Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125
Md. App. 313, 319, 725 A.2d 579, 581-82 (1999)).
190. Id., 800 A.2d at 738-39. See supra notes 137-147 and accompanying text for further
discussion of Hollingsworth.
191. Scribner, 369 Md. at 389, 800 A.2d at 738-39.
192. Id., 800 A.2d at 739.
193. d. at 390, 800 A.2d at 739.
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islative intent in enacting the statutory cap on non-economic damages
in personal injury cases.' 94
The court quickly rejected use of the manifestation test, stating
that although this test is the simplest to establish in terms of medical
evidence, it is entirely inconsistent with the language of the Maryland
statute.' 95 The manifestation test, according to the Scribner court,
"flatly ignores the distinction made by the Legislature between when
an action arises and when it accrues."' 96 Although universally ac-
cepted that an asbestos-related disease is present in the body for many
years before a doctor diagnoses it, the court concluded that the mani-
festation test would still limit damage recovery even if the evidence
proved that the disease existed before July 1, 1986.'
The court further denounced the Grimshaw test as unworkable
because courts cannot apply it consistently and it requires the intro-
duction of conflicting expert testimony.'9 s The Grimshaw test also
treats asbestos-related conditions and diseases differently, leading to
further confusion as to when a cause of action arises for each. 199
Courts must consider the onset of symptoms for asbestos-related con-
ditions, while they have to determine when the disease first arose in
the body for asbestos-related diseases.200 Ultimately, the court in
Scribner concluded that for asbestos-related diseases, the Grimshaw test
requires reliance on theoretical assumptions to prove when the first
cell turned cancerous.2 °1
After declining to adopt either the manifestation or the Grimshaw
tests, the court concluded that adopting the exposure test would be
practical, theoretically sound, and supported by the court's holdings
in both Mitchell and Murphy.2° 2 The court also determined that pleu-
194. Id. at 391, 800 A.2d at 740.
195. Id. at 390, 800 A.2d at 739.
196. Id. After explaining that words interpreted in a statute are meant to have their
"natural, ordinary and generally understood meaning," the Armstrong court concluded that
a "cause of action arises when it first comes into existence." 326 Md. 107, 121, 604 A.2d 47,
54 (1992). In so holding, the court noted the distinction that it had previously made be-
tween the cause of action accruingand arising. See id. at 120-21, 604 A.2d at 53 (finding that
in contrast to when a cause of action arises, "'a plaintiff's cause of action accrues when he
ascertains... the nature and cause of his injury'" (quoting Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods.,
284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299, 306 (1978))).
197. Scibner, 369 Md. at 390, 800 A.2d at 739.
198. Id. at 391, 800 A.2d at 739 (noting that the Grimshaw standard "is impossible to
apply in any uniform and rational way and necessarily engenders competing expert testi-
mony as to the timing of an event that no one can precisely define").
199. Id., 800 A.2d at 739-40.
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ral plaques and other asbestos-related conditions are not injuries for
purposes of section 11-108(b) (1).203 In order to successfully state a
claim under the exposure test, a plaintiff must prove that he or she
has mesothelioma or asbestosis and that the disease was caused, either
completely or substantially, by his or her exposure to the asbestos-con-
taining product manufactured by the defendant. 204 The court stated
that it was "more reasonable to look back to the exposure that ulti-
mately produced the disease," rather than trying to pinpoint the time
of the onset of the disease. 2 5 Additionally, the court concluded that
this approach was consistent with the legislative intent to improve Ma-
ryland's insurance market by increasing the predictability of damage
awards.206
Thus, the court held that Maryland courts should consider the
last time the plaintiff was exposed to the defendant's asbestos-contain-
ing product to determine when the cause of action arose for purposes
of section 11-108(b) (1).2°7 The court explained that if the last expo-
sure occurred, without a doubt, before July 1, 1986, then the statutory
cap would not apply,2 8 while if the only exposure occurred after July
1, 1986, then the statutory cap would apply.2 9 The court noted that
difficulties in applying the exposure test would only arise in the
"hopefully rare instances in which there was exposure both before
and afterJuly 1, 1986, and there [was] a genuine dispute over whether
either exposure was sufficient to cause the kind of cellular change that
led to the disease. '21 1 The court, however, stated that in this situation
the trier of fact should consider "the nature, extent, and effect of the
pre- and post-July 1, 1986 exposures" in order to determine when the
cause of action arose. 2 11 Applying the exposure test to the facts of
Scribner, the court held that Scribner's most recent exposure to defen-
dant's asbestos-containing products occurred many years before
1986.212 Thus, the court held the statutory cap did not apply to the
203. Id. at 392, 800 A.2d at 740. The court stated that unless these conditions turn into
an asbestos-related disease, the court will not consider them injuries because they are not
legally compensable harms. Id. at 391-92, 800 A.2d at 740.
204. Id. at 391-92, 800 A.2d at 740.
205. Id. at 393, 800 A.2d at 741.
206. Id. at 394, 800 A.2d at 741. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing
the legislative history of the statutory cap on non-economic damages in personal injury
cases).








jury's award of non-economic damages for Scribner's survival
213action.
4. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals decision in Scribner suc-
ceeded in clarifying the previously confusing area of the law concern-
ing when a cause of action arises with a latent disease for purposes of
the statutory cap on non-economic damages. The Scribner court held
that courts should look at the plaintiff's last exposure to asbestos-con-
taining products to decide whether to apply the statutory cap to the
plaintiff's damages. 214 In so holding, the Scribner court correctly re-
jected the Grimshaw test adhered to by the Court of Special Ap-
peals.215 The Grimshaw test could not be uniformly applied and
depended upon conflicting medical expert testimony.216 Addition-
ally, the Court of Appeals sustained its past rejection of the manifesta-
tion test, which holds that a cause of action arises when the plaintiff
experiences identifiable symptoms of the asbestos-related disease. y
In contrast, the Court of Appeals in Scribner enunciated a clear
standard that utilizes the facts surrounding the plaintiffs' asbestos ex-
posure to determine the point at which a cause of action arose, rather
than basing that decision on theoretical and uncertain assump-
tions."' Recently, this test has been applied successfully in Maryland
and in other jurisdictions. 21 9 Although the exposure test has the po-
tential to allow multi-million dollar jury awards to be excluded from
reduction under the statutory cap, its adoption adheres to the legisla-
ture's intent and it will not necessarily account for an increase in as-
bestos litigation throughout Maryland. The Scribner court precluded
many asbestos-related claims from ever reaching the trial court by stat-
ing that Maryland courts will not consider asbestos-related conditions
to be legally compensable harms.220
a. The Court Properly Refused to Adopt the Grimshaw Test.-
The Grimshaw test adhered to by the Court of Special Appeals to de-
termine when an asbestos-related cause of action arose is problematic
213. Id. at 395, 800 A.2d at 742.
214. Id. at 394, 800 A.2d at 742.
215. See id. at 391, 800 A.2d at 739-40.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 384, 390, 800 A.2d at 735-36, 739; see Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md.
107, 121, 604 A.2d 47, 54 (1992) (rejecting the defendant's application of the manifesta-
tion test).
218. Scribner, 369 Md. at 394, 800 A.2d at 742.
219. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Pranksy, 369 Md. 360, 368, 800 A.2d 722, 726 (2002); Aus-
tin v. Abney Mills, 824 So. 2d 1137, 1154 (2002).
220. Scribner, 369 Md. at 391-92, 800 A.2d at 740.
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because courts cannot consistently apply it. Additionally, litigants
have to hire several competing medical experts to try to support their
claim that the cellular changes that led to the disease occurred either
before or after July 1, 1986. Regardless of how many experts a litigant
hires, they all still have to rely on inconclusive evidence to determine
when the cause of action arose, because there is not currently strong
scientific evidence that proves when a cell becomes a cancerous
cell.22
The Grimshaw case even demonstrates the inconsistency of its ap-
plication. This case involved four plaintiffs who had significantly dif-
ferent periods of exposure to asbestos. 22 2 One plaintiff, Grimshaw,
was exposed to asbestos from 1940 to 1947 and again from 1951 to
1979.223 While a second plaintiff, Granski, was exposed from 1953 to
1963.224 The third plaintiff, McCaffery, suffered from asbestos expo-
sure from 1968 to 1970.225 The fourth plaintiff, Zumas, worked with
asbestos-containing products from 1955 to 1987.226 It is clear that the
exposure periods for these plaintiffs significantly varied in the amount
of years that they were exposed and also when they were exposed.
Granski was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 1993, while Grimshaw,
McCaffery, and Zumas were all diagnosed in 1994.227 However, the
Grimshaw court determined that Granski's cause of action arose at
least seven years prior to her diagnosis, while the other three plain-
tiffs' diseases arose at least eight years before they were diagnosed.228
The Grimshaw court did not explain its reasoning as to why it reached
these similar conclusions given the significantly different exposure pe-
riods of these plaintiffs, but only stated that the record supported its
decision. 22' The court's opinion was that all four causes of action
arose sometime prior toJuly 1, 1986, and hence the statutory cap did
not apply.23 ° The Court of Special Appeals relied on the trial court's
weighing of the evidence to reach this decision. 23' Thus, while it ap-
pears that the court did uniformly apply the standard when consider-
ing the different times of exposure, it is difficult to ascertain why they
221. Id. at 392, 800 A.2d at 740.
222. Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 147, 692 A.2d 5, 12 (1997).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 148, 692 A.2d at 12.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 165, 692 A.2d at 20-21.
228. Id.
229. Id., 692 A.2d at 20.
230. Id., 692 A.2d at 20-21.
231. Id., 692 A.2d at 20.
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would have decided that the cellular changes occurred in the same
time frame with each plaintiff.
23 2
Additionally, in Grimshaw, medical experts provided conflicting
testimony concerning when mesothelioma comes into existence.233
One medical expert testified that "typically the interval between the
tumor starting and the diagnosis of mesothelioma is between six
months and three years, '23 4 while two other medical experts testified
that the cancer began growing in the plaintiffs approximately ten
years before doctors diagnosed the disease. 23 5 One of these medical
experts also claimed that different types of tumors grow at different
rates.236 The conflicting testimony of three medical experts all from
one side of the lawsuit demonstrates the difficulty in ascertaining the
onset of mesothelioma.
As another example of contradictory expert testimony, in Arm-
strong, one party's medical expert testified that asbestosis does not ap-
pear upon exposure and usually takes at least fifteen to twenty years to
develop.23 7 In contrast, the opposing party's medical expert testified
that "asbestosis is active and present from the time that the first fiber
gets into the lungs but that often symptoms may not develop for
twenty to thirty years. '23' Armstrong demonstrates how difficult it is to
pinpoint when an asbestos-related injury arises.239
In Scribner, the expert testimony provided at trial was even more
inconclusive.24 ° One medical expert testified that the latency period
for mesothelioma was anywhere between twenty to fifty years. 241 This
expert additionally stated that "[h] e knew of one case with a latency
232. Id., 692 A.2d at 20-21.
233. Id. at 164, 692 A.2d at 20.
234. Id.
235. Id. Two years later, one of these medical experts voiced an opinion that differed
from his testimony in Grimshaw. Owens-Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md. App. 454, 503, 726
A.2d 745, 769 (1999). In Bauman, this medical expert stated that when a person shows
symptoms of mesothelioma, that person "'probably had a very small cancer five years ago,
or maybe even six or seven years ago."' Id. Based on this uncertainty assumption, the
Bauman court relied more on another medical expert's testimony that mesothelioma prob-
ably began to grow about ten years prior to diagnosis. See id.
236. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 164, 692 A.2d at 20. The medical expert posited that
one plaintiff's sarcomatoid tumors began to grow sometime within five years before diag-
nosis of mesothelioma, while the epithelial tumors of another plaintiff began to grow
about ten years before diagnosis. Id.
237. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 124, 604 A.2d 47, 55 (1992).
238. Id. at 124 n.5, 604 A.2d at 55 n.5.
239. See id. at 122, 604 A.2d at 54.
240. Scribner, 369 Md. at 380-82, 391 n.4, 800 A.2d at 733-35, 740 n.4.
241. Id.
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period of five years and another with a period of 72 years. '242 Two
other medical experts in Scribner stated that it was not accurate to as-
sume that there was a constant growth rate, while one also noted that
scientists think the cancer is spherical, even though that is not always
true, and, in fact, usually is not true with mesothelioma. 24 3 If the
Scribner court had adhered to the Grimshaw test, it is unclear whether it
would have applied the statutory cap. Based on the majority of the
expert testimony and the fact that Scribner was diagnosed with
mesothelioma in 1995, the trial court did not apply the statutory
cap.2 44 Even the Scribner trial court's application of the Grimshaw stan-
dard varied from how the Grimshaw court envisioned that courts
should apply it. In Scribner, the jury instruction the trial court fol-
lowed was that "the first cellular changes which led to the existence of
Scribner's mesothelioma began before July 1, 1986. ,,245 This differs
from the Grimshaw standard in that Grimshaw wanted juries to look at
when the cellular changes actually developed into the disease, not
when the ones that led to the disease began.246 While it is a fine dis-
tinction, it demonstrates the complexity surrounding the application
of the Grimshaw standard and how it has caused confusion in the
courts.
An additional problem in utilizing the Grimshaw test is that medi-
cal experts currently do not have strong scientific evidence upon
which to make their determinations.2 47 In Walatka, one medical ex-
pert stated that there had only been one study completed about
mesothelioma's doubling time and he did not consider that study to
be very reliable. 248 He further concluded that the nature of mesothe-
lioma tumors renders it difficult for scientists to track changes in size
over a period of time, thus it would be a long time before scientists
would have reliable evidence regarding mesothelioma's doubling
time. As a result, cases involving the question of when asbestosis
and mesothelioma come into existence require medical experts to
utilize theoretical assumptions in reaching their conclusions. 250
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 382, 800 A.2d at 734 (noting that the trial court, applying the Grimshaw stan-
dard, decided that the statutory cap did not apply to Scribner's damages).
245. Id.
246. Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 160, 692 A.2d 5, 18 (1992).
247. See Scribner, 369 Md. at 392, 800 A.2d at 740 (noting that there is "no reasonably
reliable methodology to determine when the first cell that became cancerous did so").
248. Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125 Md. App. 313, 320, 725 A.2d 579, 582 (1999).
249. Id.
250. See Scribner, 369 Md. at 393, 800 A.2d at 741 (determining that it is more reasonable
to look at when an individual was exposed to asbestos rather than to "engage in 'guessti-
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Conflicting evidence coupled with a lack of solid scientific sup-
port makes consistent application of the Grimshaw test difficult. The
Grimshaw standard requires courts and juries to determine which the-
oretically based assumption is more credible-the one given by the
plaintiff's expert or the one from the defendant's expert. 251' Thus, the
Scribner court properly refused to adopt the Grimshaw test to deter-
mine when asbestos-related injuries arise for purposes of applying the
statutory cap on non-economic damages.
b. The Court's Adoption of the Exposure Test Provides a Fact-
Based, Clearly Articulated Standard.-In Scribner, the Court of Appeals
adopted the exposure test to determine when a cause of action arises
for purposes of applying the statutory cap on non-economic dam-
ages.2 52 In so doing, the Court of Appeals delineated a clear standard
that both judges and juries can easily apply. This standard will utilize
fewer resources by the court, because litigants will need to hire fewer
medical experts. 25' Additionally, appeals of ajury's factual determina-
tion will be less likely, because it will be more difficult to controvert
the facts of when the plaintiff worked with asbestos-containing prod-
ucts. 254 Determining when an individual has had significant exposure
to asbestos is generally a straightforward fact-based inquiry because
the individual knows the years in which he or she worked with asbes-
tos-containing products and can often document that period.255 In
fact, the only situation in which the exposure test might not clearly
establish when the cause of action arose is when asbestos exposure
occurred both before and afterJuly 1, 1986.256 The court adequately
addressed this concern noting that if this situation occurs, the trier of
fact is then charged with deciding "the nature, extent, and effect of
the pre- and post-July 1, 1986 exposures. '25 7 However, it is likely that
circumstances like this one will be rare.258 In the majority of such
mates' of when the first cell became diseased, 'guesstimates' based on contradictory expert
testimony ... all of which ... seems to be founded upon uncertain assumptions").
251. Id.
252. Id. at 394, 800 A.2d at 742.
253. See id. at 395, 800 A.2d at 742 (finding that plaintiffs have the particularized knowl-
edge necessary to prove when their cause of action arose).
254. Id. at 395, 800 A.2d at 742.
255. See, e.g., Owens Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md. App. 454, 465, 726 A.2d 745, 750
(1999) (making the factual determination that the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos be-
tween 1975 and 1978 when he worked with pipes insulated with asbestos).
256. Scribner, 369 Md. at 394, 800 A.2d at 742.
257. Id.
258. The use of asbestos-containing products has been strictly regulated in Maryland
since 1986, when the Maryland Department of the Environment issued protection mea-
sures for companies and workers who still need to work with asbestos.
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situations, the plaintiff will probably have been exposed to asbestos for
more years either before or after 1986; thus, the effect of either the
pre- or post-1986 exposure will be easy to assess. The only time that a
pre- and post-1986 exposure will be a difficult factual determination is
if the plaintiff was exposed equally both before and after 1986.259
While these instances will require litigants to hire medical experts to
prove whether the pre- or post-1986 exposure was more likely to have
resulted in the asbestos-related disease, because such circumstances
will be rare, fewer resources and less time will be wasted.26 In con-
trast, under the Grimshaw standard, litigants always had to hire numer-
ous competing medical experts to try to prove their cases.261
The Court of Appeals in Pransky relied on its decision in Scribner
to find that Pransky's cause of action arose prior to July 1, 1986.262
The court reiterated that in Scribner it held that "the court may look
initially to when the plaintiff's last exposure to asbestos occurred and
that, if that last exposure undisputedly was prior to July 1, 1986" then
the statutory cap would not minimize the damage award.263 Using the
exposure test, the court was easily able to determine that Pransky's
cause of action arose prior to July 1, 1986 because she left her parents'
home, and therefore the exposure to asbestos dust, before that
time. 2 " Applying the exposure test prevented the court from having
to consider any competing testimony from the trial court about when
Pransky's disease might have developed under the Grimshaw standard.
Although Pransky involved an easy application of the exposure test,
the majority of asbestos cases litigated in Maryland courts involve an
equally simple application, 265 especially given the decrease in the use
of asbestos over the last twenty years.266
259. See Scribner, 369 Md. at 394, 800 A.2d at 742.
260. See id. at 395, 800 A.2d at 742 (finding that the plaintiff has the burden of proving
that his claim arose before July 1, 1986).
261. See id. at 392-93, 800 A.2d at 740-41 (discussing how litigants relying on the Grim-
shaw test needed to have several competing medical experts to help the jury decide when
the initial cell became diseased).
262. Georgia-Pacific Co. v. Pransky, 369 Md. 360, 368, 800 A.2d 722, 726 (2002). See
supra notes 148-154 and accompanying text for further discussion of Pransky.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals also recently applied the exposure test in
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Gianotti, 148 Md. App. 457, 813 A.2d 280 (2002). In this case, the
court applied Scribner in affirming the jury's conclusion that the plaintiff's last exposure to
asbestos was in 1974. Id. at 465, 813 A.2d at 285. Thus, the court determined that the
statutory cap on non-economic damages did not apply. Id.
266. See Continuing Restrictions on Certain Asbestos-Containing Product, 40 C.F.R.
§ 763 (1993) (noting the continuation of restrictions on asbestos-containing products).
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Other jurisdictions have successfully applied the exposure test for
several years.26 7 In 2002, the Supreme Court of Louisiana extended
its use of the exposure test in Austin v. Abney Mills. 268 The court previ-
ously applied its version of the exposure test to causes of action for
asbestos-related diseases in insurance related cases.2 69 In Abney Mills,
the court utilized the exposure test to apply to a company's liability in
a tort action.27 °
The court utilized a lot of the same reasoning that the Scribner
court used in that it quickly rejected the manifestation test, discred-
ited the contraction theory, which was similar to the Grimshaw stan-
dard, and decided that the exposure approach was the theory that was
most consistent with tort principles.27' Additionally, ChiefJustice Ca-
logero wrote a separate opinion in which he cited positively to the
Scribner case.2 7 2 This opinion analogized the facts of Scribner to the
facts of the Abney Mills case.2 73 In Abney Mills, the plaintiffs work with
Abney Mills during the 1950s to the 1970s exposed him to asbestos-
containing products, but he was not diagnosed with mesothelioma un-
til 1998.274 Abney Mills argued that an amendment to Louisiana's
worker's compensation laws in 1975 prevented Hogue from suing Ab-
ney Mills in tort law.2 75 Abney Mills further claimed that Scribner was
distinguishable because Hogue had some exposure to asbestos-con-
taining products after Louisiana amended the worker's compensation
laws.2 76 The Chief Justice noted that since this case was only at the
summary judgment stage it was not necessary for the court to actually
decide this issue. 277 However, Calogero stated that if the plaintiff
267. See, e.g., Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1066 (La. 1992) (concluding that
"key relevant events giving rise to a claim in long-latency occupational disease cases are the
repeated tortious exposures resulting in continuous, on-going damages"). Louisiana cases
are particularly informative because Louisiana courts have handled many asbestos claims.
See STEPHEN CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM
REPORT 34 (2002) (noting that Louisiana was one of the top five states with the most asbes-
tos filings between 1994 and 1997), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/
DB397/ (last visited May 20, 2003). Additionally, Louisiana was one of the first states to
adopt the exposure approach for deciding when a cause of action arises for asbestos-re-
lated diseases. See Celotex, 599 So. 2d at 1066.
268. 824 So. 2d 1137 (2002).
269. Id. at 1153 (citing Celotex, 599 So. 2d at 1076).
270. Id. at 1154.
271. See id. at 1148-54.
272. Id. at 1155 (Calogero, CJ., concurring and assigning additional reasons).
273. Id at 1156. See supra notes 156-172 and accompanying text for further discussion
of Abney Mills.
274. Abney Mills, 824 So. 2d. at 1140.
275. Id. at 1140-41.
276. Id. at 1156 (Calogero, C.J., assigning additional reasons).
277. Id.
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could prove at trial that his pre-1975 exposures to asbestos caused his
mesothelioma, then his cause of action arose before the 1975 amend-
ments.2 78 The ChiefJustice reached this conclusion by using Scribner's
holding "that a plaintiffs claim arises at the time of exposure to the
agent that later produced a real and diagnosable disease. '2 79 There-
fore, any post-19 7 5 exposures would not affect Hogue's ability to sue
his employer in a tort action.28 °
c. The Court's Decision in Scribner Is Consistent with the Legisla-
tive Intent of the Statutory Cap and Will Not Lead to an Increase in Asbestos
Litigation.-Maryland's statutory cap on non-economic damages was
enacted in 1986 to ensure that liability insurance would be available in
Maryland at a reasonable price to cover personal injuries, because of
the hope that there would be more predictable damage awards.28 In
enacting the statute, the legislature chose to use the language that the
cause of action "arises" as opposed to the statute of limitations lan-
guage that the cause of action "accrues." '282 In accordance with gen-
eral tort theory, the Maryland courts have interpreted the cause of
action under the statutory cap to arise when the "injury first comes
into existence."28 In diseases with a long latency period, the injury
will occur long before the plaintiff discovers that he or she is in-
jured.284 It is for these reasons that the Scribner court determined that
such injury arises upon continuous exposure to asbestos-containing
products, not upon the actual onset of the disease or when the symp-
toms of the disease arise.28 5 The Scribner court's decision is consistent
with the legislature's intent upon framing the statutory cap in terms of
the cause of action arising instead of accruing. 286
Asbestos litigation has been a huge burden on the American legal
system.287 By the end of the year 2000, there were more than 600,000
asbestos cases in the United States.288 Asbestos workers and their fam-




281. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 369, 601 A.2d 102, 115 (1992).
282. Scribner, 396 Md. at 384, 800 A.2d at 736.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 384-85, 800 A.2d at 736.
286. See id.
287. CARROLL, supra note 267, at 51.
288. See id. (examining the current United States trends in asbestos litigation).
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these corporations have had to litigate against thousands of claims. 28 9
Despite the surge of asbestos litigation in recent decades, it is unlikely
that the Court of Appeals' decision in Scribner will lead to a further
increase in the amount of asbestos litigation reaching Maryland
courts. Many of the asbestos claims currently appearing before courts
are for asbestos-related conditions not asbestos-related diseases.29 °
The Scribner court specifically declined to consider asbestos-related
conditions as legally compensable injuries; thus, such claims should
never reach Maryland courts. 291  Additionally, because the statutory
cap will not apply in many instances, it is likely that defendants will try
to settle claims rather than litigate them.292 Furthermore, since 1986,
asbestos use in Maryland has significantly declined and protective
measures have been instituted for people who still need to work with
asbestos. 293 Thus, as a general matter, fewer claims should be appear-
ing before the court in the future.
While it is true that the number of asbestos claims in the United
States is increasing rapidly, the largest increase has been in claims for
ailments that do not involve functional impairment.294 During the
years 1991-2000, about sixty-five percent of the compensation received
by plaintiffs in the United States went to individuals pursuing claims
for non-malignant asbestos-related injuries such as pleural plaques. 295
The Court of Appeals of Maryland clarified in Scribner that claims
where the plaintiffs do not have functional impairment will not suc-
ceed in obtaining compensation. 96 Judge Wilner stated that the jury
"need not attempt to address the problem of ... exposures that pro-
duce only pleural plaques or other conditions that, absent more, do
not constitute injuries." 297 In so stating, the court emphasized that
Maryland courts should not even consider claims that arise only from
the presence of an asbestos-related condition because these plaintiffs
289. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation after Amchem
and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1899 (2002) (discussing the effects of the Supreme Court's
invalidation of class action settlements in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591
(1997), and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)).
290. CARROLL, supra note 267, at 46.
291. Scribner, 369 Md. at 391-92, 800 A.2d at 740.
292. CARROLL, supra note 267, at 56.
293. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 6-401 et seq. (2002).
294. See CARROLL, supra note 267, at 46 (citing that non-malignant claims made up about
ninety percent of all asbestos claims in the court systems in the late 1990s).
295. Id. at 65.
296. Scribner, 369 Md. at 391-92, 800 A.2d at 740; seeOwens Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md.
App. 454, 482, 726 A.2d 745, 759 (1999) (stating that [ffor purposes of the statutory cap,
the crucial distinction is whether a plaintiffs cellular change develops into an asbestos-
related disease or simply into an asbestos-related condition").
297. Scribner, 369 Md. at 392, 800 A.2d at 740.
[VOL. 62:809
2003] COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
are not legally injured and have no cause of action."' Thus, the
Court of Appeals' decision in Scribner will not contribute to large ver-
dicts for these types of conditions, because they are not considered
injuries for purposes of the statutory cap.299 The court, by eliminating
asbestos-related conditions from the realm of legally compensable in-
juries, effectively precluded many cases from ever reaching the
courts.3 0 0
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals in Scribner succeeded in
articulating a clear, fact-based test for courts to utilize in determining
when causes of action arise for purposes of applying the statutory cap
on non-economic damages. By adopting the exposure test, the court
abrogated the theoretically sound, but difficult to apply Grimshaw test.
In contrast to the problems of conflicting expert testimony based on
scientific assumptions and the lack of credible scientific evidence
brought forth under the Grimshaw test, the exposure test relies on the
factual determination of when the last exposure to asbestos oc-
curred.30' Applying the exposure test to determine when a cause of
action arises is consistent with the legislative intent of the statutory cap
and will increase predictability without leading to a marked increase
in asbestos litigation in Maryland. 0 2
MARY S. KELLEY
298. Id. at 391-92, 800 A.2d at 740.
299. Id.
300. See id. (stating that a plaintiff must be injured to bring a cause of action for an
asbestos-related condition). Furthermore, many other independent factors have been act-
ing to potentially decrease asbestos litigation. First, the fact that asbestos use has declined
rapidly in the last seventeen years means that there are theoretically only a finite number
of claims that can be brought in the future. While asbestos-related claims will probably
continue to rise for several years, it is likely that eventually the absence of asbestos in cur-
rent industry practices will cause claims to decrease and ultimately disappear. See CARROLL,
supra note 267, at 77 (discussing the uncertainty surrounding the future of asbestos litiga-
tion). Nationally, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has completely banned six
asbestos-containing products, including new uses of asbestos. Continuing Restrictions on
Certain Asbestos-Containing Products, 40 C.F.R. § 763 (1993). Many of these uses, like
that of asbestos in insulation, have been the cause of numerous mesothelioma and asbesto-
sis claims. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 110-11, 604 A.2d 47, 48-
49 (1992) (involving asbestos-related claims arising from work with insulation products).
Thus, it is likely that the complete ban of these products will lead to an eventual decrease
in the number of asbestos claims initiated; meaning that utilization of the exposure ap-
proach for applying the statutory cap will not impact the amount of litigation in the courts.
301. Scribner, 369 Md. at 394, 800 A.2d at 742.
302. See id. at 384, 800 A.2d at 736 (noting that use of the exposure test is consistent with
the legislature's decision to trigger the statutory cap when a cause of action arises, which is
when the injury first comes into existence).
VI. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Maryland's Failure to Clarify When Governmental Entities Are
Permitted to Halt Development on Land After
J.L. Matthews, Inc.
In JL. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park and
Planning Commission,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commis-
sion (Commission) had the right to injunctive relief to prevent devel-
opment on a parcel of land prior to the commencement of
condemnation proceedings.2 The court also examined whether the
trial court properly excluded evidence of damages caused by the in-
junctive relief.' In reversing the judgment of the Court of Special Ap-
peals, the Court of Appeals held that the preliminary injunction had
been improperly granted and that evidence, which may have im-
pacted the jury's ability to determine the fair market value of the
property had been wrongfully excluded.4 Although ultimately arriv-
ing at the correct conclusion, the court's analysis was incomplete. In
concluding that the Commission only had "regular" condemnation
powers and was not entitled to injunctive relief based on the facts of
this case, the court failed to clarify under what circumstances it would
be proper to grant injunctive relief prior to condemnation proceed-
ings. In particular, although reiterating that injunctive relief may be
appropriate to prevent the "destruction, misuse, or alienation of
land," the court failed to explain what activities might rise to this
"level of extraordinary or exceptional circumstances."5 As a conse-
quence, future courts addressing this issue will have difficulty balanc-
ing landowners' Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights with a
governmental entity's ability to provide public works and amenities to
its community.6
1. 368 Md. 71, 792 A.2d 288 (2002).
2. Id. at 94-95, 792 A.2d at 301-02.
3. Id., 792 A.2d at 302.
4. Id. at 95, 792 A.2d at 302.
5. Id. at 100, 102, 792 A.2d at 305-06 (quoting Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v.
Nash, 284 Md. 376, 383 n.5, 396 A.2d 538, 541 n.5 (1979) (per curiam)).
6. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. A tak-
ing of property occurs "when government action directly interferes with or substantially
disturbs the owner's use and enjoyment of the property." BLACK'S LAw DicTioNARY 1467
(7th ed. 1999). The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a
state from depriving a person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...."
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1. The Case.-In 1990, J.L. Matthews, Inc. purchased a 29,238
square foot parcel of land containing one single-family home in the
City of Takoma Park.7 At that time, Takoma Park was part of both
Montgomery and Prince George's County.' To develop and build
eight townhomes on the property, Matthews was required to pursue
development approvals from the Commission, a bi-county governmen-
tal entity serving both counties, and directly from Prince George's
County where the property was located.9 Even though Matthews ob-
tained all the necessary approvals as early as 1994, the company
placed development of tlhe property on hold due to a slump in the
housing market."0
Three years later in 1997, Matthews was ready to begin construc-
tion on the townhouse development." By that time, however, the City
of Takoma Park had become unified under the jurisdiction of Mont-
gomery County." As a result, Matthews again delayed development of
the property and submitted the development plans to Montgomery
County for approval.' 3 The Montgomery County Planning Board ap-
proved Matthews' preliminary plan for subdivision and Matthews then
paid the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC) the nec-
essary sewer connection fees and obtained their approval.14
In September 1999, William Gries, a land acquisition specialist
for the Commission contacted Matthews to inform the company that
the Commission had an interest in acquiring the property to develop
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorpo-
rates the Takings Clause as applicable to the states. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.
Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's protection
is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
7. J.L. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 78, 792 A.2d at 292. John L. Matthews initially pur-
chased the property as an individual, but prior to the relevant events of this case, shifted
title to the property toJ.L. Matthews, Inc., of which Matthews was President and sole stock-
holder. Id. at 78 n.2, 792 A.2d at 292 n.2.




12. Id. at 79 n.3, 792 A.2d at 292 n.3. Chapter 636 of the Acts of 1994 provided for the
"alteration of the boundary line between Montgomery County and Prince George's
County," subject to referendum of "legally qualified voters" in Takoma Park. H.B. 1090,
1994 Leg., 408th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1994). The referendum was held on No-
vember 7, 1995 and the voters chose to place the entire city within Montgomery County.
Id.
13. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 79, 792 A.2d at 292. The new approval process en-
tailed "getting exceptions to comply with Montgomery County set-backs," "going through a
re-subdivision process to divide . . . one site into two lots," and "submitting a landscape
plan." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id. at 79-80, 792 A.2d at 293.
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a neighborhood park. 5 In December 1999, Gries sent Matthews an
offer of $302,250 for the property, reflecting "the average of [the
Commission's] two appraisal reports, less an amount for the estimated
demolition costs associated with [removing] the old improvement on
the property."1 6 Matthews declined the offer, because it did not prop-
erly account for the initial costs of obtaining permits first from Prince
George's County and later from Montgomery County.17 Also, Mat-
thews explained that the figure did not take into account the ex-
pected profit from development, which would be ten percent higher
than the value of the land."8
On February 4, 2000, Grier raised the offer from $302,250 to
$337,700, and advised that if Matthews did not accept the offer he
would recommend the Montgomery County Planning Board use its
eminent domain authority to take the property.' 9 Matthews again de-
clined the offer and the Planning Board voted to proceed with con-
demnation and acquire the property at a maximum price of
$350,000.20
Two weeks later, Matthews received approval for a building per-
mit from the Montgomery County Department of Permitting Services
and began to build the townhouses in accordance with the permit.21
At the same time, the Planning Board published its Draft Takoma
Park Master Plan, which included acquiring Matthews' property or use




19. Id. Eminent domain is defined as the "inherent power of a governmental entity to
take privately owned property... and convert it to public use .. " BLACK'S LAw DICrION-
ARY, supra note 6, at 541; JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 87, 792 A.2d at 297. The Maryland
legislature has granted condemnation authority to the Commission. MD. ANN. CODE art.
28, § 5-105 (1997). Section 5-105 provides in relevant parts:
Whenever it is deemed necessary by the Commission to take or acquire any
lands, . . . for parks, parkways, forests .... or for the purposes of recreation, the
Commission may purchase them from the owner or owners; or, failing to agree
with the owner or owners thereof, may condemn the same by proceedings in the
circuit court for the county in which the land . . . [is] located .... At any time
after ten days after the return and recordation of the verdict or award in the
proceedings, the Commission may enter and take possession of the property so
condemned, upon first paying to the clerk of the court the amount of the award
and all costs taxed to date, notwithstanding any appeal or further proceedings on
the part of the defendant.
Id.
20. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 81, 792 A.2d at 294.
21. Id. at 81-82, 792 A.2d at 294. Matthews began to trench the land, erect silt fencing,
arrange gravel delivery, and contract excavators for the pouring of the foundations. Id. at
82, 792 A.2d at 294.
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as a future playground, basketball court, and neighborhood gathering
space. 22
The Commission filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County on March 15, 2000 for condemnation of Matthews'
property and two days later filed a motion for a temporary restraining
order or, alternatively, for a preliminary injunction to halt Matthews'
construction efforts.23 The circuit court granted the motion for a
temporary restraining order enjoining Matthews from performing any
type of construction activity on the property, including clearing and
grading, for ten days. 24 At a later hearing on the Commission's re-
quest for a preliminary injunction, the court granted the injunction
barring Matthews from performing any construction activity until a
final judgment was entered in the case.25
Matthews filed an answer to the complaint seeking damages for
$200,000 in excess of any condemnation award for the loss of profits
due to the halting of the townhouses' construction and marketing. 26
The Commission responded with the first of two motions in limine,
requesting that the court prohibit Matthews from introducing evi-
dence of "lost profits" and other expenses associated with securing
regulatory approval for the development project.2 7 Matthews filed a
response to the Commission's motion, arguing that it was entitled to
damages for the taking and damages resulting from the injunction
that shut down development of the project. 28 On June 1, 2000, the
Commission filed a motion to strike or, alternatively, a second motion
in limine.29 In its second motion, the Commission requested that the
court additionally prohibit evidence of Matthews' alleged damages re-
22. Id. at 82, 792 A.2d at 294.
23. Id. In the motion, the Commission argued that the court should order Matthews'
construction activity stopped so as to prevent the destruction of existing vegetation and
trees on the site. Id. The Commission further believed the existing vegetation was "irre-
placeable" and that its removal would "cause harm" to both the Commission and the citi-
zens of Montgomery County. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 82-84, 792 A.2d at 294-95. The circuit court judge concluded that
if [Matthews] were permitted to go forward with construction, in essence the site
would no longer be available to [the Commission]. And that to me does consti-
tute irreparable injury to the plaintiff... result[ing] in significant additional cost
to [the Commission] and ... in this site becoming unavailable for its intended
use.
Id. at 83, 792 A.2d at 295.






suiting from the issuance of the preliminary injunction.30 At the start
of the trial on June 12, 2000, the trial judge heard arguments and
then granted both motions in limine and a motion for partial sum-
mary judgment on the issue of public necessity.31 At the conclusion of
the trial on the fair market value of the property, the jury awarded
$320,000 as just compensation.32
Matthews appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,33 which af-
firmed the circuit court's issuance of injunctive relief and granting of
both of the Commission's preliminary motions. 34 The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals agreed with the Circuit Court that the Commission and
the public would suffer irreparable harm "through the cleaning, grad-
ing, excavating, removal of existing vegetation, and the possible dem-
olition costs" should Matthews have proceeded with construction. 5
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine: (1) whether
the circuit court erred in granting the temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction, and (2) whether the circuit court erred in
granting the Commission's motion in limine that excluded evidence
of damages incurred by Matthews as a result of the temporary re-
straining order and preliminary injunction. 6
2. Legal Background.--Constitutional and statutory provisions
govern eminent domain in Maryland. The latter consists of two gen-
eral types of powers-regular and quick-take-given to authorities
based on their need to take property either immediately or after a
30. Id. In Matthews' opposition to the second motion, the company argued that "the
court has the power ... to see that all issues bearing on the issue ofjust compensation are
preserved and presented to the jury for determination." Id., 792 A.2d at 295-96. Matthews
asserted that "the jury, as the trier of fact, is entitled to hear and consider all evidence
bearing on the landowner's entitlement to just compensation for the condemnation of its
property." Opp'n to Pl.['s] Mot. to Strike or Alt. Second Mot. in Limine at 2, Maryland-
Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. J.L. Matthews, Inc., No. 208820, (Md. Cir. Ct.
June 15, 2000).
31. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 85, 792 A.2d at 296.
32. Id.
33. J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland Nat'l Park & Planning Comm'n, No. 1136 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. May 2, 2001). The Court of Special Appeals opinion written by Judge Davis was
unreported.
34. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 85-86, 792 A.2d at 296. The Court of Special Appeals
also relied on Smith v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 236 Md. 51, 63, 202 A.2d 604, 610 (1964), in
affirming the motions in limine, restating the proposition that speculative damages are not
appropriate in condemnation actions. JL. Matthews, 368 Md. at 85, 792 A.2d at 296. The
court did not address the motions separately, but instead focused on the circuit court's
prohibiting evidence of Matthews' lost profits, which the court branded as speculative, and
therefore, inappropriate. Id. at 86 n.12, 792 A.2d at 297 n.12.
35. J L. Matthews, Inc., No. 1136, slip. op. at 6.
36. Id. at 86, 792 A.2d at 297.
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condemnation proceeding. Both fair market value and the ability to
obtain injunctive relief are based on this distinction.
Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article III, section 40 of the Constitution of Maryland prohibit the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation.3 7
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Fifth
Amendment's Just Compensation Clause are therefore "practically di-
rect authorit[y]" for the interpretation of the identical provision in
the Maryland Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that 'just
compensation" requires the full monetary equivalent of the property
taken such that the property owner must be put in the same position
monetarily as if his property had not been taken.3
In addition to federal case law defining constitutional constraints
on government eminent domain powers, the Maryland General As-
sembly has also added requirements in creating the state regime for
acquiring privately owned land for public purposes. 40 Thus, an exami-
nation of condemnation proceedings must take into account the stat-
utorily created eminent domain requirements, whether injunctive
relief is warranted, and a determination of just compensation for the
taking.
a. Maryland's Statutorily Created Eminent Domain Regime.-
Maryland has an extensive statutory framework to guide governmental
37. The relevant section of the Maryland Constitution states that, "[t]he General As-
sembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to be taken for public use, without
just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first
paid or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation." MD. CONST. art. III, § 40; see
supra note 6 (providing text of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
38. Bureau of Mines of Md. v. George's Creek Coal and Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 156,
321 A.2d 748, 755 (1974).
39. Dodson v. Anne Arundel County, 294 Md. 490, 494-95, 451 A.2d 317, 320 (1982)
(equating "just compensation" with "fair market value" and providing various elements
that may influence a jury's determination of damages); Almota Farmers Elevator & Ware-
house Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973); see also United States v. Miller, 317
U.S. 369, 373 (1943) (stating that the "owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as
he would have occupied if his property had not been taken.").
40. See King v. State Rds. Comm'n, 298 Md. 80, 84-86, 467 A.2d 1032, 1034-35 (1983)
(providing an overview of statutory and state constitutional condemnation principles).
The General Assembly has provided an extensive statutory framework establishing which
governmental entities have condemnation authority, the process to determine the fair mar-
ket value of the condemned property, and the procedures for condemnation actions. See
CODE MD. R. §§ 12-102, 12-210 (2003) (describing "when property is deemed to be taken"
and the "acquisition of title and possession"); see also Utilities, Inc. of Md. v. Wash. Subur-
ban Sanitary Comm'n, 362 Md. 37, 49, 763 A.2d 129, 135 (2000) (remarking that the court
has "underscore[d] the principle that condemnation actions are exclusive special statutory
actions for the exercise of the eminent domain power...").
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entities in the exercise of their eminent domain powers, set forth both
in the Maryland Constitution and in the Maryland Code.4 Political
subdivisions and public entities have no condemnation powers other
than those conferred upon them by the State.42 Therefore, where the
State has conferred condemnation authority, these governmental enti-
ties must strictly follow the statutory procedures."
The General Assembly has delegated to several governmental en-
tities limited powers to acquire property by condemnation for parks,
roads, and other public needs.44 These condemnation actions must
proceed in accordance with Title 12 of the Real Property Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland, which sets forth the methods by which
these governmental entities can exercise the power of eminent do-
main.45 In establishing these procedures the General Assembly has
created two distinct methods for acquiring property-"regular" and
"quick-take" condemnation authority.46
(1) "Regular" Condemnation Authority.-In "regular" condem-
nation proceedings, the condemning authority files a petition pursu-
ant to Title 12, chapter 200 of the Maryland Rules.4 7  The
condemning authority obtains no right to possession of the property
until after a final judgment is obtained and the condemning authority
pays the full amount of the judgment, plus costs.4" Because a govern-
mental entity with regular condemnation authority does not take tide
41. See MD. CONsT. art. III, §§ 40A-40C (providing "quick-take" authority to Baltimore
City; Baltimore, Cecil and Montgomery Counties; State Roads Commission; and Washing-
ton Suburban Sanitary Commission); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 12-102 (when prop-
erty deemed to be taken), 12-103 (value of property set at date of taking), 12-105(b) (fair
market value); MD. ANN. CODE art. 28, § 5-105 (1997) (condemnation proceedings by the
Commission); CODE MD. R. § 12-210 (2003) (acquisition of property titie and possession).
42. Barnett v. Charles County, 206 Md. 478, 484, 112 A.2d 492, 495 (1955).
43. Id.
44. MD. ANN. CODE art. 28, § 5-105 (1997); see supra note 19 (providing the relevant
statutory text of section 5-105).
45. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-102 (1996).
46. See King v. State Rds. Comm'n, 298 Md. 80, 84-86, 467 A.2d 1032, 1034-35 (1983)
(explaining the difference between conventional condemnation actions and "quick-take"
cases).
47. CODE MD. R. 12-102, 12-105 (1996). Rule 12-102 sets forth venue provisions and
Rule 12-105 includes what information must be included in the complaint. Id.
48. Maryland Rule 12-210 states:
At any time after entry of a judgment for the plaintiff for the property con-
demned and awarding compensation to the defendant, the plaintiff may obtain
possession of the condemned property by (1) paying to the defendant or to the
clerk of the court for the use of the defendant the amount awarded the defen-
dant and the costs as determined by the judgment and (2) if the defendant files a
timely appeal and the plaintiff ... fil[es] a bond in an amount and with a surety
approved by the court.
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until the trial occurs, the fair market value of the property is assessed
by the jury "as of the date of trial."49 Therefore, although the con-
demning authority may have initiated condemnation proceedings, the
landowner retains full possession and title of the property up until the
moment the condemning authority pays the just compensation
awarded by thejury.5 ° Only after the just compensation has been paid
does the condemning authority obtain title to the property.51
(2) "Quick-Take" Condemnation Authority. -In contrast to reg-
ular condemnation actions, a condemning authority with "quick-take"
power takes possession of the property prior to trial but subsequent to
payment to the court of the property's estimated fair market value.52
The landowner may then immediately withdraw this deposit, but does
not foreclose the recovery of additional compensation if the jury de-
termines at the subsequent trial that the value of the property is
greater than the amount initially deposited by the condemning au-
thority.53 The Maryland Constitution authorizes quick-take condem-
nation authority only in limited circumstances-namely for purposes
of road and sanitary sewer construction. 54 The purpose of limiting
quick-take authority is to ensure that these powers are afforded only to
those governmental entities that need to acquire property swiftly for
pressing public projects.55 Indeed, governmental takings in general
must always serve a "valid public use," so as to impose upon a private
landowner only when necessary for the general welfare of a commu-
MD. R. 12-210 (2003); see also MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-102(2) (indicating that
condemners who do not have the power to take property prior to trial must pay after trial
judgment awarded pursuant to the Maryland Rules).
49. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-103. Section 12-103 provides that
the value of the property sought to be condemned and of any adjacent property
of the defendant claimed to be affected by the taking shall be determined as of
the date of the taking, if taking has occurred, or as of the date of trial, if taking
has not occurred.
Id.
50. King, 298 Md. at 84, 467 A.2d at 1034. Typically, condemnation trials commence
only after the parties failed to reach an agreement to transfer the property. See MD. ANN.
CODE art. 28, § 5-105 (1997) (authorizing the Commission to initiate proceedings upon
failure to reach a purchase agreement with the landowner).
51. King, 298 Md. at 84, 467 A.2d at 1034.
52. Id. at 85-86, 467 A.2d at 1035.
53. Id. at 86, 467 A.2d at 1035.
54. MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 40A-40C. Section 40A authorizes Baltimore City as well as
Baltimore, Cecil, and Montgomery Counties to exercise quick-take authority. Id. § 40A.
Section 40B grants the State Roads Commission quick-take authority and section 40C al-
lows the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission to exercise quick-take authority. Id.
§§ 40B-40C.
55. See MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 40A-40C (granting quick-take power to governmental
entities which primarily provide important public services such as highways and roads).
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nity.56 Quick-take powers are therefore carefully circumscribed so as
to adequately safeguard the rights of property owners.57
b. The Ability of Condemning Authorities to Obtain Injunctive Re-
lief.-In general, the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to "pre-
serve the status quo" between the parties pending a hearing on the
merits of a dispute.5' Neither the legislature nor the Maryland judici-
ary has clearly defined the role of injunctive relief in the specific con-
text of condemnation cases. Those authorities with quick-take powers
presumably have no need for injunctive relief because they may imme-
diately take possession of a desired piece of land.
In Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc.,59 the Court of Appeals reiter-
ated the four-part test to determine when a preliminary injunction
should be issued.6" The four-part test examines:
(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the mer-
its; (2) the "balance of convenience" determined by whether
greater injury would be done to the defendant by granting
the injunction than would result from its refusal; (3) whether
the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunc-
tion is granted; and (4) the public interest.6 1
The court in Fogle addressed whether an interlocutory injunction
was properly issued by the trial court delaying the implementation of
a state regulation prohibiting smoking in an enclosed workplace. 62
The court determined that parties seeking preliminary relief in the
form of an interlocutory injunction must have a "real probability" of
prevailing on the merits, not just a "remote possibility of doing so." '63
The court also emphasized that in a case involving both governmental
and private parties, trial courts have more discretion to grant injunc-
tive relief in order to protect the public interest.6 4
56. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748
(1974).
57. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Nash, 284 Md. 376, 382, 396 A.2d 538, 541
(1979).
58. Harford County Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford County, 281 Md. 574, 585,
380 A.2d 1041, 1048 (1977).
59. 337 Md. 441, 654 A.2d 449 (1995).
60. Id. at 455-56, 654 A.2d at 456.
61. Id. (citing Dep't of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 404-05, 474 A.2d 191, 197
(1984)).
62. Id. at 446, 654 A.2d at 452.
63. Id. at 456, 654 A.2d at 456-57. The court stated that the party seeking the injunc-
tion must prove the existence of all four factors in order to be entitled to injunctive relief.
Id. at 456, 654 A.2d at 456.
64. Id. at 456, 654 A.2d at 456-57.
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Although there is an abundance of Maryland case law on the gen-
eral use of injunctive relief, there is only a modicum of case law ad-
dressing the use of injunctive relief in condemnation actions,
particularly situations where a governmental entity is seeking to re-
strain a property owner from altering the property prior to com-
mencement of the proceedings. The Court of Appeals did address
the issue in Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Nash.65 In
Nash, the court indicated that injunctions should be issued in con-
demnation actions "to prevent the destruction, misuse, or alienation
of land" to "the detriment of the condemnor."66 Although setting
forth the standard for injunctive relief, the court in Nash held that the
rights of the property owners would have been adversely effected by a
preliminary injunction.67 In Nash, the WSSC deemed it necessary to
acquire a certain tract of land in Prince George's County for a sludge
composting facility and entered into negotiations to buy the land and
its standing timber from the landowner.6" The WSSC failed to reach
an agreement with the landowner, who then entered into a contract
with a third party for the standing timber.69 The WSSC then filed a
petition for regular condemnation in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County and sought an injunction prohibiting the removal of
the trees.7" The circuit court denied the injunction request.71 The
Court of Appeals upheld the denial on the grounds that regular con-
demnation proceedings afforded WSSC "no rights in the land" and
that the landowner "was still free to use the land, enjoy it or dispose of
it as before."72 The court reasoned that the WSSC would obtain "sub-
stantial dominion" over the parcel of land through an injunction,
which would substantially interfere with the current landowner's prop-
erty rights.73 The court stated that an injunction would "seriously cur-
tail the use of property" by the landowner. 4 Furthermore, the court
explained that governmental entities with only regular condemnation
authority would essentially gain quick-take authority by way of injunc-
65. 284 Md. 376, 396 A.2d 538 (1979) (per curiam).
66. Id. at 383 n.5, 396 A.2d at 542 n.5.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 377, 396 A.2d at 538.
69. Id., 396 A.2d at 538-39.
70. Id. at 378-79, 396 A.2d at 539. Although the WSSC had quick-take authority, it was
unsure whether such power could be exercised in this case and thus decided not to pro-
ceed under the quick-take procedures. Id. at 378-79 n.3, 396 A.2d at 539-40 n.3.
71. Id. at 379, 396 A.2d at 539-40.
72. Id. at 381, 396 A.2d at 540-41.
73. Id. at 381-82, 396 A.2d at 541.
74. Id. at 381, 396 A.2d at 541.
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tive relief.7 5 The court, however, in a footnote stated that its holding
did not foreclose the availability of injunctive relief in cases "to pre-
vent the destruction, misuse, or alienation of land or an interest
therein to the detriment of the condemnor."7 6 In the same footnote,
the court also prescribed a case-by-case analysis to balance "the rights
of the condemner with the rights of the condemnee."7 7 The court
failed to elaborate any further on what circumstances would allow a
party seeking an injunction to meet such a threshold.
c. Determining "Fair Market Value" in Condemnation Actions.-
Once condemnation actions proceed to trial, courts traditionally de-
termine just compensation based on the fair market value of the prop-
erty.7 8 The Maryland legislature has defined fair market value as "the
price as of the valuation date for the highest and best use of the prop-
erty which a vendor, willing but not obligated to sell, would accept for
the property, and which a purchaser, willing but not obligated to buy,
would pay . . . . " Fair market value can be assessed in reference to
the uses and purposes to which the land is adapted, including any
special features that may enhance its marketability and value.8" How-
ever, fair market value is never based upon what the property is worth
to the condemning party.8 ' The proper calculation is based on the
sale price paid by a purchaser acquiring the land for any or all of its
purposes.82
75. Id. at 382, 396 A.2d at 541. The court noted that the WSSC would be able to gain
control over the land via injunctive relief and avoid the obligations incident to quick-take
proceedings. Id. Essentially, the court observed that the WSSC could use an injunction to
restrict the landowner's use of land, but would not need to pay the amount required under
quick-take, until the time of the condemnation trial. Id.
76. Id. at 383 n.5, 396 A.2d at 54142 n.5; see Fogle v. H & G Rest., Inc., 337 Md. 441,
455-56, 654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995) (listing the four factors comprising the traditional test for
whether injunctive relief should be granted). The court in Nash provided no references to
other case law nor did it define "destruction, misuse, or alienation." Nash, 284 Md. at 383
n.5, 396 A.2d at 54142 n.5.
77. Nash, 284 Md. at 383 n.5, 396 A.2d at 541 n.5.
78. See Brack v. Mayor of Baltimore, 125 Md. 378, 381, 93 A. 994, 995 (1915) (stating
that "the award must be based upon [the] actual market value at the time of condemna-
tion); State Rds. Comm'n v. Warriner, 211 Md. 480, 485, 128 A.2d 248, 251 (1957) (assert-
ing that damages in condemnation cases are based on "fair market value of the land at the
time of the taking").
79. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-105(b) (1996).
80. Brack, 125 Md. at 381, 93 A. at 995.
81. Id.
82. Id.; see also Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (finding that fair mar-
ket value "does not depend upon uses to which [the landowner] has devoted his land" but
on consideration of "all suitable uses"); Pumphrey v. State Rds. Comm'n, 175 Md. 498, 506,
2 A.2d 668, 671 (1938) (determining that consideration may be given to any utility for
which the land "is adapted and for which it is immediately available").
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In addition, fair market value is not necessarily constrained to the
present use of the land. In State Roads Commission v. Adams,s 3 the
Court of Appeals contemplated whether a jury calculating just com-
pensation could consider the possibility that a dairy farm, part of
which had been condemned for placement of a highway, might be-
come a residential development.s4 The court remarked that the trier
of fact is not limited to considering the value of land for current pur-
poses, but may also consider all uses to which it might be put in the
"immediate" or "reasonably near" future.8 5
Although consideration of development potential may be part of
the valuation of the land, the Court of Appeals has determined that
mere speculation is inappropriate in calculating just compensation.
In Smith v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 6 the landowner, whose property
was "raw" as a result of scarring from mining operations, sought to
introduce evidence that his property could be rezoned and
redeveloped comparable to a nearby industrial park. 7 The court ex-
plained that there was no comparison because the land was unfit for
industrial development, it needed substantial expenditures to put the
land in suitable condition, and there were no intentions or plans in
place to convert the land into an industrial park. 8 The court stated
that there are limits on evidence suggesting comparability and rele-
vance, such as in Smith, where the evidence was overtly speculative.8
In addition to the potential uses and improvements on the prop-
erty, both the Maryland legislature and judiciary have determined the
date of the taking.9 ° The date of the taking depends on the type of
condemnation authority the General Assembly has granted to the gov-
ernmental entity seeking to acquire the property. 1 The court has ap-
plied this statutory regime such that the value of the property sought
to be condemned is computed either as the date of the actual taking
83. 238 Md. 371, 209 A.2d 247 (1965).
84. Id. at 374, 209 A.2d at 248.
85. Id. at 384, 209 A.2d at 254; Pumphrey, 175 Md. at 506, 2 A.2d at 672. The court in
Adams also approved the consideration of sales of comparable land when calculating dam-
ages. Adams, 238 Md. at 378, 209 A.2d at 250.
86. 236 Md. 51, 202 A.2d 604 (1964).
87. Id. at 58, 202 A.2d at 608.
88. Id. at 59, 202 A.2d at 608.
89. Id.
90. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-103 (1996). This section states that the value of
the condemned property is determined by "the date of the taking, if taking has occurred,
or as of the date of trial, if taking has not occurred." Id.
91. Id. § 12-102. Subsection (1) refers to quick-take authorities who may take the prop-
erty prior to trial upon payment to the condemnee or into the court. Subsection (2) refers
to all other cases, i.e. condemnors with only regular authority. Id.
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or on the date of trial.92 For governmental entities with regular con-
demning authority, the date of the taking is set as the date of the trial.
In contrast, those authorities with quick-take authority take the prop-
erty upon payment into the court or to property owner of the esti-
mated value.9"
3. The Court's Reasoning. -In J.L. Matthews, Inc., the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland reversed the Court of Special Appeals by holding
that a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction
prohibiting Matthews from proceeding with efforts to develop its
property were improperly granted by the trial court. 4 The Court of
Appeals also held the trial court erred in granting two preliminary
motions which prevented Matthews from presenting evidence of lost
profits to the jury during trial.95 Judge Harrell, writing for the major-
ity, framed the issues before the court by first examining principles of
eminent domain law, the statutory basis for condemnation, and the
scope of the Commission's condemnation authority. 6 The court
noted that government power of eminent domain is not plenary, but
is limited by the United States and Maryland Constitutions' public use
and just compensation requirements.97 The court further noted that
eminent domain statutes also limit the power of condemning
authorities. 8
Next, the court reviewed the role of the jury in determining just
compensation and the appropriate standard for arriving at such a de-
termination.99 The court explained that under section 12-103 of the
Real Property Article of the Maryland Code, the value of the property
sought to be condemned is determined on the date of trial because
that is the date when the taking occurs.1 ° °
The court then turned to address the two categories of condem-
nation authority provided to governmental entities in Maryland-
92. Id.; see also King v. State Rds. Comm'n, 298 Md. 80, 84-87, 467 A.2d 1032, 1034-35
(1983).
93. King, 298 Md. at 86-87, 467 A.2d at 1035.
94. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 95, 792 A.2d at 302.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 86-87, 792 A.2d at 297.
97. Id. at 87, 792 A.2d at 297; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (providing
the text and the provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); see also supra note
37 (providing text of Article III, section 40 of the Maryland Constitution).
98. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 88, 792 A.2d at 297; see also supra note 19 (providing
the test of the statute granting condemnation authority to the Commission).
99. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 88-89, 792 A.2d at 298. The court noted that just
compensation has been "traditionally equated" with the "fair market value of the land." Id.
at 88, 792 A.2d at 298.
100. Id. at 89, 792 A.2d at 298; MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 12-103 (1996).
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"regular" and "quick-take."'' The court noted that the Commission
only enjoyed regular condemnation authority.'0 2 The court also de-
termined that a de novo review as to the appropriateness of the injunc-
tion was the appropriate standard, even though an abuse of discretion
standard typically applies to appellate review of a lower court's equity
jurisdiction. 1 3
Finally, as a preliminary matter, the court noted that because the
injunction expired prior to the case coming before the court, "the
propriety of the injunction ordinarily would be a moot issue. "104 How-
ever, the court explained that it retains constitutional authority to ex-
press its views "on the merits of a moot case" when there is an
"imperative and manifest" public interest in having the matter de-
cided.105 Because the exercise of eminent domain involves funda-
mental "relationships between government and its citizens" and
because condemning authorities lacking quick-take power may simi-
larly attempt to use injunctive relief as a substitute for this power, the
court believed it was necessary to address the issue.10 6 In particular,
the court noted the need to offer guidance to condemning authorities
on how to operate within the scope of their regular authority."0 7
In reaching the substantive issues of the case, the court first ad-
dressed the four factors traditionally applied to determine the appro-
priateness of injunctive relief in condemnation proceedings.1 0 8
Relying on Nash, the court again stated that courts should not rely
101. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 89-90, 792 A.2d at 298-99.
102. Id. at 90 n.16, 792 A.2d at 298 n.16. The Commission only has regular condemna-
tion authority pursuant to section 5-105 of Article 28 of the Maryland Code. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 28, § 5-105 (1997) (providing that the Commission "may enter and take posses-
sion of' property only after "paying to the clerk of the court the amount of the award and
all costs taxed"); see also supra note 19 (providing full text of section 5-105). In contrast to
regular condemnation authority, quick-take authority is provided in limited situations by
the Maryland Constitution. MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 40A-40C; see also supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text (describing the limited situations where the Maryland Constitution
grants quick-take authority).
103. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 93-94, 792 A.2d at 301. In determining that de novo
review was appropriate, the court took into account "the nature of the underlying cause of
action .... the collateral role played by injunctive relief," and the purely legal question
implicated by Matthews' constitutionally based rights conflicting with the Commission's
.attempted substitution of injunctive relief for its inability to use quick-take condemnation
authority." Id.
104. Id. at 96, 792 A.2d at 302.
105. Id., 792 A.2d at 302-03; see also Lloyd v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36,
43, 111 A.2d 379, 382 (1954) (adopting an exception to the mootness doctrine when pub-
lic concern is "imperative and manifest").
106. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 97-98, 792 A.2d at 303-04.




exclusively on the four factors in deciding whether to issue an injunc-
tion. ' 9 In addition, the court stated that injunctive relief in regular
condemnation proceedings should be granted only to prevent "de-
struction, misuse, or alienation of land.""' The Matthews court fo-
cused on language in Nash that strongly disfavored the use of
injunctive relief because of the landowner's suffering of interferences
"tantamount to deprivations of their use and enjoyment of the prop-
erty."'' Therefore, the court reiterated that the availability of injunc-
tive relief in condemnation proceedings depends upon a case-by-case
"balancing of the rights of the condemnor with the rights of the con-
demnee," so as to minimize invasive interferences with property
rights.' 12 Applying this balancing test, the court concluded that Mat-
thews' right to develop the property and to just compensation greatly
outweighed the Commission's "speculative showing" as to its interest
in preventing the removal of trees and other vegetation from the
property. 1 3 Because a property owner should be free to use their
land prior to the date of the actual taking, the court also discussed
why regular condemnation authorities should be unable to ordinarily
obtain injunctive relief."4 These authorities' lack of quick-take power
"is precisely what mandates that [they] generally not be granted prelimi-
nary injunctions in condemnation cases.""' 5 Thus, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the trial court had improperly granted the preliminary
injunction. 116
Relying on this conclusion, the court then determined that the
trial court should have permitted Matthews to present evidence at trial
of the damages resulting from the injunction.'17 The Commission
claimed that the granting of the preliminary motions only precluded
evidence as to "injunctive damages" and did not prevent Matthews
from producing evidence as to fair market value of the property.'18
109. Id.
110. Id. at 100, 792 A.2d at 305.
111. Id. at 99, 792 A.2d at 304 (quoting Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Nash, 284
Md. 376, 382, 396 A.2d 538, 541 (1979)).
112. 368 Md. at 100, 792 A.2d at 305 (quoting Nash, 284 Md. at 383 n.5, 396 A.2d at 541-
42 n.5).
113. Id. at 102, 792 A.2d at 306. The court believed that the Commission's draft master
plan was merely "conceptual" and that the standard announced in Nash did not contem-
plate protecting property from the impact of "what-ifs" and "maybes." Id.
114. Id. at 100, 792 A.2d at 305; see also supra notes 90-93 (discussing the date of the
taking under case law and statutory framework).
115. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 104, 792 A.2d at 307.
116. Id. at 104, 792 A.2d at 307.
117. Id. at 109, 792 A.2d at 310.
118. Id. at 105, 792 A.2d at 308.
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The court rejected this argument, finding that the trial court's ruling
could have been and was properly construed to mean that Matthews
could not present evidence of how he would have developed the prop-
erty but for the injunction and how such development would have
increased the property's fair market value." 9 By obtaining the prelim-
inary injunction, the court concluded the Commission was able to
control Matthews' lawful action in developing the property and to arti-
ficially constrain the jury's proper determination of the property
value.1 2' The court determined this to be in "direct contravention" of
Matthews' rights and outside the scope of the Commission's condem-
nation authority.' 21 Thus, the court held that Matthews was entitled
to present evidence of how improvements to the property would have
increased the property's fair market value at the date of trial.
122
Judge Raker dissented focusing on several issues, most impor-
tantly that the destruction of the vegetation on the proposed park and
subsequent erection of improvements constituted "irreparable
harm."'123 According to Judge Raker, these harms justified the grant-
ing of injunctive relief in accordance with the standard announced in
Nash and reiterated by the majority. 124 Judge Raker distinguished the
type of evidence that was precluded from trial by the granting of the
Commission's motion in limine. Whereas the majority claimed the
motion denied Matthews the right to present evidence as to the fair
market value of the property including improvements, the dissent
claimed the motion only precluded evidence of damages flowing from
the injunction.125 Therefore, in the eyes of the dissent, Matthews
merely failed to offer evidence of fair market value at the condemna-
tion trial and hence failed to preserve the issue for appellate review.
1 26
4. Analysis.-In J.L. Matthews, Inc., the Court of Appeals held
that the preliminary injunction preventing Matthews' proposed devel-
opment adversely affected the company's property interests and that
the trial court also improperly prevented Matthews from providing ev-
idence at trial of damages resulting from the injunction. 127 In so
holding, the Court of Appeals properly protected Matthews' ability to
119. Id. at 105-06, 792 A.2d at 308.
120. Id. at 107, 792 A.2d at 309.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 110, 792 A.2d at 311 (Raker, J., dissenting),
124. Id.
125. Id. at 111, 792 A.2d at 311.
126. Id. at 111-12, 792 A.2d at 312.
127. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 107, 792 A.2d at 309.
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exercise its right while it still owned the property.1 28 However, in con-
cluding that the preliminary injunction had been improperly granted,
the court failed to provide clear guidelines as to when preliminary
injunctions are available in regular condemnation proceedings. The
court recognized that it should consider factors other than the ele-
ments traditionally considered when deciding whether to grant an in-
junction. However, the court failed to clarify the interplay between
these other factors and the traditional elements in the specific context
of condemnation proceedings. The court ultimately missed an oppor-
tunity to address what circumstances would allow a governmental en-
tity exercising regular condemnation authority to prevent a
landowner from altering the property prior to trial. In not expressly
prohibiting the availability of injunctive relief, the court failed to clar-
ify the proper role for such a remedy.
a. The Court Failed to Clarify Wat Elements of Injunctive Relief
Are Appropriate in Condemnation Proceedings.-Traditionally, the Court
of Appeals has followed a four-element balancing test to determine
whether injunctive relief is appropriate.' 29 This test examines the
likelihood of success on the merits-whether greater injury would be
done to defendant by the granting of the injunction than from its
refusal, whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury unless the
injunction is granted, and the public interest.1 30 However, inj.L. Mat-
thews, Inc., the court introduced additional elements to the traditional
analysis, thereby altering the balancing test for condemnation pro-
ceedings."' 1 The court found that a regular condemning authority
could obtain an injunction in "exceptional or extraordinary circum-
stances to prevent the detrimental 'destruction, misuse, or alienation
of land."" 32 In setting forth additional factors to be considered, the
court failed to provide guidance as to how such factors should be
weighed. Although the court acknowledged the need for considering
these other factors, the court never analyzed the propriety of the trial
court's decision to issue the preliminary injunction in light of the
128. Id. at 104, 792 A.2d at 307.
129. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing the four factors of the tradi-
tional test).
130. Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441, 455-56, 654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995).
131. SeeJL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 98, 792 A.2d at 304 (stating that "a trial court
should not rely solely on those [traditional] factors in cases where a condemning authority
seeks injunctive relief to prevent a property owner from developing his, her, or its property
prior to a condemnation trial").
132. Id. at 104, 792 A.2d at 307 (quoting Wash. Sub. Sanitary Comm'n v. Nash, 284 Md.
376, 383 n.5, 396 A.2d 538, 542 n.5 (1979)).
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traditional test. 13 1 Instead, the court indicated that the Commission
improperly relied upon the four traditional factors in not recognizing
that condemnation proceedings "[command] different or additional
requirements.' 1 34 Although the court ultimately arrived at the correct
result, the court's analysis would have been clearer and easier to apply
in the future had the court framed its discussion in terms of the four
traditional factors.
Under the first factor, the court should look at whether the plain-
tiff would succeed on the merits of their motion for a preliminary
injunction. 3 5 In J.L. Matthews, Inc., the Commission argued under
the first factor that it most likely would succeed on the merits because
it possessed condemnation authority, and the only remaining issue
was the fair market value of the property.'3 6 The Commission argued
that it met this first factor because of the statutory authority given to it
as a governmental entity with eminent domain power.13 7 Because
courts are not strictly bound by the tenets of traditional equity when at
least one party is the government, the court would probably find the
first factor satisfied. 13 8
The second factor, the "balance of convenience," is determined
by whether greater injury would be done to the party against which
the injunction is sought than would result from its refusal. 139 Rather
than scrutinize the Commission's argument in light of potential harm,
however, the court focused exclusively on balancing the rights of the
Commission with those of Matthews.' 4 0 The Commission pointed to a
number of general effects that Matthews' proposed development
would have had on the property, including the destruction of trees
and vegetation, increased costs of acquisition, and the resulting inabil-
ity to acquire other park lands in the county. 14 ' The court correctly
concluded that Matthews, as the current owner, had a greater interest
133. Id. at 98, 792 A.2d at 304.
134. Id. at 83 n.8, 792 A.2d at 295 n.8.
135. Fogle, 337 Md. at 455-56, 654 A.2d at 456; see also supra note 61 and accompanying
text (listing the first factor of the injunction analysis).
136. Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 6-8, J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Mary-
land-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 368 Md. 71, 792 A.2d 288 (2002) (No. 65).
137. Mem. at 7; see also supra note 19 (delineating the statutory eminent domain author-
ized to the Commission).
138. State Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md. 548, 555-56,
383 A.2d 51, 55-56 (1977).
139. Fogle, 337 Md. 441, 455-56, 654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995); see also supra note 61 and
accompanying text (listing the second factor of injunction analysis).
140. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 102, 792 A.2d at 306 (applying the "threshold stan-
dards of the Nash foomote").
141. Id. at 100, 792 A.2d at 305; see also supra note 23 (recapping the Commission's
argument about the injury it incurred).
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in the use and enjoyment of the land, but the court relied entirely on
a balancing of rights. 142 The court did not take into account the Com-
mission's injury because of the refusal of the injunction. As a matter
of fact, the court never discussed the second factor in terms of a "bal-
ance of convenience"; the court, instead, concentrated on the degree
of injury to the property in question."' Thus, it is difficult to under-
stand the basis for the court's analysis-traditional injunction analysis
proceeds with a "balance of convenience" whereas the court here pro-
ceeded to balance the rights of the Commission with those of
Matthews.
The third factor in the traditional analysis involves whether the
party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable injury unless the
injunction is granted. 4' The Commission argued that commence-
ment of construction was imminent because Matthews already had
permits secured and had materials delivered."' 5 Noting that construc-
tion of the townhouse units would result in the loss of irreplaceable
natural vegetation as well as increased costs to demolish the newly
built structures, the Commission argued that such "irreparable injury"
would render the parcel of land unsuitable for a public park and
would force the Commission to rework the town's master plan.
146
Again, the court departed from traditional analysis in noting and rely-
ing upon other factors in determining when a condemning authority
may appropriately obtain injunctive relief.147 The court stated that
"extraordinary or exceptional circumstances" alone will qualify to
meet the Nash standard of "destruction, misuse, or alienation of
land."' 8 The court never couched its discussion in the traditional no-
tion of "irreparable injury," which obfuscates the proper test for in-
junctions in condemnation proceedings.
The final factor of the traditional analysis is whether granting the
injunction would be in the public interest."' 9 The Commission's use
142. 368 Md. at 102, 792 A.2d at 306; see also supra text accompanying note 113 (indicat-
ing Matthews' superior right in the use of his property over the speculative right the Com-
mission had in the vegetation on his property).
143. J.L. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 84 n.8, 792 A.2d at 295 n.8.
144. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing the four factors in injunction
analysis).
145. Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 10.
146. Id.
147. J.L. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 98, 792 A.2d at 304.
148. Id. at 102, 792 A.2d at 306 (quoting Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Nash, 284
Md. 376 n.5, 396 A.2d 538 n.5 (1979)); see infra notes 155-161 (discussing the Nash
standard).
149. Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441, 455-56, 654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995); see
also supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing four factors in injunction analysis).
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of the land as a public park concededly qualifies as within the public
interest. Indeed, the court did not consider these latter two factors
explicitly. Instead, the court embedded its analysis in balancing the
rights of the condemnor with those of the condemnee.150 Traditional
analysis would examine the public interest, which the Commission as-
serted as the need to maintain the natural state of Matthews' property
so that the Commission would not be required to expend additional
public funds to replace any cleared vegetation or to remove con-
structed improvements. 15  In its order, the Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County agreed that granting of injunctive relief would "clearly
be in the public interest" because preserving the natural condition of
the property would decrease the pubic cost to create a park. "15 2 The
Court of Special Appeals squarely addressed the issue and found that
the lower court did not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction
and accepting the public interest argument. 15' Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals, in adopting its Nash "balancing of the rights" ap-
proach, never separately addressed the public interest element. Such
an oversight flies in the face of the court's precedent, which indicates
that the public interest factor is of even greater importance when a
governmental entity (such as the Commission) seeks the
injunction. 154
b. Comparison of the Nash Standard with Traditional Injunction
Analysis: The Court's Failure to Differentiate.-The court in J.L. Matthews,
Inc. based its analysis on the standard applied in Washington Suburban
Sanitary Commission v. Nash. However, the Nash standard-that a court
may issue an injunction if there is "destruction, misuse, or alienation
of the land"-appeared almost as an afterthought when introduced in
theJ.L. Matthews, Inc. decision. 5 5 The Nash court did not adopt these
terms as the focal point of its opinion, but instead relegated them to a
closing footnote, which described exceptional circumstances for
150. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 102, 792 A.2d at 306 (applying the "threshold stan-
dards of the Nash footnote").
151. Mot. for T.R.O. at 3,J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n, 368 Md. 71, 792 A.2d 288 (2002) (No. 65).
152. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. J.L. Matthews, Inc., No.
208820, slip. op. (Md. Cir. Ct. June 15, 2000).
153. J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, No. 1136,
slip op. at 4-6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 2, 2001).
154. State Dep't of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md. 548, 555-
59, 383 A.2d 51, 55-58 (1977).
155. 284 Md. 376, 383 n.5, 396 A.2d 538, 542 n.5 (1979); see also note 66 (describing how
the JL. Matthews, Inc. court adopted the Nash reasoning as a standard).
20031
MARYLAND LAw REVIEW
which injunctive relief would be appropriate. 11 6 However, the Court
of Appeals took hold of this footnote and construed it as a full-fledged
standard in JL. Matthews, Inc. by applying it either in place of, or in
addition to the four-traditional factors of injunctive relief.157
The words that make up the Nash standard-"destruction, mis-
use, or alienation of land"-seem to relate more to the second and
third factors rather than exist as a separate factor in the analysis. 158
"Destruction, misuse, and alienation" of the property would seemingly
enter the analysis when considering either the injury that would be
suffered if the injunction was granted balanced against the harm that
would result from its refusal (second prong of injunction analysis), or
the irreparable injury that the party seeking the injunction would suf-
fer if it is not granted (third prong of the injunction analysis). If the
court wanted to adopt the Nash footnote as the controlling standard
for condemnation proceedings in lieu of the four-factor test, it failed
to explicitly do so.15 9 Instead, the court hedges in implying that the
Nash approach may be different from or additional to the traditional
factors. 160
In fact, in J.L. Matthews, Inc., the court appears to have fully
adopted the Nash factors-only for condemnation cases-in addition
to the long-standing, four-prong approach to issuing injunctions. Al-
though condemnation cases may require application of a different
test, the court did not flesh out this concept, which is necessary, espe-
cially since the standard upon which it bases this new test was rele-
gated to a footnote in a case over twenty years old. 6 ' The court could
have remedied such a confusing result by noting the Nash test as part
of the injunctive relief analysis, but not a standard in addition to or in
lieu of the four factors.
c. When Condemnation Authorities and Private Landowners
Clash: Disparate Definitions of "Destruction, Misuse, and Alienation. "--The
issue before the court in JL. Matthews, Inc. essentially involved a clash
156. 284 Md. at 383 n.5, 396 A.2d at 542 n.5.
157. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 98, 792 A.2d at 304. As noted earlier, the court
proceeds to evaluate the injunction in terms of the additional factors, and not the tradi-
tional ones. Id. Therefore, it appears unclear whether the additional factors are truly addi-
tional or if they supersede the traditional elements in condemnation cases.
158. Nash, 284 Md. at 383 n.5, 396 A.2d at 542 n.5.
159. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 98, 792 A.2d at 304.
160. Id. at 84 n.8, 792 A.2d at 295 n.8; see also Nash, 284 Md. at 383 n.5, 396 A.2d at 542
n.5; see supra notes 30-154 and accompanying text (recounting how the JL. Matthews, Inc.
court favored a balancing approach rather than the traditional elements in injunctive re-
lief analysis).
161. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 98, 792 A.2d at 304.
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between governmental entities' condemnation authority and property
owners' right to use their property as they wish.' 6 2 Regular condem-
nation authority coupled with the ability to obtain injunctive relief
creates virtually the same effect as quick-take condemnation author-
ity.'63 By not addressing the proper role for injunctive relief in con-
demnation proceedings, the court leaves uncertain its application in
the future. On one hand, not allowing governmental entities with
regular condemnation authority the ability to obtain preliminary in-
junctions may encourage landowners facing condemnation to in-
crease development in hopes of thwarting the government's desire to
acquire their property. 164 On the other hand, allowing governmental
entities to obtain preliminary injunctions essentially grants them the
ability to exercise the power of eminent domain in a manner not pre-
scribed by the legislature and in a manner that proscribes private
landowners' property rights.165 In leaving open the question as to
when development becomes "destruction, misuse, or alienation," the
court failed to complete its analysis of when a preliminary injunction
should be granted to a governmental entity with regular condemna-
tion authority.
The court's reliance upon the potential clash between harm to
persons seeking injunctive relief and harm to property owner's rights
was not necessarily inappropriate, but the court's analysis failed to in-
terpret what constitutes "destruction, misuse, and alienation."' 66 The
court points out that the "speculative interest" the Commission has in
the trees and vegetation on the property does not demonstrate the
162. See id. at 100-04, 792 A.2d at 305-07 (conducting a "balancing of rights" between the
Commission and Matthews).
163. Nash, 284 Md. at 382, 396 A.2d at 541; see supra note 75 and accompanying text
(reiterating the Nash court's concern that an entity with only "regular" condemning au-
thority would gain "quick-take" powers by way of injunctive relief).
164. J.L. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 104 n.28, 792 A.2d at 307 n.28. In a footnote, the
court explained that up until the time of taking, a property owner is free to use the land as
he or she sees fit, including constructing improvements or other developments on the
land. Id.; see supra note 25 (quoting the circuit court judge's concern that construction
would result in the parcel of land becoming unavailable for a park as intended).
165. See Nash, 284 Md. at 382, 396 A.2d at 541 (describing the Maryland Constitution
and how it relates to the State's eminent domain power). If government entities with regu-
lar condemning authority were allowed liberal access to injunctions, this would circumvent
the extensive statutory framework established by the Maryland legislature. SeeJL. Mat-
thews, Inc., 368 Md. at 108, 792 A.2d at 309 (noting that the Commission could not use
injunctive relief as a "surrogate" for the quick-take authority that it lacked). In essence,
such access to injunctive relief would give regular condemning authorities the quick-take
powers that were not specifically provided by statute. Id. at 104, 792 A.2d at 307; see also
MD. ANN. CODE art. 28, § 5-105 (1997) (providing the Maryland-National Capital Park and
Planning Commission with only regular condemning authority).
166. Nash, 284 Md. at 383 n.5, 396 A.2d at 542 n.5.
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"level of extraordinary or exceptional circumstances implied by the
Nash footnote."'167  Consequently, courts, landowners, and planning
authorities share equal uncertainty as to when that threshold has been
reached.
In deciding in Matthews' favor, the court protected the rights of
the property owner in the face of the governmental entity's strong
and invasive power to take the property.16 Although arriving at the
correct result, the court relied on an undefined standard, leaving the
words "destruction," "misuse," and "alienation" open to interpreta-
tion, and, in turn, confusion.1 69 For example, governments or other
governmental authorities seeking to condemn property may construe
these terms broadly and claim that the slightest activity altering land
in any way would constitute "destruction" or "misuse."170 Or, in light
of this decision, a court may grant an injunction in the rarest of situa-
tions where a condemnor faces extreme and urgent circumstances.
Landowners aligning themselves with the court's view are likely to
confine the terms to such narrow, exceptional circumstances.' 71 In
fact, Judge Raker in dissent argued that the loss of vegetation and
construction of buildings constituted "irreparable harm," justifying in-
junctive relief as understood in Nash. 7 2 Interestingly, the Nash court
never mentioned "irreparable harm" as it is defined in the traditional
injunction analysis.17 Moreover, Judge Raker's conclusion as to
whether the extreme circumstances are present, contravenes the ma-
167. JL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 102, 792 A.2d at 306.
168. See id. at 104, 792 A.2d at 307 (noting that landowners must be protected from
government entities trying to use injunctions to freeze values of property). In Washington
Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Utilities, Inc., the court acknowledged that "the more recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court have been particularly protective of property
rights in the takings context." 365 Md. 1, 39, 775 A.2d 1178, 1200 (2001).
169. The dictionary defines "destruction" as "the action or process of destroying some-
thing." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIoNARY 225 (7th ed. 1970). The relevant denota-
tion of "misuse" is "incorrect or improper use." Id. at 542. "Alienation" is defined as "a
conveyance of property to another." Id. at 22.
170. SeeJL. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 100-01, 792 A.2d at 305 (reviewing the Commis-
sion's argument that Matthews' intended development would destroy existing trees and
vegetation).
171. See id. at 102, 792 A.2d at 306 (remarking that "conceptual" plans and interest in
retaining existing trees and vegetation on property would not suffice to meet the level of
"extraordinary ...circumstances implied by the Nash footnote"); see also supra note 23
(describing the Commission's arguments as to why the circuit court should grant its
injunction).
172. Id. at 110, 792 A.2d at 311.
173. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Nash, 284 Md. 376, 396 A.2d 538 (1979). The
Nash court seems to focus almost exclusively on the rights of the landowners and con-
demnors without even venturing into traditional injunction analysis. See id. at 378-81, 396
A.2d at 540-42 (setting forth the Nash court's reasoning).
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jority's conclusion and hence, indicates that reasonable minds will dif-
fer. 174 Because the Nash approach is highly subjective, the traditional
analysis would be a more workable standard unless the court can pro-
vide greater substance to the meaning of "destruction, misuse, or
alienation of land."
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals in JL. Matthews, Inc. cor-
rectly concluded that a trial court's granting of a preliminary injunc-
tion and granting of two preliminary motions preventing Matthews
from introducing evidence as to the value of the property had been
improperly granted. The court determined that the Commission had
regular condemnation authority, thereby limiting its ability to obtain
injunctive relief to only extraordinary circumstances. 175 In determin-
ing that the preliminary injunction was improperly granted, the court
failed to apply the traditional four-prong test, focusing instead on ad-
ditional factors as to whether the property was in danger of destruc-
tion, misuse, or alienation. The court never identified whether those
factors are part of or supersede the traditional analysis. The court's
analysis did not sufficiently address when it is proper for a court to
issue a preliminary injunction in cases involving a governmental entity
with regular condemnation authority. Thus, the court has left the is-
sue on infirm ground and the standard will likely be difficult to apply
in future cases.
GREGORY G. ScI-IWAB
174. SeeJ.L. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 110, 792 A.2d at 311 (stating that "the destruction
of the natural vegetation... constitute [s] precisely the type of irreparable harm that would
justify injunctive as contemplated in Nash").
175. Id. at 104, 792 A.2d at 307.
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VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. An Unnecessary Intrusion into the Formation of Public Policy to Create
an Exception to the Employment At-Will Doctrine in the Absence
of Legislative Authority
In Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,1 the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land considered whether to recognize a cause of action for wrongful
discharge where an employer terminates an employee for investigat-
ing and reporting the suspicious activity of a co-worker.2 The court
held that public policy in Maryland justified such an exception to the
traditional notion of at-will employment that an employee can be dis-
charged at any time.' The court, therefore, adopted a cause of action
in tort for wrongful discharge, but limited its application to instances
where employees report the criminal activity of co-workers to the
proper law enforcement authorities and are consequently discharged
for their actions.4 Because the employee in this case, Edward L.
Wholey, did not report the suspicious criminal activity of his manager
to the proper authorities, the court concluded that he had not prop-
erly stated a cause of action.5
Although the court endeavored to apply care in creating a new
cause of action in Maryland, adoption of this new exception to the at-
will employment doctrine was an unnecessary step in this case. 6 Be-
cause no clear public policy mandate exists to protect employees who
report suspicious activity of a co-worker to their superiors, the court
created an exception where the case did not warrant one.7 In the
absence of an affirmation by the legislature that an action for wrong-
ful discharge should be extended to cases like Wholey, the court
should not have created the new tort.' Additionally, the court's reli-
ance on a criminal statute to find support for public policy was mis-
placed.9 The statute places no duty on the employee to report any
1. 370 Md. 38, 803 A.2d 482 (2002).
2. Id. at 43, 803 A.2d at 484.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 59, 803 A.2d at 494.
5. Id. at 43, 803 A.2d at 484.
6. See id. at 52, 803 A.2d at 489-90 (noting the care required in creating new public
policy).
7. Id. at 49, 803 A.2d at 502.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 57-59, 803 A.2d at 493-94. The court relied on section 762 of Article 27 of the
Maryland Code to support its decision to create the new exception. Id. See infra note 130
for text of statute.
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criminal activity and the majority's reading of the statute expands the
class of people protected by the statute.1" Under the majority's read-
ing, the statute applies to any employee regardless of whether the em-
ployee has a duty to report the activity or whether the employee was
testifying as a victim or witness.'" In the absence of a clearly discern-
able public policy mandate protecting private whistle-blower employ-
ees, the court should have declined to adopt a new exception and
deferred completely to the legislature.
1. The Case.-Wholey was employed at the Glen Burnie, Mary-
land Sears as a security officer for twenty-four years.' 2 He began work-
ing for Sears in 1972, and within six months was promoted to Assistant
Security Manager. 3 In 1980, he was promoted to the position of Se-
curity Manager. 4 In this position, Wholey investigated employee and
customer theft of store merchandise. 15 In March of 1995, Wholey wit-
nessed the manager of the Glen Burnie store taking merchandise
from store displays into his office.' 6 The merchandise's subsequent
disappearance from the manager's office led Wholey to suspect that
the manager was stealing the merchandise.17 After several months of
observing this behavior, Wholey contacted John Eiseman, the District
Manager for Security, to inform him of the manager's suspicious activ-
ity. i" Eiseman suggested that Wholey use a van to monitor the man-
ager's office from outside the store.' 9 After the surveillance from the
van proved ineffective, Wholey asked Eiseman for permission to enter
the manager's office at night to search for additional evidence.2z Eise-
man gave Wholey permission to search the manager's office and
10. Wholey, 370 Md. at 74, 803 A.2d at 503.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 43, 803 A.2d at 484.
13. Id. at 43-44, 803 A.2d at 484-85.
14. Id. at 44, 803 A.2d at 485. VWholey had prior law enforcement experience, includ-
ing jobs as a Baltimore City Police Officer and a security officer at Montgomery Ward. Id.
at 43-44 n.1,803 A.2d at 485 n.1. In addition, Wholey was a deputy for the Anne Arundel
County Sheriffs Office while working at Sears from 1980 through the date of trial. Id.
15. Id. at 44, 803 A.2d at 485.
16. Id. This was in contravention of Sears' policy. Id. The manager would take the
merchandise still labeled with price tags, and there were no receipts or records of sale for
the merchandise. Id.
17. Id. Wholey never observed the manager remove the items from the store. Sears
Roebuck v. Wholey, 139 Md. App. 642, 646, 779 A.2d 408, 410 (2001).
18. WhoLey, 370 Md. at 44, 803 A.2d at 485.
19. Id.
20. Wholey, 139 Md. App. at 645, 779 A.2d at 409. The view from the van was too
restrictive for Wholey to make any observations about whether the store manager was tak-
ing the merchandise out of the store. Id.
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Wholey found some, but not all, of the merchandise.2" Eiseman then
granted Wholey's request to install cameras in the manager's office. 2 2
After installing the cameras, Wholey informed Eiseman of the installa-
tion and suggested that Eiseman inform the District Store Manager
about the cameras.2 ' About two hours after Wholey had installed the
cameras, Eiseman instructed Wholey to remove the cameras and dis-
continue his investigation. 24 Wholey followed Eiseman's orders and,
less than two months later, Sears terminated Wholey's employment.2 5
Wholey filed suit against Sears and Eiseman in the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County on the grounds of wrongful discharge and
defamation.2 6 Sears filed a motion to dismiss the wrongful discharge
claim and then a motion for summary judgment, both of which the
trial court denied.27 The case was tried before a jury, which returned
a judgment in favor of Wholey against Sears on his claim of wrongful
discharge. 2' The jury found that Sears's termination of Wholey con-
travened public policy because it fired him in retaliation for his inves-
tigation of the suspected criminal activity of his manager.29
After moving unsuccessfully to set aside the verdict on the wrong-
ful discharge claim, Sears appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
21. Id. From November 30, 1995, to December 14, 1995, Wholey continued to monitor
the manager's behavior, but did not observe the manager removing any of the merchan-
dise from his office. Id.
22. Wholey, 370 Md. 38 at 44, 803 A.2d at 485.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 44-45, 803 A.2d at 485. Eiseman informed Wholey that the District Manager
and the Human Resources Manager ordered that the cameras be disabled because the
store manager "deserve[d] more respect." Whley, 139 Md. App. at 646, 779 A.2d at 410
(internal quotation marks omitted).
25. WhoLey, 370 Md. at 45, 803 A.2d at 485. Eiseman met with Wholey a few days before
his termination and explained to him that the District Manager and the Human Resources
Manager did not like Wholey's "cop mentality" and had not approved of how Wholey han-
dled the investigation of the Store Manager. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Eise-
man subsequendy asked Wholey to resign. Id. Wholey refused and Eiseman then fired
him. Id.
26. Id. at 46, 803 A.2d at 486. Wholey's complaint also stated claims for breach of
contract against Sears and Eiseman. VhoLey, 139 Md. App. at 647 n.2, 779 A.2d at 411 n.2.
The circuit court dismissed the breach of contract claims and that ruling was not chal-
lenged in the appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Id.
27. Who/ey, 370 Md. at 46, 803 A.2d at 486. In both of these motions, Sears alleged that
its termination of Wholey did not violate a clear mandate of public policy and, therefore,
Wholey had no cause of action. Id. at 47, 803 A.2d at 486. The circuit court concluded
that Maryland's public policy favors the investigation and prosecution of crime. Whoey,
139 Md. App. at 647-48, 779 A.2d at 411.
28. Id. at 47, 803 A.2d at 487. In regard to the defamation claims, the jury decided in
favor of Sears and Eiseman. Id. Eiseman was also found not to be liable on the wrongful
discharge claim. Id.
29. Id. The trial court instructed the jury that in order to find for the plaintiff, it had to
find "that the discharge was contrary to a clear mandate of public policy." Id.
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Maryland.3" Sears maintained, both at trial and on appeal, that
Wholey was fired because of the way that he handled security
problems during a blizzard in January of 1996."' Wholey responded
that this reason was pretextual and that actually he was fired in retalia-
tion for investigating the suspicious activity of the store manager.3 2 In
reaching its decision, the Court of Special Appeals assumed that Sears
discharged Wholey for his handling of the investigation of the store
manager, and not for his actions during the January blizzard.33 Never-
theless, the court reversed the judgment holding that "no clear man-
date of public policy was implicated in Sears's termination of Wholey's
employment, as a matter of law."34 The court found no basis for a
public policy mandate upholding Wholey's claim of wrongful dis-
charge because there is no legislative or judicial declaration in Mary-
land directing private citizens to investigate suspected criminal activity
of co-workers. 35 The court further emphasized its unwillingness to
recognize such as public policy on the basis of 'judicial conjecture or
even interpretation" where it found no well-established and unambig-
uous indication of public policy. 6
Wholey appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The
court granted certiorari to determine whether there is a clear public
policy mandate in Maryland that recognizes an exception to the em-
ployee at-will doctrine whereby discharging an employee for investi-
gating and reporting the suspected criminal activity of a co-worker
constitutes wrongful discharge.38
2. Legal Background.-Maryland recognizes the common law
rule of at-will employment, which allows an employee or employer to
terminate an employment contract of indefinite duration at any time
for any reason.3 9 Maryland courts, however, have also adopted an ex-
ception to the at-will employment doctrine by recognizing a cause of
action for wrongful discharge where an employee's termination vio-
lates a clear mandate of public policy.4" Because of the abstract and
somewhat subjective nature of the concept of public policy, Maryland
30. Wholey, 139 Md. App. at 648, 779 A.2d at 411.
31. Wholey, 370 Md. at 45-46 n.2, 803 A.2d at 486-87 n.2.
32. Id. at 46, 803 A.2d at 486.
33. Id. at 46 n.2, 803 A.2d at 486 n.2.
34. WhoLey, 139 Md. App. at 660, 779 A.2d at 419.
35. Id, at 661, 779 A.2d at 419.
36. Id.
37. Wholey, 370 Md. at 47-48, 803 A.2d at 487.
38. Id.
39. Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35, 432 A.2d 464, 467 (1981).
40. Id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473.
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courts have generally looked to legislative and judicial history to deter-
mine public policy in Maryland.4" The Court of Appeals has created
an exception to the at-will employment doctrine and allows a cause of
action for wrongful discharge to proceed in two circumstances: when
the employee was discharged for exercising a statutorily granted right
and when the employee was discharged for refusing to violate the
law.42  However, Maryland courts have applied these exceptions
sparingly.4"
a. The At-Will Employment Doctine.-The at-will employment
doctrine was first developed in the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury.44 This doctrine allows an employer to discharge an employee for
any reason and without any notice in the absence of a statutory or
contractual obligation prohibiting the termination.45 The at-will em-
ployment rule was well-suited to the economic conditions that existed
at the time of its origin and Maryland strictly adhered to this rule
throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first half
of the twentieth century." At the time of its advancement, society's
views were characterized by a laissez-faire attitude toward contractual
relations.47 However, as the economic conditions began to change,
41. Id. at 45, 432 A.2d at 472 (explaining that although the court does not limit itself to
legislative enactments, "[the] recognition of an otherwise undeclared public policy as a
basis for ajudicial decision involves the application of a very nebulous concept to the facts
of the given case, and that declaration of public policy is normally the function of the
legislative branch").
42. See Watson v. People Sec. Life Ins., 322 Md. 467, 483, 588 A.2d 760, 767 (1991)
(explaining that an employer cannot fire an employee for suing the employer because the
right to legal redress is a statutorily protected right); Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., 82 Md. App.
577, 589-90, 572 A.2d 1144, 1150-51 (1990) (explaining that firing an employee for refus-
ing to violate the law contravenes a clear mandate of public policy).
43. See Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303, 1307 (4th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that the court should not extend the tort of abusive discharge to situations in which an
employee has the knowledge and intent to report wrongdoing to a supervisor in the ab-
sence of a statute or ruling by the Maryland Court of Appeals that established the affirma-
tive obligation of citizens to report crime). In Adler, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland was faced with an issue similar to that in WhoLey. Id. at 1305. The
district court certified the question to the Court of Appeals of Maryland of whether Mary-
land recognized a cause of action for abusive (wrongful) discharge. Id. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is reported at 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). See infra notes 51-60
and accompanying text (discussing the Court of Appeals's decision in Adler).
44. Adler, 291 Md. at 41-42, 432 A.2d at 470.
45. Lee v. Denro, 91 Md. App. 822, 828-29, 605 A.2d 1017, 1020 (1992).
46. See Adler, 291 Md. at 41, 432 A.2d at 470 (recognizing that the current economic
environment is extremely different from the conditions that existed when the at-will rule
was first advanced); Lee, 91 Md. App. at 828-29, 605 A.2d at 1020 (noting Maryland's strict
adherence to the rule of at-will employment).
47. Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 324 Md. 294, 303, 596 A.2d 1069, 1073 (1991).
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employees were offered less protection in the workplace.4" Following
this transformation, employment law also began to reflect the need to
protect an employee's rights.49 The change in employment law was
manifested by statutes and judicially created exceptions to the at-will
employment doctrine.5"
b. The Tort of Wrongful Discharge. -The Court of Appeals first
adopted the tort of wrongful discharge in Adler v. American Standard
Corp.5 In Adler, the court recognized an exception to the at-will em-
ployment doctrine that allowed a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge if the employee was terminated for a reason that contravened
public policy.52 In recognizing the tort, the court balanced the vul-
nerability of at-will employees and the lack of job security once pro-
vided by collective bargaining agreements with the interests of the
employer in discharging the employee when it is beneficial to the bus-
iness and the interest of society in ensuring that its public policy man-
dates are not contravened.5"
The Court of Appeals' determination of whether a discharge was
wrongful depends on whether the alleged violation of public policy is
clear enough to provide a basis for the tort.54 In Adler, the Court of
Appeals held that the employee had not stated a cause of action for
wrongful discharge because the employee's allegations did not specify
the manner in which any statutes prohibit the alleged misconduct so
as to constitute a violation of the public policy of Maryland.55 Because
the court found that the employee's complaint did not state a cause of
action, the district court allowed the employee to file a second
48. See Adler, 291 Md. at 41-42, 432 A.2d at 470 (explaining that employees no longer
had the job security provided by collective bargaining agreements or civil service
regulations).
49. Id. at 21, 432 A.2d at 470 (stating that an employee's interest in job security de-
serves recognition when his employment is threatened by his refusal to act in an unlawful
manner or by his performance of a statutorily granted right).
50. See, e.g., Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., 82 Md. App. 577, 572 A.2d 1144 (1990) (finding a
cause for abusive discharge based on ajudicially created exception). The Court of Appeals
of Maryland first adopted a new cause of action to the at-will doctrine by judicial decision.
Adler, 291 Md. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473.
51. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). The at-will employee in AdLer alleged that he was
wrongfully discharged for disclosing to his supervisors and the employer's headquarters
personnel, possible illegal acts by his supervisors including the payment of commercial
bribes and the falsification of corporate records. Id. at 33, 432 A.2d at 466.
52. Id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473.
53. Id. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470. The court explained that these interests must be consid-
ered when modifying the at-will employment doctrine. Id.
54. Id., 432 A.2d at 470-71.
55. Id. at 46, 432 A.2d at 472.
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amended complaint.56 The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland denied the motion to dismiss, finding a cause of ac-
tion for abusive discharge.57
The employer challenged the judgment of the district court and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed its
decision. 5' The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, following the
reasoning of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, held that an action for
wrongful discharge existed when the at-will employee refused to act in
an unlawful manner or exercised a statutorily granted right.59 There-
fore, the court concluded that Adler's allegations did not state a cause
of action for wrongful discharge because neither of these circum-
stances existed.6"
After recognizing the tort of wrongful discharge as an exception
to the at-will employee doctrine, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Ewing v. Koppers Co.,6 addressed the issue of whether the tort of
wrongful discharge may be brought by a contractual employee.62 The
court concluded that the remedies and rights afforded to the em-
ployee by a contract do not bar a claim for wrongful discharge.63 In
broadening the application of wrongful discharge claims, the court
reiterated the factors that it considered in Adler when recognizing a
tort in favor of at-will employees.64 The court explained that while
some of these factors were unique to at-will employees, the difference
between an at-will and a contractual employee did not affect the
State's interest in deterring conduct that contravenes public policy.65
The court, thus, upheld the employee's claim for wrongful discharge
because of the legitimate state interest in preserving the benefits of
56. Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 575 (D. Md. 1982). The employer
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Id.
57. Id. at 580.
58. Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987).
59. Id. at 1307. The United States Court of Appeals found this analysis to be consistent
with the intention of the Court of Appeals to limit the claims of wrongful discharge to a
manageable standard comprised of these two categories. Id.
60. Id.
61. 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173 (1988).
62. Id. at 49, 537 A.2d at 1174. The employee, a union member with a collective bar-
gaining agreement, alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for filing a worker's com-
pensation claim against his employer. Id. at 48, 537 A.2d at 1174.
63. Id. at 49, 537 A.2d at 1174-75.
64. Id.; see Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 42, 432 A.2d 464, 470 (1981)
(discussing the interests that must be considered when making any modifications to the at-
will employment doctrine).
65. Ewing, 312 Md. at 49, 537 A.2d at 1175.
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the worker's compensation system and in deterring employers from
infringing upon those rights.
6 6
c. Public Policy Exceptions to the At-Will Employment Doctrine.-
Although the Court of Appeals has recognized the tort of wrongful
discharge for at-will and contractual employees, a cause of action is
only available to the extent the termination of the employee contra-
venes public policy of the State.67 Generally, the court has adopted a
narrow interpretation of public policy when creating exceptions to
the at-will employment doctrine.6" The court has only recognized a
cause of action for wrongful discharge in two circumstances: where
the employee was fired for refusing to engage in an illegal activity and
where the employee was fired for fulfilling a statutorily prescribed
duty.
69
In Watson v. Peoples Security Life Insurance Co.,7" the Court of Ap-
peals recognized an exception to the at-will employment doctrine
where an employee was discharged for exercising her statutorily
granted right to seek legal redress against a co-worker for sexual har-
assment.7" The court found statutory and common law support for
the employee's claim that her employer acted in contravention of
public policy.72 The court explained that the employer violated a
clear mandate of public policy to protect "an individual's interest in
preserving bodily integrity," by citing to statutory provisions designed
to protect an employee against sexual harassment in the workplace.7"
66. Id. at 50, 537 A.2d at 1175. The court also considered whether federal labor law
preempted the plaintiffs claim. Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that federal preemp-
tion principles do not preclude the employee's recovery upon a showing that the employee
was fired in retaliation for his earlier filing of a worker's compensation claim. Id. at 56, 537
A.2d at 1178.
67. See Adler, 291 Md. at 44, 432 A.2d at 471 (finding no cause of action where the
allegations did not demonstrate a violation of the public policy of the state).
68. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland cases limiting
application of the tort of wrongful discharge).
69. See Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 82 Md. App. 577, 589, 572 A.2d 1144, 1150 (1990)
(finding that the employee had a cause of action for wrongful discharge where she refused
to engage in illegal activity); see also Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 483,
588 A.2d 760, 767 (1991) (finding that an employee had a cause of action for wrongful
discharge where she was terminated for exercising a statutorily granted right).
70. 322 Md. 467, 588 A.2d 760 (1991).
71. Id. at 480-81, 588 A.2d at 766. The employee alleged that she was terminated in
retaliation for filing a law suit against a co-worker for assault, battery and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional harm. Id. at 472, 588 A.2d at 762. She brought an action against her
employer for wrongful discharge arguing that her employer violated a public policy man-
date allowing her to exercise her "right to petition the court." Id.




The court relied on Maryland Fair Employment Practices Law as sup-
port for its decision.7 ' The court also noted that the early right to
bring a civil action based on offensive bodily contact, or apprehension
of it, is rooted in the common law. 5 The court noted that its decision
was consistent with the decision in Adler because the employee was
discharged for exercising a specific legal duty, which contravened a
clear mandate of public policy.
76
In Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc.,7 7 the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland also recognized a public policy exception to the at-
will employment doctrine where the employee, a rental agent, was ter-
minated for refusing to comply with the orders of her supervisor to
enter tenants' apartments while they were not present.7 The supervi-
sor instructed the employee to search the apartment and look
through the tenant's private belongings to obtain personal informa-
tion. 79 The court based its decision upon the belief that the constitu-
tional right to privacy is such a fundamentally protected right that an
employer cannot terminate an employee for refusing to violate this
right as a condition of employment.8 0 Although the court acknowl-
edged that it found no explicit statutory expression of public policy
regarding the discharge of an employee for refusing to search
through an individual's personal belongings, the court determined
that statutory and constitutional protections against the invasion of
privacy justified creating an exception to the at-will employment doc-
trine."' In making this decision, the court concluded that had the
employee followed the orders of her employer, she would have sub-
jected herself to civil liability.8 2 Accordingly, the court held that the
74. Id. at 482-83, 588 A.2d at 767 (explaining that this law prohibits retaliatory dis-
charge in response to an employee making complaints about sexual harassment in the
workplace).
75. Id. at 482, 588 A.2d at 767. The court explained that the " 'early recognition of the
right to be free from apprehension of violence is found in the fact that the excitement of
such an apprehension was likely to result in breaches of the peace, and if the law gave a
remedy it would thus tend to discourage them."' Id. (quoting Charles E. Carpenter, Inten-
tional Invasion of Interest of Personality, 13 OR. L. REv. 227, 237 n.57 (1934)).
76. Watson, 322 Md. at 483, 588 A.2d at 767.
77. 82 Md. App. 577, 572 A.2d 1144 (1990).
78. Id. at 581-83, 572 A.2d at 1146-47. When the employee confronted the employer
and informed her that she would not enter the apartments, the employer explained to the
employee that this was part of her job duties. Id. at 582-83, 572 A.2d at 1147.
79. Id. at 582, 572 A.2d at 1147.
80. Id. at 590, 572 A.2d at 1151.
81. Id. at 586, 572 A.2d at 1149.
82. Id. at 589, 572 A.2d at 1150.
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discharge of an employee for refusing to commit an illegal act contra-
vened public policy 
3
The Court of Special Appeals has limited application of the tort
of wrongful discharge to two specific sets of circumstances in Bleich v.
Florence Crittenton Services of Baltimore. 4 In Bleich, the court addressed
whether Maryland public policy prohibits discharging an employee
where she acted to protect children in a residential facility and where
she exercised her right to free speech.85 The court rejected the em-
ployee's claim for wrongful discharge based on her exercise of free
speech, but found a cause of action where the employee carried out a
statutory duty to report abuse and neglect to the state.8 6 The court
concluded that various sections of the Family Law Article of the Mary-
land Code evidenced the State's public policy prohibiting an em-
ployer from terminating an employee who had acted to protect the
health and safety of children in residential settings.8 7 Sections 5-
502(b), 5-702(1), and 5-704(a) deal with the protection of children
from abuse and neglect in child care facilities and require that per-
sons in the position of the employee report any suspected misconduct
to authorities.8 8 The court justified the creation of an exception to
the at-will employment doctrine based on the statute and its associ-
ated regulations because of this mandate and the express prohibition
against terminating an employee for complying with the mandate.89
The court concluded that in notifying the State about her concerns
for the safety of the children at the child care facility, the employee
was exercising an expressly granted statutory duty.90 Because the em-
83. Id. at 590, 572 A.2d at 1151.
84. 98 Md. App. 123, 632 A.2d 463 (1993).
85. Id. at 131, 632 A.2d at 467. The employee, a teacher at a residential child care
facility, wrote a letter to the State informing it about her concerns for the safety of the
residents of the facility. Her employer terminated her employment after receiving a copy
of the letter from the employee. Id. at 127-28, 632 A.2d at 465.
86. Id. at 140, 632 A.2d at 471-72.
87. See id. at 135-39, 632 A.2d at 469-71 (explaining that Maryland Family Law Article
sections 5-502(b), 5-702(1) and 5-704(a) justify the court's creation of an exception to the
at-will doctrine because the statute reflects Maryland's public policy of protecting
children).
88. Id at 135-38, 632 A.2d at 469-70. Section 5-502(b) states that it is the policy of this
State to protect children who are under the care of others. Id. at 135-36, 632 A.2d at 469.
Sections 5-702(1) and 5-702(a) seek to achieve this goal by mandating this reporting. Id.
at 136, 632 A.2d at 469.
89. Id. at 136, 632 A.2d at 469.
90. See id. at 140, 632 A.2d at 469 (comparing to other jurisdictions, "Maryland law
contains no similar provision relieving [the employee] from a duty to report child abuse to
governmental authorities as soon as she reports the abuse to 'the person in charge of
[the] ... facility'") (quoting Mudd v, Hoffman Homes for Youth, Inc., 543 A.2d 1092, 1094
n.2 (Pa. Super. 1988).
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ployer acted contrary to public policy in terminating her employment,
the court found that a claim for wrongful discharge was stated.9
d. Refusal to Acknowledge Whistle-Blower Protection.--The Mary-
land General Assembly has not enacted a general whistle-blower stat-
ute protecting private employees who report corporate wrongdoing.
9 2
Therefore, courts have not generally recognized whistle-blowing activ-
ity as being protected by a clear doctrine of public policy. 3 The
Court of Special Appeals in Lee v. Denro,94 addressed the issue of how
to distinguish between actionable claims based on clear public policy
mandates and claims arising out of employer-employee disputes that
are not actionable.95 In Lee, the employee alleged that her termina-
tion violated a public policy mandate for maximum air transportation
safety.96 The employee plaintiff claimed that her commenting on an-
other employee's alleged deviation from company procedures in the
presence of a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector and
her subsequent report of the deviation to a superior were the reason
for her discharge.97 The court held that the employee had not estab-
lished a cause of action for wrongful discharge because the employee
failed to demonstrate that her claim was "anything more than a pri-
vate dispute regarding the employer's execution of normal manage-
ment operating procedures."9 " The court reasoned that the employee
had not alleged a violation of public policy clearly discernable from a
statute, constitutional provision, or common law.99 The court further
observed that the employer did not coerce the employee to break the
law by attempting to silence her or by persuading her to lie to the FAA
91. Bleich, 98 Md. App. at 139, 632 A.2d at 471.
92. SeeSalzerv. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 293 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
"the district court correctly noted [that] Maryland does not provide 'a general
whistleblower cause of action' for an at-will employee who reports a violation of federal or
state law").
93. See, e.g., Milton v. ITT Research Inst., 138 F.3d 519, 523 (4th Cir. 1998) (explaining
that recognition of whistle-blower protection for private employees who had no statutory
duty to report wrongdoing would unnecessarily turn the narrow exception into a broad
one).
94. 91 Md. App. 822, 605 A.2d 1017 (1992).
95. Id. at 828, 605 A.2d at 1020.
96. Id. at 827, 605 A.2d at 1020.
97. Id. at 826, 605 A.2d at 1019. In the employee's termination letter, the employer
stated that the employee had jeopardized the results and completion of the test by disput-
ing the company's testing procedures. Id. at 827, 605 A.2d at 1019.
98. Id. at 833, 605 A.2d at 1023.
99. Id. at 830, 605 A.2d at 1021. The court explained that "the fact that the employer
does not have a good reason for the employee's discharge does not, in the absence of a
clear violation of public policy, render the discharge abusive or wrongful." Id. at 836, 605
A.2d at 1024 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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inspector. ".. Therefore, the Lee court concluded that when an em-
ployee interferes with a corporation's standard operating procedures
in raising his or her complaints, the employer is free to discharge the
employee at-will as long as the employer's actions do not violate a pub-
lic policy mandate.'01
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Milton v. 11T Re-
search Institute'0 2 restated the proposition that Maryland courts have
not recognized general whistle-blower protection for private employ-
ees who report violations of state or federal law. 10 3 Accordingly, the
court refused to recognize the tort of wrongful discharge where the
employee claimed that he was terminated for whistle-blowing.'° 4 The
court reiterated that Maryland courts have recognized public policy
exceptions in only two circumstances. 0 5 Although the court recog-
nized that the employee might have been fulfilling a duty in that case,
he failed to link his duty to any public policy clearly discernable from
a legislative enactment. 106 Therefore, the facts of the employee's case
did not fit into either accepted category, and following the lead of
Maryland courts, the Fourth Circuit refused to create an exception to
cover whistle-blowing without a "clear legislative signal."'0 7 The court
explained that because of the vague nature of public policy, it would
be improper for the court to create public policy without guidance
from the legislature.'
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Szaller v. American
National Red Cross"°9 again emphasized the limited nature of the pub-
100. Id. at 832, 605 A.2d at 1022.
101. Id. at 835, 605 A.2d at 1024. The court found that Lee failed to set forth any facts
in support of her claims that the employer violated two federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. sections
1001 and 1505, that implicate the policy of promoting "maximum achievable safety in air
transportation." Id. at 831, 605 A.2d at 1021-22.
102. 138 F.3d 519 (4th Cir. 1998).
103. Id. at 523.
104. Id. The employee expressed his concerns to management that the employer was
violating federal tax law by failing to report income to the Internal Revenue Service while
claiming tax exempt status. Id. at 521. The employee was ultimately fired and brought a
suit for wrongful discharge and breach of contract against his employer. Id.
105. Id. at 522; see supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the two circum-
stances where the court will find an exception to the at-will doctrine).
106. See Milton, 138 F.3d at 523 (explaining that in the absence of a statute that imposes
on the employee a specific duty to report the suspicious activity of his employer, the em-
ployee's fiduciary duties of care and loyalty alleged are too broad to constitute a statutorily
prescribed obligation for the purposes of the tort of abusive discharge).
107. Id.
108. See id. (commenting that the search for "a specific legal duty ... limits judicial
forays into the wilderness of discerning 'public policy' without clear direction from a legis-
lative or regulatory source").
109. 293 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 2002).
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lic policy exception when it affirmed a lower court's refusal to recog-
nize a whistle-blowing exception for an employee who reported his
employer for allegedly violating Food and Drug Administration regu-
lations.' 10 The court first explained that Maryland courts have given
no indication that federal regulations should be used as a basis for
determining public policy.111 Even if Maryland courts recognized fed-
eral regulations as a basis for public policy, the court concluded that
the employee in this case would still not have a cause of action for
wrongful discharge.1 12 The court noted that Maryland courts recog-
nized public policy exceptions only in the two limited circumstances
first identified by the court in Adler.1 ' Applying this rationale, the
Fourth Circuit determined that because the employee had not alleged
that he was asked to violate any regulations nor did any of the regula-
tions on which he based his complaint impose on him a duty to report
his employer's alleged violations, it would not create a public policy
exception." 4 The court emphasized that because the Maryland legis-
lature has not enacted broad whistle-blower protection, it would be
improper for the court to expand the tort of wrongful discharge to
cover employee whistle-blowing.' 15
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Wholey, the Court of Appeals of Ma-
ryland held that a recognized public policy in Maryland justified an
exception to the at-will employment doctrine that protects employees
from termination when they report the suspected criminal activity of
co-workers to the appropriate law enforcement authorities.116 How-
ever, because Wholey only investigated and did not report the suspected
criminal activity of his supervisor to the proper law enforcement au-
110. Id. at 150.
111. Id. at 151. The court reasoned that "federal policy is enforced by the means Con-
gress specifies, not through state-law [wrongful] discharge actions." Id. In Lee, the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland acknowledged the issue of whether federal law alone could
be a basis of a state wrongful discharge claim in Maryland, but declined to decide the issue.
See Szaller, 293 F.3d at 151 n.1 (citing Lee, 291 Md. App. at 831 n.2, 605 A.2d at 1022 n.2).
112. Szaller, 293 F.3d at 152.
113. Id.; see also Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.3d 1303, 1307 (4th Cir. 1987) (ex-
plaining that the court generally recognizes claims for abusive discharge in situations
where the employee refused to engage in an illegal activity or where the employee exer-
cised a statutorily granted right).
114. Szaller, 293 F.3d at 152-53.
115. Id. at 153. The United States Court of Appeals recognized that Maryland has been
hesitant in creating public policy that is not based on a clear statutory enactment. Id. The
court stated that "[i]t would be even less appropriate for a federal court to undertake this
delicate task with no more guidance than we have here from the state." Id. (quoting
Milton v. ITT Research Inc., 138 F.3d 519, 523 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
116. Whaley, 370 Md. at 59, 803 A.2d at 494.
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thorities, the court ruled that he was not entitled to the benefit of the
exception.' 17 Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Special Appeals reversing the jury verdict in favor of Wholey on his
claim for wrongful discharge." 8
Judge Battaglia, writing for the court, first discussed the tort of
wrongful discharge and explained that to establish this claim, the em-
ployee's discharge must violate a clear mandate of Maryland public
policy.' 19 Because the discernment of public policy is fraught with
uncertainty, the court stressed that any exceptions should be limited
to clearly defined constitutional and statutory enactments. 12  In an
effort to confine the scope of public policy mandates to articulable
legal principles, the court identified two factors limiting the adoption
of a new public policy mandate for wrongful discharge. 21 The first
was the purpose behind the tort of wrongful discharge of providing a
remedy for an otherwise unremedied violation of public policy. 122
Thus, a potential claim is limited to instances in which the employee is
provided with no legal protection from the employer's conduct.12"
The court reasoned that allowing an employee to recover damages for
an employer's violation of public policy when the legislature had al-
ready provided a remedy would be in excess of what the legislature
deemed necessary to carry out that public policy mandate. 24
The second limiting factor identified by the court was that the
public policy must be reasonably discernable from clearly "prescribed
constitutional and statutory mandates. 1 125 Although the court stated
that it would not confine itself solely to these sources, it recognized
the importance of using caution in relying on other bases for discern-
117. Id. at 43, 803 A.2d at 484.
118. Id. at 71, 803 A.2d at 501.
119. Id. at 48-51, 803 A.2d at 487-89. Judge Battaglia's opinion was joined by Judges
Cathell and Harrell. See id. at 71, 803 A.2d at 501.
120. Id. at 52, 803 A.2d at 489-90. The court cited its decision in Adler v. American Stan-
dard Corp. for support. Id.; see also Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 46, 432 A.2d
464, 472 (1981) (noting that "public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and variable
quality, and, unless deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory
provisions, should be accepted as the basis of a judicial determination, if at all, only with
the utmost circumspection" (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930))).
121. WhoLey, 370 Md. at 52-53, 803 A.2d at 490.
122. Id. at 52, 803 A.2d at 490.
123. Id.; see also Chappell v. S. Md. Hosp., 320 Md. 483, 493-94, 578 A.2d 766, 772 (1990)
(finding that a cause of action for wrongful discharge did not lie because plaintiff had
statutory remedies).
124. Wholey, 370 Md. at 53, 803 A.2d at 490. The court stressed that it was the province
of the legislature to strike "the appropriate balance between right and remedy." Id. (quot-
ing Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 615, 561 A.2d 179, 185 (1989)).
125. Id., 803 A.2d at 490-91.
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ing public policy because this function is generally left to the
legislature. 
26
In applying the first limiting factor to Wholey's case, the court
found that no statutory provision existed to provide a remedy for
Wholey because the General Assembly has failed to enact any general
statutory protection for private employee whistle-blowers.' 27  The
court identified two circumstances in which the legislature has acted
to protect public employee-whistle-blowers, but could not find corre-
sponding protection for private whistle-blowers.' 2 8
In applying the second limiting factor, the court identified a stat-
ute that provided a clearly discernable basis for the public policy ex-
ception sought by Wholey. 12' The court concluded that section 762 of
Article 27 of the Maryland Code, which makes it a misdemeanor for a
person to harm or injure another person in retaliation for reporting a
crime, was a sufficient basis for creating a public policy exception to
the at-will doctrine. 3 ° The court explained that a public policy man-
date was clearly discernable from this provision because it evidenced
the legislature's goal of protecting witnesses who report suspected
criminal activity to the appropriate authorities.'' However, because
section 762 imposes a criminal penalty only on employers who retali-
ate against employees for reporting a crime to the proper authority
and provides no civil remedy, the court concluded the tort of wrong-
126. Id. at 54, 803 A.2d at 491.
127. Id. at 57, 803 A.2d at 492-93.
128. Id. at 57 n.11, 803 A.2d at 493 n.l. The court identified prescribed remedies for
situations in which a public employee reports discriminatory practices or violations of oc-
cupational safety and health regulations. Id. However, Wholey had no prescribed reme-
dies under state law and was left to seek a remedy in tort. Id.
129. Id. at 57, 803 A.2d at 493.
130. Id. at 57-58, 803 A.2d at 493-94. Section 762 states the following:
a. Prohibited acts-A person may not intentionally harm or injure any person or
damage or destroy any property with the intent of retaliating against a victim or
witness for giving testimony in an official proceeding or for reporting a crime or
delinquent act.
b. Penalty-A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and
upon conviction shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 5 years.
A "witness" is defined as a person who:
(1) Has knowledge of the existence of facts relating to a crime or delinquent act;
(2) Makes a declaration under oath that is received as evidence for any purpose;
(3) Has reported a crime or delinquent act to a law enforcement officer, prose-
cutor, intake officer, correctional officer, or judicial officer; or
(4) Has been served with a subpoena issued under the authority of a court of this
State, of any other state, or of the United States.
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 762 (1957).
131. Wholey, 370 Md. at 59, 803 A.2d at 494.
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ful discharge was available. 13 2 Accordingly, the court held that termi-
nating an employee for reporting suspicious activity to the
appropriate law enforcement authorities is contrary to public
policy. 133
The court, however, limited this holding by noting that the pro-
tections afforded by section 762 extended only to those employees
who reported the activity to the appropriate authorities, not to those
employees who merely investigate and inform their supervisors of suspi-
cious behavior. 3 4 The court recognized the legislature's consistent
distinction between internal and external reporting. 135 In the few in-
stances where the legislature had acted to protect private whistle-blow-
ers, this protection has only applied when the employee reports the
suspicious activity externally. 136 Because previously enacted whistle-
blower statutes required external reporting to the proper authorities,
the court concluded that external reporting was also a necessary ele-
ment to maintain a common law cause of action for wrongful
discharge. 1
3 7
The court, thus, disqualified those who only report criminal activ-
ity to their superiors from bringing wrongful discharge claims, even if
such reporting might be in the public interest. 138 The court ex-
plained that it would not create public policy based on abstract no-
tions of what might be in the public interest, especially when the
legislature had not specifically mandated citizen reporting of criminal
activity. 13 Therefore, although the court was willing to recognize an
exception for reporting crimes, the court refused to expand the ex-
ception to employees who investigate and internally report suspected
criminal activity in the absence of a general legislative enactment. 4 °
Judge Raker, joined by Judge Wilner, wrote a concurring opinion
in which she also affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Ap-
peals. 4 ' Judge Raker agreed with the court that this case involved an
employee reporting suspected criminal activity to his supervisor, an
132. Id. at 60, 803 A.2d at 494.
133. Id. at 61, 803 A.2d at 495.
134. Id. at 62, 803 A.2d at 495-96.
135. Id. at 63, 803 A.2d at 496-97.
136. Id., 803 A.2d at 496.
137. Id., 803 A.2d at 497.
138. Id. at 65-66, 803 A.2d at 498. The court opined that "the public good is best served
by reporting suspected criminal activity to law enforcement authorities." Id. at 65, 803 A.2d
at 498.
139. Id. at 66, 803 A.2d at 498.
140. Id. at 67, 803 A.2d at 499.
141. Id. at 71, 803 A.2d at 501 (Raker, J., concurring).
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act not protected by a clear public policy mandate."' 2 However, she
disagreed with the plurality's decision to create a new cause of action
for wrongful discharge when the facts of the case did not necessitate
such action.14 3 Judge Raker admonished the plurality for appearing
to exercise judicial restraint in creating a new mandate of public pol-
icy, but not having similar restraint to avoid creating a new cause of
action where it was unwarranted."'
Judge Raker explained that the tort of wrongful discharge is a
narrow exception to the at-will employment doctrine that has only
been upheld in limited circumstances where an employee has been
fired for refusing to violate the law or for exercising a legal right.1" 5
Because the facts of this case did not fit within either of these catego-
ries, Judge Raker agreed with the conclusion of the Court of Special
Appeals that Wholey failed to state a cause of action for wrongful
discharge." 6
Judge Raker further argued that the plurality's opinion was in-
consistent with Maryland precedent regarding wrongful discharge."' 7
Because courts have consistently relied on statutory or constitutional
enactments as a basis for public policy, Judge Raker explained that the
plurality acted improperly in creating a new exception in a situation
where there was no statute making it a violation of public policy to
terminate an at-will employee. 14'8 Although the plurality used section
762 to derive public policy goals, Judge Raker criticized the use of this
section to support the conclusion that a public policy mandate existed
to protect employees who report suspected criminal activity to the ap-
propriate authorities."' 9 Specifically, Judge Raker charged that the
plurality's interpretation of section 762 expanded the class of pro-
tected individuals to cover all employees, regardless of whether the
employee had a duty to report suspicious activity or whether the em-
ployee testified as a victim or witness.15 In the absence of any statute
or constitutional provision expressly granting an employee the duty to
report the suspicious activity of his employer, Judge Raker ultimately
142. Id. at 71-72, 803 A.2d at 502.
143. Id. at 72, 803 A.2d at 502.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 73, 803 A.2d at 502.
147. Id., 803 A.2d at 503.
148. Id. at 74, 803 A.2d at 503. Judge Raker argued that section 762 does not require
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concluded that the court unnecessarily announced the formulation of
new public policy. 5 1
Judge Eldridge wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that Wholey
had sufficiently established a cause of action for abusive discharge.
1 52
Judge Eldridge reasoned that the General Assembly has enacted whis-
tle-blower protection on several occasions, which serves as an articul-
able basis on which the court could recognize a public policy mandate
to support Wholey's cause of action. 153 Additionally, Judge Eldridge
disagreed with the court's repeated narrow treatment of the scope of
the tort of abusive discharge. 154 Judge Eldridge explained that while
Maryland courts unanimously recognized the tort of abusive dis-
charge, they have proceeded to limit its scope making it inapplicable
to almost all employee actions against their employers. 155
4. Analysis.-In Wholey, the Court of Appeals reached the cor-
rect decision by precluding Wholey from bringing a cause of action
for wrongful discharge. However, the court took the unnecessary step
of carving out the circumstances under which a cause of action for
wrongful discharge could proceed despite the fact that the case did
not require such action. In so doing, the court interfered with public
policy by allowing employees to bring wrongful discharge claims if
they have been terminated for externally reporting suspicious activity
of a supervisor or co-worker.1 56 The court acted in the absence of
express legislative intent to protect employee whistle-blowers.
157
a. The Court Ignored Its Self-Imposed Limitations on Creating New
Public Policy Mandates.-The court ignored its self-imposed limitation
on creating new public policy mandates by creating an exception to
the at-will employment doctrine absent legislative or judicial expres-
sion on the subject. The court should only create a new exception
when expressly required by public policy because determining public
151. Id. at 76, 803 A.2d at 504.
152. Id. (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Bell joined Judge Eldridge's dissenting
opinion. Id. In his dissent, Judge Eldridge refers to "abusive discharge" in the same con-
text that the plurality refers to "wrongful discharge." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Judge Eldridge observed, "the [c]ourt has so limited the tort action that numer-
ous discharges from employment, which are abusive and clearly contrary to public policy as
a matter of common sense, are held to be beyond the scope of the tort." Id. at 77, 803 A.2d
at 504.
155. Id. at 77, 803 A.2d at 504-05.
156. Id. at 70, 803 A.2d at 501.
157. Id. at 72, 803 A.2d at 502.
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policy is a more appropriate function of the legislative branch. 15
However, in Wholey, the court created public policy tojustify an excep-
tion to the at-will employment doctrine. 59 In doing so, the court
strayed from the confines of statutory provisions clearly expressing the
legislature's position on whistle-blowing by relying on a statute that is
not a clear expression of a public policy mandate applicable to
Wholey. t6 ° By relying on a statute that did not give Wholey the right
or duty to report the suspicious activity to his supervisor, the court
acted without a clear legislative signal and ultimately ignored its self-
imposed limitation on discerning public policy.' 61
In creating an exception to the at-will employment doctrine
where the facts of the case do not support a cause of action, the court
unnecessarily interfered with the formation of public policy. The
court held that public policy mandates the protection of employees
who are terminated for reporting suspected criminal activity of super-
visors and co-workers to the appropriate authorities. 162 However,
Wholey did not state any facts that warranted the court's decision to
create a new exception because he reported the suspicious activity to
his supervisor, not to appropriate law enforcement officials.' 63 Addi-
tionally, the court's decision is inconsistent with prior case law where
the court has only found an exception based on an express provision
in a legislative enactment, a judicial decision or an administrative reg-
ulation. 164 Because no source of law applies to the facts of Wholey's
case, the court had no legal basis for the creation of an additional
cause of action.' 65 Even if the court adopted a broader approach for
defining public policy requiring that the termination undermined a
policy clearly linked to a specific law, the court's decision would still
interfere with the formation of public policy.' 66 Because the legisla-
158. See Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impeding Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM.
Bus. L.J. 653, 661 (Summer 2000) (explaining that many states took the position that creat-
ing new public policy should not be done by the judiciary, but instead by the legislative
branch of the government); see also Wholey, 370 Md. at 73, 803 A.2d at 502 (explaining that
courts do not 'create new public policy,' they look to a previously established mandate that
necessitates the creation of a new exception).
159. Wholey, 370 Md. at 73, 803 A.2d at 502.
160. Id. at 57, 803 A.2d at 492 (explaining that the legislature has acted to protect pri-
vate employee whistle-blowers from discharge in two circumstances, neither of which per-
tain to the facts of Wholey's discharge).
161. See id. at 74, 803 A.2d at 503.
162. See id. at 71, 803 A.2d at 501.
163. Id. at 65, 803 A.2d at 498.
164. Id. at 73, 803 A.2d at 503 (Raker, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 72, 803 A.2d at 502 (Raker, J., concurring); see Ballam, supra note 158, at 664
(discussing the different approaches taken by states in addressing the public policy excep-
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ture has not enacted legislation protecting internal whistle-blowing ac-
tivity, the court created a new cause of action where the facts did not
constitute a cause of action.
1 6 7
In addition, the court's efforts to find statutory support for its
decision were misplaced. 68 The court tenuously relied on section
762 of Article 27 of the Maryland Code as the statutory basis for recog-
nizing a public policy mandate to protect whistle-blowing employees,
rather than a clearly discernable source of law.' 69 Section 762 states
that a person cannot harm or retaliate against a victim or witness for
giving testimony in an official proceeding or for reporting a crime or
delinquent act.171 It defines "witness" as an individual who reports
criminal activity to the appropriate law enforcement authorities.
71
This section is an inadequate basis on which to discern a public policy
exception that applies to Wholey's case because it clearly does not
protect individuals similarly situated to Wholey from termination.1
72
Wholey reported the suspicious activity to his supervisor, not to law
enforcement officials. 77' Thus, the plurality disregarded this impor-
tant distinction by expansively reading the statute to apply to all em-
ployees, regardless of whether the employee was testifying as a victim
or witness.
174
Additionally, section 762 places no duty on the employee to re-
port the criminal activity, suggesting that it is not an expression of
clearly mandated public policy that would support the exception rec-
ognized by the court. 175 The court has only created public policy ex-
ceptions under two circumstances: where the employee was exercising
a statutorily prescribed duty or right, and where the employee was
tion). In taking the broader approach, Maryland does not require that a specific law gov-
ern the case, but requires that the public policy on which the claim is based be linked to a
specific law. See Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 82 Md. App. 577, 586, 572 A.2d 1144, 1149
(1990) (finding the exception applied even though there was no statutory expression of
public policy against discharging employees for refusing to invade privacy of others).
167. Wholey, 370 Md. at 49, 803 A.2d at 502.
168. See id. at 73, 803 A.2d at 502-03 (stating that "[t]his [c]ourt should not be creating
public policy to justify an exception to the at-will employment doctrine").
169. Id. at 74, 803 A.2d at 503 (Raker, J., concurring).
170. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 762 (1957).
171. Id.
172. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 74, 803 A.2d at 503 (arguing that plurality's reading of sec-
tion 762 expands the class the legislature intended to protect). In enacting section 762,
the legislature made it a misdemeanor to harm or injure another individual in retaliation
against that victim or witness for reporting a criminal act. Id at 57-58, 803 A.2d at 503.
173. Id. at 44, 803 A.2d at 485.
174. Wholey, 370 Md. at 74, 803 A.2d at 503 (Raker, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 74, 803 A.2d at 503 (Raker, J., concurring).
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fired for refusing to disobey the law."' 6 By relying on statutes that
place the employee into one of these two categories, the court can
ensure that the meaning of public policy is clearly discernable.17
7
The court should not have relied on section 762 as an expression
of public policy applicable to Wholey because the statute only protects
a victim or witness for reporting a crime, but places no duty on the
employee to report the suspicious activity. Although the court is free
to create a new public policy exception when warranted, the court
ordinarily does not find a violation of public policy absent a statute
expressing a clear mandate of public policy.1 78 Therefore, the court's
reliance on section 762 to create a new exception to the at-will doc-
trine was tenuous because section 762 creates neither of the circum-
stances in which the courts have previously recognized a cause of
action for wrongful discharge.' 79
In creating the new exception, the court acted contrary to the
well-established principle that because discerning public policy is a
difficult task, courts should only recognize the tort where the facts of
the case place the employee squarely within one of the recognized
categories of wrongful discharge. 8 ° In Watson, the court found an
exception to the at-will employment doctrine where the employee was
terminated for exercising her right to legal redress against a co-worker
for sexual harassment.18' Unlike the facts in WhoLey, the employee in
Watson clearly fit within the class of people that the legislature in-
tended to protect because the Maryland Code specifically prohibits
retaliatory discharges for complaints against sexual harassment in the
workplace. 82 The statutory policy evidenced the legislature's intent
to grant employees protection for exercising the statutorily granted
right to seek legal redress, thereby justifying the court's decision to
create an exception. 183 In Watson, a clear public policy mandate ex-
176. See Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 803 F.3d 1303, 1307 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that
limiting the claim of wrongful discharge claims to these two categories restricts the claims
to a manageable standard).
177. Ballam, supra note 158, at 661.
178. Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins., 322 Md. 467, 478, 588 A.2d 760, 765 (1990).
179. Wholey, 370 Md. at 74, 803 A.2d at 503 (Raker, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 75-76, 803 A.2d at 503-04 (Raker, J., concurring); see Ballam, supra note 158,
at 664 (explaining that courts require a clear link to statutory or constitutional enactments
as a basis for public policy to avoid "undue impairment of managerial discretion" and to
discourage "unwarranted litigation").
181. Watson, 322 Md. at 483, 588 A.2d at 767. The statute relied on by the court placed
the employee in one of the recognized categories of wrongful discharge identified by the
court in Adler, terminating an employee for exercising a statutorily granted right. Id.
182. Id. at 482-83, 588 A.2d at 767.
183. Id.
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isted to protect employees from harassment in the workplace. 8 4 In
Wholey, however, there has been no statutory mandate enacted to pro-
tect employees who report suspicious activity to supervisors. The legis-
lature has determined that whistle-blowing is not afforded the same
protection as sexual harassment.'8 5 Therefore, unlike in Watson, the
court did not have an adequate basis on which to create a public pol-
icy exception.
Similarly, in Bleich, the court created an exception where a statute
specifically placed a duty on educators to report child abuse and pro-
tected the educators from termination as a result of their actions. 8 6
Unlike section 762, which places no duty on the individual to report
illegal activity, this statute mandates that the employee report any sus-
pected abuse externally.'1 7 The court justified the creation of the ex-
ception because the facts of the case fit squarely within a public policy
mandate to protect children.' Again, Wholey is distinguishable be-
cause section 762 places no duty on an employee to report the crimi-
nal activity. 1
89
Additionally, where the statute in Watson clearly applied to cer-
tain individuals, including educators, section 762 makes no reference
to an employee in Wholey's situation nor does it clearly state that an
individual is protected against retaliation in the workplace for whistle-
blowing. Thus, it is not a clear expression of the legislature to protect
employees in the position of Wholey. Unlike in Woley, in these in-
stances where the court recognized an exception, the decision was
based on a clear mandate of public policy that when an employee
exercised certain rights, "these rights must not be frustrated by the
threat of loss of employment."' 0
184. Id. at 483, 588 A.2d at 767.
185. Cf Wholey, 370 Md. at 63, 803 A.2d at 496. The legislature has only enacted protec-
tion for employees who whistle-blow externally. If the legislature had deemed it appropri-
ate to protect internal whistle-blowers, it would have broadened the class of protected
employees under the statute.
186. Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Servs., 98 Md. App. 123, 140, 632 A.2d 463, 471
(1993). The employee was a teacher at a residential child care facility, which placed her
within the auspices of the statute. Id. at 126, 632 A.2d at 464.
187. Id. at 140, 632 A.2d at 471.
188. See id. at 136, 632 A.2d at 469 (explaining that in order to protect children from
abuse or neglect, the purpose of the Maryland Family Law Article, section 5-702(1) is "to
mandat[e] the reporting of any suspected abuse or neglect").
189. Id.
190. See Cheryl Massingale, At-Will Employment: Going, Going. . . ,24 U. RiCH. L. REv. 187,
192 (Winter 1990) (explaining the circumstances in which states generally recognize a
cause of action for abusive discharge).
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b. The Court Should Have Deferred Expanding Public Policy to the
Legislature.-The court's formulation of public policy in this case is
particularly distressing given that this is an area where the Maryland
legislature has taken a conservative position toward protecting private
whistle-blowers.' 91 In unnecessarily creating a new exception to the
at-will employment doctrine, the court transformed a rule of narrow
application into a broader exception, thereby encouraging litigation
by disgruntled employees. 9 2 The court's expansion of exceptions to
the at-will employment doctrine was unnecessary because the legisla-
ture is perfectly capable of enacting laws that it deems necessary to
protect the public good. 193 The court's recognition of a new public
policy mandate suggests the court's lack of caution in creating public
policy and its disregard for keeping the tort of wrongful discharge to a
"manageable and clear standard."' 94
Additionally, because the legislature has declined to protect pri-
vate employee whistle-blowers, the court should not have interfered
with the traditional employer-employee relationship by creating a new
public policy exception giving employees an additional cause of ac-
tion against employers. 195 The reluctance on the part of the legisla-
ture to impose obligations on citizens to report or prevent crimes
should have restrained the court from finding a new exception here
where the legislature has only provided narrow relief.'96 When the
Court of Appeals first recognized the tort of wrongful discharge, it
intended "to preserve the rights of the employer to terminate an em-
ployee at-will, subject only to those limited exceptions . ..where a
clear mandate of public policy has been violated."' 97 Courts have
191. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 57 n.11, 803 A.2d at 492-93 n.ll. The legislature has acted to
protect public employee whistle-blowers who report for example, violations of the law,
abuses of authority, and gross mismanagement of public funds. Id. However, in the pri-
vate arena, the legislature has only acted to protect employees who report discriminatory
practices or violations of occupational safety and health regulations. Id.
192. See Milton v. ITT Research Inst., 138 F.3d 519, 523 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Recognizing
whistle-blower protection for every corporate officer fired in the wake of a disagreement
over an employer's business practices would transform this 'narrow exception' into a broad
one indeed.").
193. SeeAdlerv. Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 45, 432 A.2d 464, 472 (explaining that
the declaration of public policy is normally the function of the legislative branch).
194. See Wholey, 139 Md. App. at 653-54, 779 A.2d at 414-15 (explaining that restricting
the tort of wrongful discharge to two categories, neither of which prohibit whistle-blowing,
limits the tort of abusive discharge to a workable doctrine).
195. See Milton, 138 F.3d at 523 (explaining that courts are reluctant to create new ex-
ceptions without any signal from the legislature because of the difficulty of discerning pub-
lic policy).
196. WhoLey, 139 Md. App. at 654, 779 A.2d at 415.
197. Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.3d 1303, 1307 (4th Cir. 198,).
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been cautious in recognizing exceptions to the at-will employment
doctrine because of the risk of unnecessarily upsetting the balance of
power inherent in the employer-employee relationship.'98
In recognizing a whistle-blowing exception for an employee who
reports suspicious activity to the proper authorities, the court further
disregarded the interests of the employer in being able to discharge
an employee whenever it was beneficial to his business.19 9 It is not the
role of the courts to interfere with management discretion unless the
General Assembly has mandated judicial interference on the basis of a
greater public policy."' 0 Although the court was acting to protect
wrongfully discharged employees, its actions constituted judicial over-
reaching in the absence of legislation protecting employees like
Wholey. 201
The court's decision in Wholey also blurs the distinction between
simple employer-employee disputes and situations in which the em-
ployee has a legitimate claim for wrongful discharge. 02 By allowing a
cause of action to proceed where the employee has not alleged facts
that justify the creation of an exception to the at-will doctrine, the
court has turned an ordinary dispute into an actionable wrongful dis-
charge claim. In these situations, where the employee was simply air-
ing his grievances in a way that disrupted the operating procedures of
the employer, the employer should be free to terminate the employee
at-will.20 3
The court should not have created a new cause of action for
wrongful discharge because the legislature has not placed a duty on
198. See Ballam, supra note 158, at 660 (noting that the law only needed to counter the
power imbalance by offering protection in those limited instances when employees were
wrongfully discharged).
199. See Adler, 830 F.3d at 1306 (explaining that when deciding if a cause of action for
wrongful discharge exists, the court considers the interests of the employee, employer and
society as a whole).
200. Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment At-Will-When Should
Courts Defer to the Legislature, 72 NEB. L. Rav. 956, 975 (1993) (explaining that the legislature
is better suited to pronounce public policy in the employment area because "[courts] are
confined to facts of the specific case at hand and often to fully consider the broader policy
ramification inherent in their decisions").
201. See Wholey, 370 Md. 38, 51, 803 A.2d 482, 502 (Raker, J., concurring) (explaining
that even if the court did adopt a new exception in this case, the plurality adopted a much
broader exception).
202. See Ballam, supra note 158, at 662 (explaining that many "states feared opening a
Pandora's box with a more expansive public policy definition and, hence, adopted a nar-
rowly circumscribed approach").
203. See Lee v. Denro, 91 Md. App. 822, 834-35, 605 A.2d 1017, 1023-24 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1992) (explaining that a number of courts have concluded that an employee who is
terminated for complaining about an employer's business or management practices does
not state a cause of action for wrongful discharge).
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employees to report criminal activity to their supervisors. Accord-
ingly, in Milton, the court refused to find a cause of action for wrong-
ful discharge because the employee had no duty to make
management aware of the unlawful practices of the company. 204 The
court found that because no legislative enactment has indicated that
Maryland intends to turn the narrow whistle-blowing exception into a
broad one, it would be inappropriate for the court to create public
policy without more guidance.2 °5 The court was hesitant to create a
new exception because, unlike in previous cases, the employee had no
responsibility to report the suspicious activity and would face no po-
tential liability for failing to disclose the information. 20 6 The court in
Wholey should have acted with the same caution because there was sim-
ilarly no duty on Wholey to report the actions of his supervisor, evi-
dencing the legislature's intent not to protect private whistle-blower
employees in these circumstances.
Additionally, in Lee, the court reaffirmed that when an employee
interferes with the normal operating procedures of the employer in
raising her objections, the employer can terminate the employee at-
will. 20 7 The court found that although the employer's decision to ter-
minate the employee may have been unfair, it did not give the em-
ployee a cause of action for wrongful discharge in the absence of a
clear violation of public policy.2 8 Where the court cannot infer that
an employer fired an employee for refusing to disobey the law or for
exercising a statutorily granted right, the allegations amount to noth-
ing more than an ordinary dispute between an employee and an
employer.20 9
Likewise, the court in Wholey should have similarly viewed the situ-
ation as nothing more than a private dispute over Wholey's investiga-
tion of the suspicious activities of his superior. As in Lee, the
complaints made by Wholey did not warrant protection based on an
employee's good intentions. 210 When an employee is raising objec-
tions about an employer's business in a manner that only involves the
204. See Milton v. ITT Research Inst., 138 F.3d 519, 523 (4th Cir. 1998) (explaining that
even if the employee was fulfilling a fiduciary duty, he had not linked his duty to any public
policy mandate that was violated by his discharge).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Lee v. Denro, 91 Md. App. 822, 835, 605 A.2d 1017, 1024 (1992).
208. Id. at 836, 605 A.2d at 1024.
209. Id. at 834, 605 A.2d at 1023.
210. See id. (explaining that when it can be naturally inferred from facts that the com-
pany discharged the employee because he was disrupting its operating procedures, the
employee's complaint amounts to nothing more than a private dispute).
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private interests of the parties, the employer can terminate the em-
ployee at-will l.2 1  The court should not have interfered in this situa-
tion because the legislature did not act to make Wholey's concerns
about the actions of his supervisor a matter of public interest.212
5. Conclusion.-In Wholey, the Court of Appeals of Maryland cre-
ated a new exception to the at-will employment doctrine despite de-
termining that the facts of the case did not constitute a cause of
211action. In creating this exception, the court acted inconsistently
with the well-established view that courts must proceed cautiously
when adopting new public policy mandates. Additionally, the court's
decision did not comport with prior case law limiting a cause of action
for wrongful discharge to two distinct categories, when an employee is
terminated for exercising a statutorily granted right and when an em-
ployee is terminated for refusing to disobey the law. Because
Wholey's case did not fall within either of the established categories of
activity to which the tort applies, the court should have limited its in-
volvement, instead of creating a new exception absent a statute clearly
expressing a mandate of public policy.
NANcy STRASFELD
211. Id. at 836, 605 A.2d at 1024.
212. See Wholey, 370 Md. at 74, 803 A.2d at 503 (noting that "[m]any courts have com-
mented on dangers inherent in judicial involvement in the formation of public policy")
(Raker, J., concurring).
213. Wholey, 370 Md. at 59, 803 A.2d at 494.
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VIII. EVIDENCE
A. A Departure from PriorJurisprudence Distorts the Original Purpose of
the Frye-Reed Test
In Wilson v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the State's
experts to use the product rule to prove the improbability of two Sud-
den Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) 2 deaths in the same family.3 In a
unanimous decision,4 the court held that because of the lack of gen-
eral agreement within the scientific community regarding the role of
genetics in SIDS deaths, the calculations based on the product rule5
did not satisfy the Frye-Reed test for admissibility of expert testimony in
Maryland. 6 The court reasoned that because three medical studies
implicated a genuine controversy in the scientific community regard-
ing the role of genetics in SIDS deaths, the two deaths in Wilson could
not be viewed as mutually exclusive events-a condition necessary for
product rule calculations to be accurate.7 In so reasoning, the court
departed from its prior Frye-Reed jurisprudence, characterized by def-
erence to the trial court's discretion when experts at trial have testi-
1. 370 Md. 191, 803 A.2d 1034 (2002).
2. SIDS is a classification given to an infant death that matches certain criteria but has
no discernable cause. Id. at 203-04, 803 A.2d at 1041. SIDS is a "diagnosis of exclusion,"
meaning that a SIDS diagnosis is made when an infant who seems to be in otherwise good
health suddenly stops breathing and dies without an apparent physical explanation. See id.
at 204, 803 A.2d at 1041.
3. Id. at 195, 803 A.2d at 1036. Although the two infants only had a common father,
the court continuously referred to the two infants as being "in a single family." See id. at
195-96, 211, 803 A.2d at 1037, 1045. The Court of Special Appeals, however, took issue
with this characterization, noting that while the infants had "a father in common," they
were not from the same "biological family." Wilson v. State, 136 Md. App. 27, 68, 764 A.2d
284, 306 (2000). The Court of Special Appeals stated that this fact "immediately modifies a
statistical analysis based upon probabilities of events occurring in the same biological fam-
ily." Id.
4. Judge Harrell concurred in the judgment of the court but did not join in the
court's reasoning in full. Wison, 370 Md. at 218, 803 A.2d at 1050.
5. The product rule is a mathematical formula designed to explain the probability
that two unrelated events will, in fact, occur. Id. at 206, 803 A.2d at 1042. The "classic
illustration" involves a coin toss-whereby the probability of a coin landing on heads on
two successive tosses equals the probability the coin will land on heads after the first toss
multiplied by the probability the coin will land on heads after the second toss. Id., 803
A.2d at 1042-43. In this example, the probability of the coin landing on heads after each
toss, because there are two sides to a coin, is 50%. Therefore, the probability of getting two
heads on two successive coin tosses is 50% multiplied by 50%, or 25%. Id.
6. Id. at 195, 803 A.2d at 1036.
7. Id. at 210-11, 803 A.2d at 1045.
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fled to an absence of a genuine and widespread debate regarding the
scientific theory or principle at issue. This new jurisprudence is prob-
lematic because it allows too much weight to be given to materially
insignificant Frye-Reed issues in cases where the circumstantial evidence
of guilt is overwhelming. Additionally, the decision is problematic be-
cause it distorts the original purpose of the Fye-Reed test of preventing
a defendant from being unduly prejudiced by a novel scientific theory
or principle.
1. The Case.-In 1980, Garrett Eldred Wilson impregnated and
subsequently married Deborah Oliver Fennell.8 Within four weeks of
the birth of his daughter, Brandi Jean Wilson, Wilson purchased two
separate insurance policies totaling $40,000 on her life.9 On the eve-
ning of April 30, 1981, Fennell became ill."° Wilson gave her some
pills, which he said were "vitamins" to help her sleep.11 This night was
the only night Wilson took care of Brandi. 2 Between 3:30 a.m. and
5:30 a.m., while Fennell was still asleep, Brandi died.1" After an au-
topsy was performed, Brandi's death was attributed to SIDS, but Fen-
nell told family members and friends that she thought Wilson was
"involved" in Brandi's death.14 On the morning of Brandi's death,
Wilson contacted the insurance agent for one of the policies on
Brandi's life and shortly thereafter collected the insurance proceeds. 15
Four months after Brandi's death, Fennell left Wilson. 6 The couple
ultimately divorced.17
In 1986, Wilson became engaged to two different women, Eliza-
beth Bahlmann and Mary Anastasi 18 On March 22, 1987, Anastasi
gave birth to Wilson's son, Garrett Michael Wilson.19 After a few
8. Wilson, 136 Md. App. at 35-36, 764 A.2d at 288.
9. Id. at 36, 764 A.2d at 288. Wilson was the primary beneficiary for both policies. Id.
10. Id., 764 A.2d at 289.
11. Id. Fennell testified that after she took the pills, she slept through the entire night.
Id. She further testified that she had not slept that long since the baby's birth. Id. In
addition, Fennell testified that, even though the neighbors, the paramedics, and her par-
ents arrived at the house around 6:00 a.m., Fennell did not wake up until her mother later
"shook her awake." Id. at 37, 74 A.2d at 289.
12. Id. at 36, 764 A.2d at 289.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 37, 764 A.2d at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Wilson never informed Fennell that he had taken out two life insurance poli-
cies for Brandi. Id. Fennell did not learn of the policies until long after Brandi's death.
Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 38, 764 A.2d at 289.
20031
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
weeks, Wilson purchased two separate insurance policies totaling
$150,000 on Garrett's life.2" On the morning of August 22, 1987, Wil-
son offered to feed the baby for the first time since his birth.21 After a
few minutes, Anastasi also went to the baby's room. 22 She noticed that
the baby did not "feel right" and that there was "foam around his
mouth. '23 She called for an ambulance and then began to administer
CPR to no avail. 24 Garrett was pronounced dead at the hospital, and
his death was subsequently labeled a SIDS death. 25 Wilson then col-
lected $150,000 in insurance proceeds.26
On May 28, 1998, Wilson was indicted for the murder of Garrett
Michael Wilson by a grand jury in Montgomery County. 27 At trial in
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the defense moved in
limine to exclude testimony by the State's experts that calculated the
probability of two SIDS deaths in the same family on the ground that
such evidence would be unfairly prejudicial. 2' The trial court denied
the motion and allowed the testimony.29 The State then presented
testimony from four medical experts regarding the deaths of both
Brandi and Garrett."° All four witnesses testified that the infants died
of suffocation or "probable suffocation," and three of the experts fur-
ther determined that the manner of death for Garrett was homicide.3"
Two of the experts based their decision in part on the statistical im-
20. Id., 764 A.2d at 290. Wilson was again the primary beneficiary on both policies. Id.
21. Id. at 39, 764 A.2d at 290. There is some disagreement regarding the actual date of
Garrett's death. The Court of Appeals reported that Garrett died on August 13, 1987.
Wilson, 370 Md. at 197, 803 A.2d at 1037. The Court of Special Appeals reported that
Garrett died on August 22, 1987. Wilson, 136 Md. App. at 39, 764 A.2d at 290.
22. Wilson, 136 Md. App. at 39, 764 A.2d at 290.
23. Id. at 39-40, 764 A.2d at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id., 764 A.2d at 291. Following Garrett's death, Anastasi told her family and friends
that she thought Wilson had murdered Garrett for the insurance proceeds. Id at 40, 764
A.2d at 291. Wilson made several expensive purchases following his receipt of the insur-
ance proceeds. Id. at 41, 764 A.2d at 291. Among these purchases were "five expensive
gifts of jewelry" for Anastasi. Id. At one point, Wilson showed Anastasi $10,000 in cash,
which he said came from the insurance proceeds. Id.
26. Id. at 41, 764 A.2d at 291.
27. Wilson, 370 Md. at 197, 803 A.2d at 1037.
28. Record at 109-11, Wilson (No. 19).
29. Wilson, 136 Md. App. at 72, 764 A.2d at 308.
30. Wilson, 370 Md. at 197-98, 803 A.2d at 1037-38.
31. Id. at 197-200, 803 A.2d at 1037-39. Dr. Charles Kokes performed the first autopsy
on Garrett. Id at 197, 803 A.2d at 1037. He initially thought Garrett died of SIDS but
changed his opinion to homicide after learning about Brandi's death and interviewing
Garrett's mother. Id. at 197-98, 803 A.2d at 1037.
Dr. John Smialek reviewed both infants' autopsy reports. Id. at 198, 803 A.2d at 1037.
He changed his opinion about Brandi's death to suffocation after reviewing statements by
the children's relatives and learning about the life insurance policies. Id., 803 A.2d at
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probability of two infants in the same family dying of SIDS. 12 Viewing
SIDS as not having a genetic component, the experts used the prod-
uct rule to determine the probability that two infants in the same fam-
ily would both die of SIDS.3' During the defense's case-in-chief,
Wilson's expert also used the product rule to calculate the probability
that Garrett died of SIDS. 34 In its closing argument, the State used
Wilson's expert's calculations to suggest that, based on a 1 in 10 mil-
lion chance that Garrett died of SIDS, there was a corresponding "1 in
10 million [chance] that the [defendant] [was] innocent."8 5
In response to the State's reference to the probability of Wilson's
innocence during closing remarks, the defense moved for a mistrial. 6
The court denied the motion, at which point the defense requested a
1038. He changed his opinion about Garrett's death based on the swelling in Garrett's
brain. Id.
Reviewing both infant's deaths, Dr. Linda Norton concluded that Brandi's death was
caused by suffocation based on pictures suggesting that the baby's face was pushed into the
mattress of the crib. Id. Dr. Norton concluded that Garrett's death was also attributable to
suffocation after hearing about the insurance policies and reviewing Ms. Anastasi's state-
ments Id.
Dr. Ann Dixon performed an autopsy on Brandi and changed her opinion from SIDS
to "probable suffocation" after reviewing witness statements and information about the
insurance policies. Id. She did not review Garrett's death. Id.
32. Dr. Kokes testified that the rate of SIDS deaths was "somewhere between 1 to 2
deaths for every 1,000 live births." Id. at 199, 803 A.2d at 1038. Furthermore, he noted
that Garrett had cerebral swelling. Id. Dr. Kokes estimated that the probability that a SIDS
death occurring with cerebral swelling is about 1 in every 100,000 live births. I& Thus,
because Garrett was the second child in the family to die of SIDS and he had cerebral
swelling, Dr. Kokes then multiplied the probability of Garrett dying from SIDS, by the
probability of Brandi's dying of SIDS, and concluded that the probability that Garrett died
from SIDS was 1 in 100,000,000. Id.
Dr. Norton, however, relied on statistics indicating that SIDS occurs once in every
2000 live births. Id. She concluded that the probability of two SIDS deaths in the same
family was therefore 1 in 4,000,000. Id. at 199-200, 803 A.2d at 1038-39.
33. Id. at 198-99, 803 A.2d at 1038. While the two infants shared only the same father,
the State's experts nevertheless considered the two infants to be in the same family for the
purposes of statistical calculation. Wilson, 136 Md. App. at 68, 764 A.2d at 306. See supra
note 3 and accompanying text (explaining that although the Court of Special Appeals took
issue with this characterization, the Court of Appeals did not find the characterization to
be statistically significant).
34. Wilson, 136 Md. App. at 79, 764 A.2d at 312. Dr. Jones testified that a SIDS death
occurs approximately three times in every 1,000 live births. Id. Consequently, Dr. Jones
concluded that the loss of two children is equal to a 1 in 11,088,900 chance that both the
infants died of SIDS. Id. The prosecution later rounded off this number in its closing
argument to 1 in 10,000,000. Id.
35. Wilson, 370 Md. at 213, 803 A.2d at 1047 (emphasis omitted).
36. Id.
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curative instruction. 7 In response to this request, the trial court re-
peated an earlier instruction regarding the significance of statistics in
the case.3" The jury subsequently convicted Wilson of first degree
murder of his son Garrett. 9 Wilson was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole.4 0
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Wilson maintained
that the trial court committed several errors.4 ' Wilson argued that the
State's expert testimony encroached on the jury's "function to judge
credibility and resolve contested facts" because the testimony, insofar
as it concluded that Garrett's death was the result of homicide, made
a determination of Wilson's criminal agency.42 He also argued that
the State's experts should not have been allowed to use the product
rule to determine the probability of two SIDS deaths in one family
based on the lack of agreement in the scientific community as to
whether genetics is a factor in SIDS deaths.4 3 Finally, Wilson argued
that the trial court did not take adequate curative action after the
State addressed the statistical probability of his innocence in its clos-
ing remarks.4 4
The Court of Special Appeals rejected Wilson's claims and af-
firmed his conviction. 5 The court reasoned that because Wilson was
able to cross-examine the State's experts and to call his own expert
37. Id. The defense counsel urged the court to declare a mistrial because "[y]ou can
never ever, ever, use statistics and compare that to the burden of proof or reasonable
doubt." Id. at 213-14, 803 A.2d at 1047.
38. Id. at 214, 803 A.2d at 1047. Specifically, the trial court repeated:
Members of the jury, I think [it] is appropriate to review with you one instruction
which I read to you earlier and [which] will be contained in your packet.
By doing this, I am not trying to highlight this instruction above all others. I want
you to consider this instruction in conjunction with all of the other instructions
you have received from the Court.
During this trial you have heard testimony regarding statistical probabilities. Cer-
tain experts in rendering their opinions relied in part on the statistical probabili-
ties of a SIDS death occurring twice in the same family.
You may consider this testimony only in evaluating the weight to be given to those
opinions and not for any other purposes.
Wilson, 136 Md. App. at 75, 764 A.2d at 309.
39. Wilson, 370 Md. at 196, 803 A.2d at 1036.
40. Id.
41. Wilson, 136 Md. App. at 35, 764 A.2d at 288.
42. Id. at 42, 764 A.2d at 291-92.
43. Id. at 68-69, 764 A.2d at 306. The Court of Special Appeals noted that this argu-
ment was not entirely correct because the two infants "had a father in common" but had
different mothers. Id. at 68, 764 A.2d at 306. The court further observed that "[t] his factor
immediately modifies a statistical analysis based upon probabilities of events occurring in
the same biological family." Id.
44. Wilson, 136 Md. App. at 75, 764 A.2d at 309.
45. Id. at 90, 764 A.2d at 318.
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witness to challenge the State's experts' theories, the jury was able to
appropriately assess the statistics in its determination of Wilson's guilt
or innocence. a6 In addition, relying on Armstead v. State,47 the court
concluded that the expert testimony based on the product rule was
admissible because Wilson had the opportunity to fully explore the
statistical issues through cross-examination."a Finally, the court noted
that because there was enough circumstantial evidence to support a
guilty verdict, the State's reference to the slim probability of Wilson's
innocence in its closing argument was not prejudicial enough to war-
rant a mistrial.49
Wilson then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.5 °
The court granted certiorari to consider whether the trial court abused
its discretion by allowing the State to introduce expert testimony using
the product rule to compute the probability of two SIDS deaths in a
single family.51
2. Legal Background.-Until 1975, the admissibility of scientific
evidence in the majority of federal trials was governed by the test de-
veloped in Frye v. United States. 2 In Fye, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit determined that scientific
evidence is admissible if it is generally accepted in the relevant scien-
tific community. 53 In 1975, the Frye test was incorporated into Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 54 After the Frye test was devel-
46. Id. at 68, 764 A.2d at 306. The Court of Special Appeals also noted that a determi-
nation of "homicide" as the manner of death is not itself a determination of a criminal act;
it is therefore "not a determination of the defendant's criminal agency." Id. at 67, 764 A.2d
at 306.
47. 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221 (1996).
48. Wilson, 136 Md. App. at 72, 764 A.2d at 308. The Court of Special Appeals analo-
gized the situation in Armstead to the one in Wilson and determined that because Wilson,
like the defendant in Armstead, had the opportunity to attack the State's statistical evidence
on cross-examination, the statistical evidence was admissible. Id. at 72, 764 A.2d at 308; see
infra notes 112-121 and accompanying text (finding that the defendant in Armstead was
able to cross-examine the State's experts regarding the probability that a DNA "match"
might be attributable to laboratory error).
49. Wilson, 136 Md. App. at 79, 764 A.2d at 311.
50. Wilson, 370 Md. at 195, 803 A.2d at 1036.
51. Id.
52. MARGARET T. STOPP, EVIDENCE LAW IN THE TRIAL PROCESS 186 (1999).
53. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923).
54. STOPP, supra note 52, at 185. Rule 702 provides that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon suffi-
cient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
2003]
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oped in 1923, but prior to its incorporation into Rule 702, most states
adopted the Frye test to govern the admissibility of expert testimony in
state proceedings.55
The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the Frye test in Reed v.
State.56 After Reed, Maryland courts began to refer to the test as the
Frye-Reed test.5 7 Since the test's adoption, the Court of Appeals' Frye-
Reed jurisprudence has been characterized by its predictability. The
court has consistently deferred to the trial court's determination on
whether the scientific evidence is admissible.58 In instances where the
court has reversed a trial court's determination, the court has often
discussed at length the nature of the debate in the scientific commu-
nity in order to determine whether the scientific technique at issue
was generally accepted or controversial.59 In addition, where the op-
portunity to overturn a trial court's decision on Frye-Reed grounds ar-
guably existed, the court has often refrained from doing so when it
was clear that the defendant was afforded ample opportunity to cross-
examine the State's experts to challenge the reliability of the scientific
principle."a
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts in the case.
FED. R. EviD. 702. Under Rule 702, Frye considerations are only one of several considera-
tions that a trial court may take into account in determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence. STOPP, supra note 52, at 185.
In 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States ended the nation-wide conflict re-
garding the role of Frye considerations in federal cases. Id. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court determined that Rule 702 would govern federal
cases; therefore, the Frye issue of acceptance in the scientific community is only one of
several considerations a trial court in federal cases may consider in determining whether to
admit scientific evidence. Id.; 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993).
55. See, e.g., Boeche v. State, 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Neb. 1949) (determining that the
scientific principles involved in the use of the polygraph had not yet "received general
scientific acceptance" as required by Frye).
56. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
57. See, e.g., State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 93, 517 A.2d 741, 743 (1986) (applying the
"Frye-Reed" test to post-traumatic stress disorder testimony).
58. See, e.g., Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 83, 673 A.2d 221, 243 (1996) (upholding a
trial court's decision despite the national debate over the proper method of calculating
whether a DNA match was actually due to laboratory error).
59. See, e.g., Reed, 283 Md. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377 (concluding that the trial court
abused its discretion only after engaging in an extensive discussion regarding the treat-
ment of voice spectrography in jurisdictions across the country).
60. See, e.g., Armstead, 342 Md. at 83, 673 A.2d at 243 (concluding that even though a
particular method of statistical calculation may have been "outmoded," the fact that the
defendant was able to attack the validity of the calculations on cross-examination was
enough to satisfy due process concerns).
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a. The Development of the Frye-Reed Test. -In Frye, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit outlined a
standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence through expert tes-
timony in federal proceedings.6 1 In Frye, the court considered
whether evidence gained from a systolic blood pressure deception test
was admissible as exculpatory evidence.6 2 The defendant requested
that the scientist who conducted the test should be allowed to testify
on the ground that the opinion of an expert witness regarding an
issue beyond the range of common knowledge or experience is admis-
sible into evidence.63 The court denied the request, holding that the
systolic pressure deception test had not yet gained sufficient recogni-
tion within the scientific community so as to 'justify the courts in ad-
mitting the expert testimony.'"64
The court's decision in Frye for many years set the standard for
the admissibility of scientific evidence.65 The Frye test examines the
probative value of the evidence by focusing on the acceptability of the
scientific principle within the scientific community.66 By requiring
the scientific principle or theory to be generally accepted in the scien-
tific community, the Frye test attempts to ensure that the evidence is
reliable-a basic threshold that must be met for the admission of all
evidence.67
61. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
62. Id. at 1013. The scientific theory asserted in Frye was that a person's blood pressure
is influenced by changes in the person's emotions. Id. As a person's emotions change, the
systolic blood pressure rises because of "nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic branch
of the autonomic nervous system." Id. Experiments conducted on this theory concluded
that telling the "truth" is spontaneous and thus comes without conscious effort. Id. at
1014. The utterance of a lie, however, requires conscious effort, which is thus reflected in
a rise of the systolic blood pressure. Id. at 1013-14.
63. Id. at 1014.
64. Id. The following passage from the court's opinion in Frye has often been quoted:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experi-
mental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particu-
lar field in which it belongs.
Id.
65. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 382, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (noting that Frye's
criteria of general acceptance became the standard in a majority of courts across the
country).
66. Id. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368.
67. Id. If evidence is not reliable, its probative value is substantially outweighed by its
danger of being unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 197 (2 ed. 1999). If the probative value of evidence is substantially
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The test developed in Frye became the standard for almost every
jurisdiction in the United States.6 8 In Reed, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland adopted the Frye test for determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence through expert testimony in state proceedings. 69
In Reed, the court considered whether testimony based on spectro-
grams, or "voiceprints" determining voice identification, was admissi-
ble against the defendant.7" In that case, a rape victim notified the
police that she had received a telephone call from someone who iden-
tified himself as her assailant.7" The police then attached a recording
device to her telephone and subsequently recorded seven more calls
by the individual.7 2 After the purported assailant, Reed, was appre-
hended, he was compelled to submit "voice exemplars" to the State's
Attorney for Montgomery County.7 3 The data was then submitted to
the Voice Identification Unit of the Michigan State Police Department
for spectrograph analysis and comparison. 4 The test resulted in a
positive identification of Reed on four of the seven calls.7 5 After hear-
ing evidence regarding the "validity and reliability" of voice spectro-
grams as a method of identification, the trial court admitted the
evidence.76
In determining that the trial court had abused its discretion in
admitting the expert testimony, the Court of Appeals in Reed reviewed
the opinion of the scientific community regarding the use of voice
spectrograms.7 7 The court considered the testimony of Dr. Tosi, the
leading expert on the voiceprint process, who testified that the scien-
tific community was evenly divided on the topic of the reliability of
voice spectrograms. 71 In addition, the court noted that three state su-
preme courts had held voice spectrogram evidence inadmissible,
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, then the evidence may be excluded. FED.
R. EVID. 403.
68. Reed, 283 Md. at 382, 391 A.2d at 368 ("This criterion of'general acceptance' in the
scientific community has come to be the standard in almost all of the courts in the country
which have considered the question of the admissibility of scientific evidence.").
69. Id. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372.
70. Id. at 375, 391 A.2d at 364-65.
71. Id., 391 A.2d at 365.
72. Id. at 375-76, 391 A.2d at 365.
73. Id. at 376, 391 A.2d at 365. Reed was required to repeat, into a telephone con-
nected to a recording device, the words that were spoken to the victim by her attacker. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 377, 391 A.2d at 365.
77. Id. at 389-91, 391 A.2d at 372-73.
78. Id. at 391-94, 391 A.2d at 373-75. Tosi testified that "[p]ersons that I know of that
have done some experimentation or have published, I say less than ten; five opposed [and]
four or five are in favor ...." Id.
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while the lower courts of two states as well as the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had held the evidence admissible.7 9
Taking notice of the national debate regarding the admissibility
of voice spectrogram evidence, the Court of Appeals in Reed held that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.8 0 The
court reasoned that the trial court misapplied the Frye test by requir-
ing general acceptance only within the group actually engaged in the
use and experimentation of voice spectrography instead of within the
broader scientific community of speech and hearing science.8 ' Exam-
ining the record, other courts' opinions, and legal and scientific com-
mentary, the Court of Appeals found the trial court's formulation of
the Frye standard improper.8 2  The court concluded that the
voiceprint analysis had not achieved the level of general acceptance in
the scientific community required under Frye.85 The court stated that
before expert testimony based on the application of a particular scien-
tific technique can be admitted, the technique must be accepted as
reliable within the scientific community.8 4
b. The Court's Frye-Reed Jurisprudence.--Since the Frye-Reed
test's adoption, the Court of Appeals has often deferred to trial
courts' determinations regarding the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence except in instances where the trial court clearly erred in admit-
ting the scientific evidence. In State v. Collins,85 the Court of Appeals
considered whether the trial court erred in admitting the hypnotically
enhanced testimony of Alfred Davis, a witness to the shooting death of
Olivia Collins, the wife of defendant Leon Collins.8 6 During the first
of two trials, Davis testified that he was at least fifteen feet away from
the car when Olivia Collins was shot.8 7 After undergoing hypnosis,
however, Davis recalled during the second trial that he was actually
present in the car at the time of Olivia Collins' shooting.8 8 He recal-
led that a car, identified by Olivia Collins as her husband's car, drove
79. Id. At the time, the states holding voice spectrograms inadmissible, were Califor-
nia, Michigan, Pennsylvania. Id. at 395, 391 A.2d at 375. The two states holding voice
spectrograms admissible, were New York and Ohio. Id.
80. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
81. Id. at 398-99, 391 A.2d at 377.
82. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367.
85. 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
86. Id. at 671, 464 A.2d at 1029.
87. Id., 464 A.2d at 1032.
88. Id., 464 A.2d at 1031.
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up beside the car in which Davis and Olivia Collins were sitting.89 He
testified that Leon Collins removed a rifle from his car and shot his
wife, while she was still seated next to Davis.90 Because Davis was sub-
ject to cross-examination on his post-hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony, the trial court allowed the evidence.9' The Court of Special
Appeals reversed, and repeating its ruling after Collins' first trial, con-
cluded that "the use of hypnosis to restore or refresh the memory of a
witness" is not sufficiently accepted in the scientific community to sat-
isfy the Fye-Reed test. 2 Therefore, the court held Davis's testimony
was inadmissible. 3
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Special Appeals deci-
sion.94 Before reaching its conclusion, however, the court in Collins
took notice that in disposing of testimony where a witness has been
hypnotized, courts in the United States have taken four different ap-
proaches.95 The court also examined the works of the most eminent
physicians who have written and testified on the subject of hypnosis
and included excerpts of these works in its opinion. 6 After evaluating
the differing viewpoints on the issue of the reliability of post-hypnotic
testimony, the court, noting that it was according itself with the major-
ity view, concluded that the testimony did not pass the traditional evi-
dentiary "safeguards" for reliability.97 Thus, the court held that the
89. Id.
90. Id., 464 A.2d at 1032.
91. Id., 464 A.2d at 1031.
92. Id. at 678, 464 A.2d at 1032 (quoting Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 205, 447
A.2d 1272, 1272 (1982)). The court noted that it may well be that "'hypnotherapeutical
techniques'" are being "'refined"' and may, at some point, become acceptable in the sci-
entific community. Id. (quoting Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 205, 447 A.2d 1272,
1272 (1982)). Until that time, however, hypnotically enhanced testimony would not pass
the Frye-Reed test for admissibility. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 671, 464 A.2d at 1029.
95. Id. at 681, 464 A.2d at 1034. The court noted that:
Cases considering hypnosis fall into four categories: (1) those holding that hypno-
sis goes to the weight and credibility of the evidence and not to its admissibility
thus leaving its evaluation for the trier of fact; (2) those holding testimony inad-
missible where a witness has been hypnotized; (3) those holding testimony of a
previously hypnotized witness admissible if certain safeguards are followed; and
(4) those holding that even though a witness has been hypnotized he may testify
relative to matters he disclosed prior to hypnosis.
Id.
96. Id. at 695-700, 464 A.2d at 1041-43 (citing Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in
the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REv. 313 (1980)); Martin T.
Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, XXVII, No. 4, INT. J. CLINICAL AND ExPERI-
MENTAL HYPNosis 311 (1979)).
97. Id. at 703, 464 A.2d at 1045. The court spent considerable time reflecting on the
minority rule, which holds that testimony that has been enhanced through hypnosis is
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trial court abused its discretion in admitting Davis's testimony.98 The
court concluded that hypnotically enhanced testimony did not pass
the Frye-Reed test because even if the testimony could in theory satisfy
traditional evidentiary safeguards, it would inevitably inject "undue
delay and confusion into the judicial process."9 In addition, the divi-
sion in the scientific community over the reliability of post-hypnotic
testimony supported holding the evidence inadmissible under the
Frye-Reed test.1 ° °
In State v. Allewalt,t '0 the Court of Appeals considered whether
testimony from a psychiatrist that the victim of a rape was suffering
from post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the rape met the Frye-
Reed test for admissibility. 10 2 At trial, defense counsel objected to the
admission of the testimony on the ground that post-traumatic stress
disorder testimony "has not been recognized in the State of Maryland
as being generally accepted within the scientific community.""1 3 The
trial court overruled the objection and concluded that the evidence
satisfied the Frye-Reed test.' ° 4 The Court of Special Appeals reversed
the trial court's judgment, holding that the testimony was unfairly
prejudicial because it had the effect of corroborating the prosecu-
tion's case.
1 05
In reversing the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, the
Court of Appeals noted that the lower court's analysis erected "an un-
reasonably high standard for the admissibility of medical opinion evi-
dence." ' 6 The court also reiterated the significance of the trial
court's discretion, emphasizing that admissibility "is a matter of trial
admissible in a criminal trial if the trial court determines that the use of the hypnosis was
"reasonably likely to result in recall comparable in accuracy to normal human memory.'
Id. at 688, 464 A.2d at 1037 (quoting State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (NJ 1981)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 701, 464 A.2d at 1044 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court cited
positively to the reasoning of the California Supreme Court, which cautioned that if hyp-
notically enhanced testimony were admissible, trial courts might well have to rule on ex-
tremely subtle scientific issues beyond their ability to decide correctly. The trial court's
resolution of such issues would then generate limitless claims that could be raised on ap-
peal. Furthermore, errors in ruling on the admissibility of such testimony might deter-
mine the outcome of a case before the trial has begun if the hypnotized subject is the
victim or a key witness. Id. at 701-02, 464 A.2d at 1044.
100. Id. at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044.
101. 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986).
102. Id. at 91, 517 A.2d at 741-42.
103. Id. at 93, 517 A.2d at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id. at 93-94, 517 A.2d. at 743.
105. Id. at 97, 517 A.2d at 745. Specifically, the court noted that "[b]y stating that a rape
could cause the disorder, an expert implicitly verifies the victim's claim that the rape did
cause it." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 98, 517 A.2d at 745.
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court discretion based on the facts."'1 0 7 Although the court admitted
that the trial court's ruling "carrie[d] certain baggage with it," the
court nevertheless deferred to the trial court's judgment.'0 8 In deter-
mining whether the testimony met the Frye-Reed standard for admissi-
bility, the court also undertook a lengthy examination of several other
states' treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder testimony.'0 9 The
court noted that there is an almost even division among other states
regarding the admissibility of such evidence."' Because the court was
convinced that the trial court had reviewed the salient points of both
lines of cases before rendering a decision, the court deferred to the
trial court's judgment and overturned the decision of the Court of
Special Appeals.1 1'
The Court of Appeals has refrained from overturning the Frye-
Reed determinations of trial courts when it is clear the defendant had
ample opportunity to cross-examine the scientific theory or principle
at issue. In Armstead v. State,'12 the Court of Appeals considered
whether DNA "match" evidence and the descriptive statistics in sup-
port of the "match" were admissible under Fye-Reed.'13 Section 10-915
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code
sets forth that evidence of a DNA match is admissible, but the statute
fails to specify whether the product rule or the ceiling principle
should be used to calculate the probability of the match.1 1 4 Armstead,
107. Id. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
108. Id. The court noted that in future post-traumatic stress disorder cases, the defen-
dant may want to counter the State's post-traumatic stress disorder evidence with his own
expert testimony which would lead to the issue of whether the defense could require the
victim to be examined by the defense's expert. Id. Another issue is whether the absence of
post-traumatic stress disorder can be used by the accused to prove the defense of consent
to a rape charge. Id. at 109-10, 517 A.2d at 751.
109. Id. at 104-08, 517 A.2d at 748-51 (1986). As an example, the court examined an
opinion from the Supreme Court of Missouri, which held that post-traumatic stress disor-
der testimony is not admissible because the psychiatrist's opinion was not sufficiently based
on a scientific technique that is either accepted in the scientific community or rationally
sound. Id. at 105, 517 A.2d at 749. The court also examined a decision by the Supreme
Court of Kansas determining that evidence of rape trauma syndrome is relevant if the
defendant argues a defense of consent. Id. at 106-07, 517 A.2d at 750.
110. Id. at 106, 517 A.2d at 750.
111. Id. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751 (noting that the "salient factors considered in both lines
of cases reviewed . . . lead us to conclude that the trial court did not abuse his discretion
under the circumstances of the instant case").
112. 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221 (1996).
113. Id. at 43, 673 A.2d at 223.
114. Id. at 81, 673 A.2d at 242; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 10-915 (1974 &
Supp. 1995). Section 10-915 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides, in
pertinent part, that "[i] n any criminal proceeding, the evidence of a DNA profile is admis-
sible to prove or disprove the identity of any person." Id. The ceiling principle is a modifi-
cation of the product rule. Armstead, 342 Md. at 72 n.24, 673 A.2d at 237 a.24. The ceiling
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the defendant, argued that a "shift in scientific opinion" had rendered
calculations based on the product rule "outmoded."' 15 Consequently,
because the trial court admitted calculations explaining the
probability of the match from both the product rule and the ceiling
principle, Armstead argued that the court should reconsider the ad-
missibility of such evidence under the Frye-Reed test." 6
In its reasoning, the court in Armstead acknowledged the national
debate over the validity of the product rule, but nevertheless upheld
the trial court's admission of both calculations.' 1 7 The court empha-
sized that "[s] cientific test results ... need not be infallible" to meet
the standard for reliability under Fye-Reed." 8 In addition, the court
pointed to the fact that the defendant was free to introduce evidence
that attacked the reliability of such calculations.' 19 The court also rea-
soned that because the jury was given full explanations of "both the
product rule and [the] ceiling principle calculations," the concerns
under the Frye-Reed test were mitigated.1 20 Finally, despite the fact that
the defendant did not call in his own experts to refute the product
rule calculations, the Armstead court upheld the trial court's broad dis-
cretion to determine whether such evidence is admissible.' 2
1
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Wilson, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that the State's use of the product rule to compute the
improbability of two SIDS deaths in infants in the same family did not
satisfy the Frye-Reed test for the admissibility of expert testimony.' 22
Writing for the court, 2 3 Judge Raker first explained that a trial court
principle assumes a much higher maximum frequency for genetic characteristics across
subpopulations. Id. For example, if a particular characteristic that shows up in the defen-
dant's DNA sample occurs in about 1% of the general population, the ceiling principle
might assume a maximum frequency of 5% in order to compensate for any error that
using the 1% figure might have caused. Id. In contrast, the product rule would simply
incorporate the 1% figure into the statistical calculations. Id.
115. Arnstead, 342 Md. at 82-83, 673 A.2d at 243. The court did concede that there had
been significant "legal and scientific debate" over whether the product rule can be applied
to DNA testing. Id. at 70-71, 673 A.2d at 237. However, the court noted that there existed
a growing number of scientific publications that support the validity of the product rule in
genetic testing. Id. at 74, 673 A.2d at 239.
116. Id. at 83, 673 A.2d at 243.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 84, 673 A.2d at 244.
119. Id. at 86, 673 A.2d at 245.
120. Id. at 87, 673 A.2d at 245.
121. Id.
122. Wilson, 370 Md. at 195, 803 A.2d at 1036.
123. Judges Bell, Eldridge, Wilner, Cathell, Harrell, and Battaglia joined in the judg-
ment. Id. Judge Harrell wrote a concurring opinion in which he noted that he joined in
the court's opinion "based solely on the discussion in Part III of the opinion regarding the
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has broad discretion in determining whether expert testimony is ad-
missible. 124 The court then explained that, under Reed, the proper
test for establishing whether such testimony is admissible is whether
the basis of the opinion is generally accepted within the scientific
community. 125 The court then explained that the Frye-Reed test also
applies to expert testimony that relies on statistical calculations.' 26 As
such, the court reasoned, the Fye-Reed test applied to Wilson because
the State's experts used the product rule to calculate the probability
that two infants in the same family both died of SIDS. 127
The court then examined the opinions of several experts regard-
ing the cause of SIDS. 128 The court reasoned that a "genuine contro-
versy exists" within the scientific community regarding the role of
genetics in SIDS deaths. 29 Thus, the court determined there was in-
adequate proof that the two SIDS deaths in the same family were in
fact independent or unrelated events. 130 On account of this determi-
nation, the court concluded that the product rule should not have
been used to calculate the probability of two SIDS deaths of infants in
the same family because using the product rule to compute the
probability of two events presupposes that the two events are indepen-
dent and unrelated.1 3' Thus, the court concluded that the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing the State's experts to testify to the
likelihood of two SIDS deaths in the same family based on product
rule calculations. 132
The court then addressed Wilson's argument that the trial court
"took inadequate corrective action" after the State calculated the sta-
tistical probability of Wilson's innocence in its closing remarks. 33
The Court of Appeals noted that the State's comment was in error on
the grounds that the statistics were originally admitted "to satisfy the
State's burden that Garrett's death was a homicide, not that [Wilson]
was the person who committed the homicide."' 34 However, the court
did not find it necessary to decide whether the State's comments in its
prosecutor's prejudicial error in commenting on the statistical probability of [Wilson's]
innocence." Id. at 218, 803 A.2d 1050 (Harrell, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 200, 803 A.2d at 1039.
125. Id. at 201, 803 A.2d at 1040.
126. Id. at 202, 803 A.2d at 1040.
127. Id. at 203, 803 A.2d at 1041.
128. Id. at 204-06, 803 A.2d at 1041-43.
129. Id. at 210-11, 803 A.2d at 1045.
130. Id. at 211, 803 A.2d at 1045.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 212, 803 A.2d at 1046.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 214, 803 A.2d at 1047.
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closing remarks were sufficiently prejudicial enough to warrant a mis-
trial because the statistics the State relied on in its closing remarks will
not be admissible in the new trial. 135
4. Analysis.-In Wilson, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that the Circuit Court for Montgomery County abused its discretion in
permitting the State to introduce expert testimony using the product
rule to demonstrate the improbability of two SIDS deaths among chil-
dren in the same family.136 The court determined that such evidence
is inadmissible because there is no general agreement in the scientific
community that genetics is not a factor in SIDS deaths.13 1 In so rea-
soning, the court departed from its prior Frye-Reedjurisprudence char-
acterized by deference to the trial court's discretion when experts at
trial have testified to an absence of genuine widespread controversy
regarding the scientific theory or principle at issue. This departure
allows for undue weight to attach to materially insignificant Fye-Reed
issues in cases where the circumstantial evidence of guilt is overwhelm-
ing. This departure also ultimately leads to a distortion of the original
purpose of the Fye-Reed test of preventing a defendant from being
unduly prejudiced by a novel scientific theory or principle.
a. The Court's Decision Was a Departure from Prior Frye-Reed
Jurisprudence.--Prior to Wilson, the Court of Appeals was reluctant to
overrule a trial court's determination of a Frye-Reed issue-it did so
only when it was satisfied that there was rigorous debate within the
scientific community regarding the particular scientific theory or prin-
ciple at issue. 138 In prior cases where the court has overturned the
trial court's judgment, the court has often justified its decision by ad-
hering to the opinions of experts in the relevant field of the scientific
inquiry or adopting the approaches of another state with respect to
the particular Frye-Reed issue. 1 39 However, when the court is satisfied
that the procedural due process safeguards have been met at trial and
the evidence at issue has been fully explained to the jury, it will refrain
135. Id. at 217, 803 A.2d at 1049. The court noted that "in light of our ruling.., it is
unclear what the substance of the [expert] testimony will be in any future proceeding." Id.
136. Id. at 195, 803 A.2d at 1036.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 681-96, 464 A.2d 1028, 1034-42 (1983) (dis-
cussing the opinions of the most eminent physicians on the subject of hypnosis as well as
the four categories within which other states have categorized hypnosis testimony).
139. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 395, 391 A.2d 364, 375 (1978) (discussing how
other states' highest courts, other states' lower courts, and other federal courts have dealt
with the admissibility of voice spectrography).
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from finding an abuse of discretion on Frye-Reed grounds. 4 ° In con-
trast, the court's decision in Wilson departs from these foundational
elements of the court's prior jurisprudence.
(1) The Court's Decision Failed to Properly Evaluate Expert
Testimony as to the State of Scientific Opinion.--In previous Frye-Reed cases,
the Court of Appeals analyzed the opinions of experts who were famil-
iar with the particular scientific theory or principle at issue in the case
before overturning the trial court's Frye-Reed determination.' 41 In
Reed, the court gave considerable weight to the opinion of an expert
who testified at trial that the scientific community was evenly divided
on the topic of the reliability of voice spectrograms.'42 The Wilson
court, however, failed to acknowledge the fact that several experts
who testified at Wilson's trial explicitly stated that genetics was not a
factor in SIDS deaths. 143 Furthermore, the Wilson court assigned no
weight to the fact that Wilson's own expert assumed the deaths were
independent and used the product rule to calculate the probability of
the two deaths.'4 4 The Wilson court's failure to consider, much less
weigh, the experts' testimony at trial is inconsistent with Reed. In fact,
the Reed court determined that the trial court had abused its discre-
tion in admitting the voice spectrography evidence in part because
the testimony of the State's expert itself "indicate [d] substantial divi-
sion of opinion" regarding the reliability of the voiceprint process.' 45
Because the trial court had admitted the voice spectrography evidence
despite such testimony, the Reed court had a strong foundation for its
conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion.' 46 In Wilson, how-
ever, such a basis for the court's conclusion was not present. None of
the experts who testified at trial indicated that there was any division
of opinion regarding the role of genetics in SIDS deaths; in fact, the
experts testified that it is widely accepted that SIDS has no genetic
140. See, e.g., Allewalt v. State, 308 Md. 89, 98-101, 517 A.2d 741, 74547 (1986) (conclud-
ing that although post-traumatic stress disorder had not theretofore been recognized in
Maryland as being generally accepted in the scientific community, the trial court's ruling
should not be disturbed).
141. See, e.g., Collins, 296 Md. at 682-96, 464 A.2d at 1034-42 (discussing the opinions of
the most eminent physicians on the subject of hypnosis).
142. Reed, 283 Md. at 389-93, 391 A.2d at 372-74; see also supra note 78 and accompany-
ing text (elaborating on the testimony of the expert, Dr. Tosi).
143. See Wilson, 370 Md. at 198-99, 803 A.2d at 1038. Dr. Kokes testified that it is "'com-
mon knowledge"' that SIDS deaths "rarely reoccur within the same family." Wilson v.
State, 136 Md. App. 27, 58, 764 A.2d 284, 301 (2000). In addition, Dr. Norton testified that
"SIDS is not genetic." Id. at 64, 764 A.2d at 304.
144. Wilson, 370 Md. at 213, 803 A.2d at 1047.
145. Reed, 283 Md. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
146. Id.
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component. 147 Because the expert testimony in Wilson indicated that
the scientific community generally agreed that genetics plays no role in
SIDS deaths, the Wilson court's conclusion that the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting the product rule evidence is inconsistent
with Reed. 14
8
The Wilson court also failed to evaluate expert opinion in accor-
dance with the precedent in Collins. In Collins, the court examined
the works of the most eminent physicians on the topic of hypnosis and
its reliability in court proceedings before concluding that the trial
court had abused its discretion in admitting hypnotically enhanced
testimony.149 This examination was significant because these works
directly addressed the lack of reliability in hypnotically enhanced trial
testimony. 5 ° In contrast, the articles relied on by the court in Wilson
did not even address the role of genetics in SIDS deaths.'51 Rather,
these articles focus on congenital defects, sleeping environments, and
biological conditions as potential explanations of some SIDS
deaths.152 Despite the fact that these articles at best only suggest that
147. See supra note 143 (explaining that two experts concluded that SIDS is not genetic).
148. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (noting that experts for both the prose-
cution and the defense testified that there is no genetic component to SIDS).
149. State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 702, 464 A.2d 1028, 1044 (1983) (citing the works of
Diamond and Orne, the most prominent experts on the uses of hypnosis in court
proceedings).
150. Id.
151. Wilson, 370 Md. at 204-11, 803 A.2d at 104145.
152. First, the Wilson court relied heavily on an article by Michael J. Ackerman et al.,
entitled Postmortem Molecular Analysis of SCN5A Defects in Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. Id. at
204-05, 803 A.2d at 104142. The court noted that the article supports the determination
that the trial court abused its discretion because the article "draws into question the asser-
tion that SIDS deaths within a single family are independent or unrelated events." Id. at
205, 803 A.2d at 1042. However, this article hypothesizes that a congenital heart defect
may be responsible for 2% of SIDS deaths. Id. at 204-05 n.6, 803 A.2d at 1042 n.6. The
court cites this article to suggest that the cause of SIDS "may result from a genetic condi-
tion." Id. at 204, 803 A.2d at 1041. However, the authors of the article do not hypothesize
that this congenital defect is in any way linked to genetics. The study only notes that
"[alpproximately 2% of this prospective, population-based cohort of SIDS cases had an
identifiable SCN5A channel defect, suggesting that mutations in cardiaction channels may
provide a lethal arrhythmogenic substrate in some infants at risk for SIDS." Id. at 204-05
n.6, 803 A.2d at 1042 n.6. The study did not even conclude that the mutations actually
caused the death of these infants-much less that the mutations were genetic. Therefore,
the article does not support the Wilson court's assertion that the scientific community can-
not agree on the role of genetics in SIDS deaths.
The Wilson court also improperly relied on an article by John Kattwinkel et. al, which
focused on the role of infants' sleeping environment and position in SIDS deaths. SeeJohn
Kattwinkel, et. al., Changing Concepts of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome: Implications for Infant
Sleeping Environment and Sleep Position, 105 PEDIATRICs 650 (2000). The court suggests that
the Court of Special Appeals misconstrued the significance of the article because it "omit-
ted the author's discussion of genetics as a risk factor [for SIDS]." Wilson, 270 Md. at 208,
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genetics is a potential factor in SIDS deaths, the court nevertheless
relied on these three articles exclusively to support its determination
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence based
on the product rule.'53 Because these articles do not directly address
the role of genetics in SIDS deaths, the court's finding of abuse of
discretion premised on these articles is inconsistent with the court's
prior decision in Collins.
(2) The Court's Decision Failed to Examine the Approach of Other
Jurisdictions.-Prior to Wilson, the Court of Appeals also consistently
examined the decisions of other jurisdictions examining similar Frye-
Reed issues before determining whether the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in a particular case.154 In Reed, the court extensively examined
the rulings of other jurisdictions before ultimately determining that
voice spectrography evidence was inadmissible. 55 In addition, in Col-
lins, the court undertook a lengthy discussion regarding how courts
across the country have dealt with post-hypnotic testimony under
Frye.'56 In Wilson, however, the court did not inquire into other
courts' treatment of the role of genetics in SIDS in considering the
admissibility of evidence under Fye-Reed. Although only one other ju-
risdiction has considered whether the product rule can be used to
803 A.2d at 1044. However, this article does not suggest that there is a genetic component
to SIDS; it merely suggests that some studies have concluded that "having a sibling who
died of SIDS" may be "a significant risk factor" for future SIDS deaths. Id. The article does
not suggest that this risk factor must therefore be genetic. Moreover, there is a recognized
difference between the term "genetic" and "familial." See Appellee's Brief at 23, Wilson v.
State, 370 Md. 191, 803 A.2d 1034 (2002) (No. 19). "[F]amilial simply means it runs in the
family. Genetic means it's actually passed on through your genes. So, a genetic character-
istic is, by definition, familial, but all familial characteristics are not genetic." Id. (citation
omitted).
Finally, the court improperly relied on an article by Carl E. Hunt to buttress its conclu-
sion that the scientific community cannot agree on the role of genetics in SIDS deaths.
Wilson, 370 Md. at 210, 803 A.2d at 1045. The article suggests that "assuming a SIDS risk of
1.3/1000 live births in the United States, then subsequent siblings have about a 0.65% risk
of also dying of SIDS." Id. Like the Kattwinkel article, the Hunt article does not defini-
tively suggest that genetics is the reason for the study's determination that a second sibling
has a "0.65%" risk of dying of SIDS." Id. Rather, the article focuses on other biological
factors. See id.
153. Wilson, 370 Md. at 209, 803 A.2d at 1044.
154. See, e.g., Collins, 296 Md. at 681, 464 A.2d at 1034 (examining other jurisdictions'
decisions regarding the admissibility of post-hypnotic testimony).
155. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 395, 391 A.2d 364, 375 (1978). The court noted that
California, Michigan, and Pennsylvania had determined voice spectrography evidence to
be inadmissible. Id The court also noted that the lower courts of New York and Ohio as
well as the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had admitted voice spec-
trography evidence. Id.
156. Collins, 296 Md. at 681, 464 A.2d at 1034.
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determine the probability of multiple SIDS deaths, 57 the court's fail-
ure to undertake this seemingly insignificant inquiry would have been
instructive for two reasons.
First, the jurisdiction that has considered the use of the product
rule in calculating the probability of multiple SIDS deaths assumed
that SIDS is not genetic.' 58 In State v. Pankow,'59 the Court of Appeals
of Wisconsin determined that, in using the product rule to calculate
the probability of multiple SIDS deaths, there are "certain generally
accepted data"'160 that are appropriate for such calculations. 161 In-
cluded in this category is the determination that "two SIDS deaths oc-
cur [in the United States] per 1,000 live births."' 6 2 This statistic
supports the notion that there is no genetic component to SIDS. In
addition, the Pankow court allowed testimony suggesting that the
probability of three SIDS deaths in the same household in five years
was "one thousand times smaller than 9.1 in one trillion."'163 Al-
though this testimony was extremely prejudicial to the defendant, the
Pankow court maintained that such prejudice "was not so weighty as to
render the admission of the evidence an abuse of discretion."'164 The
trial court in Wilson also reached the conclusion that the evidence
based on product rule calculations was not so prejudicial as to be inad-
missible.' 65 Thus, an inquiry into the Pankow decision might have dis-
couraged the Court of Appeals from concluding that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting the product rule calculations.' 66
Second, the results of an outside jurisdiction inquiry might have
prompted the Court of Appeals to consider whether determining if
genetics is a factor in SIDS deaths was a proper inquiry at all. The
Court of Special Appeals, in affirming the trial court's admission of
the product rule evidence, noted the inaccuracy of framing the in-
157. See State v. Pankow, 422 N.W.2d 913 (Wis. App. 1988). Id. at 914. In Pankow, the
defendant was baby-sitting several children at her home, and over the course of five years,
three infants died allegedly of SIDS while in her care. Id.
158. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin accepted the fact that there are two SIDS deaths
for every one thousand live births in the United States. Id. at 918.
159. 422 N.W.2d 913 (Wis. App. 1988).
160. Id. at 918. The generally accepted data included the fact that "two SIDS deaths
occur per 1,000 live births; 90% of SIDS deaths occur under six months of age; and 90% of
SIDS deaths occur between midnight and 9 a.m." Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. The State's expert further testified that "such an event would occur by chance
every 600,000 years." Id.
164. Id. at 919.
165. Record at 109-11, Wilson, (No. 19).
166. Wilson, 370 Md. at 195, 803 A.2d at 1036.
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quiry as a question of the role of genetics in SIDS deaths. 167 The
lower court noted that it is "accurate" to assert that "deaths labeled as
SIDS deaths may indeed have a connection."168 However, it further
reasoned that "[t] he inaccuracy arises once that connection is discov-
ered, because the deaths should no longer be identified as SIDS
deaths. ' 16' The Court of Special Appeals emphasized that SIDS is
merely a "diagnosis of exclusion" that is "subject to change if an actual
cause is uncovered.' 171 Consequently, because SIDS is a diagnosis and
not a disease, by definition SIDS cannot have a genetic component. 1
71
This observation, combined with the Pankow court's assumption that
genetics is not a factor in SIDS deaths, should have persuaded the
Court of Appeals to affirm the trial court's judgment. 172 Because the
Wilson court did not undertake an outside jurisdiction inquiry, its deci-
sion failed to recognize SIDS as a diagnosis rather than a disease.
Such a recognition might have persuaded the court that a Frye-Reed
analysis was not appropriate in Wilson.
(3) Lack of Deference to the Trial Court's Determination. -In the
absence of genuine debate in the scientific community, the Court of
Appeals in cases prior to Wilson would defer to the trial court's deter-
mination.' 73 In Allewalt, the court upheld the trial court's decision
that post-traumatic stress disorder testimony was admissible in a rape
trial, although such testimony was not, theretofore, admissible in
Maryland.' 74 The court noted that because other jurisdictions were
evenly divided on the issue, the admissibility of post-traumatic stress
disorder evidence was "a matter of trial court discretion based on the
facts."17 5 Although, like in Allewalt, the trial court in Wilson was faced
with a Frye-Reed issue not previously considered in Maryland, the Wil-
son court failed to defer to the trial court's judgment. Furthermore,
the trial court in Wilson, unlike the trial court in Allewalt, was not




171. Catherine L. Goldenberg, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome as a Mask for Murder: Investi-
gating and Prosecuting Infanticide, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 599, 602 (1999).
172. The Pankow court did not address the role of genetics in SIDS deaths, but accepted
the fact that two out of every 1000 live births in the United States are attributed to SIDS.
State v. Pankow, 422 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Wis. App. 1988).
173. See, e.g., Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 87, 673 A.2d 221, 245 (1996) (upholding
the trial court's decision to admit calculations of the probability of DNA "match" errors
using both the product rule and the ceiling principle).
174. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 97, 517 A.2d 741, 745 (1986).
175. Id. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
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forced to decide between two competing lines of reasoning as to
whether certain evidence should be admitted. The trial court's deci-
sion in Wilson rested solely on the notion that the scientific commu-
nity was in complete agreement that genetics was not a factor in SIDS
deaths.176 Consequently, because the trial court's determination in
Wilson was more straightforward than the decision in Aliewalt, the
court should have placed greater emphasis on deferring to the trial
court.
The Wilson court also should have deferred to the trial court's
judgment because Wilson had ample opportunity to rebut the State's
calculations based on the product rule."' In Armstead, the court
noted that the defendant "had ample opportunity to challenge the
product rule calculations." '178 Like Armstead, Wilson was able to
cross-examine all four of the State's expert witnesses with regard to
their product rule probabilities.179 Wilson also called his own expert
witness, who testified that the cause of Garrett's death was undeter-
mined.180 Most significantly, however, Wilson's own expert used the
product rule to calculate the probability that both of Wilson's chil-
dren's deaths were caused by SIDS.' Thus, Wilson did not challenge
the notion that the deaths were not mutually independent."8 ' There-
fore, the trial court had no reason to entertain an inquiry regarding
the role of genetics in SIDS deaths.18
Additionally, the Wilson court should have upheld the trial court's
determination because the jury received a full explanation of the
proper weight to give to the statistical analysis. In Armstead, the court
noted that even though it might have reached the opposite conclu-
sion of the trial court, it would not overturn the trial court's decision
176. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (explaining how experts for both the
prosecution and the defense testified that there is no genetic component to SIDS).
177. Wilson v. State, 136 Md. App. 27, 72, 764 A.2d 284, 308 (2000).
178. Armstead, 342 Md. at 87, 673 A.2d at 245.
179. Wilson, 136 Md. App. at 72, 764 A.2d at 308.
180. Id. at 68, 764 A.2d at 306.
181. Wilson, 370 Md. at 213, 803 A.2d at 1047.
182. See id. (noting that Wilson moved for a mistrial "on the grounds that the State
improperly used the statistical evidence to calculate the probability that (Wilson] was
innocent").
183. Additionally, Wilson never moved in limine to exclude the State's experts' calcula-
tions based on the assumption that the two deaths were not independent events. Wilson
only moved in limine to exclude the testimony determining the probability of two SIDS
deaths in the same family and the testimony that implicated him in Brandi's death. Id. at
200, 803 A.2d at 1039. However, he never moved that the calculations were inaccurate
because there was a genetic component to SIDS which made the two deaths somehow
related, thereby prohibiting the use of the product rule in calculating the probability that
the two deaths were attributable to SIDS. See id.
2003]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
"because tie jury was presented with both the product rule and ceil-
ing principle calculations, with full explanations of both methods,
[and] it had the opportunity to weigh the contested evidence."' s4
Likewise, the jury in Wilson had a full explanation of all of the statisti-
cal analysis for both the State's and the defense's experts.1 85 However,
the court in Wilson ignored this circumstance in reaching its decision.
Finally, the Wilson court should have upheld the trial court's de-
termination to admit the product rule evidence because, as the court
articulated in Armstead, "[s] cientific test results ... need not be infalli-
ble to meet the standard for due process." '186 In Armstead, the court
upheld the use of either the product rule or the ceiling principle to
calculate the probability of a DNA match with the defendant, even
though the court observed that, in several other states, only calcula-
tions based on the product rule are admissible under Frye.18 7 Al-
though the statistics in Wilson may not have been completely
"infallible," the jury was nevertheless presented with full explanations
of both the State's and the defense's experts' calculations. 18 8 Further-
more, because the infants in fact had only a common father, any error
in calculation would actually result in a decrease of the probability
that both infants had died from SIDS. 8 9 The Wilson court's determi-
nation that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the statis-
tical evidence, therefore, is a departure from prior Frye-Reed
jurisprudence.
b. The Court's Decision in Wilson Gives Undue Focus to Materi-
ally Insignificant Frye-Reed Issues and Distorts the Original Purpose of the
Frye-Reed Test.-The Court of Appeals' decision in Wilson suggests
the beginning of a new Frye-Reedjurisprudence-one in which the dis-
cretion of the trial court is vulnerable to reversal despite a relatively
limited controversy over the scientific principle or theory in question.
This new jurisprudence is problematic for two reasons. First, revers-
ing the trial court's determination in cases of relatively limited contro-
versy over the scientific principle or theory allows Frye-Reed issues to be
dispostive in cases where other circumstantial evidence against a de-
184. Armstead, 342 Md. at 87, 673 A.2d at 245.
185. Wilson, 370 Md. at 211-12, 803 A.2d at 1046-47.
186. Armstead, 342 Md. at 84, 673 A.2d at 244.
187. Id. at 74, 673 A.2d at 239.
188. Wilson v. State, 136 Md. App. 27, 68, 764 A.2d 284, 306 (2001).
189. Id. The experts for both the State and the defense assumed, for purposes of calcu-
lation, that the infants were from the same family. Id. In fact, they only shared a common
father. Consequently, as the Court of Special Appeals pointed out, this error would actu-
ally decrease the probability that both infants died of SIDS. Id.
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fendant might otherwise make the Frye-Reed issue seem less important.
In addition, reversing trial court judgments in cases where it is clear
that the defendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine the ex-
perts and the theories upon which they base their testimony, distorts
the original purpose of the Frye-Reed test. A defendant who had ample
opportunity to cross-examine the experts as well as the scientific theo-
ries they used will not be unduly prejudiced by a novel scientific the-
ory or principle.
(1) The Court's Decision Allows Materially Insignificant Frye-
Reed Issues to Be Given Undue Weight in the Decision of the Case.-In Wil-
son, the statistics based on the product rule were not the only element
of the State's case. 19 ° Dr. Smialek, Maryland's Chief Medical Exam-
iner, did not rely exclusively on statistical probabilities to reach his
conclusion that Garrett's death was the result of a homicide.'
Rather, he relied in part on "information about objects in both in-
fants' cribs and on witnesses' statements.., in the context of this case
and in light of his experience as a medical examiner."'9 2 Most signifi-
cantly, however, Dr. Smialek noted that because cerebral swelling was
not consistent with SIDS and because Garrett's lungs were "ex-
panded," it was more likely that Garrett suffocated as a result of the
"physical act of another person."'9 3 Because Dr. Smialek's conclusion
was not based on the product rule, the court's exclusion of his testi-
mony on the grounds that there was no general agreement in the sci-
entific community regarding the role of genetics in SIDS deaths was
improper. The court improperly used the Frye-Reed test to exclude ex-
pert testimony that was otherwise admissible.
In addition, Dr. Norton, a forensic pathologist specializing in pe-
diatric deaths, did not rely solely on the product rule determinations
to conclude that Garrett's death was a homicide.19 4 She made her
conclusions based on circumstantial evidence, including the insur-
ance policies and Anastasi's statements about listening to Wilson in
Garrett's room minutes before Garrett died.'9 5 Dr. Kokes likewise did
not base his conclusion that Garrett died as a result of a homicide
entirely on statistical analysis.' 9 6 He also considered circumstantial ev-
190. Wilson, 370 Md. at 197-98, 803 A.2d at 1037-39. The testimony of Anastasi as well as
Drs. Smialek and Norton did not involve any statistical calculation. Id.
191. Wilson, 136 Md. at 62, 764 A.2d at 303.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 63, 764 A.2d at 303 (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. Id. at 64, 764 A.2d at 303-04.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 58, 764 A.2d at 300.
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idence, including the statements from Anastasi and the information
about the insurance policies to determine that Garrett was
smothered. 197 Nevertheless, the court excluded their testimony based
on the fact that there is no general agreement in the scientific com-
munity regarding the role of genetics in SIDS deaths.
Based on these physicians' testimony, the statistical analysis used
to conclude that Garrett died of homicide rather than SIDS is more
properly viewed as additional support for the State's determination. It
was merely one factor of many considered by Drs. Kokes and Norton.
Moreover, the Court of Special Appeals observed the limited use of
statistical testimony at trial and correctly noted that there was enough
circumstantial evidence that, if believed, could have led to a guilty ver-
dict.'98 Indeed, based on the circumstantial evidence in Wilson, it is
possible the jury would have reached a guilty verdict regardless of the
scientific community's view regarding the role of genetics in SIDS
deaths. '99 Thus, when the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
based on the conclusion that the statistical evidence of the likelihood
of two SIDS deaths of children in the same family was inadmissible, it
gave dispositive weight to a Frye-Reed issue that did not factor signifi-
cantly in the case.
(2) The Court's Decision Distorts the Original Purpose of Frye-
Reed.-The court's holding also distorts the original purpose of the
test. Originally, Fye-Reed "was designed to serve the same purpose as
the trial judge's discretionary balancing of probative value against
prejudice."200 In balancing probative value against unfair prejudice, a
trial court often looks to the defendant's ability to cross-examine the
State's witnesses on the scientific principle or theory at issue and to
bring in expert witnesses of his own to refute the State's evidence.2 0 '
This rationale was present in Allewalt and Armstead, where the Court of
Appeals noted that even though the cases may have had colorable Frye-
Reed arguments, the discretion of the trial court to admit the evidence
deserved deference because the defendant in both cases was allowed
ample opportunity to refute the State's evidence.20 2 In Wilson, the
court seems to have abandoned this principle.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 79, 764 A.2d at 311.
199. See id.
200. Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 61, 673 A.2d 221, 232 (1996).
201. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (1986).
202. Id. at 108-10, 517 A.2d at 751-52; Armstead, 342 Md. at 87, 673 A.2d at 245.
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In addition, the Frye-Reed test was designed to ensure that a defen-
dant is not unduly prejudiced by an expert's use of a novel scientific
principle to conclude that a defendant is guilty.20 3 However, when a
trial court is overturned for abuse of discretion when it is arguable
that the Frye-Reed issue was not central to the State's experts' testimony
and when the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the
experts' statistical methodology, the purpose of Frye-Reed is no longer
served. Wilson failed to demonstrate that he was unfairly prejudiced
by the trial court's determination that the product rule statistics were
admissible. Thus, the Court of Appeals' determination that the there
is no agreement in the scientific community regarding the role of ge-
netics in SIDS deaths serves no evidentiary purpose.2 °4 Moreover, Wil-
son would likely have been convicted regardless of the trial court's
Frye-Reed determination.
Finally, a practical problem with the Court of Appeals' new Frye-
Reed jurisprudence involves future cases similar to Wilson. Because the
court has suggested that the trial court's discretion in Frye-Reed cases is
no longer as broad as it was in Allewalt and Armstead, a defendant
might well worry less about the thoroughness of his cross-examina-
tions of experts during trial.20 5 If he has any support for an assertion
that the scientific community is not entirely united on a particular
Frye-Reed issue, then, on appeal, he may use Wilson as proof that the
Court of Appeals no longer adheres to a jurisprudence characterized
by deference to the trial court's determination. Should the appellate
court agree in such a situation, the original rationale for the Frye-Reed
test would be jeopardized.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Wilson al-
tered its previous Fye-Reedjurisprudence when it held that, because of
the lack of general agreement within the scientific community regard-
203. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (explaining the original purpose of
the Frye-Reed test).
204. See supra note 199 (noting that there was enough circumstantial evidence to lead to
a finding of guilt).
205. Wilson himself did not interpose any Fye-Reed objections or motions at trial. The
defense never moved in limine to exclude the State's experts' calculations based on the
assumption that the two deaths were not independent events. See Wilson, 370 Md. at 200,
803 A.2d at 1039. The defense only moved in limine to exclude the testimony determining
the probability of two SIDS deaths in the same family and the testimony that implicated
him in Brandi's death. Id. Furthermore, the defense never moved that the calculations
were inaccurate because there was a genetic component to SIDS which made the two
deaths somehow related, thereby prohibiting the use of the product rule in calculating the
probability that the two deaths were attributable to SIDS. Id. The idea that the calcula-
tions might not pass the Frye-Reed test must, therefore, have come after trial.
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ing the role of genetics in SIDS deaths, calculations based on the
product rule indicating the probability that Garrett's death was the
result of SIDS should not have been admitted against Wilson.2" 6 This
decision marked a change in the court's Frye-Reed jurisprudence be-
cause the court in Wilson, unlike past cases, failed to defer to the trial
court's determination on the admissibility of the scientific evidence.
The court did so despite the fact that Wilson had ample opportunity
to cross-examine the State's experts and refute their statistical analy-
sis. 2 ° 7 The court's decision in Wilson is problematic because it allows
too much weight to be given to materially insignificant Frye-Reed issues
in cases where the circumstantial evidence of guilt is overwhelming.
The court's decision also distorts the original purpose of the Frye-Reed
test of ensuring that a defendant has not been unduly prejudiced by a
novel scientific theory or principle.20 8 Moreover, the court's decision
in Wilson has initiated an erosion of the original purpose and ratio-
nale of the Frye-Reed test.
JENNIFER SKAGGS
206. Wilson, 370 Md. at 195, 803 A.2d at 1036.
207. Wilson v. State, 136 Md. App. 27, 72, 764 A.2d 284, 308 (2000).
208. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385, 391 A.2d 364, 370-71 (noting that
"[flairness to a litigant would seem to require that before the results of a scientific process




A. Opening the Door for Recoupment of Child Support Payments
In Walter v. Gunter,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a
putative father is not legally obligated for child support arrearages
2
when the paternity declaration on which the child support order was
based is invalidated.3 The court's decision in Walter reflects the recent
direction of the Maryland courts toward eliminating the best interests
of the child standard from paternity proceedings and reinforcing the
State's preference for biological, rather than legal, determinations of
paternity.4 However, this trend contradicts case law from other states
that largely retains the best interests of the child standard as a hurdle
to reopening paternityjudgments. Furthermore, the court's decision
opens the door for non-genetic fathers to recoup the child support
payments they made prior to genetic testing disestablishing their pa-
ternity. The court's decision in Walter, coupled with the removal of
the best interests of the child standard from consideration in paternity
cases, will have an adverse impact on Maryland children who have re-
lied upon child-support payments.
1. The Case.--On August 13, 1993, Michelle Gunter filed a peti-
tion to establish paternity, claiming that Nicholas Todd Walter was the
father of her child, Taylor Alexandria Gunter.5 Based on Gunter's
assertion that she had sexual relations only with Walter around the
time of Taylor's conception, Walter consented to ajudgment of pater-
nity in September 1993.6 As a result, the court ordered Walter to pay
$43.00 per week in child support payments.7
In the years following the paternity judgment, civil contempt pro-
ceedings were periodically brought against Walter to enforce his child
1. 367 Md. 386, 788 A.2d 609 (2002).
2. Arrearages are "something unpaid and overdue." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 18
(Pocket Edition, 2000).
3. Walter, 367 Md. at 389, 788 A.2d at 610. This case presented the first opportunity
for Maryland courts to address this issue. Id. at 392, 788 A.2d at 612.
4. See Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 437, 754 A.2d 389, 411 (2000) (holding that
courts need not take into account the best interests of the child when ordering a paternity
judgment to be set aside).




support obligation.' Walter filed a petition to modify child support
on March 30, 2000, nearly seven years after he consented to the pater-
nity judgment.9 Walter also filed a motion for genetic testing, assert-
ing that a test was necessary because Gunter's family had told him on
a number of occasions that he was not Taylor's father.' ° The genetic
testing conclusively excluded Walter as Taylor's father." Based on
the test results, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County termi-
nated Walter's prospective child support obligation as of September
28, 2000.12
At a hearing on October 19, 2000, a Master considered Walter's
requests to end his responsibility for paying the child support arrear-
ages and to recoup the child support payments already made.'" The
Master recommended that the circuit court set aside the paternity
judgment, but hold Walter accountable for the accrued child support
arrearages as of March 30, 2000, the date on which Walter filed his
motion for genetic testing. 4 In addition, the Master recommended
that the circuit court deny Walter's request to recoup child support
payments already made.' 5
Walter filed an exception to the Master's recommendations only
on the issue of arrearages.' 6 Walter did not file an exception to the
Master's denial of his request of recoupment for child support already
paid.' 7 The circuit court accepted the Master's recommendations and
set aside the paternity judgment, but ordered that Walter remain re-
sponsible for the $11,228 arrearage in existence as of the filing of the
action."
8. Id. Walter claimed that a work-related accident in 1996, and a later car accident led
to injuries that kept him from his job as a cab driver, affecting his ability to make the
monthly payment. Id. at 389-90, 788 A.2d at 611.
9. Id. at 390, 788 A.2d at 611. As of March 30, 2000, the day Walter filed for paternity
testing, Walter owed $11,228 in child support arrearages. Id. at 391, 788 A.2d at 612. He
owed $4153.33 to the State Department of Social Services and the remainder to Taylor. Id.





15. Id. The Master determined that recoupment of child support payments already
paid to Taylor by Walter would be "detrimental to the best interests of the child," thus
denying Walter's request. Id. at 390-91 n.2, 788 A.2d at 611-12 n.2.
16. Id. at 390, 788 A.2d at 611.
17. Id. at 390-91 n.2, 788 A.2d at 611-12 n.2. Because Walter did not file an exception
to the Master's denial of his recoupment request, the court did not address the issue of
recoupment in its opinion or holding. Id.
18. Id. at 391, 788 A.2d at 611-12.
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Walter appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 9
At the same time, Walter filed a petition for certiorari before judgment
and a petition for expedited review with the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land. 20 Before the case could be heard in the Court of Special Ap-
peals, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine whether
Walter remained liable for child support arrearages after the paternity
judgment on which his child support order was based had been
vacated.21
2. Legal Background.--Maryland law governing paternity declara-
tions has undergone a critical transformation over the last ten years,
marked by the Maryland courts' and the General Assembly's increased
willingness to reopen paternity declarations. 22 During this period of
time, the best interests of the child standard has been eliminated from
the trial court's discretion when deciding whether to allow post-judg-
ment challenges to paternity declarations. 23 As a result, paternity dec-
larations may now be challenged under any circumstance regardless
of the impact such a challenge might have on a child.2 4 This trend is
not in line with how other states treat paternity judgments. In other
states, a court must consider the child's best interests before allowing
a previously-enrolled paternity judgment to be challenged. 25 Addi-
tionally, Maryland is out of step with the Uniform Parentage Act of
2000,26 which advocates for consistency in state laws regarding the re-
opening of paternity judgments.
19. Id.
20. Id., 788 A.2d at 612.
21. Id. The Court of Appeals also granted certiorari to determine whether, if the court
found that Walter was responsible for the arrearages, he could be subject to contempt
proceedings or imprisonment for failure to make payments. Id. Because the court con-
cluded that Walter was not responsible for the arrearages, it did not reach this second issue
in its holding and opinion. Id.
22. See, e.g., Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 437, 754 A.2d 389, 411 (2000) (holding
that Family Law Article section 5-1038 could be applied retroactively to reopen paternity
judgments enrolled prior to the law's effective date of October 1, 1995).
23. See id. at 399, 754 A.2d at 415 (stating that the legislature intended to eliminate
consideration of the "best interests" standard when allowing paternity judgments to be
reopened or set aside).
24. See id. at 404, 754 A.2d at 425 (stating that "a blood or genetic test is to be triggered
automatically when any party, including the putative father, moves to have testing
conducted").
25. See infra notes 49-68 (discussing other states' handling of paternity judgments and
application of the best interests of the child standard).
26. Uniform Parentage Act (2000), drafted by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, available at http://www.aaml.org/Articles/2000-11/
UPA%20FINAL%20TEXT%20WITH%COMMENTS%20.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
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a. Maryland Law Regarding Paternity Declarations. -Tradition-
ally, judicially determined fathers in Maryland could only challenge
paternity declarations under very narrow circumstances. In Tandra S.
v. Tyrone W, 27 the court ruled that courts have no authority to set
aside an enrolled paternity judgment except upon a showing of
"fraud, mistake, or irregularity," even if a later genetic test disproves
the adjudged father's biological connection to the child.2" The court
acknowledged the "harsh" result that its ruling would have on the
men who were required to continue child support payments, but de-
clared that the "overriding policy" in Maryland is to respect final judg-
ments, once made.2 9 The court also expressed its view that finality in
paternity cases is particularly important to the parties involved, and
that the 'judicially-determined" father in each case had ample oppor-
tunity to challenge the original action, yet none elected to contest the
paternity judgment entered against them.3 ° The majority explained
that overturning these paternity judgments after a number of years
would leave children "fatherless and without support."3 In his dis-
senting opinion, Judge Eldridge stated that the court should allow pa-
ternity declarations to be revisited under any circumstances because
of the importance to children of knowing their biological father.3 2
Judge Eldridge stated that the majority's refusal to revisit a paternity
declaration when faced with irrefutable scientific evidence that the
declaration was invalid "'defie[d] common sense.'"n
Maryland softened its tough stance against reconsideration of pa-
ternity declarations in 1995. Responding to public pressure and
swayed by the dissenting opinion in Tandra S., Maryland's General As-
sembly changed portions in the Family Law Article of the Maryland
27. 336 Md. 303, 648 A.2d 439 (1994).
28. The court read Family Law Article section 5-1038, regarding paternity judgments,
to be "governed by the strict revisory rules set forth in Rule 2-535." Id. at 315, 648 A.2d at
445. Thus, the court declared that it had the power to reopen paternity judgments after
thirty days when there was clearly fraud, mistake, or irregularity in the proceedings. Id. at
325, 648 A.2d at 449-50.
29. Id. at 324, 648 A.2d at 449.
30. Id. at 324-25, 648 A.2d at 449. The court stated that the father "had full knowledge
of the original paternity complaint, and he knowingly waived his right to counsel, a blood
test, a trial by judge or jury, and the right to call and cross-examine witnesses." Id. Because
Walter passed up the chance to defend the paternity claim in court, the court stated that
he could no longer challenge the now-enrolled paternity decree. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 328, 648 A.2d at 451 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Judge Eldridge wrote that
paternity judgments differ from typical judgments rendered by a court because of the
ramifications to children that follow a paternity declaration, including inheritance, "citi-
zenship, and a child's knowledge of his or her medical history." Id.
33. Id. at 330, 648 A.2d at 452 (citation omitted).
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Code to allow a judgment of paternity to be reopened if later genetic
testing disproved an acknowledged father's paternity.34 In fact, the
law was passed to prevent a situation like the one in Tandra S. from
recurring.3 5 Specifically, the General Assembly amended section 5-
1038 so that an adjudged father could move to set aside a paternity
declaration previously enrolled against him when later genetic testing
excluded him as the child's biological father.36
In addition to criticism from the legislature, the court's decision
in Tandra S. was harshly criticized by three articles published shortly
after the decision was entered.3 7 The articles reflected the frustration
on the part of the men in the Tandra S. case, who were not the child's
father yet were forced to pay support while the "real" father had no
financial or legal obligation to his child.3"
The General Assembly's efforts to overrule the Tandra S. decision
were also criticized. The Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore
City, in a letter written by Patricia Jessarny, expressed concern that
amending section 5-1038 could have a "serious impact" on Maryland's
paternity and child support system.39 In particular, Jessamy stated
that the issue of paternity must be "viewed with regard to the best
34. Langston v. Rifle, 359 Md. 396, 412-13, 754 A.2d 389, 397-98 (2000). The court
noted that the General Assembly apparently "agreed with the various criticisms of Tandra S.
in the media and with Judge Eldridge and Judge Raker's claim that the decision defied
'common sense.'" Id. at 412, 754 A.2d at 397-98.
35. Id. at 406, 754 A.2d at 394. The court stated that "[c]learly, Chapter 248 was de-
signed to remedy the effect Tandra S. had on paternity declarations." Id.
36. See id. at 405, 754 A.2d at 405 (describing the 1995 change in law that followed the
Tandra S. decision). Section 5-1038 provides in relevant parts:
A declaration of paternity may be modified or set aside: .
... if a blood or genetic test done in accordance with § 5-1029 of this subtitle
establishes the exclusion of the individual named as the father in the order.
(ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, a declaration of pa-
ternity may not be modified or set aside if the individual named in the order
acknowledged paternity knowing he was not the father.
(b) Other orders subject to modification. - Except for a declaration of paternity,
the court may modify or set aside any order or part of an order under this subtitle
as the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the
best interests of the child.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-1038 (1999).
37. See Adam Ambrose, Paternity: A Missed Opportunity, DAILY Ric., Nov. 12, 1994, at 24;
Jane Bowling, Forcing Paternity in the Name of Finality and Expediency, DAILY REc., Nov. 12,
1994, at 18; William Thompson, Md. High Court's Paternity Ruling Fathers Bizarre Justice,
BALT. SUN, Oct. 24, 1994, at 4E (criticizing the Tandra S. decision).
38. See supra note 37 (describing three articles criticizing the Tandra S. decision).
39. Letter from Patricia Jessamy, State's Attorney for Baltimore City, to Chairman and
Members of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee 1 (Mar. 30, 1995) (on file with the
Maryland Department of Legislative Services).
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interest of the child."4  Similarly, the Maryland Department of
Human Resources took the position that changing the law would have
a "devastating effect" on Maryland's system for establishment of pater-
nity.4 The Department also reasoned that once an individual has
committed to a parenting relationship through acknowledging pater-
nity, that commitment "should take priority in a paternity proceed-
ing. Despite the criticism, the General Assembly amended the law
to allow paternity declarations to be reopened even after the thirty-day
final judgment window had passed.
Following the General Assembly's change to the Family Law Arti-
cle, trial courts were given the power to reconsider paternity judg-
ments regardless of when they were initially enrolled. In Langston v.
Riffe,44 the Court of Appeals was again asked to consider whether a
paternity declaration could be reopened in light of a subsequent dis-
covery that an adjudged father was not, in fact, a child's biological
father.45 In Langston, William Carl Langston attempted to set aside a
paternity judgment twelve years after he acknowledged that he was the
father of Angela Riffe and had agreed to pay child support.46 After a
detailed discussion of the legislative history behind the General As-
sembly's 1995 amendments, the court held that the legislative intent
was for section 5-1038 to be applied retroactively to all paternity deci-
sions entered before the October 1, 1995, effective date of the legisla-
tion.4 7 Thus, the court ruled that the General Assembly intended to
have a blood or genetic test automatically triggered when any party,
including an acknowledged father, moved to have testing
conducted.48
b. Other States' Laws Regarding Paternity Declarations. -- Con-
trary to the trend in Maryland, many other states continue to treat
paternity declarations as final judgments which can be reopened only
40. Id. at 2.
41. Testimony presented by Brian Shea, Department of Human Resources, before the
House Judiciary Committee regarding House Bill 337 (Mar. 3, 1995) (on file with the Ma-
ryland Department of Legislative Resources).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 359 Md. 396, 754 A.2d 389 (2000).
45. Id. at 399, 754 A.2d at 390.
46. Id. at 401-02, 754 A.2d at 391-92.
47. Id. at 416, 754 A.2d at 399. The court understood the legislative history of Chapter
248, which modified Family Law Article section 5-1038, to mean that it was intended to
allow a circuit court to "modify or set aside 'any' paternity declaration, including those
entered prior to the effective date of the Act." Id.
48. Id. at 403, 754 A.2d at 392.
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under very narrow circumstances. In Clay v. Clay,49 for example, the
Court of Appeals of Minnesota considered whether to allow a hus-
band to challenge paternity after a couple's divorce proceedings had
been finalized.5" The trial court, in issuing the divorce decree, found
that the child was the "issue of the marriage," a finding that went un-
challenged by the husband.51 Three years later, the husband chal-
lenged paternity of the child, stating he had reason to believe that the
child was not his.52 The court denied the paternity challenge, stating
that the doctrine of res judicata prevented the man from arguing the
issue at a later date.5 3
In Watson v. State,54 the Court of Appeals of Oregon considered
whether to allow a man to challenge a paternity declaration two years
after he acknowledged he was the child's father.55 Responding to the
man's claim that he had been induced into acknowledging paternity
by the mother's fraudulent conduct, the court stated that the man was
not prevented at the time from disputing the mother's testimony or
challenging his paternity.56 Based on the state's strong policy interest
in the finality of litigation, the court ruled that the man could not
reopen the judgment.57
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania confronted the same issue in
Wachter v. Ascero.58 Three years after acknowledging paternity of a
child, the man filed a petition to reopen the paternity issue, wanting
to "know for sure" if he was the child's father.59 Citing res judicata,
the court stated that the issue of paternity was settled when the man
entered into the support order and did not appeal the order.6 ° Alter-
natively, the court asserted that its decision was justified under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, which estopped the man from denying
that he was the child's father because he had allowed the order to go
unchallenged for three years.6
49. 397 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. App. 1986).
50. Id. at 573.
51. Id. at 575.
52. Id. at 574.
53. Id. at 575. The court stated that the man had two opportunities to assert a claim
that he was not the child's father, and that he knew or should have known at the time of
the divorce that he was not the child's father. Id.
54. 694 P.2d 560 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
55. Id. at 561.
56. Id. at 563.
57. l
58. 550 A.2d 1019 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
59. Id. at 1020.
60. Id. at 1020-21.
61. Id. at 1021. The court explains that the man would be estopped from denying
paternity if the man "has indicated by his conduct that the child is his own." Id.
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Courts in Michigan and Virginia have similarly applied estoppel
and final judgment rules to post-judgment paternity challenges. The
Supreme Court of Michigan in Hackley v. Hackly6 2 ruled that a divorce
decree containing a support order conclusively established the fa-
ther's duty to support a child born during the marriage." The court
held that resjudicata barred the ex-husband from challenging the pa-
ternity of the child after the divorce decree was finalized.64 Similarly,
in Slagle v. Slagle,65 the Court of Appeals of Virginia considered
whether a man could challenge a paternity declaration included in a
divorce decree one year after the decree was entered by the court,
based on new information indicating he may not be the child's biolog-
ical father.66 The court ruled that the issue of paternity had been
"conclusively adjudicated" in the final divorce decree, a judgment
from which the man did not appeal.67 Applying the state's final judg-
ment rule to the case, the court denied the man's request to eliminate
his child support payments even though genetic testing showed that
he was not the child's biological father.68
c. The Best Interests of the Child Standard Under Maryland
Law.-While the "best interests of the child" standard has traditionally
played a prominent role in Maryland family law decisions, a second
effect of the court's decision in Langston was to do away with this stan-
dard when allowing a later challenge to a paternity declaration.69
While a court no longer considers the child's best interest in paternity
proceedings, it remains guided by this standard in child custody and
visitation cases.70
The Court of Appeals first announced the best interests of the
child standard in Barnard v. Godfrey,71 a child custody case. The court
stated that its "paramount purpose" in deciding custody matters was
considering the child's welfare and "promoting the best interest of the
child[ ]" involved.72 Determining the child's best interests involved
62. 395 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. 1986).
63. Id. at 907.
64. Id.
65. 398 S.E.2d 346 (Va. App. 1990).
66. Id. at 350.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 425, 754 A.2d 389, 404 (2000) (holding that the
best interests of the child may no longer be considered by the court when considering
challenges to previously enrolled paternity declarations).
70. Id at 430, 754 A.2d at 407.
71. 157 Md. 264, 145 A. 614 (1929).
72. Id. at 267, 145 A. at 615.
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consideration of the "character, habits and condition in life" of the
parents.73 Furthermore, a parent could forfeit the right to custody of
a child as a result of "improper conduct, manner, or habit of living."7 4
Using these factors, the court determined that a divorced couple's
young children were better placed in their mother's custody, where
they would lead happier lives and be "removed from the influence of
and association with the father," alleged to be abusive toward the
mother and children.7 5
In Elza v. Elza,7 6 the Court of Appeals stated that in determining
which parent is to have custody of a child after the parents divorce,
the judge must adhere to the child's best interests. 77 In the lower
court proceedings, a chancellor awarded custody of a young girl to
her mother after finding that both parents were equally fit and capa-
ble of caring for the child.78 The father appealed the chancellor's
decision, arguing that the court relied erroneously on the maternal
preference presumption in awarding custody of the girl to her
mother. 79 Granting certiorari to consider the issue, the Court of Ap-
peals agreed with the father that the chancellor ruled in error and
that the marital presumption was no longer valid in Maryland. ° The
court remanded the case for consideration of the child's best inter-
ests, including the child's needs, her relationship with each parent,
and the "effect of the biological as well as psychological differences
between her parents on her welfare."8 "
Similarly, in Giffin v. Crane,82 the court considered a post-divorce
custody battle between parents.83 Although the Court of Appeals rec-
ognized that determining the best interests of the child is not an easy
task, it stated that in custody matters it "must be guided first, and fore-
73. Id., 145 A. at 615-16.
74. Id., 145 A. at 616.
75. Id. at 271, 145 A. at 617.
76. 300 Md. 51, 475 A.2d 1180 (1984).
77. Id. at 56, 475 A.2d at 1183.
78. Id. at 55, 475 A.2d at 1182.
79. Id. at 56, 475 A.2d at 1183. The court briefly discussed the history of Maryland's
"maternal preference" in child custody cases. The court explained the principle as follows:
"'In determining what is the best interest of the child, it is entirely proper for the trial
court to consider . . . the general rule that the custody of a child of tender years should
ordinarily be awarded to the mother."' Id. at 57, 475 A.2d at 1183 (quoting Oberlander v.
Oberlander, 256 Md. 672, 261 A.2d 727 (1970)). The court concluded, however, that the
maternal preference was abolished by statute in child custody matters. Id. at 58, 475 A.2d
at 1184.
80. Id. at 59, 475 A.2d at 1184.
81. Id. at 60, 475 A.2d at 1185.
82. 351 Md. 133, 716 A.2d 1029 (1998).
83. Id. at 135, 716 A.2d at 1030.
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most, by what it believes would promote the child's best interest. '84
The Giffin court enumerated the factors to be considered when deter-
mining a child's best interests to include: the child's age, health, and
sex, as well as the court's evaluation of the child's "life chances" in
each of the parents' homes.8"
In addition to guiding the courts in custody disputes, the best
interests of the child standard served as the controlling standard in
Maryland paternity cases prior to 1995. The Court of Appeals first
addressed the issue in Turner v. Whisted,86 in which the court deter-
mined whether to allow a putative father to use blood tests to rebut
the presumption of another man's paternity.87 The Turner court cre-
ated a balancing test to handle the dispute, weighing the "integrity of
the familial relationships already formed" with the rights of the bio-
logical father.88 Additionally, the court stated that consideration of
the best interests of the child is an important consideration in deter-
mining whether or not to allow the order for blood testing.89 After
considering the child's best interests using its balancing test, the court
denied the putative father blood testing, because the results, if they
proved his paternity, would undermine the marital presumption of
paternity respected by Maryland law.9°
The Court of Appeals reached a similar decision a year later in
Monroe v. Monroe.91 The Monroe court concluded that blood tests to
contradict an acknowledged father's paternity should not be ordered
without first assessing the impact on the child's welfare.92 In Monroe, a
mother sought to admit blood testing to prove that her child's long-
acknowledged father was not the child's biological father so that she
could gain sole custody of the child and move from Maryland.93 The
court, citing Turner, concluded that the mother needed to demon-
strate that ordering blood tests would be in the child's best interest,
specifically as to the child's "physical, mental, and emotional needs"
84. Id. at 145-46, 716 A.2d at 1035-36.
85. Id. at 146, 716 A.2d at 1035-36 (quoting Chief Judge Gilbert's majority opinion in
Montgomery County Dep't of Social Services v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 381 A.2d 1154 (1977)).
86. 327 Md. 106, 607 A.2d 935 (1992).
87. Id. at 111, 607 A.2d at 936.
88. Id. at 117, 607 A.2d at 940.
89. Id. at 110, 607 A.2d at 936.
90. Id. at 117, 607 A.2d at 940. The traditional marital presumption is that "[a] child
born or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of both
spouses." Id. at 110, 607 A.2d at 936.
91. 329 Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993).
92. Id. at 772-73, 621 A.2d at 905.
93. Id. at 761-62, 621 A.2d at 899-900.
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from the child's-not her mother's or father's-perspective.94 The
court acknowledged that the child may have bonded with or gained
"psychological dependence" on the acknowledged father, even with-
out a biological connection to the man.95 Thus, the court held that
reopening the judgment would not be in the child's best interest.96
In Tandra S., the court reinforced the need to consider a child's
best interests when allowing post-judgment challenges to paternity
declarations.97 In two similar cases combined by the court in its opin-
ion, the acknowledged father filed a motion to set aside the judgment
of paternity entered against him by requesting blood testing.9" The
court denied the fathers' requests to reopen the judgments, stating
that paternity judgments were "final" judgments, which under Mary-
land law could only be reopened in cases of "fraud, mistake, or irregu-
larity."99 The court also concluded that the childrens' best interests
would not be served by allowing the paternity issue to be relitigated
because it created the potential of leaving the children "fatherless and
without support.""1 ° To provide additional support for its holding,
the court found that the "majority of decisions from other jurisdic-
tions" supported the court's reinstatement of the original paternity
judgment.1 '
Contrary to this well-established precedent, Maryland removed
the court's discretion to consider the best interests of the child before
allowing paternity judgments to be reopened."' In Langston, the
court considered three separate paternity disputes in which an ac-
knowledged father sought to set aside that judgment based on new
evidence that he was not the child's biological father.'" In its deci-
sion, the court examined the legislative history of the General Assem-
bly's 1995 amendments to Family Law Article section 5-1038 and
concluded that the final version of the law eliminated consideration
94. Id. at 772, 621 A.2d at 905.
95. Id. at 772-73, 621 A.2d at 905.
96. Id. at 777, 621 A.2d at 907.
97. Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 307, 648 A.2d 439, 441 (1994).
98. Id. at 306, 648 A.2d at 440. In one of the cases before the court, the acknowledged
father challenged the paternity judgment approximately six years after the judgment was
enrolled in the court. Id. at 308-10, 648 A.2d at 441-42. In the other, the acknowledged
father challenged that paternity judgment two-and-a-half years after it was enrolled. Id. at
306-08, 648 A.2d at 440-41.
99. Id. at 314-15, 648 A.2d at 444-45.
100. Id. at 325, 648 A.2d at 449. The court noted that reopening a paternity judgment
would result in "unfairness" to the children. Id.
101. Id. at 324, 648 A.2d at 449.
102. Langston v. Rifle, 359 Md. 396, 437, 754 A.2d 389, 411 (2002).
103. Id. at 399, 754 A.2d at 390.
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of the best interests of the child from paternity proceedings.10 4 The
court stated that while the best interests analysis no longer applied to
paternity proceedings, it would remain applicable in custody and visi-
tation determinations in which consideration of the standard "ma [de]
more sense."'1 5 In conclusion, the court stated that its holding "does
not necessarily affect any child support already paid or in arrears as of
the date of the filing of these respective proceedings at the trial
court."' °6 In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Bell disagreed with
the majority's examination of the legislative history of the amend-
ments to section 5-1038.1"7 Contrary to the majority's opinion, Chief
Judge Bell asserted that the best interests of the child must be consid-
ered before any blood or genetic testing is ordered.1 °8 Chief Judge
Bell also stated that after paternity has been established, the issue of
parentage is "intertwined" with the interests of the child and cannot
be separated. 10 9
d. Other States' Use of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in
Paternity Proceedings.--States other than Maryland have continued to
hold the best interests of the child standard as the court's paramount
consideration in paternity proceedings. In Massachusetts, the Su-
preme Judicial Court recently held that a father could not move to set
aside a judgment of paternity nearly six years after he voluntarily ac-
knowledged paternity." 0 The court ruled that allowing an attempt to
"undo a determination of paternity" could be devastating to a child
who has consistently relied on her father's support, and thus, such a
challenge was not in the child's best interest."' The court also found
that the father, faced with growing doubts that he was the child's fa-
ther, failed to seek genetic testing at the "earliest reasonable opportu-
nity," further justifying the court's ruling."12
104. Id. at 425, 754 A.2d at 404.
105. Id. at 430, 754 A.2d at 407.
106. Id. at 437, 754 A.2d at 411.
107. Id. at 438-39, 754 A.2d at 412 (Bell, CJ., dissenting).
108. Id. at 459, 754 A.2d at 423. ChiefJudge Bell stated that allowing final orders to be
set aside or modified in the paternity context must be "exercised with the utmost caution,"
including the welfare of the child. Id. at 453, 754 A.2d at 420 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 452, 754 A.2d at 419. Chief Judge Bell stated that by eliminating the "best
interests" standard from paternity proceedings, the majority "ignores the significant impact
these proceedings may have on the children involved." Id. at 454, 754 A.2d at 420.
110. Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 490 (2001).
111. Id. at 495-96.
112. Id. at 496.
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In Colorado, a court first considers the welfare of the child before
ordering post-judgment paternity testing.' 13 In People ex rel. JA.V v.
R.L. C., the Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that a man who
has previously admitted paternity could not obtain genetic tests to
challenge that judgment of paternity eleven years after it was en-
tered.1 14 The court reasoned that allowing the father to challenge the
relationship would threaten the child's relationship with the parent
and her "financial and psychological stability."'1 15 The court con-
cluded that it is not in the best interests of the child to permit an
existing relationship to be subjected to "endless question and chal-
lenge," with the possibility of leaving children "fatherless and without
financial support." '116
The highest courts in Washington and Kansas, as well as courts in
a number of other states, have also held that a trial court must con-
sider the child's best interests before ordering blood or genetic test-
ing.' 1 7 In In re Marriage of Ross," 8 the Supreme Court of Kansas held
that prior to ordering blood tests to determine if a presumed parent is
a child's biological parent, the trial court must consider the child's
"physical, mental, and emotional" needs based on the facts in the re-
cord." 9 The court concluded that the "mere filing of a paternity ac-
tion does not automatically imply that the action is in the child's best
interests." ' Similarly in McDaniels v. Carlson,2 ' the Supreme Court
of Washington held that the trial court must consider the impact of a
paternity action on the child before allowing paternity proceedings.
12 2
The court stated that the best interests of the child standard "d[id]
not entitle a court to presume that paternity determination is automat-
ically in the child's best interest."' 23 The court cited studies by child
development experts stressing the importance of stability and predict-
ability in parent-child relationships, even when the parent is not the
113. People ex rel.J.A.U. v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327, 333 (Colo. 2002). The court stated that
"the child's interests must also be considered when deciding whether to permit a legal
father to reopen a judgment of paternity." Id.
114. Id. at 328.
115. Id. at 332-33.
116. Id. at 333.
117. See, e.g., In re Paternity of "Adam," 903 P.2d 207, 211 (Mont. 1995) (holding that
the best interests of the child standard applies in determining whether to order blood
tests).
118. 783 P.2d 331 (Kan. 1990).
119. Id. at 338.
120. Id. at 339.
121. 738 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1987).




biological parent, and stated that in some cases, a child is better off
with no paternity determination at all. 124
In addition to the many states that consider the best interests of
the child prior to allowing challenges to paternity declarations, there
is a growing movement toward standardizing state laws regarding pa-
ternity declarations. The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) of 2000,125
endorsed by many family law organizations, encourages all states to
adopt uniform laws related to issues of paternity.' 26 Section 603(b) of
the UPA gives courts discretion to decline a request for genetic testing
if it would not be in the best interests of the child.127 The court may
examine numerous factors in determining the child's best interest,
including the child's age, the relationship between the alleged father
and the child, and the circumstances under which the "father"
learned of his lack of genetic link to the child.128
e. Financial Responsibility for Children. -Maryland courts have
long held that a duty to support a child resides with the child's biolog-
ical parents. 129  In Carroll County Department of Social Services v.
Edelmann,13° the Court of Appeals considered whether it had legal au-
thority to terminate parental rights of a father who, since the birth of
his child, had very little involvement in the child's life.' 3 ' In its analy-
sis, the court examined the concept of parenthood and concluded
that it is "both a biological and a legal status" that imposes upon par-
ents the duty to support their children until they are able to support
themselves.' 3 2 The court supported its decision by quoting Black-
stone, who wrote that a parent's duty to support his or her children is
a principle based in natural law.' 33 The court ultimately ruled that a
124. Id.
125. Uniform Parentage Act (2000), drafted by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, available at http://www.aaml.org/Articles/2000-1I/




129. See, e.g., Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 517, 374 A.2d 900, 905 (1977) (holding that
"parents must share the responsibility for parental support in accordance with their respec-
tive financial resources").
130. 320 Md. 150, 577 A.2d 14 (1990).
131. Id. at 175, 577 A.2d at 26. In a petition to the court to terminate the father's paren-
tal rights, the child's mother alleged that the father "'ha[d] not exercised visitation with
[the child] for over five (5) years,"' and she believed that termination was in the best
interests of the child. Id. at 155, 577 A.2d at 16.
132. Id. at 170, 577 A.2d at 23.
133. Id., 577 A.2d at 23-24 (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, § 1, at 447).
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parent's duty and responsibility to his child cannot be terminated
under Maryland statutory law.134
A similar principle of a natural parent's duty to support his chil-
dren guided the court's ruling in Knill v. Knill.is5 The Knill court
considered whether a husband was required to support a child who,
although born to his wife during their marriage, was not actually his
biological child. " 6 The child's mother argued that her husband
should be estopped from denying support to the child based on the
fact that he had "represented himself to the child and to the commu-
nity" as the child's father for over twelve years.'3 7 The court, however,
ruled that equitable estoppel did not apply because the element of
financial detriment was not satisfied, thus freeing the husband from
the obligation to support the child.' The court, finding support in a
"long line" of Maryland cases holding natural parents responsible for
their children's support, ruled that the child's mother was "obliged"
to file a paternity action for support against the child's natural
father. 13
9
The duty to pay child support under Maryland law, however, does
not extend to stepparents. In Brown v. Brown,"4 ° a husband con-
tended that he could not be imprisoned for failure to honor his con-
tractual obligation to support a stepchild.' 4 ' The Court of Appeals
ruled in the husband's favor, holding that only "dependent" children
were entitled to support as a result of a legal duty and that there was
no legal duty to support a stepchild.' 42 In Bledsoe v. Bledsoe,'43 the
Court of Appeals considered whether an ex-husband had a duty to
support his ex-wife's children from a previous marriage by supporting
them in the "family home." '44 The court held that the term "family"
included only natural or adopted children of the marriage, and did
134. Id. at 176, 577 A.2d at 26.
135. 306 Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546 (1986).
136. Id. at 529, 510 A.2d at 547.
137. Id. at 531, 510 A.2d at 548.
138. Id. at 537, 510 A.2d at 551. The court found that the estoppel elements of repre-
sentation and reliance were met, but that the evidence "fail[ed] to demonstrate any finan-
cial detriment incurred by [the child] as a result of [the husband's] course of conduct
during their twelve-year relationship." Id.
139. Id. at 538, 510 A.2d at 551.
140. 287 Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396 (1980).
141. Id. at 275, 412 A.2d at 397.
142. Id. at 286, 412 A.2d at 397.
143. 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982).
144. Id. at 184, 448 A.2d at 354. The specific issue before the court was whether the
term "family home" and "child" in relevant statutes referred to only biological children or
included non-biological or step-children in its definition. Id.
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not extend to stepchildren; thus, the ex-husband was not required to
support his ex-wife's children.' 45
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Walter, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a putative father is not legally obligated to pay
child support arrearages that result from a vacated paternity judg-
ment.146 Judge Battaglia, writing for the court,'4 7 first determined
that the facts of the case precluded application of section 12-104 of
the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code, which provides for mod-
ification of a child support order upon showing of a material change
of circumstance.148 Instead, the court framed the issue as a considera-
tion of the "viability" of the child support order after the paternity
declaration on which the order was based was invalidated, rather than
simply a request to modify a child support order.1 49 Therefore, the
court concluded that section 12-104 was inapplicable. 5 °
The court then determined that section 5-1038 of the Family Law
Article, which allows trial courts discretionary authority to modify a
paternity order, was similarly inapplicable to the case.' 5 ' The court
reasoned that section 5-1038 applies to "valid and enforceable paternity
declarations," whereas the paternity judgment in this case had been
vacated.152 Because the support order is "inextricably linked to the
paternity declaration," the court concluded that the trial court no
longer had the discretion to modify the underlying declaration once it
became invalid.'15 Therefore, section 5-1038 was not dispositive as to
the issue before the court.'
54
145. Id. at 194, 448 A.2d at 359.
146. Walter, 367 Md. at 389, 788 A.2d at 610.
147. Judge Battaglia's opinion was joined by Judges Eldridge and Cathell. See id. at 403,
788 A.2d at 619. ChiefJudge Bell wrote a separate concurring opinion. Judges Wilner and
Harrell each wrote dissenting opinions. Id. Judge Harrell's dissenting opinion was joined
by Judge Raker. Id.
148. Id. at 393, 788 A.2d at 613. Family Law Article section 12-104 allows the court to
modify a child support award "subsequent to the filing of a motion for modification and
upon a showing of a material change of circumstance." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 12-
104(a) (1999).
149. Walter, 367 Md. at 393-94, 788 A.2d at 613.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 395, 788 A.2d at 614.
152. Id.
153. Id. The court reasoned that section 5-1038 allows the courts to modify only valid
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The court then addressed the ramifications of invalidating a pa-
ternity judgment. 5 ' The court expressed doubt that the order to pay
could remain in effect when the portion of the order on which child
support was based was declared void.' 56 The court recognized that as
a result of the genetic testing and subsequently vacated paternity dec-
laration, Walter should no longer be bound by the duties and obliga-
tions that parenthood imposes. 5 7 The court analogized Walter's
status to that of a stepparent, emphasizing that the court has refused
to extend the duty of child support to stepparents because they have
no biological ties to their stepchildren.
1 58
Building on its finding that the vacated paternity declaration nul-
lifies all orders that stemmed from it, the court turned to the issue of
Walter's financial obligation. 5 9 The court stated that "[w]ithout pa-
ternity, there is no legal duty; without a legal duty, there can be no
financial obligation."' 60 The court found support for this conclusion
from a series of Maryland cases holding that financial responsibility
for children is a duty only owed by a child's biological parents.' 6 ' The
court thus determined that a vacated child support order not only
offers prospective relief from child support payments, but also invali-
dates all other outstanding legal obligations.
6 2
Finally, the court addressed the statement from the court's opin-
ion in Langston that its holding in that case did not apply to support
already paid or to arrearages owed by putative fathers. 16 3 In an at-
tempt to clarify, the court explained that the earlier statement was
"clearly" dicta,'6 4 and was only intended to limit the court's holding to
155. Id. at 396-403, 788 A.2d at 616-19. The Consent Order was as follows:
A. That the Defendant [Walter] is the father of the minor child(ren), Taylor
Alexandria Gunter, born, 9/3/92.
B. That the Defendant [Walter] is charged with support of the minor child(ren)
named above until such child(ren) shall become 18 years of age, die, marry, or
become self-supporting, whichever event first occurs.
C. That the Defendant [Walter] shall pay the sum of $43.00 Dollars per week,
pursuant to the Maryland Child Support Guidelines, accounting from the 5th day
of October, 1993, for the temporary support and maintenance of the minor
child (ren).
Id.
156. Id. at 398, 788 A.2d at 616.
157. Id. at 396, 788 A.2d at 616.
158. Id. at 396-97, 788 A.2d at 615.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id., 788 A.2d at 615-16 (citing Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 193, 448 A.2d 353,
358 (1982); Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 284, 412 A.2d 396, 402 (1980)).
162. Id. at 398-99, 788 A.2d at 616.




paternity declarations under section 5-1038.165 The court reiterated
that its decision in Walter was not based on application of section 5-
1038, but rather on the nullification of the support order on which
the arrearages were based. '66 The court stated that the issues in Walter
were distinct from those presented in Langston, thus removing from
consideration the court's statement regarding arrearages in
Langston. '67
Even though he agreed with the outcome reached in the case,
Chief Judge Bell wrote a concurring opinion to explain his opinion
in Walter and its "consistency" with his dissent in Langston. 6' In
Langston, Chief Judge Bell argued that the legislature intended to ap-
ply section 5-1038 retroactively so that no meritorious case under the
revised statute would be left without a remedy.169 Briefly describing
the case law and history that led the legislature to enact its 1995
amendment to section 5-1038, Chief Judge Bell reiterated his belief
that the only way section 5-1038 could truly overturn the court's deci-
sion in Tandra S. was if it offered retrospective-not only prospec-
tive-relief to putative fathers.
170
The Langston majority, in Chief Judge Bell's assessment, gave sec-
tion 5-1038 a "broad," sweeping interpretation, 17 1 and it was on this
issue that the Chief Judge disagreed with the Langston majority.1 72
Chief Judge Bell would have given the amendment a narrower con-
struction by not expanding the "equitable grounds for challenging pa-
ternity" and by not assisting the "father" in gathering evidence needed
to mount his challenge.' 73 A narrower interpretation, the ChiefJudge
asserted, would satisfy the legislature's goal of correcting a "perceived
165. Id.
166. Id. at 402, 788 A.2d at 618-19.
167. Id. at 403, 788 A.2d at 619.
168. Id. at 404, 788 A.2d at 620 (Bell, C.J., concurring).
169. Id. at 408, 788 A.2d at 622.
170. Id. Chief Judge Bell noted that he still agreed with the Langston majority's state-
ment that it did not make sense to prevent a man from challenging a paternity judgment
solely because the declaration was entered against him before the October 1, 1995 effective
date of the new law. Id.
171. Id. This "broad" interpretation allowed putative fathers an automatic fight to
blood or genetic testing to attempt to disprove a paternity declaration previously enrolled
against them.
172. Id. ChiefJudge Bell, in contrast, would have "required the production, by the mov-
ing party, of the reliable evidence prescribed [in section 5-1038], that the paternity judg-
ment was in error, naming the wrong person as the father of the child who is its subject."
Id. at 409, 788 A.2d at 622-23.
173. Id. at 409, 788 A.2d at 623.
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inequity" while avoiding a "wholesale disruption" of the lives of chil-
dren who depend on the State's child support system. 1
74
Regardless of whether section 5-1038 is given a broad or narrow
interpretation, however, Chief Judge Bell agreed with the outcome
reached in Walter1 75 He concluded that allowing a non-biological fa-
ther to "shed the title" of father based on genetic testing would be a
"meaningless gesture" if the "father" is required to pay for that child's
support, whether through future payments or arrearages.' 76
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wilner asserted that the court's
holding would give men a powerful new incentive to avoid paying
child support and continue to challenge paternity judgments. 77
Judge Wilner noted that the next step in the "assault" on efforts to
support children will be to allow non-fathers to recoup child support
payments already made.1 71 Judge Wilner expressed that the court
failed to establish a basis on which to distinguish its holding in Walter
from a situation in which a father seeks to recoup the money he actu-
ally did pay.'7 ' Judge Wilner warned that the court's decision "dis-
mantled" the child support system and sent a message to men in
paternity disputes that there is no sanction for their failure to pay.'8 °
He asserted that when the legislature enacted amendments to section
5-1038 in 1995, it intended to relieve men of further responsibility for
child support after being excluded as a child's genetic father-a "per-
missible" legislative call. 81 But the majority in Walter, he argued,
"made a mess" of the amendment by applying it retroactively and by
rewarding men-including Walter-for their "defiance" in not mak-
ing support payments."8 2
174. Id. at 409-10, 788 A.2d at 623. ChiefJudge Bell suggested that Walter confirmed the
accuracy of his "prediction" in Langston that there will be a number of men requesting
blood tests because they have fallen behind in support payments or because they later
regret their decision to voluntarily acknowledge paternity. Id. at 410 n.18, 788 A.2d at 623
n.18.
175. Id. at 411, 788 A.2d at 624.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 413, 788 A.2d at 625 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. Judge Wilner noted that the majority's holding would communicate to men
that "in paternity cases, you are a fool if you actually pay the child support. If there is even
the slightest doubt in your mind regarding your paternity, consent to paternity, consent to
pay child support, but don't actually pay it" because if you are lucky, "you will escape all
responsibility." Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 413-14, 788 A.2d at 625 (noting that Walter's child support payments were,
at the time of contesting paternity in 2000, about five-and-a-half years in arrears).
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Judge Harrell, joined by Judge Raker in dissent, discussed the is-
sue of child support as a vested right and refused to let the majority's
explanation of its "damning dicta" in Langston stand unchallenged."s3
Noting various definitions of "vested" rights, the judges reasoned that
child support is a vested right with which the legislature did not inter-
fere when it enacted the 1995 amendments to section 5-1038.184 With
regard to the arrearages Walter owed, the judges placed responsibility
squarely on Walter's shoulders, stating that it was his inaction over
seven years that created the legal issue which he "urge[d] upon the
Court." 8 5 Thejudges concluded by reiterating that the child support
arrearages owed by Walter were vested rights that could not be inter-
fered with retrospectively, thus the State must seek full recovery of
Walter's debt through any legal means possible. 8 6
4. Analysis.-As evidenced by the decision in Walter, the Mary-
land courts are continuing down a path that is not in line with prece-
dent and is harmful for Maryland's children. The court's recent
elimination of the "best interests of the child" standard from paternity
proceedings, coupled with the decision in Walter, opens the door for
non-genetic fathers to recoup previously paid child support after their
paternity has been disestablished. 8 7 Recent legislative and judicial
decisions defining Maryland as a state that values biological defini-
tions of paternity, and its willingness to grant non-genetic fathers ret-
rospective relief from paternity judgments, further support this
possibility. 8 If allowed by the Court of Appeals, recoupment of child
support payments will have a negative effect on potentially thousands
of Maryland's most vulnerable children." 9
a. The Best Interests of the Child Standard Should Govern Mary-
land Child Welfare Proceedings.--The best interests of the child standard
183. Id. at 414, 788 A.2d at 625-26 (Harrell & Raker, JJ., dissenting). Judge Harrell
stated that "[o]thers in the Majority in Langston now may be willing to relegate that lan-
guage to an intellectual 'oops' or an aside; I am not." Id. at 414 n.1, 788 A.2d at 625 n.1.
184. Id. at 415, 788 A.2d at 626.
185. Id. at 417, 788 A.2d at 628. Judge Harrell noted that it was Walter's own "lack of
diligence" that brought the issue before the court. Id. at 416-17, 798 A.2d at 627.
186. Id. at 417-18, 788 A.2d at 628.
187. See id. at 386, 788 A.2d at 609.
188. See supra notes 22-48 (describing the Maryland legislature's 1995 amendment to
Family Law Article section 5-1038); see also Walter, 367 Md. at 386, 788 A.2d at 659.
189. See infra notes 238-242 (describing how children in single-parent homes live in pov-
erty much more frequently than their counterparts in two-parent homes, so taking away
child support payments from these vulnerable children will likely cause them even greater
financial harm).
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traces its history back to early principles of English law. "o Maryland
has historically applied it to all proceedings involving children, includ-
ing custody, child support, and paternity determinations. 1" Contrary
to the practice of many other states and the widely-supported Uniform
Parentage Act, however, Maryland eliminated the standard from pa-
ternity proceedings in Langston, when the court ruled that a man may
seek to disestablish paternity of a child even years after he voluntarily
acknowledged that he was the child's father.192
Having the best interests of the child standard as the court's para-
mount consideration traces its development to the eighteenth century
when children were viewed as the property of the father and the en-
tire family was subject to the father's power and control.1" 3 The idea
that a father's control extended to his family contributed to the devel-
opment of the "paternal preference" found in English common law
prior to and during the nineteenth century. 194 However, in the twen-
tieth century, the maternal preference rule became the guiding prin-
ciple in cases dealing with young children, based on the idea that
young children's needs were best met by their mothers.19 5 Gradually
during this century, however, courts began to examine the circum-
stances of each case and turned to the child's interests and needs in
determining issues directly affecting the children's lives.' 96 Thus, the
"best interests of the child" standard became the central concern in
legal issues involving children.19 7
Until recently, the best interests of the child standard governed
Maryland courts' and the legislature's consideration of all issues per-
taining to children. The standard has been applied in custody, visita-
tion, and child support proceedings alike.' Originally enacted in
1984, Family Law Article section 5-1038 allowed courts to modify child
support orders only after consideration of the best interests of the
child. Decisions handed down from Maryland's courts reflected the
190. CLAIRE BREEN, THE STANDARD OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: A WESTERN
TRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAw 44-45 (2002).
191. See supra notes 76-109 (describing Maryland's use of the best interests of the child
standard in child custody, visitation, and paternity proceedings).
192. Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 437, 754 A.2d 389, 411 (2000).





198. See supra notes 77-109 (discussing the Maryland courts' application of the best inter-
ests of the child standard to child custody, visitation, and paternity cases).
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strong child-centered standard. 9 Particularly regarding challenges
to paternity declarations, the standard stood as a difficult hurdle for
adjudged fathers to cross before the court would allow genetic testing
to disprove a father's genetic tie to a child. °°
This shift in Maryland law directly affected the outcome in Walter.
Under the new law governing paternity declarations, the trial court
was not required to consider any facts regarding the relationship that
Walter may have developed with Taylor during the years he held him-
self out as her biological father. 21 1 More specifically, the law prevents
the trial court from considering what impact overturning the long-
standing paternity judgment might have on Taylor, who depended on
her father's financial (and possibly emotional) support for nearly
seven years. 2112 As a result, Walter's seven-year link to Taylor was sim-
ply erased by the trial court.20 3 In an attempt to be fair to men like
Walter who neglect to challenge a paternity judgment against them in
a timely manner, Maryland's courts have disregarded the interests of
those most in need of protection-the children.
b. Elimination of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in
Paternity Proceedings Is Not in Line with Other States' Practices and Is Harm-
ful to Maryland's Children.-In an effort to prevent men from having to
pay child support after genetic testing excludes them as a child's fa-
ther, the legislature in 1995 amended section 5-1038 of the Family
Law Article to allow putative fathers to seek genetic testing for any
reason and at any time, not just on the basis of evidence of fraud,
mistake or irregularity. 20 4 Interpreting the legislative intent of section
5-1038, the court eliminated the best interests of the child standard as
a hurdle to obtaining paternity testing.205 The court also applied sec-
tion 5-1038 retroactively to allow fathers to challenge paternity decla-
199. See supra notes 76-109 (describing Maryland child custody, visitation and paternity
cases in which Maryland courts held that the "best interests of the child" standard should
be the court's paramount concern).
200. See, e.g., Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 325, 648 A.2d 439, 450 (1994) (hold-
ing that the court cannot vacate a paternity declaration based on the results of a post-
judgment blood test excluding the putative father as the child's actual genetic father).
201. Walter, 367 Md. at 400, 788 A.2d at 617-18.
202. The Walter court, addressing Judge Wilner's dissent, states that a man who waits
seven years to contest paternity is "no shining example" of how paternity issues should be
resolved in Maryland, but still refuses to hold a man who is not a child's biological father
responsible for her support. Id. at 399 n.12, 788 A.2d at 616 n.12.
203. Id. at 391, 788 A.2d at 611-12.
204. Langston v. Rifle, 359 Md. 395, 405, 754 A.2d 389, 393 (2000).
205. Id. at 403, 754 A.2d at 392.
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rations enrolled prior to the amendment's effective date. 206  The
court's elimination of the best interests standard is clear in decisions
following Langston v. Rifle, in which the court has viewed paternity
declarations as "contracts" between a father and child that can be re-
scinded without considering the impact on the child.217
The Maryland court's elimination of the best interests of the
child standard also runs counter to other states' case law regarding
challenges to previously enrolled paternity declarations.20 8 In Colo-
rado, for example, a court refused to order paternity testing after a
legal judgment of paternity has been entered, based on the welfare of
the child.209 In Massachusetts, a court recently ruled that allowing a
man to disestablish paternity could be potentially devastating to a
child, thus the man's request was denied. 2 0 High courts in Washing-
ton and Kansas, as well as a number of other states, have similarly held
that the "best interests of the child" must be considered by the court
prior to allowing acknowledged fathers to challenge paternity
judgments. 211
Maryland's elimination of the best interests of the child standard
from paternity proceedings also runs counter to the growing trend in
family law toward uniform state laws that advocate for consideration of
the best interests of the child in actions to set aside paternity judg-
ments. The UPA, endorsed by a host of family law organizations, en-
courages the adoption by all states of uniform laws related to issues of
paternity.212 Section 603(b) of the UPA gives courts discretion to de-
206. Id. at 406, 754 A.2d at 394; see also supra notes 22-24 (describing the court's retroac-
tive application of section 5-1038 in Langston).
207. Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 397, 788 A.2d 609, 615 (2002). The court stated
that there is no situation in law which would require a continuing obligation on a contract
"subsequently ruled invalid." Id.
208. See, e.g., People ex rel. J.A.U. v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327, 333 (Colo. 2002) (stating that
"the child's interests must also be considered when deciding whether to permit a legal
father to reopen a judgment of paternity," including the financial and emotional toll that
disestablishing paternity might take on the child). In other states, courts are given discre-
tion to consider "the best interests of the child" before allowing genetic testing that could
potentially disprove an adjudged father's paternity. See, e.g., Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth Is
Not a Defense in Paternity Actions, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 79-81 (2000) (describing the
"New York Model," which gives judges discretion to decide whether a potential change in
paternity status is in the best interest of the children involved).
209. People ex. rel. J.A.U., 47 P.3d at 333.
210. Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 495-96 (Mass. 2001).
211. In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331, 338-39 (Kan. 1989); McDaniels v. Carlson, 738
P.2d 254, 261 (Wash. 1987); see supra notes 113-124 (listing states in which courts have held
that the child's best interests must be considered before allowing challenges to paternity
judgments).
212. The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) of 2000 was approved by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on August 1, 2000, and has been endorsed
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cline a request for genetic testing if it would not be in the best inter-
ests of the child.2 13 The court may examine numerous factors in
determining the child's best interest, including the child's age, the
relationship between the alleged father and the child, and the circum-
stances under which the "father" learned of his lack of genetic link to
the child.214 The trend advocated by proponents of the UPA clearly
indicates a desire to keep the best interests standard as the court's
primary concern in determining whether to allow challenges to pater-
nity judgments.
By eliminating the best interests of the child standard from pater-
nity cases, Maryland has strayed far from its history of dealing with
children's welfare, from other states' handling of similar cases, and
from uniform state laws encouraged through the UPA. Contrary to
the direction Maryland has taken in Walter and Langston, the standard
should continue to apply to child welfare cases involving paternity de-
terminations." 5 The best interests standard serves to preserve stability
in children's family lives and protect them from the emotional,
mental, and psychological stress that can come with "uprooting a
child's foundation" when a paternity determination that may have ex-
isted for years is overturned.2 1 6 Furthermore, allowing a legally-recog-
nized father to decide at any time, on a whim, to challenge that he
may not be the actual biological father, leaves children's interests
gravely unprotected. 217 Once parentage has been determined, even if
by voluntary acknowledgement, it is a fact that cannot and should not
be separated from the child's best interests. 218
(1) Biological Determinations of Paternity.-The Court of Ap-
peals decision in Walter defines Maryland as a state in which biological
by the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association, the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers, the National Child Support Enforcement Association, the Eastern
Regional Interstate Child Support Association, the Academy of American Adoption Attor-
neys, and the Organization of Parents Through Surrogacy. Texas recently became the first
state to adopt the UPA. Paula Roberts, Biology and Beyond: The Case for Passage of the New
Uniform Parentage Act, 35 FAM. L.Q. 41, 44 (Spring 2001); see also Battle Robinson & Susan
Paikin, Who is Daddy? A Case for the Uniform Parentage Act (2000), 19-SUM Del. Law. 23 (Sum-
mer 2001).
213. Robinson & Paikin, supra note 212, at 25.
214. Roberts, supra note 212, at 59-60.
215. Walter, 367 Md. at 409, 788 A.2d at 622 (Bell, CJ., concurring); Langston v. Rifle,
359 Md. 396, 452, 754 A.2d 389, 419 (2000) (Bell, CJ., dissenting).
216. Langston, 359 Md. at 454, 754 A.2d at 421.
217. Id. at 459, 754 A.2d at 423.
218. Id. at 452, 754 A.2d at 419.
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determinations of paternity are paramount. 219 In balancing legal pre-
sumptions of paternity with genetic facts, Maryland policy and law
value scientific truth-in the form of exact genetic paternity determi-
nations-over legal definitions of paternity that the State historically
viewed as unreviewable final judgments.22' As a result of this shift,
fathers' rights have been elevated over the rights of their judicially
determined children, 22' and men like Walter are allowed to sever all
ties to children they have supported for years.
The law has historically favored stable, legal determinations of pa-
ternity over accurate determinations in situations where actual proof
of paternity was unavailable. 22 2 This was true in Maryland, where
prior to the legislature's 1995 amendments to the Family Law Article,
legal determinations of paternity were final with very narrow excep-
tions. 2 23 Maryland courts valued stability over accuracy in determina-
tions of paternity, and allowed judicial determinations of paternity to
stand even in light of conclusive genetic evidence excluding a link
between a father and child. 224 In the 1980s and early 1990s, the court
employed the best interests of the child standard as well as equitable
estoppel techniques to uphold paternity declarations. 225 The effect of
these decisions was to preserve the stability of families who had relied,
in some cases for many years, on a judicially determined father for
support. 226 Prior to 1995, Walter would have been unable to chal-
219. Walter, 367 Md. at 398, 788 A.2d at 616. The court stated that the genetic testing
and the subsequent vacatur of Walter's paternity declaration terminated Walter's role of
parent, both biologically and legally. Id at 396, 788 A.2d at 615.
220. See Kaplan, supra note 208, at 70. Kaplan's article investigates how three states' laws
have handled cases where prior paternity declarations have been later nullified by ad-
vances in genetic testing that disqualify a "legal" father as a child's genetic father. Id. at 72-
73. Maryland can be compared to the Massachusetts state model, in which the state seeks
accurate determinations of paternity and denies courts discretion to consider the child's
best interest before allowing challenges to paternity declarations. Id. at 78.
221. See id.
222. Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and the Future of
the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 222 (2002).
223. See, e.g., Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 324, 648 A.2d 439, 449 (1994) (stat-
ing that "the overriding policy in Maryland emphasizes that once a case is decided, it shall
remain decided with certain very narrow exceptions" which, under Maryland Rule 2-535,
allowed for reversal in cases of "fraud, mistake, irregularity or clerical error").
224. See id. at 324-25, 648 A.2d at 449 (holding that a 'judicially determined" father,
even though not the genetic father, would not be allowed to relitigate a paternity declara-
tion for fear that the child would be left "fatherless and without support").
225. See id.; see also Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 536-37, 510 A.2d 546, 550-51 (1986)
(holding that principles of equitable estoppel prevented a man from challenging a support
order for a child who, although born to his wife during wedlock, was not his genetic child).
226. Tandra S., 336 Md. at 324-25, 648 A.2d at 449.
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lenge the paternity declaration he acknowledged three years earlier,
and would remain responsible for child support payments to Taylor.
The General Assembly's 1995 amendments marked a shift in Ma-
ryland's policy toward favoring scientifically accurate determinations
of paternity. Responding to negative press about the court's decision
in Tandra S., the legislature amended section 5-1038 to allow paternity
declarations to be reopened when later genetic testing disproved the
putative father as a child's genetic father.2 2 The Court of Appeals in
Langston broadened the application of section 5-1038 by applying it
retrospectively to all paternity judgments entered before the legisla-
tion's October 1, 1995, effective date.22 After Langston, a judicially
determined father could challenge a paternity declaration for any rea-
son, regardless of how long it had been in effect, and regardless of the
nature of the relationship between "father" and child,229 as was done
in Walter. The Court of Appeals further reinforced the idea of pater-
nity as solely a scientific matter by reducing paternity declarations to
"contracts" between fathers and their children. 3 ° As seen in Walter,
these contracts are tenuous, and can be broken easily by a "father"
who decides that he is no longer interested in supporting a child he
once considered his own.
The shift from legal to biological determinations of fatherhood
in Maryland puts fathers' best interests ahead of those of Maryland's
children, just as Walter's interests were put ahead of Taylor's. Mary-
land now values exact, scientific evidence of paternity gathered
through genetic or blood testing, allowing such testing to occur
months or even years after a man voluntarily acknowledged pater-
nity.2"' In so doing, Maryland is disregarding the fact that the loss of a
parental relationship could be psychologically and emotionally detri-
mental to a child.23 2 Additionally, the policy leaves children like Tay-
lor without financial support or paternity and puts a burden on state
child support enforcement agencies to find a child's "true" biological
227. Langston v. Rifle, 359 Md. 396, 405, 754 A.2d 389, 394 (2000); see supra notes 22-24
(describing the court's holding allowing retroactive application of section 5-1038).
228. Langston, 359 Md. at 406, 754 A.2d at 394.
229. Id.
230. Walter, 367 Md. at 397, 788 A.2d at 615 (refusing to create any situation in law that
requires a continuing financial obligation on a "contract subsequently ruled invalid").
231. Langston, 359 Md. at 406, 754 A.2d at 394.
232. See, Kaplan, supra note 208, at 77-78 (explaining that states that consider father-
hood a strictly "biological" concept disregard "evidence suggesting that the loss of the pa-
ternal relationship could cause psychological harm to the child").
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father in order to pursue a support order against him.233 The stan-
dard governing child welfare cases in Maryland can now be called "the
best interests of the father" as it has devalued the child's social and
economic interests in the name of scientific accuracy.2 4
(2) Recoupment.-The current state of paternity and child
support law in Maryland presents a very real possibility that fathers
may be able to recoup previously paid child support after genetic test-
ing disestablishes their paternity. Maryland's elimination of the best
interest of the child standard as a bar to paternity challenges and its
firm position that fatherhood is a biological issue opens the door to
such challenges, as does the court's willingness to grant retrospective
relief to non-genetic fathers. 235 Allowing recoupment of child sup-
port payments already made to children under a previously valid child
support order will have far-reaching negative effects on the children
of Maryland who depend on such support.2 6
Maryland's elimination of the best interests of the child standard
from paternity proceedings sets the stage for a father to be reim-
bursed for child support payments made under a previously-valid
child support order. With the best interests standard no longer guid-
ing the court's decisions in paternity proceedings, the court must no
longer consider the impact-including financial ramifications-that
paternity-related decisions will have on a child.237 The best interests
standard has been eroded in Maryland so that it no longer prevents
men from challenging paternity of a child even years after voluntarily
acknowledging paternity.238 The standard is similarly absent from fi-
nancial matters, as a man is now able to cease responsibility for child
support arrearages he owed while a valid paternity declaration was in
effect.219 With the best interests standard out of consideration, there
233. Id. at 79 (noting that children are left "without financial support, paternity, or legit-
imacy" while the social services system must now apply its "bureaucratic muscle" to get the
mother to identify the child's biological father).
234. Id. at 78 (characterizing Massachusetts' approach of valuing scientific evidence of
paternity as constituting "the best interests of the husband" test).
235. See, e.g., Walter, 367 Md. 386, 788 A.2d 609 (holding that a putative father is not
obligated to pay child support arrearages after the paternity order against him is invali-
dated); Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 754 A.2d 389 (2000) (holding that the best inter-
ests of the child standard has no place in paternity proceedings).
236. Langston, 359 Md. at 417, 754 A.2d at 400 (referring to testimony before the legisla-
ture by the Maryland Department of Human Resources that the amendment to Family Law
Article section 5-1038 "would permit disgruntled fathers the opportunity to challenge pa-
ternity judgments in thousands of Maryland child support cases").
237. Walter, 367 Md. at 412-13, 788 A.2d at 625 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
238. Langston, 359 Md. at 428, 754 A.2d at 406.
239. Walter, 367 Md. at 389, 788 A.2d at 610.
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is nothing left to prevent a father from recouping child support pay-
ments after the court determines he is not the child's biological
father.
The willingness of Maryland's courts to provide retrospective re-
lief to non-genetic fathers in contesting paternity declarations may
open the door even further. In Vermont, for example, the court has
limited non-genetic fathers to prospective relief from child support
payments after their paternity has been disestablished, putting a safe-
guard in place to prevent such claims. 240 The Vermont court held
that recoupment of "previously paid or accrued" child support install-
ments is off-limits and would bring financial harm to the children and
custodial parents who benefited from the payments.241 Maryland
courts on the other hand, have allowed such retroactive modifica-
tion. 2 1 2 The willingness to provide men retrospective relief from child
support orders indicates that the court might rule favorably on a fu-
ture request to recoup child support payments.
The Walter decision provides even more evidence that recoup-
ment may soon become a reality in Maryland. Judge Wilner, dissent-
ing in the case, issued a clear warning that the majority's holding may
open the door for recoupment of child support payments in Mary-
land.243 Judge Wilner stated that based on the majority's opinion, the
court would be unable to draw a distinction between relieving a non-
genetic father of the child support arrearages he owed and reimburs-
ing a non-genetic father for payments already made.244 Thus, based
on its holding in Walter, the court may be unable to say "no" to a
240. Hilaire v. DeBlois, 721 A.2d 133 (Vt. 1998).
241. Id. at 135.
242. In Langston, the Court of Appeals allowed retroactive application of section 5-1038
to paternity declarations enrolled prior to an October 1, 1995, change in law. Langston,
359 Md. at 406, 754 A.2d at 394. The effect was to allow paternity declarations to be re-
opened in light of later genetic testing, regardless of when the original declaration was
enrolled. Id. at 427, 754 A.2d at 405-06. In Walter, the Court of Appeals held that a man is
not responsible for child support arrearages that stemmed from a paternity declaration
that was later declared invalid. Walter, 367 Md. at 389, 788 A.2d at 610.
243. Walter, 367 Md. at 412-13, 788 A.2d at 625 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
244. Id. Judge Wilner stated that
[t]he Court says that it is not deciding the issue [recoupment] in this case, but,
absent some additional legerdemain, on what basis will it hold that, with
parenthood extinguished, the once-self-confessed father is retroactively relieved
of all responsibility for court-ordered child support he failed to pay but cannot
recover the same court-ordered child support that, through a newly asserted the-
ory of fraud or mistake of fact, he did pay? If the Court, being intellectually hon-
est, found no distinction, it would be faced with the unattractive prospect of
forcing mothers and children to repay support already duly paid and spent.
[Voi-. 62:917944
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
man's effort to recoup child support payments he made prior to
learning that he was not actually a child's biological father.245
(3) The Effect of Recoupment on Maryland's Children.-The
number of paternity declarations in Maryland that may be overturned
as a result of genetic testing may be very high.24 6 Data shows that as
many as one-third of judicially determined paternity decisions may be
disestablished due to genetic testing.247 The retroactive application of
Family Law Article section 5-1038 as held in Langston has the potential
to upset possibly thousands ofjudicially determined paternity declara-
tions in Maryland.248 Similarly, relieving men of their responsibility to
pay arrearages that accumulated while a child support order was in
effect against them, as allowed in Walter, puts many of Maryland's chil-
dren in financial jeopardy.249 Recoupment is the logical next step; if
it is allowed under Maryland law, thousands of non-genetic fathers
may also be able to reclaim child support payments they previously
made to their children.
If allowed, recoupment will hit Maryland's most vulnerable chil-
dren the hardest. Children in single-parent households are more
likely to grow up in poverty than their counterparts in two-parent
homes.2 50 Nearly half of the families in mother-only households live
below the poverty line.251  The figure rises in black and Hispanic
mother-only households, where nearly two-thirds live in poverty.252
Children in single-parent households grow up at a severe disadvantage
from children in two-parent households, more likely to suffer from
health, behavioral or educational problems.253 Inadequate child sup-
port, while not solely responsible for these poor outcomes, puts chil-
245. See id.
246. Langston, 359 Md. at 417, 754 A.2d at 400 (citing testimony from the Department of
Human Resources prior to the enactment of Chapter 248 that "[t]his bill would permit
disgruntled fathers the opportunity to challenge paternity judgments in thousands of Ma-
ryland child support cases").
247. See Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 222, at 221-22 (noting that DNA Diagnostics
Center, "one of the most aggressive laboratories performing paternity testing, has reported
that thirty percent of the men tested prove to be misidentified").
248. See supra note 246 (describing the potential impact that the legislature's 1995
amendment of Family Law Article section 5-1038 could have on thousands of Maryland
children).
249. Walter, 367 Md. at 403, 788 A.2d at 619.







dren at increased risk.254 To permit non-genetic fathers to recoup
previous child support payments would bring even further financial
hardship on Maryland's children, for whose benefit such payments
have already been expended. The outcome of such a decision may
put potentially thousands of Maryland children at even greater risk by
eliminating a source of financial support upon which they have relied.
5. Conclusion.-In eliminating the best interests of the child
standard from paternity proceedings, Maryland courts have broken
from both Maryland precedent and other states' case law. In Walter,
the court continued down the path of considering the father's-
rather than the child's-best interest. As a result, the court has
opened up the door to the undesirable prospect of allowing men to
recoup child support payments paid to children over the course of
months or even years, potentially leaving thousands of Maryland chil-
dren without support.
JENNIFER E. RENTSCHLER
254. Id. at 158.
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X. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Undermining Legislative Intent by Disallowing Unemployment
Insurance Benefits to Employees Who Voluntarily Leave Work for
Higher Wages
In Plein v. Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation,' the Court
of Appeals of Maryland reconsidered whether, under the Labor and
Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland,2 an em-
ployee is entitled to unemployment benefits on the basis of work done
for a previous employer, where that employee voluntarily resigned in
order to accept a higher paying job.' In a 4-3 decision affirming its
earlier decision in Total Audio-Visual Systems, Inc. v. Department of Labor,
Licensing and Regulation,4 the court held that the claimant, Patrick
Plein, was not entitled to unemployment benefits because he volunta-
rily resigned from previous employment in order to accept a higher
payingjob.5 The court reasoned that voluntarily leaving employment
for a better paying job does not constitute "good cause" within the
meaning of section 8-1001 (b) (1) of the Labor and Employment Arti-
cle.6 The court reached its decision, as it had done previously, by de-
termining that the statutory language was unambiguous, and
therefore, subject to a plain meaning interpretation.7 Further, the
court reasoned that because the legislature had not overturned Total
Audio-Visual, the legislature had acquiesced to the court's previous in-
terpretation.8 The court's decision suffers from an incorrect applica-
tion of the plain meaning doctrine.9 More importantly, by narrowly
1. 369 Md. 421, 800 A.2d 757 (2002).
2. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-1001 (2002).
3. Plein, 369 Md. at 423, 800 A.2d at 758.
4. 360 Md. 387, 758 A.2d 124 (2000).
5. Plein, 369 Md. at 423, 800 A.2d at 758.
6. Id. at 425, 800 A.2d at 760. Section 8-1001(b)(1) of the Labor and Employment
Article provides in relevant part that the Secretary may find good cause only if:
(1) the cause is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with:
(i) the conditions of employment; or
(ii) the actions of the employing unit.
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-1001.
7. Plein, 369 Md. at 425, 800 A.2d at 760 (citing TotalAudio-Visual, 360 Md. at 395, 758
A.2d at 128).
8. See Plein, 369 Md. at 437, 800 A.2d at 767. The court stated "we have been reluctant
to overrule our prior decisions where it is likely that the Legislature, by its inaction, indi-
cates its adoption, or at least acceptance, of the interpretation reflected in the opinion
announcing the decision." Id.
9. The plain meaning doctrine of statutory interpretation holds that a court interpret-
ing an unambiguous statute should look no further than the plain meaning of the words of
947
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interpreting the statutory language and finding that the legislature's
inaction equated to legislative approval, the court misconstrued the
statutory scheme and failed to consider both the legislative history and
the remedial purpose of the statute.' In its analysis, the court should
have looked beyond the plain wording of the statute in order to ascer-
tain the legislative intent. Had the court chosen to do so, it would
have discovered that the legislature intended to grant benefits to indi-
viduals who voluntarily left work to accept better employment, and
then became laid off through no fault of their own."
1. The Case.-The appellant, Patrick Plein, worked as a tile set-
ter's helper for Atlas Tile & Terrazzo, earning $9.00 an hour.12 Subse-
quently, Plein left Atlas Tile for a position as a sales associate with
Home Depot, U.S.A. 3 In his new position, Plein made $12.00 an
hour and was eventually entitled to a benefits plan. 4 Plein began
work at Home Depot on August 14, 2000, but on September 27, 2000,
he was laid off through no fault of his own. 5 Plein applied for unem-
ployment benefits, but a claim specialist for the Department of Labor,
Licensing and Regulation (DLLR) denied his benefits.' 6 Plein then
appealed to the DLLR Division of Appeals, which affirmed the claim
specialist's determination on the basis of the Court of Appeals of Ma-
ryland's recent decision in Total Audio-Visual.17 Upon finding that
Plein voluntarily quit his original job without cause, the DLLR Divi-
sion of Appeals' hearing examiner denied Plein benefits for the week
beginning July 16, 2000.18 The denial of benefits was to continue un-
til Plein became re-employed, earned at least fifteen times his weekly
benefit amount in covered wages, and thereafter became unemployed
the statute in order to determine the legislature's intent. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co.
v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 301, 783 A.2d 667, 670 (2001).
10. Plein, 369 Md. at 426-29, 800 A.2d at 760-62.
11. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-1001(b) (1).
12. Plein, 369 Md. at 429, 800 A.2d at 762.
13. Id. at 429-30, 800 A.2d at 762.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Plein v. Atlas Tile & Terrazo, Inc., No. 0016871 (Nov. 16, 2000) at 3.
17. Id. at 2 (applying the holding of Total Audio-Visual to the specialist's analysis). In
Total Audio-Visual, the court held that voluntarily leaving one job "for a better paying job
does not constitute 'good cause' within the meaning of Section 8-1001 of the Labor and
Employment Article." Total Audio-Visual Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regula-
tion, 360 Md. 387, 397, 758 A.2d 124, 129 (2000).
18. Atlas Tile & Terrazzo, D.L.L.R. Appeal No. 0016871, at 2.
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without fault. 9 Both the DLLR Board of Appeals and the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City upheld the decision.20
Plein then filed an appeal with the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. 21 Before the Court of Special Appeals considered the case,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to reconsider its
holding in Total Audio-Visual.
22
2. Legal Background.-In order to provide a context for consid-
ering whether the court appropriately reaffirmed Total Audio-Visual, it
is necessary to examine the purpose and history of Maryland's unem-
ployment insurance statute, how the court has interpreted the statute,
basic canons of statutory construction, and the rule of stare decisis.
a. Maryland's Unemployment Insurance Statute.-In 1936, in
response to widespread unemployment caused by the Great Depres-
sion, the General Assembly passed the Unemployment Compensation
Law of Maryland.2 3 The General Assembly found that involuntary un-
employment was a "serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare
of the people," and therefore, it was in the public's interest to prevent
the spread of involuntary unemployment and to lighten its crushing
burden.2 4 The Unemployment Compensation Law lessens the bur-
den of involuntary employment by creating an excise tax on employ-
ers, and the revenue from the tax is then placed in reserve to aid
persons who become unemployed through no fault of their own.2 5
Under the Unemployment Compensation Law, each employer
must pay a statutorily delineated percentage of taxable wages on cov-
ered employment that is performed for the employer.2 6 The contri-
butions collected from each employer are put into a general fund;
19. Section 8-1001 (e) provides that if an individual is disqualified for benefits under
section 8-1001 (a), the disqualification begins in "the first week for which unemployment is
caused by voluntarily leaving without good cause." MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-
1001(e). Furthermore, section 8-1001(e) requires that the disqualification last "until the
individual is reemployed and has earned wages for covered employment that equal at least
15 times the weekly benefit amount of the individual." Id
20. Plein v. Atlas Tile & Terrazzo, Inc., No. 24-C-01-000302 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City
2001) (mem.).
21. Plein, 369 Md. at 422-23, 800 A.2d at 758.
22. Id.
23. Md. Unemployment Comp. Bd. v. Albrecht, 183 Md. 87, 89, 36 A.2d 666, 667
(1944).
24. 1936 Md. Laws ch. 1, § 1(2); see also MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-102(b) (1)
(2002).
25. 1936 Md. Laws ch. 1, § 1(2). Maryland's current Unemployment Compensation
Law maintains a similar policy. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-102(c).
26. MD. CODE ANN. LaB. & EMPL. § 8-608 (2002).
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thus, the contributions are not reserved for the benefit of a specific
employer's employees, but rather, inure to the benefit of all unem-
ployed persons having contributing employers.2 7 In addition, for
each employer, the DLLR maintains an earned rating record, which
registers all benefits distributed based on covered employment per-
formed for that employer. 28 An employer's earned rating record im-
pacts the statutorily defined percentage of contributions that the
employer must make to the general fund.29
Benefits, however, are not chargeable against the earned rating
record of an employer when a claimant voluntarily leaves either to
accept better employment or enter an approved training program:' °
Since its enactment in 1936, the Unemployment Compensation Law
has contained a disqualification clause that denies benefits to individ-
uals who voluntarily leave work without good cause. 31 From 1936 to
1979, the disqualification clause stated only that individuals shall be
disqualified from benefits upon a finding that the employee "left work
voluntarily without good cause. 32
In order to clarify the definition of good cause, in 1979, the legis-
lature redrafted the disqualification clause, thereby enacting Mary-
land Law 293.33 Initially, the proposed changes required that
unemployment benefits be denied where the employee left work
"without good cause attributable to the employer."34 The proposed
language was modified following the testimony before the Senate Eco-
nomic Affairs Committee of Frank 0. Heintz.35 In his testimony, Mr.
27. See 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 264-266 (1945) (noting that employers contribute to a state-
wide general unemployment benefit fund).
28. MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 8-611 (2002).
29. See id. §§ 8-610 to -612.
30. Id. § 8-611(e) (4).
31. 1936 Md. Laws ch. 1, § 1(5) (providing that "[a]n individual shall be disqualified
for benefits-(a) [f]or the week in which he has left work voluntarily without good
cause, . . .and for not less than the one or more than the five weeks which immediately
follow such week (in addition to the waiting period), as determined by the Board accord-
ing to the circumstances in each case").
32. Id.
33. The changes were originally introduced in Senate Bill 943, and subsequently en-
acted as Maryland Law 293. S.B. 943, 1979 Leg., 393d Sess. (Md. 1979) See also 1979 Md.
Laws 293.
34. S.B. 943, 1979 Leg., 393d Sess.
35. In 1979, Frank 0. Heintz was Executive Director of the Employment Security ad-
ministration, Department of Human Resources, the agency then charged with administer-
ing the statute. See id. (including the language recommended by Mr. Heintz in his
testimony before the Senate Economic Affairs Committee); see also Hearing on S.B. 943
Before the Senate Econ. Aff Comm., 1979 Leg., 393rd Sess. (Md. 1979) (testimony of Frank 0.
Heintz, Executive Director Employment Security Administration, Dep't of Human
Resources).
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Heintz noted that the term "good cause" had never been statutorily
defined, and that there was no binding case law defining the term."6
In addition, Mr. Heintz testified that the interpretation of "good
cause" had been left largely to the Employment Security Administra-
tion's discretion.3 7 He added that the Employment Security Adminis-
tration considered "good cause" to "mean a cause attributable to and
arising from the conditions of employment or actions of the em-
ployer."3' He revealed that historically, the Employment Security Ad-
ministration considered voluntarily leaving work for a better career or
higher pay to be a good cause where the claimant had a reasonable
belief that he had obtained alternative employment that offered a rea-
sonable expectation of a better career or higher pay, and that the al-
ternative employment would be of substantial duration. 9
Further, in his testimony before the Senate Economic Commit-
tee, Mr. Heintz stated that the Employment Security Administration
did not consider purely personal reasons for voluntarily leaving em-
ployment to constitute good cause because they were not attributable
to or directly arising from the conditions of employment or the ac-
tions of the employer.4" Mr. Heintz noted that under the language of
proposed Senate Bill 943, the Employment Security Administration
believed that it could consider personal reasons to be good cause be-
cause the proposed statute did not limit a finding of good cause to
only causes attributable to and arising from the conditions of employ-
ment or the actions of the employer. 41 Following his testimony in a
letter addressed to the Chairman of the Economic Affairs Committee,
Mr. Heintz suggested that the language of the statute be amended to
state that "[o] nly a cause which is directly attributable to, arising from
36. Hearing on S.B. 943 Before the Senate Econ. Aff Comm., 179 Leg., 393rd Sess. (Md.
1970) (testimony of Frank 0. Heintz, Executive Director, Employment Security Adminis-




40. Id. at 2. Mr. Heintz testified:
to date the Agency has considered the following circumstances not to be good
cause, since the circumstances are not attributable to or directly arising from the
conditions of employment or the actions of the employer:
1. a claimant quits because his/her spouse has been transferred to another place
of employment;
2. the claimant quits because he has trouble making child-care arrangements;
3. the claimant quits because he has difficulty in arranging transportation;






or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the
employer may be considered good cause. '"42
When Senate Bill 943 enacted Maryland Law 293, the changes
suggested by Mr. Heintz were incorporated verbatim. Since 1979,
there have been few substantive changes to the disqualification sec-
tion pertaining to voluntary termination of employment.4 4 In 1991,
the Unemployment Compensation Law, previously Article 95A of the
Maryland Code, was recodified as Title 8 of the Labor and Employ-
ment Article.4" Although the statute was reformatted, the substance
of the disqualification section pertaining to voluntarily leaving work
remained unchanged.4 6 As such, the current language of section 8-
1001 (b) (1) states that the Secretary may only find good cause, if the
"cause is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with: (i)
the conditions of employment, or (ii) the actions of the employing
unit. 47
b. Maryland Court and Agency Interpretation of the Statute.-
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has found that, because the Unem-
ployment Compensation Law is remedial in nature, it should "be lib-
erally construed in favor of carrying out its purpose" of alleviating
economic distress.48 The court has stated, however, that the disquali-
fication provisions should be narrowly construed.49 Although the dis-
qualification clause for voluntarily leaving work has continually been
applied under Maryland's Unemployment Law, there is little case law
on what constitutes "good cause" within the meaning of the statute. 0
But the court has differentiated between voluntarily leaving work for
"good cause" and voluntarily leaving work due to a valid circum-
stance.5 1 To be considered "good cause," the court has held that "the
cause must be one which would reasonably impel the average able-
42. Letter from Frank 0. Heintz, Executive Director of the Employment Security Ad-
ministration, Department of Human Resources, to Honorable Harry J. McGuirk, Chair-
man, Senate Economic Affairs Committee (Mar. 7, 1979) S.B. 943, bill file, at 1.
43. 1979 Md. Laws 293.
44. See MD. CODE ANN. LAB & EMPL. § 8-1001(b) (1) (2002) (stating that to be consid-
ered "good cause," the cause must be "directly attributable to, arising from, or connected
with" the conditions of employment or the actions of the employing unit).
45. 1991 Md. Laws 8.
46. Id. The Special Revisor's Note to section 8-1001 stated that "[t]his section is new
language derived without substantive change from former Art. 95A, § 6(a) and (a-i)." Id.
47. MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 8-1001 (b) (1).
48. Allen v. Core Target City Youth Program, 275 Md. 69, 75, 338 A.2d 237, 241 (1975).
49. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., v. Dep't of Employment & Training, 309 Md. 28, 40,
522 A.2d 382, 388 (1987).
50. See 1936 Md. Laws ch. 1, § 1(5); see also MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-1001.
51. Bd. of Educ. v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 29, 37, 491 A.2d 1186, 1190, 1193 (1985).
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bodied qualified worker to give up his or her employment. '5 2 Alterna-
tively, to be a valid circumstance the reason for leaving work must pass
the "'necessitous or compelling' test."53 The court utilized this dis-
tinction to support its holding in Total Audio-Visual that voluntarily
leaving work for better pay was not a "good cause directly attributable
to, arising from, or connected with the conditions of employment" or
an action of the employment unit.54
An early opinion recognizing the distinction between a good
cause and a valid circumstance was Board of Education of Montgomery
County v. Paynter,55 in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland consid-
ered whether voluntarily leaving work due to continual harassment
was "good cause" under the Unemployment Insurance Law.56 Paynter
was a full-time teacher at Wheaton, in the Montgomery County School
System, where students continually harassed him for his alleged sexual
preference. 57 As a direct result of the harassment, Paynter submitted
his resignation to the school's principal.51 Subsequently, Paynter ap-
plied for, and was eventually granted, unemployment benefits.59 The
Board of Education of Montgomery County appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which granted certiorari to consider whether voluntarily leav-
ing work due to continual harassment constituted "good cause" under
Unemployment Insurance Law, section 6(a).6 ° The court began its
analysis by determining that the language of the statute was unambig-
52. Id. at 37, 491 A.2d at 1193 (quoting Uniweld Prods., Inc. v. Indus. Relations
Comm'n, 277 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)).
53. Id. at 29, 491 A.2d at 1190. Section 8-1001(c) states that a valid circumstance must
be "a substantial cause that is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with con-
ditions of employment or actions of the employing unit;" or "of such necessitous or com-
pelling nature that the individual has no reasonable alternative other than leaving the
employment." MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-1001(c).
54. Total Audio-Visual Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 360 Md.
387, 397, 758 A.2d 124, 129 (2000).
55. 303 Md. 22, 491 A.2d 1186 (1985).
56. Id. at 3940, 491 A.2d at 1195. In 1985, the disqualification provision for voluntarily
leaving work was codified as Article 95A, section 6(a). MD. CODE ANN. art. 95A, § 6(a)
(1985).
57. Paynter, 303 Md. at 30-31, 491 A.2d at 1190. Shortly after beginning work at Whea-
ton, Paynter began being harassed by a group of students. Id. Some of Wheaton's students
would call Paynter a "faggot" or "fag" and would disrupt his class by yelling and slamming
doors. Id.
58. Id. at 32, 491 A.2d at 1191.
59. Id. at 26, 491 A.2d at 1188. The initial claims officer denied Paynter's application,
so Paynter appealed to the Board of Appeals of the Employment Security Administration.
Id. The Board referred the matter to a referee, who found that Paynter should be granted
benefits. Id. at 26-27, 491 A.2d at 1188. On subsequent appeals, both the Board of Appeals
and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County upheld the ruling of the referee. Id. at 27,
491 A.2d at 1188.
60. Id. at 27-28, 491 A.2d at 1188-89.
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uous, and therefore, subject to the plain meaning doctrine of statu-
tory interpretation. 61 Furthermore, the court held that the correct
standard for determining whether an employee voluntarily left em-
ployment for good cause was objective; only a cause which would "rea-
sonably impel the average able-bodied qualified worker" to voluntarily
resign from his or her job constitutes good cause under the standard
the court created. 2 Concluding that the DLLR referee had applied
the correct standard,6 the court held that his ruling should be af-
firmed because the record contained substantial evidence to support
the referee's conclusion that leaving work because of continual harass-
ment constituted good cause.64
More recently, in Total Audio-Visual, the Court of Appeals ad-
dressed whether, under section 8-1001 of the Labor & Employment
Article, an employee is entitled to unemployment benefits on the ba-
sis of his or her employment with a previous employer, where that
employee voluntarily resigned in order to accept a higher paying
job.65 In Total Audio-Visual, the claimant was employed in a manage-
rial position for approximately one year.66 While working for Total
Audio-Visual, the claimant was offered a higher paying job with a rival
company, Projection Incorporated.67 Shortly after commencing work
at his new job, the claimant was laid off through no fault of his own.68
The claimant was eventually granted unemployment benefits.6"
61. Id. at 29, 491 A.2d at 1189.
62. Id. at 37, 491 A.2d at 1193 (quoting Uniweld Prods., Inc. v. Indus. Relations
Comm'n, 277 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)). Moreover, the court opined that
the applicable standards of reasonableness are those "as applied to the average man or
woman, and not to the supersensitive." Id.
63. Paynter, 303 Md. at 37, 491 A.2d at 1194.
64. Id. at 39-40, 491 A.2d at 1195.
65. Total Audio-Visual Sys. Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 360 Md.
387, 390, 758 A.2d 124, 126 (2000).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 390-91, 758 A.2d at 126. Projection's offer included an $8000 increase in pay
and one percent of the company's gross profits. Id. Because Total Audio-Visual refused to
match the offer, the claimant resigned his position and began working for Projection. Id.
68. Id. at 391, 758 A.2d at 126.
69. Id. Because the initial claims specialist found that the claimant was not eligible for
benefits based on his short employment with Projection, and that he had left Total Audio-
Visual voluntarily, the claimant was denied benefits. Id. On appeal, the claimant was
granted benefits because the hearing examiner found that leaving ajob for better paying
employment was considered "good cause" within the meaning of section 8-1001. Id. Both
the Board of Appeals of the DLLR and the Circuit Court of Montgomery County affirmed
the award of benefits. Id.
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Subsequently, Total Audio-Visual appealed the grant of benefits
to the Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals granted
certiorari to address the issue of first impression.70
In its analysis, the court reasoned that the plain reading of the
statute clearly indicated that leaving work voluntarily in order to ac-
cept a better paying job did not constitute good cause.71 Moreover,
the court stated that the denial of benefits to the claimant was consis-
tent with the Paynter court's distinction between those circumstances
that are related to, arising from, or connected with the conditions of
employment, and those circumstances that are not work related.7 2
Analogizing the provisions of section 8-1001 (a) to the provisions of
section 8-1001 (d), the court reasoned that voluntarily leaving ajob for
better paying employment was similar to leaving work to go into busi-
ness, to relocate with a spouse, or to go to school, in which case sec-
tion 8-1001(d) expressly denies benefits.7" Therefore, the court
determined that granting unemployment benefits to employees who
voluntarily leave ajob for better paying employment, while disqualify-
ing employees who voluntarily resigned for other purely personal rea-
sons would be inconsistent.
74
Finally, the court considered section 8-611 of the Labor and Em-
ployment Article." The court opined that it would be inconsistent to
grant employment benefits to a claimant who left his job to accept
70. Id.
71. Id. at 397, 758 A.2d at 129. The court opined that leaving one's job for a better
paying job was not "'directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with' either a con-
dition of employment or an action of the employment unit," but rather related to the
conditions of future employment. Id. at 397-98, 758 A.2d at 130. Further, the court rea-
soned that if an offer of higher pay was considered good cause, "any condition of future
employment which compares favorably with the claimant's present employment" would
also constitute good cause. Id. at 398, 758 A.2d at 130.
72. See id. at 398-99, 758 A.2d at 130. The court opined that because offers of better
pay are conditions of future employment, the circumstances resulting in an employee's
decision to voluntarily leave work for higher pay must pass the "necessitous or compelling"
test in order for that employee to receive unemployment benefits. Id. at 399, 758 A.2d at
130. The court further noted that under the "necessitous or compelling" test, "more needs
to be shown than that the precipitating event or cause 'would reasonably [have] im-
pel[led] the average able-bodied qualified worker to give up his or her employment."' Id.
at 401, 758 A.2d at 131 (quoting Uniweld Prods., Inc. v. Indus. Relations Comm'n, 277 So.
2d 827, 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)).
73. See id. (stating that "[a]ccepting more money and changing jobs is as much of a
gamble and thus, as much of a personal matter, as going into business for oneself").
74. See id., 758 A.2d at 132.
75. Id. at 402, 758 A.2d at 132. Section 8-611 contains provisions for charging against
the earned rating record of each base employer where the claimant previously worked.
MD. ANN. CODE, LAB. & EMPL. § 8-611 (2002). Under section 8-611(e) (4), the Secretary
may not charge the earned rating record of the claimant's previous employer where that
claimant voluntarily left that employer to accept better employment. Id. § 8 -611 (e) (4).
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better employment, while not charging the earned rating record of
the employer from which the basis of the benefits arose.7 6 Moreover,
under section 8-1001(a), the court noted that the determination of
whether an employee may be eligible for benefits is employer spe-
cific. 7 7 Thus, the court stated that DLLR's reading of section 8-
1001 (a) would nullify section 8-611 (c) (4).78 The court reasoned that,
because the claimant was not eligible to receive benefits at the time he
left Total Audio-Visual, he could not subsequently become qualified
by being laid off from a subsequent employer.79 Therefore, the court
held that an employee is not entitled to unemployment benefits on
the basis of his or her employment with a previous employer, where
that employee voluntarily resigned in order to accept a higher paying
job.80
In Total Audio-Visual, Judge Cathell dissented,"' arguing that the
majority misinterpreted the statutory scheme of Maryland's Unem-
ployment Compensation Law.82 He found that the sole issue of the
case was whether the claimant was entitled to benefits, not whether a
charge should be issued against a specific employer.83 Furthermore,
Judge Cathell noted that the statutory scheme allows benefits to be
granted to an employee who becomes unemployed through no fault
of his or her own, and through no fault of the employer.84 Therefore,
he reasoned that section 8-611 should have had no bearing on the
court's interpretation of section 8-1001.85
Additionally, Judge Cathell found that the language of the statute
was "replete with ambiguity," and therefore, the court should have
looked to the legislative history when interpreting the statute.8 6 After
analyzing both the legislative history of section 8-1001 and the pur-
pose of Maryland's Unemployment Compensation Law, Judge Cathell
reasoned that the intent of the legislature was to provide benefits to
individuals who voluntarily leave work and subsequently become un-
76. Total Audio-Visual, 360 Md. at 402, 758 A.2d at 132.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 405, 758 A.2d at 133-34.
80. Id at 390, 758 A.2d at 126. The court acknowledged that the claimant may have
had pragmatic reasons for leaving his job, but stated that it was Projection's actions not the
actions of Total Audio-Visual, which led to his unemployment. Id. at 405, 758 A.2d at 134.
81. Judges Eldridge and Raker joined in the dissent. Id. at 405, 758 A.2d at 134
(Cathell, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 406, 758 A.2d at 134.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 408, 758 A.2d at 135.
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employed through no fault of their own.8 7 Moreover, he found that
this interpretation was in accordance with Paynter, because a reasona-
ble individual in the claimant's position might leave his current em-
ployer in order to receive a substantially higher salary.88 Finally, Judge
Cathell concluded that granting benefits to an individual in the claim-
ant's position would be in accordance with several otherjurisdictions'
interpretations of similar statutes.8 9
c. Canons of Statutory Construction. -The Court of Appeals of
Maryland has consistently held that "the cardinal rule of statutory in-
terpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legisla-
ture."9 ° However, the rules of statutory construction that the court
utilizes to discern the legislative intent vary widely from case to case. 91
Although the applicable canons of statutory interpretation are often
conflicting,92 when the canons are applied appropriately, they provide
"an opportunity for principled decision making, as opposed to ad hoc
judicial legislation."9'
The primary canon of statutory interpretation is the plain mean-
ing doctrine.94 The plain meaning doctrine holds that where statu-
tory language is unambiguous, a court will not typically look beyond
the statutory language to ascertain the legislative intent.95 Relying on
the plain meaning doctrine, in Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpat-
rick,96 the Court of Appeals held that, under sections 3-501 and 3-505
of the Labor and Employment Article, 97 a bonus given outside of a
worker's promised compensation is revocable at anytime before deliv-
ery.98 The court opined that the pursuit of statutory interpretation
"begins with the words of the statute, which we give their ordinary and
common meaning, and, when they are clear and unambiguous, ends
there, as well."9 9 Furthermore, the Fitzpatrick court declared that stat-
87. Id. at 428, 758 A.2d at 146.
88. Id. at 429, 758 A.2d at 147.
89. Id. at 430, 758 A.2d at 147.
90. See State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717, 720 A.2d 311, 315 (1998) (quoting Oaks v.
Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)).
91. See, e.g., Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311 (1998).
92. See Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 512, 525 A.2d 628, 631 (1987)
(stating "U]ust as in the science of Physics every action has an equal and opposite reaction,
so it seems that every canon of statutory construction has an equal and opposite canon").
93. Id.
94. Id. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632.
95. Bell, 351 Md. at 718, 720 A.2d at 315.
96. 366 Md. 295, 785 A.2d 667 (2001).
97. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-501, 3-505 (2000).
98. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 366 Md. at 306, 783 A.2d at 673.
99. Id. at 301, 783 A.2d at 670.
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utory language must be interpreted within the context of the statutory
scheme.' 00 Thus, the court held that unless the bonus was promised
as part of the compensation of the employee, the bonus is merely a
gratuity and is revocable at any time before delivery.'0 '
When invoking the plain meaning doctrine, the court usually
does not look beyond the words of the statute to determine the legisla-
tive intent. 0 2 It is, however, within the court's discretion to look be-
yond the statutory language for support.'0 3 In State v. Bell, the court
explained that, while the actual language is the starting point for stat-
utory interpretation, the statutory language must be read in its full
context and "in light of external manifestations of intent or general
purpose available through other evidence."'0 4 Although the Bell court
applied the plain meaning doctrine to Maryland Rule 4-246(b), the
court looked to the legislative scheme in order to ascertain the legisla-
tive intent.10 5 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
rule required a specific reference to the unanimity requirement dur-
ing in-court advice in order for a defendant to "knowingly" waive his
right to a jury trial.'0 6 Instead, the court held that the "unanimity"
requirement was not necessary because a plain reading of the statute,
taken with the statute's legislative history, required the defendant only
to have an "acquaintance" with the principles of a jury trial, not "full"
knowledge.1
07
More recently, in Giant Food, Inc. v. Department of Labor, Licensing
and Regulation,'0 8 the Court of Appeals applied a broader version of
the plain meaning doctrine. The court addressed the issue of
100. Id. at 302, 783 A.2d at 671. Applying the canons to sections 3-505 and 3-501, the
court opined that an employee was entitled to all compensation and remuneration, includ-
ing bonuses, which were promised to the employee in exchange for his work. Id. at 303,
783 A.2d at 671-72.
101. See id. at 305-06, 783 A.2d at 672-73.
102. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
103. State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717-18, 720 A.2d 311, 315 (1998).
104. Id. at 717-18, 720 A.2d at 315. The court further noted:
[The court] may and often must consider other external manifestations or per-
suasive evidence, including the bill's tide and function paragraphs, amendments
that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and
subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental
issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we
read the particular language before us in a given case.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. See id. at 712, 718-23, 720 A.2d at 313, 315-18. The court noted that the canons of
statutory interpretation apply equally to the court's interpretation of its rules. Id. at 717,
720 A.2d at 315.
106. Id. at 730, 720 A.2d at 321.
107. Id.
108. 356 Md. 180, 738 A.2d 856 (1999).
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whether the disqualification clause of section 8-1004 of the Labor and
Employment Article required either a work stoppage at the individual
premises where the employee last worked or a work stoppage at the
employer's facility as a whole.109 In this case, the court reiterated that
the plain meaning of the statutory language is the primary source for
determining legislative intent.110 However, the court opined that the
plain meaning doctrine is not absolute, but rather, a statute must be
construed in accordance with its purpose, aim, or policy, 1 ' avoiding
an interpretation "which is illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with com-
mon sense.""' 2 Applying these canons to section 8-1004 of the Labor
and Employment Article, the court looked to case law, the legislative
history, and the interpretation of similar statutes by other states."'
The court concluded that there was a substantial curtailment of opera-
tions, which constituted a work stoppage at each of the premises
where the employee's worked. 1 14
The plain meaning doctrine only applies where the statute in
question is clear and unambiguous. When the court finds that the
statutory language is susceptible to more than one meaning, the court
must look beyond the text of the statute to ascertain the legislative
intent." 5 In Greco v. State, 16 the Court of Appeals found that Mary-
land Rule 4-345 (b)' 17 was susceptible to more than one meaning, and
was, therefore, ambiguous."' The court stated that when interpreting
rules of procedure, it applies the same principles and canons as in
statutory interpretation."' In its analysis, the court conceded that the
word "imposition" in Rule 4-345(b) could reasonably be interpreted
to refer only to either an initial pronouncement of a sentence; or al-
ternatively, to the subsequent modification of a sentence which im-
poses criminal liability.' 20 Because the language of Rule 4-345(b) was
ambiguous, in interpreting the rule, the court looked to the applica-
ble case law, analogous rules, and the history and purpose of the
109. Id. at 187-88, 738 A.2d at 859-60.
110. Id. at 189, 738 A.2d at 861.
111. Id. at 189-90, 738 A.2d at 861 (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d
590, 594 (1992)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 191-203, 738 A.2d at 862-68.
114. Id. at 205-06, 738 A.2d at 870.
115. Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 428, 701 A.2d 419, 421 (1997).
116. 347 Md. 423, 701 A.2d 419 (1997).
117. MD. R. 4-345(b).
118. Greco, 347 Md. at 429, 701 A.2d at 421.
119. Id. at 428, 701 A.2d at 421.
120. Id. at 429, 701 A.2d at 421-22.
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rule. 12 ' The court concluded that "imposition of sentence" under
Rule 4-345 (b) included a Modification for Reduction of Sentence that
was granted, thus tolling the statute of limitations for the appellant.
122
Additionally, in Morris v. Prince George's County,121 the Court of Ap-
peals considered whether an individual, who transfers from one type
of pension to another, carries with him his years of service in the first
system for purposes of computing retirement eligibility under Article
78B, section 32(a). 1 24 The Morris court found that the trial judge
inappropriately applied the plain meaning doctrine because he had
deleted statutory language in order to render the statute unambigu-
ous.125 The court opined that the trial judge should have read the
statutory language in its full context and in accordance with the legis-
lative history."' After an analysis of the statute's history, the court
reasoned that the legislature intended to allow an individual to carry
forward his or her accumulated service years for purposes of retire-
ment eligibility when he or she transfers from an actuarial pension
system to an accumulated system. 127 In support of its holding, the
court noted that the Maryland State Retirement Agency had inter-
preted the statute in a similar manner for forty-two years.' 21 Deter-
mining that legislative acquiescence in the Agency's long-standing
interpretation gave rise to a "strong presumption" of correctness, the
court concluded that the Agency's interpretation should be entitled
to deference.129
d. The Rule of Stare Decisis and the Principle of Legislative
Acquiescence.-The Court of Appeals has determined that legislative ac-
quiescence to a court's interpretation of a statute suggests that the
interpretation should be upheld under the rule of stare decisis."3 ° The
rule of stare decisis maintains that courts should follow previous judicial
decisions when the same legal issues arise in subsequent litigation. 3 1
Thus, stare decisis allows individuals to be guided in their personal and
business dealings because the law remains fixed as it is not subject to
121. Id. at 429-37, 701 A.2d at 422-26.
122. Id. at 438, 701 A.2d at 426.
123. 319 Md. 597, 573 A.2d 1346 (1990).
124. Id. at 600, 573 A.2d at 1347.
125. Id. at 602-03, 573 A.2d at 1348-49.
126. Id. at 603, 573 A.2d at 1349.
127. Id. at 615, 573 A.2d at 1354.
128. Id. at 613, 573 A.2d at 1354.
129. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sinai Hosp. V. Dep't of Employ-
ment, 309 Md. 28, 46, 522 A.2d 382, 391 (1987)).
130. Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 210, 438 A.2d 1301, 1305 (1981).
131. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1137 (Bryan A. Garner et al., eds., 7th ed. 1999).
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change. 132 Because the legislature is presumed to be aware of the
court's statutory interpretations and has the ability to overturn such
interpretations, the court has determined that the rule of stare decisis
precludes it from overruling an interpretation where it finds that the
legislature has acquiesced to that interpretation. 133
Recently, the Court of Appeals considered the rule of stare decisis
in State v. Green.' In Green, the court overturned Cardinell v. State,1 35
which held that the State had a common law right to appeal in crimi-
nal cases. 1 36 In so doing, the court noted that the rule of stare decisis is
not absolute, but allows the court to change a precedent if it deter-
mines that precedent has become unsound.1
3 7
Despite this allowance, the court is reluctant to overturn a deci-
sion where it believes the legislature has acquiesced to that deci-
sion.13 8 In Williams v. State,'1 9 the Court of Appeals declined to
overrule its previous interpretations of the Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article, section 12-202.4' Previously, in Jourdan v. State,1 4 1
the court held that it had jurisdiction under section 12-202 to review
appellate decisions of the Court of Special Appeals raised under the
Post Conviction Procedure Act.'4 2 However, the Jourdan court found
that it did not have jurisdiction to review the grant or denial of an
application of leave to appeal. 4 3 Subsequent to Jourdan, the Williams
court noted that the legislature twice re-enacted section 12-202 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article with amendments,"' and
twice amended the Post Conviction Procedure Act. 1 45 Because the
legislature had amended each of the statutes at issue twice without
overturning the court's interpretation, the court presumed that the
legislature had acquiesced to the court's interpretation of the stat-
132. See, e.g., State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 78-79, 785 A.2d 1275, 1285 (2001) (quoting
Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 186 Md. 406, 416, 47 A.2d 365, 370
(1946)).
133. Williams, 292 Md. at 210, 438 A.2d at 1305.
134. Id.
135. 335 Md. 381, 644 A.2d 11 (1994).
136. Green, 367 Md. at 78, 785 A.2d at 1285.
137. Id. at 79, 785 A.2d at 1285 (quoting White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354, 223 A.2d 763,
767 (1966)).
138. See Williams, 292 Md. at 210, 438 A.2d at 1305.
139. Id.
140. Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 12-202 (1980).
141. 275 Md. 495, 341 A.2d 388 (1975).
142. See Williams, 292 Md. at 210, 438 A.2d at 1305.
143. Jourdan, 275 Md. at 506 n.4, 341 A.2d at 395 n.4.
144. Williams, 292 Md. at 209-10, 438 A.2d at 1305.
145. Id. at 210, 438 A.2d at 1305.
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utes. 1 16 Therefore, the Williams court concluded that it would be in-
appropriate to overrule its prior interpretation.14
7
Similarly, in Jones v. State,1 4 8 the Court of Appeals determined
that, since the legislature had not acted to overturn its previous inter-
pretation of section 150 of the Maryland Code Article 27, the legisla-
ture had acquiesced to its interpretation. 149 Eleven years prior to
Jones, the court, in Choi v. State,' 50 addressed the circumstances under
which a person could be convicted of making a false statement, re-
port, or complaint to the police. 1 ' In Choi, the court opined that
under section 150 of Article 27, an individual could only commit the
offense if his false statement resulted in the police undertaking an
investigation. 152 Subsequent to Choi, the legislature repealed and re-
enacted Article 27, section 150 with amendments, without overturning
the interpretation of the Choi court.'5 3 Therefore, the Jones court de-
clined to overrule the Choi court's interpretation. 54
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Plein, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land affirmed its holding in Total Audio-Visual that an employee is not
entitled to unemployment benefits on the basis of work done for a
previous employer, where that employee voluntarily resigned to seek a
higher paying job. 15 5 In so holding, the court upheld the District
Court of Baltimore City's ruling that the claimant, Patrick Plein,
should not be granted unemployment benefits.' 5 6 In a 4-3 decision,
the majority rejected both Plein's and the DLLR's arguments that To-
tal-Audio Visual was wrongly decided. 1 57
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 362 Md. 331, 765 A.2d 127 (2001).
149. See id. at 337-38, 765 A.2d at 131.
150. 316 Md. 529, 560 A.2d 1108 (1989).
151. Id. at 546, 560 A.2d at 1116.
152. Id. at 548, 560 A.2d at 1117.
153. Jones, 362 Md. at 337, 765 A.2d at 130.
154. Id. at 338, 765 A.2d at 131.
155. Plein, 369 Md. at 422-23, 800 A.2d at 758; see also Total Audio-Visual Sys., Inc. v.
Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 360 Md. 387, 405, 758 A.2d 124, 134 (2000) (hold-
ing that under the Labor and Employment Article, voluntarily leaving a job for a better
paying job does not constitute "good cause").
156. Plein, 369 Md. at 422-23, 800 A.2d at 758.
157. Id. Although DLLR was the appellee in Plein, it agreed with the appellant that Total
Audio-Visual should be overturned because the Total Audio-Visual court misconstrued the
legislative scheme and the decision was in opposition to the DLLR's long-standing adminis-
trative rulings. Id.
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Chief Judge Bell, writing for the majority, began his opinion by
reiterating the Total Audio-Visual court's holding and reasoning.'58
The court noted that many of the arguments made by Plein were simi-
lar to those set forth by the DLLR in Total Audio-Visual.'59 Without
addressing Plein's arguments, the court relied on the fact that the leg-
islature did not overturn Total Audio-Visual as support for the affirma-
tion of its holding. 16 ° The court determined that the legislature has
shown that it will overturn an interpretation of the court "when it be-
lieves the [c]ourt has gotten it wrong." '161
Further, the court explained that, because the legislature is pre-
sumed to be aware of the court's decisions, the court is reluctant to
overrule a previous decision where it considers legislative inaction to
indicate the adoption or at least acceptance of the court's previous
decision.162 Additionally, the court explained that in each of the last
two legislative sessions, in both the House of Delegates and the Sen-
ate, unsuccessful bills were introduced to overturn Total Audio-Vis-
uaL'63 Thus, the court reasoned, due to the legislature's activity
(more precisely its inactivity), the legislature understood the court's
interpretation of section 8-1001, and, therefore, agreed with the
court's decision in Total Audio-Visual.164
The court then addressed Plein's contention that the court was
not compelled to affirm Total Audio-Visual under the rule of stare deci-
sis as set forth in State v. Green.1 65 Agreeing with Plein, the court
noted, the rule of stare decisis is "flexible and requires that a balance be
struck between fixed and established rulings .... and correct rulings
and principles." However, the court declined to overrule Total Audio-
Visual because of its reliance on the legislative acquiescence
principle. 1 6
6
158. 369 Md. at 423, 800 A.2d at 758. See supra notes 81-89 for a discussion of Total
Audio-Visual.
159. Plein, 369 Md. at 423, 800 A.2d at 758.
160. Id. at 433-35, 800 A.2d at 765-66.
161. Id. at 433, 800 A.2d at 765.
162. Id. at 437, 800 A.2d at 767. The court cited Jones v. State, 362 Md. 331, 765 A.2d 127
(2001), and Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981) for its application of the
legislative acquiescence doctrine. Id.
163. Plein, 369 Md. at 434, 800 A.2d at 765.
164. Id. at 435, 800 A.2d at 766.
165. Id. In State v. Green, the court held that the rule of stare decisis is not absolute. 367
Md. 61, 79, 785 A.2d 1275, 1285 (2001). The court reasoned that "it is sometimes advisable
to correct a decision or decisions wrongly made in the first instance if it is found that the
decision is clearly wrong and contrary to other established principles." Id. (quoting Town-
send v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 186 Md. 406, 417, 47 A.2d 365, 370 (1946)).
166. Plein, 369 Md. at 436, 438, 800 A.2d at 766, 768.
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Judges Cathell, Eldridge, and Battaglia dissented for the reasons
stated in Judge Cathell's dissent in Total Audio-Visual.167 In Total
Audio-Visual, Judge Cathell reasoned that the majority misinterpreted
the statutory scheme. 6 ' Additionally, he determined that section 8-
1001 was replete with ambiguity, and therefore, the court should have
looked to the statute's legislative history. 169 Analyzing the history of
section 8-1001 and the purpose of Maryland's Unemployment Com-
pensation Law, Judge Cathell concluded that the legislature intended
to provide benefits to individuals that voluntarily left work for better
employment and later became unemployed through no fault of their
own.
170
4. Analysis.-In Plein, the Court of Appeals of Maryland af-
firmed its earlier holding that an employee, who voluntarily leaves
work for better pay and is subsequently laid off through no fault of his
own, is disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits
under section 8-1001 of the Labor and Employment Article. 1 7 Under
such circumstances, the court reasoned that voluntary resignation is
not a cause "directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with
the conditions of employment." The court's interpretation suffers
from a misguided application of the principle of legislative acquies-
cence and the rule of stare decisis.1 72 By finding that the legislature's
failure to overturn Total Audio-Visual amounted to legislative acquies-
cence, 1 7 the court failed to recognize that the legislature had acqui-
esced to the DLLR's interpretation of the statute for more than twenty
years.' 74 Furthermore, the court's interpretation of section 8-1001
suffers from an incorrect application of the plain meaning doc-
trine.175 Prior case law applying the canons of statutory construction
allows the court greater interpretive latitude than merely discerning
167. Id. at 438, 800 A.2d at 768; see supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (setting
forth Judge Cathell's dissent in Total Audio-Visual).
168. 360 Md. at 387, 405, 758 A.2d, 124, 134 (Cathell, J., dissenting); see supra notes 81-
89 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Cathell's dissent in Total Audio-Visual).
169. Total Audio-Visual, 360 Md. at 408, 758 A.2d at 135.
170. Id. at 428, 758 A.2d at 146.
171. 369 Md. at 422-25, 800 A.2d at 758-59.
172. See supra notes 130-154 for a discussion of the principle of legislative acquiescence
and the rule of stare decisis.
173. Plein, 369 Md. at 438, 800 A.2d at 767-68.
174. The legislature became aware of the agency's interpretation of good cause in 1979,
following the testimony of Frank 0. Heintz. Hearing on S.B. 943 Before the Senate Econ. Aff
Comm., 1979 Leg., 393rd Sess. (Md. 1979) (testimony of Frank 0. Heintz, Executive Direc-
tor, Employment Security Administration, Dep't of Human Resources). See supra notes
32-40 and accompanying text.
175. Plein, 369 Md. at 425, 800 A.2d at 759-60.
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legislative intent from the language of the statute. 17 6 In accordance
with prior case law, an examination of the statutory purpose, legisla-
tive history, and administrative interpretation reveals that the legisla-
tive intent would be greater served by granting unemployment
benefits to individuals that seek to better their careers or salary, and
who are subsequently laid off through no fault of their own.
a. Misguided Application of the Principles of Stare Decisis and
Legislative Acquiescence to Total Audio-Visual.-The Plein court was mis-
guided in its determination that the principles of stare decisis and legis-
lative acquiescence precluded the court from overruling Total Audio-
Visual. As support for its conclusion that overruling Total Audio-Visual
would be inappropriate, the court cited Williams and Jones. 7 7 Both
Williams and Jones, however, are distinguishable from Plein. In Wil-
liams, the court declined to overrule its decision in Jourdan because
the court determined that the legislature had acquiesced to the
Jourdan court's interpretation of the statute in question. 7 The legis-
lature, however, had twice amended the statute at issue in Williams
without overturning theJourdan court's interpretation. 7 Similarly, in
Jones, the court determined that the legislature had acquiesced to the
Choi court's interpretation because it stood for eleven years, despite
the fact that the legislature had repealed and re-enacted the statute in
question without overturning the Choi court's interpretation. 80 Al-
though legislation had been introduced to overturn Total Audio-Vis-
ual,18 prior to Plein, the legislature had not reenacted or amended
the finding of "good cause" under section 8-1001 since the court's
holding in Total Audio-Visual. '82 Moreover, Total Audio-Visual was only
decided two years prior to Plein. Therefore, both Williams and Jones
are distinguishable from Plein.
The court's analysis is further flawed because it fails to consider
that the legislature acquiesced to the DLLR's interpretation of "good
cause" for more than twenty years. In 1979, while the legislature was
redrafting Article 95A, section 6, the testimony of Mr. Heintz made
176. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 718-19, 720 A.2d 311, 315-16 (1998).
177. Plein, 369 Md. at 438, 800 A.2d at 767-68.
178. Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d at 1301 (1981); see supra notes 140-147
and accompanying text.
179. 292 Md. at 209-10, 438 A.2d at 1305.
180. Jones v. State, 362 Md. 331, 765 A.2d 127 (2001); see supra notes 149-154 and ac-
companying text.
181. Plein, 369 Md. at 434, 800 A.2d at 765 (stating that the bills were introduced in both
the House of Delegates and the Senate to overrule Total Audio-Visual).
182. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-1001 (2002).
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clear to the legislature that the Employment Security Administration
considered an employee's leaving work voluntarily to accept better
employment to be a good cause directly attributable to, arising from,
or connected with the conditions of employment. 83 Moreover, prior
to Total Audio-Visual, the agencies charged with administering the La-
bor and Employment Article continued to find that leaving work to
accept better employment was a good cause within the meaning of the
section 8-1001 and its predecessors. 84
Due to the DLLR's long-standing interpretation, the court should
have given greater deference to the agency's interpretation and its
opposition to Total Audio-Visual. If the legislature is presumed to be
aware of the court's interpretations and decisions,' 85 then the legisla-
ture must also be presumed to be aware of agency interpretations and
decisions."8 6 In Morris v. Prince George's County, the court stated that
when interpreting a statute, the long-standing legislative acquiescence
in the administrative interpretation of the statute gives rise to a strong
presumption that the interpretation is correct.'87 Thus, the Plein
court incorrectly determined that the legislature's inability to pass a
law overturning Total Audio-Visual in two years, should be accorded
greater weight than the legislature's over twenty-year acquiescence to
the DLLR's earlier interpretation.' 88
Consistent with the court's previous decisions regarding the rule
of stare decisis, the court should have looked to its interpretation in
Total Audio-Visual in order to decide if it was fairly and correctly de-
cided. Rather, the court incorrectly concluded that its previous inter-
pretation was correct because the legislature had failed to overturn its
decision. In State v. Green, the court stated that the rule of stare decisis
is not absolute and allows the court to overrule prior decisions that
were "wrongly made in the first instance if it is found that the decision
is clearly wrong and contrary to other established principles."'89 Had
the Plein court fully re-examined Total Audio-Visual, it would have
found that its interpretation suffers from an inappropriate application
183. Hearing on S.B. 943 Before the Senate Econ. Aff Comm., 1979 Leg., 393rd Sess. (Md.
1979) (testimony of Frank 0. Heintz, Executive Director, Employment Security Adminis-
tration, Dep't of Human Resources).
184. See Total Audio-Visual Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 360 Md.
387, 391, 758 A.2d 124, 126 (2000) (stating that the DLLR granted benefits to the claimant
because he left work voluntarily for good cause).
185. Plein, 369 Md. at 437, 800 A.2d at 767.
186. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
187. 319 Md. 597, 613, 573 A.2d 1346, 1354 (1990).
188. Plein, 369 Md. at 437, 800 A.2d at 767.
189. Green, 367 Md. 61, 79, 785 A.2d 1275, 1285 (2001).
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of the canons of statutory interpretation, and that it is contrary to the
legislative history and statutory scheme.
b. Inappropriate Application of the Plain Meaning Doctrine to the
Language of Section 8-1001.-The case law regarding statutory interpre-
tation makes clear that the court's analysis begins, and often ends,
with the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. 9 °
The court, however, has stated that where the statutory language is
susceptible to more than one meaning, it.should look beyond the stat-
utory language in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature.' 9 '
Thus, the Plein court inappropriately applied the plain meaning doc-
trine to section 8-1001 because the language of the statute is
ambiguous. 19
2
The relevant language of section 8-1001, provides that the Secre-
tary may find that an employee had good cause for voluntarily leaving
work only if, "the cause is directly attributable to, arising from, or con-
nected with: [1] the conditions of employment; or [2] the actions of
the employing unit."'93 In Greco v. State, the court stated that statutory
language is ambiguous when it is "reasonably capable of more than
one meaning."'9 4 The Labor and Employment Article does not de-
fine the phrases "conditions of employment" or "actions of the em-
ploying unit."19 5 However, section 8-1005, which provides for the
disqualification of benefits for unemployed individuals who do not ac-
cept suitable work, suggests that wages are conditions of employ-
ment.' 96 Section 8-1005(b) states that the Secretary may not consider
employment to be suitable if "hours, wages, or other conditions of work
offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those
prevailing for similar work in the locality." ' Thus, wages could rea-
sonably be interpreted as conditions of employment.
The Code also does not define the phrases "directly attributable
to," "arising from," or "connected with."1 98 By definition, the phrase
"connected with" is the broadest criteria for determining whether an
190. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 301, 783 A.2d 667, 670
(2001).
191. Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429, 701 A.2d 419, 421-22 (1997).
192. See id. (stating that the court should look beyond the statutory language where the
language is ambiguous).
193. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-1001 (2002).
194. Greco, 347 Md. at 429, 701 A.2d at 421.
195. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-1001.
196. Id. § 8-1005 (emphasis added). Section 8-1005(b) contains the criteria for whether
the Secretary may find employment to be suitable. Id.
197. Id. § 8-1005(b) (2) (ii).
198. Id. § 8-1001.
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employee left work for "good cause." The word "connected" is de-
fined as "united, joined, or linked." '99 Wages are clearly united and
linked with the conditions of employment; the salary that an em-
ployee receives from an employer affects whether that employee will
initially accept an offer of employment, and whether that employee
will remain with that employer. Additionally, when an employee is
offered a higher paying job, he or she must make a comparison be-
tween the offered salary and his or her current wages, along with
other conditions of employment. Thus, an offer of better pay may
reasonably be interpreted to be "connected with the conditions of em-
ployment. '20 0 Therefore, because section 8-1001 is reasonably suscep-
tible to more than one interpretation, the language of the statute is
ambiguous.2° '
The ambiguousness of the statutory language is further evi-
denced by the mere fact that the court is divided in its interpretation
of the statute.20 2 In both Plein and Total Audio-Visual, three of the
seven presiding judges disagreed with the majority's interpretation.203
By subjecting the language of section 8-1001 to the plain meaning
doctrine, the majority implicitly stated that the interpretation of the
dissenting judges was irrational and capricious. In addition, because
the court has determined that Maryland's Unemployment Insurance
Law is remedial in nature, and should be construed in favor of eligibil-
ity,204 the majority should have given greater weight to the interpreta-
tions of the dissenting judges.20 5
199. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 431 (2d ed. una-
bridged 1987).
200. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-1001.
201. See Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429, 701 A.2d 419, 421-22 (1997) (stating that
statutory language is ambiguous if it is "reasonably capable of more than one meaning").
202. Id.
203. Plein, 369 Md. at 438, 800 A.2d at 768; Total Audio-Visual Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of
Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 360 Md. 387, 405, 758 A.2d 124, 134 (2000).
204. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Dep't of Employment and Training, 309 Md. 28,
40, 522 A.2d 382, 388 (1987).
205. The court has stated that statutory language can be ambiguous in two different
respects: "1) it may be intrinsically unclear...; or 2) its intrinsic meaning may be fairly
clear, but its application to a particular object or circumstance may be uncertain." Webster
v. State, 359 Md. 465, 481, 754 A.2d 1004, 1012 (2000) (quoting Gardner v. State, 344 Md.
642, 648-49, 689 A.2d 610, 613 (1997)). The language of section 8-1001(b)(1) pertaining
to a finding of good cause falls within this second category, as evidenced by DLLR's inter-
pretation as well as the divisiveness within the Plein and Total Audio-Visual courts. Because
the language of section 8-1001 is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation,
the court should have looked beyond the language of the statute to ascertain the legislative
intent. See Greco, 347 Md. at 429, 701 A.2d at 421-22.
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Moreover, the DLLR's long-standing interpretation of section 8-
1001 provides further evidence that the language of section 8-1001 is
ambiguous, and, therefore, the Plein court inappropriately applied the
plain meaning doctrine. In Morris v. Prince George's County, the court
opined that long-standing administrative construction by an agency
charged with administering the statute should be entitled to defer-
ence.2" 6 For more than twenty years, the Employment Security Ad-
ministration and the DLLR, the agencies charged with interpreting
section 8-1001 (and it predecessors), held that voluntarily leaving
work for a higher paying job or a better career was a "good cause ...
attributable to and arising from the conditions of employment," if the
individual had a reasonable belief that he had obtained better em-
ployment and it would be of substantial duration.2 °7 Furthermore, ar-
guing that the court in Plein should overrule Total Audio-Visual, the
DLLR agreed with the appellant that the court had misinterpreted
section 8-1001.208 Thus, by subjecting section 8-1001 to the plain
meaning doctrine, the Plein court ignored precedent and gave very
little deference to the long-standing agency interpretation.
As a result of the court's incorrect application of the plain mean-
ing doctrine, the court again misinterpreted the statutory scheme.
The court has stated that a statute must be interpreted within the con-
text of the statutory scheme.20 9 Moreover, when the Bell court looked
to the legislative scheme to ascertain the legislature's intent, it stated
that statutory language cannot be read in isolation, but rather "in light
of the full context in which [it] appear[s] and in light of external
manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other
evidence."210 Because the Total Audio-Visual court determined that
the language of section 8-1001 unambiguously disqualified individuals
who voluntarily left work to accept better employment from bene-
206. Morris v. Prince George's County, 319 Md. 597, 613, 573 A.2d 1346, 1354 (1990).
207. Hearing on S.B. 943 Before the Senate Econ. Aff Comm., 1979 Leg., 393d Sess. (Md.
1979) (testimony of Frank 0. Heintz, Executive Director Employment Security Administra-
tion, Dep't of Human Resources). See discussion supra note 38 and accompanying text.
Additionally, the DLLR granted benefits to the claimant in Total Audio-Visual and was the
appellee in that case. Total Audio-Visual, 360 Md. at 390-91, 758 A.2d at 125-26.
208. Brief for Appellee, Plein v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 369 Md. 421,
800 A.2d 757 (2002) (No. 116).
209. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 302, 783 A.2d 677, 671
(2001).
210. State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 718, 720 A.2d 311, 313 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Stanford v. Md. Police Training & Corr. Comm'n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697
A.2d 424, 427 (1997)).
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fitS, 2 1' and then looked to related provisions for support, the court
misinterpreted the statutory scheme.
In Total Audio-Visual, the court determined that section 8-
611 (e) (4)212 supported its holding that voluntarily leaving work for a
higher paying job was not a "good cause" within the meaning of sec-
tion 8-1001.2L" The Total Audio-Visual court reasoned that if the
earned rating record of the employer from which the claimant left
voluntarily cannot be charged under section 8-611(e)(4), then with
regard to that employer, it would be illogical to find that leaving work
to accept better employment would constitute "good cause. "214 As
Judge Cathell's dissent pointed out, however, the issue in Plein and
Total Audio-Visual was whether an employee was entitled to benefits,
not whether benefits may be charged against the employer's earned
rating record.21 5
Moreover, an examination of section 8-611 demonstrates that the
Plein and Total Audio-Visual courts misinterpreted the statutory
scheme. Assuming arguendo that a charge against an employer's
earned rating record has some impact on the finding of good cause,
the court's determination that section 8-611(e) (4) precluded a find-
ing of good cause for voluntarily leaving work to pursue better em-
ployment cannot be reconciled with the other provisions of section 8-
611(e) (4).216 Under section 8-611 (e) (4), benefits granted to an indi-
vidual who voluntarily left work to enter training approved by the Sec-
retary cannot be charged against the earned rating record of the
employer. 217 Section 8-1001 (b) (2) (iii), however, specifically states
that the Secretary may find good cause if an individual voluntarily left
work to attend a training program, which is offered under the Mary-
land Job Training Partnership Act, or if otherwise approved by the
Secretary.218 Since an employee may be granted unemployment ben-
efits where the earned rating record of the employer is not charged, it
is clear that the Plein and Total Audio-Visual courts failed to recognize
that the statutory scheme provides for circumstances where an individ-
211. Total Audio-Visual, 360 Md. at 403-05, 758 A.2d at 132-34.
212. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-611(e) (4) (2002).
213. Total Audio-Visual, 360 Md. at 403-05, 758 A.2d at 132-34.
214. Id. at 404, 758 A.2d at 133.
215. Id. at 406, 758 A.2d at 134 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
216. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-611 (e) (4). Section 8-611 (e) (4) precludes the
Secretary from charging the earned rating record of the employing unit if either "the
claimant left voluntarily to accept better employment" or if "the claimant left employment
voluntarily to ... enter training approved by the Secretary." Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. § 8-1001.
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ual may be granted benefits even though he or she became unem-
ployed through no fault of his or her own and through no fault of the
employer.21 In that circumstance, "the benefits due to that employee
are incorporated into the statistics that generate the overall base rate
for all employers in the State. '2 20 Thus, by subjecting section 8-1001
to a narrow application of the plain meaning doctrine, the Plein and
Total-Audio Visual courts misinterpreted the statutory scheme.
c. Serving Legislative Intent by Granting Unemployment Bene-
fits.-Had the Plein court interpreted the statute with greater latitude,
it would have found that the statutory scheme and legislative intent
would be greater served by providing unemployment benefits to indi-
viduals that voluntarily leave work to accept better employment and
are subsequently laid off through no fault of their own. Furthermore,
the legislative intent, as evidenced by the stated policy of the statute,
the legislative history, and the DLLR's long-standing interpretation,
were undermined by the court's misapplication of the plain meaning
doctrine.
Maryland's Unemployment Compensation Law was enacted to
lighten the burden of involuntary unemployment on both society and
the unemployed. 221 The statute accomplishes this goal by creating a
safety-net for individuals who become unemployed through no fault
of their own. 2 2 2 Denying unemployment benefits to individuals who
leave work and are subsequently laid off through no fault of their own
is unjust, inconsistent with common sense, and undermines the legis-
lative purpose. 223 The court's holding in Plein discourages individuals
with low-paying jobs from seeking better employment.224 Further, the
court's interpretation encourages employers to keep wages low, which
generates less money for unemployment insurance funds and causes
the economy to slow.
2 2 5
219. See Total Audio-Visual, 360 Md. at 406, 758 A.2d at 134 (Cathell, J. dissenting).
220. Id.
221. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-102.
222. Id.
223. See Total Audio-Visual, 360 Md. at 404-05, 758 A.2d at 133 (stating that the claimant
may well have left his job for good cause "at least from a practical, and even common
sense, point of view").
224. An individual may be less willing to accept better employment, if he is aware that
he will be denied unemployment benefits should he soon become unemployed through
no fault of his own.
225. Because sections 8-608 to 8-613 provide that the funding of unemployment insur-
ance come from a proportion of wages paid to employees, the higher an employee's salary,
the greater his contribution to the unemployment reserves. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.
§§ 8-608 to -613.
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Alternatively, granting unemployment benefits to employees who
voluntarily leave work for better pay and are subsequently laid off
through no fault of their own, better accomplishes the purpose of
Maryland's Unemployment Compensation Law. By granting benefits
to such individuals, the crushing burden of unemployment is light-
ened by "maintaining the purchasing power [of the unemployed indi-
vidual], and limit[s] the serious consequences of poor relief
assistance. 226 Therefore, society benefits because unemployed indi-
viduals are able to continue to contribute to the economy. By provid-
ing a safety-net, individuals are encouraged to seek better
employment or high paying jobs, thus increasing the unemployment
reserves and stimulating the economy.
The legislative history illustrates that the intent of the legislature
was to provide unemployment insurance benefits to employees who
obtain better paying employment and are subsequently laid off
through no fault of their own. Since the court subjected section 8-
1001 to the narrow plain meaning doctrine in Plein, the court did not
consider the legislative history of the statute. In State v. Bell, the court
stated that even under the plain meaning doctrine, statutory language
should be read in its full context and "in light of external manifesta-
tions of intent or general purpose available through other evi-
dence. '2 27 The legislative history of section 8-1001 demonstrates that
the legislature considered voluntarily leaving work in order to obtain
better employment to be a "good cause . . .directly attributable to,
arising from, or connected with the conditions of employment." '228
The legislature adopted the language of section 8-1001(b) (1) in ac-
cordance with the testimony and recommendations of Frank 0.
Heintz.229 In his testimony, Mr. Heintz stated that the Employment
Security Administration considered "voluntarily leaving work" for a
better career or a higher paying job to be "good cause," and it would
grant unemployment benefits to individuals who subsequently be-
came unemployed through no fault of their own. 230 Further, Mr.
Heintz recommended that the application of the term "good cause"
226. Id. § 8-102.
227. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 718, 720 A.2d 311, 316 (1998) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Specifically, the Bell court stated that the court should consider amendments to the
legislation and the relationship of the statute to earlier and subsequent legislation. Id.
228. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-1001.
229. 1979 Md. Laws 239. Maryland Law 239 adopted the language suggested by Mr.
Heintz verbatim. See discussion supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
230. Hearing on S.B. 943 Before the Senate Econ. Aff Comm., 1979 Leg., 393 Sess. (Md.
1979) (testimony of Frank 0. Heintz, Executive Director Employment Security Administra-
tion, Dep't of Human Resources), at 1.
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be limited to causes which were directly "attributable to and arising
from the conditions of employment or actions of the employer," in
order to prevent employees who left for purely personal reasons from
qualifying for benefits.2 31 Mr. Heintz's testimony demonstrates that,
at the time of the statutory revision, the legislature was aware that the
Employment Security Administration did not consider leaving work
for better paying employment to be a personal reason.232 The court's
interpretation of section 8-1001 in Plein is in direct contrast to Mr.
Heintz's testimony.
2 3 3
Moreover, the Plein court's determination that leaving work vol-
untarily for a higher paying job was similar to the other purely per-
sonal reasons for which the statute requires disqualification, is
inconsistent with the statute's legislative history.234 When the legisla-
ture clarified the term "good cause," the testimony of Mr. Heintz re-
vealed that the Employment Security Administration considered
leaving work voluntarily to become self-employed, to accompany or
join a spouse in a new location, or to attend an educational institution
to be purely personal reasons for leaving employment.23 5 Thus, the
Employment Security Administration did not grant benefits to claim-
ants in these circumstances because it found that the claimant did not
have "good cause" for voluntarily leaving work.236 The legislature
adopted changes to the disqualification clause for voluntarily leaving
work in 1987, and specifically required the disqualification of benefits
for individuals in these exact circumstances.237 Therefore, if the legis-
lature considered leaving work voluntarily to pursue better employ-
ment to be a purely personal reason, it would have added such a
provision to the required disqualification clause.
In addition, prior case law supports the interpretation that volun-
tarily leaving work for higher paying employment qualifies as good
cause "attributable to, arising from, or connected with the conditions
Id.
231. Id. at 1-2.
232. Id.
233. Compare id., with Plein, 369 Md. at 427, 800 A.2d at 761 (stating that voluntarily
leaving work for a higher paying job is similar to the other purely personal reasons for
which benefits are denied under section 8-1001) (quoting Total Audio-Visual, 360 Md. at
400-01, 758 A.2d at 131-32). See also Total Audio-Visual, 360 Md. 387, 758 A.2d 124.
234. Hearing on S.B. 943 Before the Senate Econ. Aff Comm., 1979 Leg., 393rd Sess. (Md.
1979) (testimony of Frank 0. Heintz, Executive Director Employment Security Administra-
tion, Dep't of Human Resources, at 2).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 1987 Md. Laws 261 § 6.
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of employment. ''238 In Board of Education of Montgomery County v.
Paynter, the court stated that in order to constitute good cause, "the
cause must be one which would reasonably impel the average able-
bodied qualified worker to give up his or her employment."239 Fur-
ther, the court stated that the "applicable standards are the standards
of reasonableness as applied to the average man or woman, and not
the supersensitive. ' '240 A substantial increase in salary would reasona-
bly impel the average able-bodied man or woman to leave his or her
currentjob. 241' Furthermore, individuals in lower paying jobs, who are
often the recipients of unemployment benefits, would be even more
receptive to leave their jobs for higher paying employment.
5. Conclusion.-In Plein, the court affirmed its holding in Total
Audio-Visual, that employees, who voluntarily leave employment for
higher paying jobs and are subsequently laid off through no fault of
their own, should be denied unemployment benefits. The court's in-
terpretation suffers from a misguided application of the rules of stare
decisis and legislative acquiescence. Furthermore, the court under-
mined the legislative intent and statutory purpose, by again subjecting
section 8-1001 to the plain meaning doctrine. The court should have
looked beyond the wording of the statute, and found that Plein was
entitled to benefits. Granting unemployment benefits to individuals
who voluntarily leave work and are subsequently laid off through no
fault of their own, would be in accordance with the legislative intent,
the statutory scheme, and prior case law.
JAMES CHARLES BUCK
238. SeeBd. of Educ. v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 37, 491 A.2d 1186, 1193 (1985).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Total Audio-Visual Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 360 Md.
387, 404-05, 758 A.2d 124, 133 (2000) (stating that the claimant in Total Audio-Visual may
have good cause for leaving employment "at least from a practical, and even common
sense, point of view").
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